Delhi High Court
Arindam Lahiri vs Union Of India & Ors. on 20 March, 2009
Author: A.K.Sikri
Reportable
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP (C) No. 13640 of 2006
and
WP (C) No. 7054 of 2009
1. WP (C) No. 13640/2006
% Reserved on : February 26, 2009
Pronounced on : March 20, 2009
Arindam Lahiri . . . Petitioner
through : Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. D.C. Pandey and
Mr. Piyush Sharma, Advocates
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors. . . . Respondents
through : Mr. H.K. Gangwani with
Mr. Ashwani Bhardwaj,
Advocates
2. W.P. (C) No. 7054 of 2009
% Reserved on : March 06, 2009
Pronounced on : March , 2009
Union of India & Ors. . . . Petitioners
through : Mr. R.V. Sinha, Advocate
VERSUS
Arindam Lahiri . . . Respondent
through : Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. D.C. Pandey, Advocate
CORAM :-
THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
to see the Judgment?
WP (C) No. 7054/2009 nsk Page 1 of 55
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J.
1. Subject matter of the afore-mentioned two writ petitions is different.
In the petition filed by Shri Lahiri, challenge is to the penalty imposed
upon him by the respondents therein after holding a departmental
inquiry. His OA in this behalf has been dismissed by the Tribunal
and, therefore, he has come up to this Court challenging the order of
the Tribunal. Other writ petition is filed by the Union of India &
Ors., which arises out of an OA filed by Shri Lahiri claiming
promotion to the post of Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. That
OA has been allowed by the Tribunal and certain directions are
issued against which the Union of India has filed the writ.
2. Thus, though the subject matter is different, first writ petition
preferred by Shri Lahiri has bearing on the second petition. There is
some commonality of facts as well. In fact, promotion case is sequel
to the departmental action. Because of this reason, though the two
petitions were heard and reserved for judgment on different dates,
albeit within a span of one week, we propose to pass one common
judgment in order to avoid repletion of lengthy facts. However, in
this common judgment, the two petitions are being considered
separately.
We first take up the case of departmental enquiry.
3. WP (C) No. 13640/2006
The petitioner joined the services in the Income-Tax
department as an Income Tax Officer (ITO) in the year 1972. He got
promotions from time to time and rose to the position of
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to which post he was
promoted on 31.1.1994. While discharging his duties as CIT
(Appeals), he was hearing appeals from the orders of the assessing
authorities, obviously a quasi-judicial function. At the relevant
period with which we are concerned, he was functioning as CIT
(Appeals) (Central-IV), Mumbai. In respect of certain appeals
decided by him, the respondent felt that the petitioner had not
conducted himself properly. A charge memo dated 21/24.11.1995
was issued to him. However, in the meantime, one of his orders was
upheld by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). Because of
that reason, said charge memo was withdrawn and instead another
charge memo dated 28.2.1997 was served upon him under Rule 14
of the CCS (CCA) Rules, for major penalty proceedings. As per this
memo, two articles of charge were leveled against him, which read as
under :-
"Article-I
That the said Shri Lahiri while functioning as
Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) (Central) IV Mumbai in
1994, has with malafide intention entertained and disposed of
a petition filed by M/s. GTC Industries Limited, for stay of
demand in respect of A.Y. 1987-88, 89-90, 90-91 and 91-92.
He passed an order dated 12.9.94 staying the recovery of
demand in the above mentioned case ignoring statutory
requirements and also the decision of ITAT on the same issue
for A.Y. 84-85 to 86-87 and acted in a manner which was
detrimental to the interest of revenue.
By above acts of misconduct Shri A. Lahiri has failed to
maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and exhibited
conduct unbecoming of Government Servant and thereby
violated provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II
That during the aforesaid period and while functioning
in aforesaid office, the said Shri A. Lahiri decided appeals by
passing perverse and malafide orders in the cases of (i) GTC
Industries Ltd. (ii) Simplex Enterprises, (iii) Ashok Rupani and
(iv) Hindustan Transmission Projects. The orders passed by
him were prejudicial to the interest of revenue as material
evidence on record was ignored and assessing officer was not
given opportunity as required u/s. 250 of I.T. Act to represent
revenue‟s case.
By above acts of misconduct Shri A. Lahiri has failed to
maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and exhibited
conduct unbecoming of a Government Servant and thereby
violated provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964."
4. The petitioner denied the charges; a departmental inquiry was
conducted leading to report dated 29.4.1999 of the Inquiry Officer
holding both the charges as proved. He was given a copy of the said
Inquiry Report to enable him to make representation thereagainst, if
any. He submitted his representation dated 28.10.1999 taking
various pleas, thereby questioning the findings arrived at by the
Inquiry officer. The disciplinary authority, however, accepted the
findings of the Inquiry Officer. Matter was referred to the Central
Vigilance Commission (CVC) for second stage advice. The CVC sent
its advice on 10.7.2001, as per which imposition of major penalty
was opined. Decision was taken by the disciplinary authority to
impose a major penalty subject to the advice of the Union Public
Service Commission (UPSC). After receiving that advice dated
13.8.2004 from the UPSC, the disciplinary authority passed orders
dated 7.10.2004 holding the petitioner guilty of misconduct and
imposed the penalty of reduction by three stages in the time-scale of
pay for a period of three years upon the petitioner, with further
direction that he would not earn increments during this period and
that will also have the effect of postponing his future increments of
pay.
5. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid penalty order by approaching
the Tribunal in the form of an application under Section 19 of the
Administrative Tribunal Act, which was registered as OA No.
189/2005. After eliciting response of the respondents in the form of
reply to the said OA and hearing the parties, the Tribunal has passed
impugned judgment dated 25.7.2006 dismissing the OA of the
petitioner. Assailing this order, present writ petition is filed by the
petitioner.
6. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner,
made a fervent plea to the effect that the petitioner was exercising
powers as a quasi-judicial authority when he had decided certain
appeals in respect of which charge sheet was issued. These appeals
related to three assessees, namely, M/s. GTC Industries Ltd.; Shri
Ashok Rupani and M/s. Simplex Enterprises. Submission was that a
bare perusal of the allegations leveled against the petitioner in the
charge sheet would demonstrate that only apprehension/doubts
were expressed by the respondents alleging that the petitioner had
shown favours to those assessees. There was no evidence at all to
implicate the petitioner and prove that he had shown any such
favours to the said assessees while deciding the appeals. He
submitted that the entire matter was to be examined keeping in view
one important element, namely, the appeals were decided while
discharging quasi-judicial functions and applying the test laid down
by the Supreme Court while dealing with the charges relating to
discharge of quasi-judicial function, on mere apprehension/doubts,
such quasi-judicial authorities could not be proceeded
departmentally. He pitched it to be a case of „No Evidence‟.
7. To buttress this submission, Mr. Patwalia referred to the advice of the
UPSC wherein the UPSC itself had only conjectured to rope in the
petitioner, conceding at the same time that there was no direct
evidence to establish that the petitioner had shown any favour to the
said assessees.
8. Mr. Patwalia also pointed out that Article of Charge No.I related to
the orders of stay of demand granted by the petitioner in the appeal
filed by M/s. GTC Industries Ltd. Specific allegation was that while
doing so, he ignored statutory requirements and also the decision of
ITAT on the same issue for the assessment year 1984-85 to 1986-87.
He submitted that there was no denial of the fact that the petitioner
had the requisite power to grant the stay. The respondent could not
show as to which statutory provision or the decision of the ITAT
which the petitioner had ignored. Furthermore, even the UPSC had
accepted that the petitioner had power to grant stay; there was no
evidence to prove that the petitioner had granted stay for some
consideration and only doubt was expressed about the intentions of
the petitioner in passing the orders, as is clear from para 7.3 of the
UPSC advice.
9. His submission was that on the basis of such apprehension alone, it
could not be stated that the charge is proved. He also made detailed
submissions justifying the circumstances in which the petitioner had to
pass order staying the recovery of demand. In this behalf, his
submission was that proper explanation was given by the petitioner
in defending the said charge which was not even taken due note of
by the disciplinary authority.
10. As per the allegations of the department, the petitioner had granted
stay against coercive recovery proceedings by means of attachment
of overdraft bank account resorted to by the Income Tax Officer in
favour of M/s. GTC Industries on 12.9.1994, the same day when the
application was moved by the assessee. It was also alleged that
when the jurisdiction in the case being transferred to some other CIT
(A) has been made w.e.f. 24.10.1994 vide Circular issued on
18.9.1994, he passed the stay order in haste in order to circumvent
the effect of circular dated 18.10.1994. Refuting this, the petitioner
had explained that the application dated 12.9.1994 had been moved
by the assessee namely M/s. GTC Industries in appeals pertaining to
the assessment years 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89, 1990-91 and 1991-
92 which had been pending on the applicant since 30.4.1990. The
perusal of the application clearly shows that the ITO had initiated
coercive proceedings against the assessee and issued attachment
orders of the overdraft bank account acting in utter contravention
and violation of Board‟s Circular prescribing the coercive proceedings
ought not be initiated till the demand is confirmed in the first appeal
i.e. by the CIT (Appeals). Further the proceedings had been initiated
by the ITO in the manner amounting to circumvent the fall
out/consequence of the order dated 05.09.1994 passed by the
Bombay High Court in CWP No. 1805 of 1994 directing that
evidence of witnesses who have not been put to cross-examination
to the assessee shall not be relied upon the department in excise
proceedings having vital bearing to the Income Tax Proceedings also
being one and similar. The same principle has been reiterated by the
High Court vide order dated 31st July 1995 passed in CWP No. 707
of 1995 qua proceedings under the Income Tax Act. Further the
coercive proceedings were in direct contravention to the Ld. ITAT
Order dated 9.2.1989 in the case of M/s. GTC Industries itself
pertaining to assessment year 1984-85 wherein the matter was
remanded to the CIT (Appeal) for compliance with directions.
Consequently the order dated 12.9.1994 had been passed by the
petitioner following the proposition of law and directions contained
in the orders passed by the Bombay High Court and the Ld. ITAT
Orders. The other contention that the proposal of assessee to
liquidate the demands in installments before the CIT (Admn.) was
also not correct. As held by the Kerala High Court in the case
reported as 221 ITR 502, only CIT (Appeal) is empowered and
competent to grant stay and CIT (Admn.) does not possess
competence to entertain any such application. Even the High Courts
have been pleased to hold that payment of demand in installments
amounted to coercive recovery and thus cannot be resorted till first
appeal is disposed.
11. His explanation was that the stay was granted by the petitioner
looking to the fact that the ITO had issued attachment of overdraft
Bank account of assessee which resulted in total closure of business
operation of the company dealing in perishable goods viz. cigarettes
in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, guidelines and
circulars issued by the Board as also the Ld. ITAT order and Bombay
High Court order on the aspect. The Board Circular vests such a
discretion in the petitioner to stay demand pending disposal of the
Regular Appeal in appropriate cases and so any allegation to the
contrary is misplaced, fallacious and incorrect.
12. In nutshell, submission of the petitioner in respect of this charge was
that the petitioner did not act beyond his powers and dealt with the
application for stay as he was empowered to decide the same.
Further, while granting the stay, he kept in mind the relevant factors
and the law on the point. Furthermore, even when he granted the
stay on 12.9.1994, at the same time he also assured that the appeals
are decided within time bound period and, therefore, fixed the final
hearings from 15.9.1994 and decided the appeals on 20.10.1994.
This was also done with bona fide intentions in discharge of judicial
duties. Above all, when no oblique motives were found, even as per
the report of the Inquiry Officer or CVC, it could not have been
stated that charge is established on mere suspicion.
13. Referring to Article of Charge-II, it was argued that the main
allegation was that he did not decide appeals relating to the
aforesaid three assessees fairly. Allegation qua the appeals of M/s.
Hindustan Transmission products was that he decided the appeal on
18.10.1994 despite request for more time by the Assessing Officer and
more so when the jurisdiction of the case was transferred, he still
hastened to pass the order in order to circumvent the Notification of
the DG (Inv.). In the case of Simplex Enterprises, the allegation, even
as per the Inquiry Officer, was that he passed the orders without
properly verifying the full facts and the correctness of the assessee‟s
submission. Likewise, in the case of Ashok Rupali, the charge was
that the petitioner passed the orders without correctly examining the
facts and considering the new evidence without giving an
opportunity to the Assessing Officer. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior
counsel, reiterated that in the absence of any motive, etc. these could
not be treated as the charges of misconduct against a person who
was discharging quasi-judicial function.
14. On merits qua each allegation, the explanation of the petitioner was
as under :-
In terms of Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, even the board
has not been authorized to interfere with the exercise of power and
jurisdiction of CIT (Appeal) and thus the allegations so made are
misplaced. Even otherwise the hearing in the appeal pertaining to
M/s. GTC Industries had concluded on 18.10.1994 and the orders
were reserved which had been pronounced on 20.10.1994. Thus
even otherwise assuming, without admitting the veracity and legality
of such contentions in any manner, that the jurisdiction was
supposed to have been transferred in terms of Circular issued on
18.10.1994 when the hearing of appeal had already concluded it
cannot be said that the same affected the pronouncement of orders
on 20.10.1994 as in any case the petitioner had jurisdiction till
24.10.1994. The contentions of respondent that the Misc.
Application dated 15.09.1994 filed by the Department seeking
vacation of stay granted by Applicant vide order dated 12.09.1994
had been kept pending till 18.10.1994 when notice to the assessee for
filing its response was fixed for 24.10.1994 is also not tenable. The
petitioner while granting stay in favour of M/s. GTC Industries had
directed day to day hearing of the appeal and the stay was to
operate till 30.10.1994 (for 6 weeks) and he had made sure by that
time the main appeal would be disposed of by him. Consequently,
alleging contrary intentions by the respondents is highly untenable
and unsustainable in the eyes of law. Further since the main appeal
was disposed of on 20.10.1994, misc. application cannot be assumed
to have been pending even after the disposal of the main appeal.
The petitioner has stated that the contentions of issuance of the
Circular on 18.10.1994 cannot be meant to be in the knowledge on
18.10.1994 or even prior to that time.
The petitioner also refuted the contentions of the departmet
that by passing the orders in the Appeals pertaining to M/s. GTC
Industries the Applicant had caused loss to revenue. It is the settled
position of law under the provisions of Section 220 of the Income
Tax Act that the demand till it is confirmed in first appeal cannot be
treated to be any demand as per the provisions of Income Tax Act
and the assessee cannot be deemed to be in default thereby justifying
any coercive proceedings being initiated against it by the Income Tax
Department. Further the petitioner deleted those additions wherein
the ITO himself has contradicted the basis of valuation being changed
to MRP printed on the cigarette dealt with by M/s. GTC Industries
i.e. double branding hypothesis being discontinued after September
1985 and so any additions made on that count was clearly contrary
to such claims. The petitioner remanded the matter to the ITO to
verify and after following the procedure prescribed in law as also the
High Court‟s order and the Ld. ITAT directions to raise a fresh
demand thus leaving it all open to raise demand afresh in accordance
with law. Thus no loss had been caused to the revenue at all.
15. Explaining the appeal decided in Ashok Kumar Rupani‟s case, the
petitioner submitted that it was wrong imputation that he relied
upon the statement/order of the FERA Authorities while deciding the
appeal and thus allowed additional evidence in violation of Rule
46A of the Income Tax Rules. The ITO had relied and had referred
to the proceedings before the FERA Authorities as is clear from
question No. 13 appearing in this Assessment Order. Consequently
the violation as alleged are absolutely not made out and is rather
false and misplaced. The petitioner vide his detailed appellate order,
deleted the entire addition made by the AO amounting to Rs.1.07
crores accepting the assessee‟s arguments and the findings of the
FERA authorities that Shri Rupani was only a go between in these
transactions and was not involved in any way in his personal
capacity.
16. As regards the contentions raised by the respondents pertaining to
the appellate orders passed by the petitioner in the cases of M/s.
Simplex Industries is concerned, submission was that the petitioner
had passed the order based upon the applicable provisions of laws
relevant for the case in hand. As noticed in the Appellate Orders
including others, the fact that the AO had not been able to point out
any defects in the books of accounts of the appellant. If somebody
scrawls some figures on a sheet of paper in his house the books of
accounts of the appellant cannot be rejected on the basis of that
sheet of paper. Noticing in his appellate order the petitioner
concluded in appellant‟s case before him that most of the sales were
on credit for which the AO had vouched that the sale bill do not
contain names and addresses of the parties to whom the sales had
been made. Therefore, the additions made without confirming the
transactions with the parties were also unwarranted.
Similarly, in the case of M/s. Hindustan Transmission, the
petitioner stated that in his appellate order he had stated the fact that
the AO ought to have verified the contracts, statements, affidavits
filed by the parties and Sh. Bothra. It was not open to the AO to
simply brush them aside by saying that they were self serving and the
AO should have pointed out fallacies and inconsistencies with facts.
The petitioner further pointed out that the AO had not at all dealt
with the explanation filed by the company vide their letters dt.
25.1.94 and 11.3.94. The petitioner found that there was no
evidence to suggest that the company had allowed discount to the
extent of 13.44% and the entire evidence relied upon by the AO
related to the subsequent AY 1992-93.
17. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned senior counsel
summed up his legal arguments in the following manner :-
(a) No charge of misconduct, in law, was made out against the
petitioner.
(b) There was a delay in completing the inquiry. The appeals were
decided in the year 1994 by the petitioner. However, charge
sheet was served in the year 1997. The inquiry was
unnecessarily prolonged even when there was full cooperation
on the part of the petitioner, which is clear from the fact that
the Inquiry Officer was appointed only on 11.2.1998. Though
he concluded the inquiry and submitted his report on
29.4.1999, it was forwarded to the UPSC for advice more than
four years thereafter, i.e. on 22.8.2003. UPSC took one year
in submitting its observations on 13.8.2004; and punishment
imposed on 7.10.2004. In this manner, argued the counsel,
seven years were allowed to pass, which affected the petitioner
adversely. Punishment which was ultimately imposed, namely,
reduction of 3 stages in the time-scale for a period of three
years in 2004 had its affect till 7.10.2007. Had it been
imposed immediately after the conclusion of the inquiry, it
would have been over much before the petitioner was
considered for promotion to the post of Chief Commissioner of
Income Tax in the year 2005 and would have been granted
promotion as he was found fit for promotion by the DPC.
Legal submission was that because of delay the punishment be
quashed in view of the following judgments of the Supreme
Court :-
(i) P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board
(2005) 6 SCC 363
(ii) State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan
(1998) 4 SCC 154
(iii) State of M.P. v. Bani Singh
1990 (Supp.) SCC 738
(iv) M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India
(2006) 4 SCC 88
Alternatively, he submitted that even if such a penalty is
to be maintained, it should be ante-dated so as not to effect
the promotional chances of the petitioner, as held in :-
(i) Major Singh Gill v. State of Punjab
1992 (1) SCT 436
(ii) State of Punjab v. Major Singh Gill
1994 (1) SCT 811
(iii) Shiv Kumar Sharma v. HSEB & Ors.
AIR 1988 SC 1673
(iv) FCI v. S.N. Nugarkar
2002 (1) SCT 1049
(c) There was no application of mind in the order passed by the
disciplinary authority inasmuch as advice of the UPSC was
followed mechanically thereby violating Rule 15(3) of the CCS
Rules.
(d) The UPSC advice was passed on extraneous material which was
not even the charge and since this was followed mechanically
by the disciplinary authority, the order of the disciplinary
authority stood vitiated because of this reason.
(e) Stand of the petitioner was vindicated in view of the judgment
dated 9.12.2005 passed by the CESTAT, Principal Bench, New
Delhi in the case of GTC Industries v. Collector of Central
Excise, Delhi , 2006 198 ELT 121. In that case, the demand
raised by the excise authorities on similar/identical allegation
of generation on premium on sale of cigarettes, flow back of
money received by M/s. GTC Industries from the retailers/
whole-sale dealers/buyers and charging process over and above
the printed price on the packets of cigarettes, which was also
the basis of assessments in the case pending before the
petitioner in the appeals for the same assessment years, had
been negatived and the demand raised on such bases was
quashed by the CESTAT.
18. Mr. Gangwani, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other
hand submitted that the scope of judicial review in such cases was
very limited. Though no direct evidence of oblique motives was
available, from the attendant circumstances, which were quite
apparent and would constitute "material", the Inquiry Officer rightly
concluded that the petitioner had not conducted himself properly in
granting the stay in the matter of GTC Industries or deciding the
appeals of the three assessees/parties. Referring to the same
observations of the Inquiry Officer in the Inquiry Report and the
UPSC‟s advice, to which reference was made by learned counsel for
the petitioner, he submitted that such an inference was legitimately
drawn by the concerned authorities on the basis of material
produced. This Court, he reminded, would not sit as an appellate
authority and come to a different conclusion than arrived at by the
disciplinary authority. He also referred to the reasons given by the
Tribunal in its impugned judgment to support his submission.
19. Mr. Gangwani further argued that the CVC, UPSC and the
respondents have considered entire material on record, which clearly
shows that the petitioner acted in a hasty, biased and non judicious
manner as has already been reflected in the penalty order. There
was sufficient material on record and the petitioner was found guilty
on the principles of preponderance of probability and the petitioner
had failed to show any prejudice caused to him, from any action of
the IO. In fact from the conduct of the petitioner it is clear that the
petitioner had been too eager to oblige the assessees without taking a
judicious approach and passing orders in a hurry before the date on
which the jurisdiction over the case was to be withdrawn from him
which shows his bias in favour of the assessees. The department had
no option but to go in appeal to the higher authority in the cases
decided by him. The disciplinary proceedings have been held in
accordance with the rules and the Inquiry Officer has come to the
conclusion based on the relevant reports and documents which form
part of the case. The petitioner has been afforded reasonable
opportunity to defend himself and the penalty awarded is justified.
20. Referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, he argued that
in such circumstances, even a quasi-judicial authority whose action is
not bona fide can be charge sheeted. He submitted that the inquiry
was conducted as per the rules and sufficient opportunity was given
to the petitioner to defend himself during the inquiry. Further
opportunities, as admissible under law, were also given before
passing the penalty order.
21. He further submitted that the disciplinary proceedings in the present
case were lengthy and time consuming and it is not unusual for delay
to take place in following the due procedure as laid down in the
rules in the interest of natural justice and also to provide sufficient
opportunity for defence. After a preliminary show cause was issued,
the response to it has to be well considered before taking CVC advice
in initiating disciplinary action, after which a charge sheet is to be
prepared with care and issued. The reply received from the
petitioner was processed to decide whether the enquiry is to be held
and only then the IO and presenting officer were appointed. Later
when the enquiry report was received it was required to be
examined and CVC approached for second stage advice in the
matter. A copy of the enquiry report was served along with CVC
advice and the representation received analyzed. Once again the
matter had to be referred to the UPSC for advice before final orders
were passed imposing the penalty. Even the final orders to be passed
by the disciplinary authority require intense application of mind and
have to be detailed speaking order. In view of the above process,
the inquiry proceedings took some time in the present case. But the
petitioner had not been prejudiced from the same in any manner,
more so, when the inquiry proceedings have been conducted as per
the rules and in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
22. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the
petitioner wants this Court to reappreciate the evidence, which is not
permissible in law. This Hon‟ble Court would not like to re-
appreciate the evidence nor will it decide whether the conclusions
drawn by the disciplinary authority are necessarily correct in the eyes
of this Court. It may interfere only when it is a case of no evidence
or legally inadmissible evidence is taken into account and the finding
recorded is perverse or that there is material irregularity and illegality
in the decision making procedure which caused prejudice to the
delinquent in his defence. He refuted the contention that the
disciplinary authority did not have any material or evidence for
recording the finding. Referring to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of Orissa v. Bidya Bhushari Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC
779, he submitted that the Court had pointed out that an order of
punishment can be supported on any finding as to the substantial
misdemeanor which the punishment can lawfully be imposed and it
was not for the court to consider whether that ground alone would
have weighted with the authority in dismissing the public servant. In
the decision in Krishna Chandra Tandon‟s case, (1974) 4 SCC 374,
the Apex Court has also observed that if an allegation or two fell, it
hardly mattered if the order could be supported on other counts. In
the present case, there is sufficient material on record for coming the
view that this cannot be said to be a case of "No Evidence". He
pleaded that so long as the findings are based on evidence, this Court
would not like to interfere in the present case.
We have considered the respective submissions
23. LEGAL POSITION
The petitioner acted in a quasi-judicial authority in passing
orders of stay in one case or deciding appeals of certain assessees,
which acts of the petitioner became the basis of serving charge sheet
against him, thereby bringing the acts on the part of the petitioner
within the ambit of „misconduct‟. It is now well settled principle of
law that an officer taking decision in exercise of quasi-judicial
function is not immune from disciplinary proceedings. However, it is
only the conduct of the officer in discharge of his duties and not
correctness or legality of his decision which could be subject to
disciplinary action. Various nuances explaining this legal principle
can be found in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Union of India & Ors v. K.K. Dhawan, 1993 (2) SCC 56, which has
become a classic on this subject. The Supreme Court in that case held
that when an officer in exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a
person, he is not acting as a Judge. There is a great reason and
justice for holding in such cases that the disciplinary action could be
taken. It is one of the cardinal principles of administration of justice
that it must be free from bias of any kind. The observation of the
Supreme Court in V.D. Trivedi v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 55
that that "the action taken by the appellant was quasi-judicial and
should not have formed the basis of disciplinary action" was made to
buttress the ultimate conclusion that the charge framed against the
delinquent officer had not been established and, therefore, it could
not be construed as laying down the law that in no case disciplinary
action could be taken if it pertains to exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.
24. While stating this principle, the Supreme Court also outlined the
circumstances in which disciplinary action can be taken against the
erring official, which are as under :-
(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his
reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion of duty;
(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or
misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a
Government servant;
(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed
conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory
powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the
bribe may be.
25. The Apex Court also added immediately thereafter that the aforesaid
instances were exhaustive and made following pertinent observations
in this behalf :-
"29. The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive.
However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or
merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling
under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is
not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each
case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be
postulated."
26. While the aforesaid principles are not difficult to fathom, it is the
application of these principles in given cases which may become a
thorny issue. In the present case itself the department has tried to
allege that the manner in which the orders were passed by the
petitioner, it manifests that he acted in order to unduly favour those
assessees. At the same time, it is also accepted by the department
that there is no evidence or even allegation that the petitioner was
actuated by corrupt motive or he had acceded his statutory powers
while passing those orders.
27. Before dealing with the issue as to whether inference of the
disciplinary authority that the petitioner acted in order to unduly
favour the assessees, it would be of immense help to us to take note
of the approach which is to be adopted by the Court while making
such an assessment of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer or,
for that matter, the disciplinary authority.
In K.K. Dhawan (supra), article of charge against the
respondent ITO mentioned that nine assessments against various
assessees were completed: (i) in an irregular manner, (ii) in undue
haste, and (iii) apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon
the assessees concerned. In case of the nine cases of the assessees the
details relating to misconduct or misbehaviour were furnished.
Therefore, it was charged that the respondent had violated the
provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil
Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. What is of relevance is not the
correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the
conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer.
The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may
be questioned in appeal or reversion under the Act. But the
Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for
violation of the Conduct Rules.
28. Some other judgments which may be useful for us while discussing
the respective arguments in the present case may also be noted at this
stage.
29. Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad & Anr.,
JT 2007 (4) SC 135
This was a case where inquiry was initiated by the High Court
against its judicial officer on receiving complaint against the said
Officer, namely, the appellant in that case. The appellant had
granted bail to an accused who was charged with the offence of
murder. There was no allegation of receiving any illegal gratification
for granting bail to the accused. The charge was that he had passed
the orders of bail for extraneous consideration with oblique motive
and insufficient grounds, without cogent and tangible reasons, and
that he attempted to justify his order by superfluous reasoning by
making adverse comments on the conduct of the Executive
Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration. The learned Judge
of the High Court, who conducted the inquiry, held that in the facts
of the case where a heinous and daring offence has been committed
in broad day light and two persons had been shot dead in a crowded
area next to the Collectorate at Jhansi and the accused were named
in the FIR as well as in the dying declaration and the bail applications
having been considered and rejected twice on merits by the
respective courts, the third bail application granted by the charged
officer in utter disregard of the judicial norms and on insufficient
grounds appeared to be based on extraneous considerations. The
Supreme Court, in the aforesaid conspectus, formulated the following
issue which needed determination:
"8. The question for consideration is whether the appellant
had granted bail on insufficient grounds or was justified in
passing such an order..."
The Apex Court thereafter observed that granting of bail to the
accused, pending trial, is one of the significant judicial functions to be
performed by a judicial officer. Neither the State nor the
complainant had filed appeal against the bail order passed by the
appellant. The State had also not alleged that the accused, who had
been granted bail, was likely to abuse his bail or likely to abscond.
Commenting upon the reasons given by the Inquiry Officer, the Apex
Court noted the following material aspects which were ignored:
"9....The learned enquiry Judge did not care to take notice of
the fact that the co-accused who were similarly situate had
been granted bail by the High Court and that accused Ram Pal,
who was a student and had been in jail for more than one year
was granted bail for cogent reasons, set out in the order passed
by the appellant. In the bail order, the appellant stated that
there was an allegation that the Magistrate who recorded the
dying declaration was once upon a time a tenant in one of the
houses owned by the complainant. Taking cognizance of this
fact by the appellant in the order could not be said to be a
totally unwarranted and a superfluous reasoning."
30. The Apex Court was also of the view that solely on the basis of the
complaint, decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings should not
have been taken by the High Court. It counseled that there should
be strong grounds to suspect the officer‟s bona fides and that the
order passed by a judicial officer is actuated by malice, bias or
illegality. This action can be found in the following passage from the
said judgment :-
"11. We fail to understand as to how the High Court arrived
at a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings solely based on
the complaint, the contents of which were not believed to be
true by the High Court. If the High Court were to initiate
disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should
have been strong grounds to suspect officer‟s bona fides and
the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or
illegality. The appellant-officer was well within his right to
grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions.
Unlike provisions for granting bail in TADA Act or NDPS Act,
there was no statutory bar in granting bail to the accused in
this case. A Sessions Judge was competent to grant bail and if
any disciplinary proceedings are initiated against the officer for
passing such an order, it would adversely affect the morale of
subordinate judiciary and no officer would be able to exercise
this power freely and independently."
31. At this juncture, we deem it proper to discuss the case of Zunjarrao
Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 409 and
other judgments which tend to show a discordant note to the
Nagarkar‟s case (supra).
In this case, disciplinary proceedings for major penalty were
initiated under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 against the
appellant. The charge against him was that he, while working as
Collector/Commissioner, Central Excise, "passed an Order-in-
Original... in which he had favoured (an assessee party) by not
imposing any penalty on the said party even though he had held that
(the party) had clandestinely manufactured and cleared the excisable
goods and evaded the excise duty willfully. (The appellant) thus
failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted
in a manner unbecoming of a government servant and contravened
Rules 3(1)(i) and (ii) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964." The
appellant ordered imposition of excise duty and confiscation of the
goods but his Order-in-Original was silent about imposition of
penalty. The Supreme Court on reviewing the legal position
regarding imposition of penalty, concluded that the appellant had no
discretion not to impose penalty though he had discretion to decide
quantum of penalty. His approach in not imposing penalty was
therefore not in conformity with the law. The Court however
considered the question whether mistaken view of law itself was
sufficient to proceed against the appellant. The Supreme Court while
deciding this question also took into consideration the explanation
given by the appellant that he had acted in the overall interest of
revenue in not imposing penalty on assessee party. In this process, it
is held as under :-
"(a) A wrong interpretation of law cannot be a ground for
misconduct. It is a different matter altogether if it is
deliberate and actuated by mala fides. Negligence in
quasi-judicial adjudication is not carelessness,
inadvertence or omission but a culpable negligence.
(b) When penalty is not levied, the assessee certainly benefits
but it cannot be said that by not levying penalty, the
officer has favoured assessee or shown undue favour to
him. There has to be some basis for the disciplinary
authority to reach such a conclusion even prima facie.
Records in the present case do not show that the
disciplinary authority had any information within its
possession from where it could form an opinion that the
appellant showed "favour" to the assessee by not
imposing penalty. He may have exercised his jurisdiction
wrongly but that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That
cannot always form a basis for initiating disciplinary
proceedings against an officer while he is acting as a
quasi-judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that
being a quasi-judicial authority, he is always subject to
judicial supervision in appeal.
(c) Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer
cannot take place on information which is vague or
indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter.
There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary
authority to proceed against the delinquent officer.
Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board
in exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against
the order-in-original passed by the appellant could not be
enough to proceed against him. There is no other
instance to show that in similar case, the appellant
invariably imposed penalty.
(d) It every error of law were to constitute a charge of
misconduct, it would impinge upon independent
functioning of quasi-judicial officers like the appellant.
Misconduct, in sum and substance, is sought to be
inferred in the present case from the fact that the
appellant committed an error of law. The charge-sheet
on the face of it, does not proceed on any legal premise
and is thus liable to be quashed. To maintain a charge-
sheet against a quasi-judicial authority, something more
has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g. in the
nature of some extraneous consideration influencing
quasi-judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is alleged
herein, the impugned charge-sheet is rendered illegal.
The charge-sheet, if sustained, will impinge upon the
confidence and independent functioning of a quasi-
judicial authority. The entire system of administrative
adjudication whereunder quasi-judicial powers are
conferred on administrative authorities, would fall into
disrepute if officers performing such functions are
inhibited in performing their functions without fear or
favour because of constant threat of disciplinary
proceedings."
On the aforesaid analysis, the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that no case for initiation of any disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant therein had been made out and the penalty
imposed upon him.
32. This case came up for discussion before the Supreme Court in Union
of India & Ors. v. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680. Following passage
therefrom was relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent
to argue that the ratio of Nagarkar (supra) was not approved by the
Supreme Court :-
"9. In our opinion, Nagarkar case was contrary to the view
expressed in K.K. Dhawan case. The decision in K.K. Dhawan
being that of a larger Bench would prevail. The decision in
Nagarkar case therefore does not correctly represent the law.
Inasmuch as the impugned orders of the Tribunal and the High
Court were passed on the law enunciated in Nagarkar case this
appeal must be allowed. The impugned decisions are
accordingly set aside and the order of punishment upheld.
There will be no order as to costs."
33. However, interestingly in two subsequent judgments, there is a note
of approval put by the Apex Court to the Nagarkar‟s case. These
are:-
(i) Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad & Anr.
(2007) 4 SCC 247
"12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the
subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed
by them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been
established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher
courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous
judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action
based on judicial orders, High Court must take extra care and
caution.
xx xx xx
17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India (1999) 7 SCC
409, this Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi
judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong interpretation of law
cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceeding. Of course,
if the Judicial Officer conducted in a manner as would reflect on his
reputation or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie
material to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his
duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a party or had
passed an order actuated by corrupt motive, the High Court by
virtue of its power under Article 235 of the Constitution may
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such
circumstances it should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels
have to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness and
maintenance of judicial independence are very essential for an
efficacious judicial system. Making adverse comments against
subordinate judicial officers and subjecting them to severe
disciplinary proceedings would ultimately harm the judicial system
at the grass root level."
(ii) Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
(2007) 4 SCC 566
"11. A finding of fact was arrived at that the accused did not make
demand of any amount from the complainant and thus no case has
been made out against him. This Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji
Nagarkar v. Union of India and Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 409, has
categorically held:
42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an
officer cannot take place on information which is vague or
indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter.
There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary
authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely
because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the
exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that
order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to
proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to
show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed
penalty."
34. All these cases, and precisely the issue whether Nagarkar (supra)
stands disapproved by the Supreme Court in subsequent judgments,
has been discussed by the Madras High Court in its illuminous
judgment in WP (C) No. 11433/2001 and 16592/2001 entitled Union
of India & Ors. v. P. Parameswaran. In its decision rendered on
10.1.2008, the Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the view of
the Tribunal which had quashed the penalty imposed upon the
respondent therein who was charge sheeted in the course of
discharge of his quasi-judicial duties. In that case the concerned
officer took up the stand that as an Assessing Officer under the
Central Excise Act, he was discharging a quasi-judicial function and
that he had passed orders only after considering the relevant aspects
of the case and also after referring to the binding precedents in that
regard. He also stated that when that order came to be reversed by
the appellate authority or by any other higher authority, no
disciplinary action can be taken only on the ground of wrong
interpretation of law. Even the appellate authority did not find that
there was any mala fide intention on the part of the first respondent
and, therefore, there was no negligence on his part. He had also
relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Nagarkar (supra) to contend that the Government has no right to
initiate disciplinary action on an information which is vague and
indefinite and that suspension has no role to play in such matter. It
was also contended that wrong interpretation of law cannot be a
ground for misconduct. In the absence of any deliberate act or any
action actuated by mala fides, no such action can be taken.
35. Submission of the department, on the other hand, was that such a
blanket immunity cannot be available even in respect of a
Government officer discharging quasi-judicial functions and if his
action results in any negligence thereby causing loss to the State, the
same can be recovered as provided under the relevant Service Rules.
The High Court found that judgment of the CAT was solely based on
Nagarkar‟s case (supra). In this context, question arose as to whether
Nagarkar‟s case (supra) was contrary to the view expressed by the
Supreme Court in K.K. Dhawan (supra), as noted in Duli Chand
(supra). After taking note of the observations in Duli Chand that
Nagarkar‟s case was contrary to the view expressed in K.K. Dhawan,
the High Court referred to subsequent judgments in Ramesh Chander
Singh (supra) and Inspector Prem Chand (supra), wherein Nagarkar‟s
case was approved and resolved the dactylonomy in the following
manner :-
"14. Once again, in this matter also, there is no reference to
the earlier three Judge Bench judgment in Duli Chand‟s case.
However, since Nagarkar‟s case was found to be contrary to
the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in K.K. Dhawan
case wherein the Supreme Court had laid down six instances
under which a Government servant discharging quasi-judicial
function can be proceeded in a disciplinary action (which have
been already extracted). We will have to apply those facts also
in the present case. But the subsequent judgment in Ramesh
Chander Singh case (cited supra), K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ had
referred to Nagarkar‟s case and quoted it with approval.
Ultimately, the decisions will have to be applied depending on
the fact situation of each case.
15. Therefore, if the decisions in K.K. Dhawan case,
Nagarkar case, Duli Chand case, Ramesh Chander Singh case
and Inspector Prem Chand case are read together, it is
necessary that before initiating disciplinary action, the
Department must have a prima facie material to show
recklessness and that the officer had acted negligently or by his
order unduly favoured a party and his action was actuated by
corrupt motive. In fact, K.G. Balakrishnan, CJ in Ramesh
Chander Singh‟s case even took an exception to the practice of
initiating disciplinary action against Officers merely because the
orders passed by them were wrong."
Applying the aforesaid test in the case at hand, the Madras
High Court affirmed the view of the Tribunal in the following
manner :-
"16. If all these tests are cumulatively applied, the Tribunal in
the present case had correctly found that there was no mala
fide motive on the part of the first respondent in passing the
order and that a Government servant cannot be punished for a
wrong interpretation of law. In the light of the above
discussion, we feel that the CAT has correctly understood the
scope of judicial review and has set aside the order of recovery
passed against the petitioner."
36. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the Madras High
Court which has, in our respectful submission, correctly culled out the
principle on the basis of all the aforesaid judgments in para 15 above.
37. With this, we proceed to discuss the present case in the light of the
aforesaid principle.
38. ANALYSIS
Re.: Article of Charge No.1
Reading of this charge would demonstrate that in the matter of
grant of stay of demand to M/s. GTC Industries Ltd., allegation
against the petitioner was that: (i) he entertained and disposed of the
said application „with mala fide intention‟; (ii) he passed the order
„ignoring the statutory requirement‟ and „decision of the ITAT‟.
Second ingredient of the charge is not established in the inquiry. The
authorities have conceded that the petitioner did not exceed his
statutory powers as he was empowered to decide the application for
stay. No decision of ITAT is shown which was ignored by the
petitioner. Insofar as the first ingredient is concerned, it is conceded
that there is no direct evidence which would prove mala fide
intentions. Notwithstanding the same, the charge is treated as
proved on the basis of „strong suspicion‟. The UPSC itself has
observed as under in this behalf in para 7.3 of its advice, which is to
the following effect :-
"7.3 In view of the above facts the Commission observe that
although the CO had the power to grant stay, yet he did not
exercise this power in a judicious manner. The application for
stay was put up to him directly and he passed orders on the
same day without giving an opportunity to the Assessing
Officer or obtaining the comments of the Administrative
Commission. He also did not verify the facts mentioned by the
assessee. The Commission note that it is indeed astonishing
that the CO granted a stay on demand to the tune of
Rs.85,64,58,769/- on the same day on which the application
was filed without taking into consideration the version of the
Assessing Officer and without fully considering the merits of the
case. However, there is no evidence on record to prove that
the CO granted the stay for some considerations. However,
the haste and the manner in which the CO disposed of the
applications does create a serious doubt regarding his
intentions in passing such an order. The Commission, in view
of these facts, consider Article-I of the charge as proved.
(Emphasis supplied)"
Thus, the authorities are mainly influenced by the fact that the
petitioner passed the orders on the said application on the same day
without giving an opportunity to the Assessing Officer or obtaining
the comments of the Administrative Commissioner and without
verifying the facts mentioned by the assessee. Accepting that though
there was no evidence on record to prove that he had granted the
stay for some consideration, only on the ground that he had passed
the orders in a hasty manner, it was concluded that the same creates
"a serious doubt regarding his intentions in passing such an order".
39. No doubt, the petitioner passed the stay order in the application on
the same day. He had, however, explained the urgency which was
involved which, according to his wisdom, necessitated grant of stay,
as according to him otherwise the functioning of the assessee would
have come to a standstill. He had justified the order on the ground
that the Income Tax Officer had initiated coercive proceedings
against the assessee and attachment orders of the overdraft bank
account were passed by him in contravention and violation of
Board‟s circular. He had also kept in mind the orders passed by the
Bombay High Court in CWP No. 1805/94 and 707/95. He,
therefore, decided the application with bona fide intentions in
discharge of his judicial duties. While granting stay of 12.9.1994,
which was to remain operative till 30.10.1994, at the same time he
also assured that the appeals are decided within time bound period
and, therefore, fixed the judicial hearings from 15.9.1994 and
ultimately decided these appeals before the deadline, i.e. on
20.10.1994. The petitioner, thus, had his own explanation and we
feel that the same is not given due consideration by any of the
authorities.
40. Be that as it may, even if one goes by the observations of the UPSC,
the question would be as to whether there were sufficient
circumstances to create „a serious doubt‟ regarding his intentions.
Significantly, even as per the respondents, conduct of the petitioner
had created only the doubts in the mind of the authorities. When
the petitioner was exercising his quasi-judicial powers, he had
necessary powers to decide the stay application as well and had
taken certain factors on record in mind while passing the order, only
a doubt about his intention cannot take place of „proof‟. Matter
could have been different if the petitioner was exercising
administrative powers. No doubt, better course of action on the
part of the petitioner could have been to grant stay for some days
and, in the meantime, seek comments of the Assessing Officer as well.
Instead of taking this course of action, in his wisdom, the petitioner
chose to decide the appeals finally at an early date so that stay does
not remain in operation for long period. Once the matter is to be
looked into from this perspective, which we feel is the right
perspective having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme
Court in various judgments noted above, we feel that the finding of
the disciplinary authority is based on presumptions and surmises. We
may hasten to add that the power of judicial review over such
decisions of the disciplinary authorities is limited and courts are not
to sit as appellate authorities, as rightly pointed out by the learned
Tribunal. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the court has
the power to examine as to whether there is any evidence worth the
name which may connect with the specific charge levelled against the
delinquent employee.
We are of the opinion that except some doubts, there is no
other evidence to show mala fide intention on the part of the
petitioner in deciding the say application of the assessee. Moreover,
for this purpose we have not made any attempt to go through the
evidence ourselves like the appellate authority, but have gone by the
observations of the respondents themselves.
41. Re.: Article of Charge No. II
Insofar as second charge is concerned, it relates to passing of
assessment orders in respect of certain assessees. Four assessees are
specifically mentioned. At the outset, we may point out that instead
of limiting the discussion to the appeals of the said four assessees, the
authorities are influenced by the fact that out of total 85 appeals
disposed of by the petitioner from June 1994 to October 1994, the
department filed appeals in as many as 55 cases. Further fact noticed
is that out of 15 appeals decided in the month of October 1994, 12
appeals have been decided during the short period from 17 to 21st
October 1994. This is clear from the following comments contained
in the report of the UPSC :-
"7.1 The Commission note that the IO has held that both the
Articles of charge are provide and the DA has agreed with him.
The disciplinary proceedings against the CO were initiated on
the basis of a comprehensive vigilance inspection of the work
of the CO carried out by the Vigilance Wing of Central Board
of Direct Taxes. According to the vigilance report, the CO was
appointed as CIT(A), Central-IV, Mumbai on 28.4.1994. The
jurisdiction of the CIT (A) Central-IV, Mumbai underwent
change by virtue of order dated 18.10.94 of DGIT (Inv.),
Mumbai. This order was effective from 24.10.94. Thus, the
CO held jurisdiction over the old charge upto 23.10.94. The
report pointed out that a total of 85 appeals were disposed of
from June, 94 to October, 94 by the CO and, out of these 85,
second appeals have been filed by the department in as many
as 55 cases. It is only in 5 cases out of 85 that appeals have
been dismissed by the CO. It would be further seen from the
vigilance report that out of 15 appeals decided in the month of
October, 94, 12 appeals have been decided during the short
period from 17th to 21st October 1994. The Deputy Director of
Income Tax (Vigilance) in his forwarding letter has concluded
that the appellate orders passed by the CO show that he has
tended to heavily rely on assessee‟s submissions without
subjecting the same to judicial scrutiny. He has not paid
adequate attention to the arguments of the Assessing Officer in
the assessment orders. In some cases, he has not given
reasonable opportunity to the assessing officer to represent his
case. All this has led to the miscarriage of justice and the
appellate orders passed by him have a definite bias towards the
assessee and against the Department."
42. On the aforesaid comments, we are constrained to make the
following observations :-
a) It was not even a charge against the petitioner that he had
decided most of the appeals in favour of the assessees and against
the department or that he had decided 12 appeals during short
period from 17 to 21st October 1994. Thus, extraneous material is
brought on record which has influenced the decision making
process.
b) For want of any allegation to this effect in the charge memo, the
petitioner was denied any opportunity to explain the
circumstances.
c) Merely because the petitioner decided more appeals in favour of
the assessees and against the department, because of which the
department had filed second appeals, cannot be a ground to
doubt his intentions.
d) That apart, allegation is that while passing those orders, the
conduct of the petitioner was prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue "as material evidence on record was ignored and AO
was not given opportunity as required under Section 250 of the
Income Tax Act to represent Revenue‟s case". Thus, charge does
not relate to the discharge of quasi-judicial duties simplicitor.
Undisputedly, the petitioner had power to decide these appeals
one way of the other as per his wisdom. Even if the orders are
wrong in law, that would not become matter of misconduct.
However, charge is that appeals were decided "by
passing perverse and mala fide orders" inasmuch as material
evidence on record was ignored and opportunity was not given
to the Assessing Officer.
43. Insofar as the appeal of M/s. GTC Industries is concerned, the
disciplinary authority found that no sufficient opportunity was given
to the assessing authority to collect evidence as directed by the
petitioner. The petitioner had fixed the appeal of M/s. GTC
Industries for final hearing from 15.9.1994. On that date, he had
requested the Assessing Officer to make available the correspondence
that he had entered into with the various persons in the course of his
inquiry to the assessee so as to enable the assessee to present his
defence. The Assessing Officer was also directed to record the cross-
examination of various parties as early as possible. The petitioner
had also requested the Assessing Officer to forward transcripts of the
cross-examination with one copy endorsed to the assessee as the case
had to be decided before 31.10.1994. The Assessing Officer in his
letter dated 19.9.1994 requested the CIT (A) for more time in
collecting information wanted by the petitioner. CIT, Centr-I in his
letter dated 19.9.1994 to the petitioner, requested him to give
sufficient time to the Assessing Officer. The CIT, Central-I, Mumbai
wrote to the petitioner on 6.10.1994 to keep his decision pending till
the matter was decided by the ITAT. However, the petitioner went
ahead with the hearing of the appeal without giving an opportunity
to the Assessing Officer and decided the same.
Once the petitioner had granted stay of demand and the
assessee was protected by that stay order, his anxiety to hear the
appeal and decide the same turning down the request of the
Assessing Officer to give some time to enable him to collect
information as wanted by the petitioner may be erroneous.
However, even here he has some explanation which is not given any
due consideration.
44. In respect of M/s. Simplex Enterprises, the allegation is that while
allowing the appeal, the petitioner deleted the additions made by
the assessing authority ignoring the material facts. These additions
were on account of suppression of sales and on account of unsecured
loans. We find from the report of the Inquiry Officer that entire
comments related to the merits of the case, which give an impression
that according to the Inquiry Officer, appeal should not have been
decided in that manner.
As far as the merits of the case are concerned, the department
has filed an appeal in the ITAT. This, therefore, could not have been
the basis of charge even if the decision of the petitioner, on merits, is
wrong.
45. In respect of assessment in the case of Mr. Ashok Rupani, it is pointed
out that while deciding the appeal, the petitioner had considered the
statement given by Mr. S.K. Neotia before the FERA authorities. This
statement was not referred to by the Assessing Officer in the
assessment order. Therefore, the petitioner should have given an
opportunity to the Assessing Officer while adducing additional
evidence and by not doing so, the petitioner violated Rule 46-A of
the 1956 Rules. If the petitioner failed to notice the provisions of
Rule 46-A of the Income Tax Rules, 1956 and passed the order based
on the aforesaid statement of Shri Neotia, that would only mean that
he committed some error in passing the order in appeal. However,
when we apply the principles of K.K. Dhawan and Nagarkar‟s case
(supra), it cannot constitute a misconduct.
46. Upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be as under :-
(a) Charge No.1, as levelled, cannot be said to be proved. As per
the view taken by the disciplinary authority, the same is based
on circumstances creating suspicion. It is accepted by the
disciplinary authority that there is no direct evidence of mala
fide intention. On the basis of alleged circumstances also, the
disciplinary authority has pointed that it raises "strong suspicion
regarding his intentions". We do not find any such
circumstances which could establish his bad intentions. Even if
we presume from the alleged circumstances that the petitioner
acted recklessly, that is not the charge which is levelled.
Moreover, had the matter been viewed from this angle, the
disciplinary authority may not have taken such a serious view
and imposed the impugned penalty, which is a major penalty.
(b) Charge No.II, if at all, can be said to be proved qua M/s. GTC
Industries Ltd. only and that also cannot be said to be of such a
serious nature, having regard to our discussion above. In
respect of other appeals decided by the petitioner, there is no
evidence to show perversity or mala fides. In order to
implicate a quasi-judicial authority, infraction of some
procedural requirement cannot become the basis of charge.
Admittedly, there is no evidence of mala fides against the
petitioner.
(c) Since the punishment was imposed upon the petitioner on the
basis that both the charges are proved, and as per our aforesaid
analysis Charge No.I cannot be said to be proved and likewise,
Charge No.II is proved to limited extent, that too qua the
orders passed in the appeals relating to M/s. GTC Industries,
the disciplinary authority shall pass fresh orders of penalty
keeping in view that aspect only. While doing this, here also
extenuating circumstances, as pointed out by the petitioner,
shall be taken into consideration. It is obvious that fresh
penalty order passed, if any, would be lesser penalty and not
as was imposed earlier.
47. Accordingly, Rule is made absolute. The writ petition stands allowed
in the aforesaid terms and the impugned order of the Tribunal, as
well as that of the disciplinary authority, are set aside. Fresh orders
shall be passed by the disciplinary authority within four weeks.
No order as to costs.
48. WP (C) No. 7054/2009
Mr. Arindam Lahiri is the respondent herein and is due to retire
on 31.3.2009 when he attains the age of superannuation. Before his
retirement, he aspires to become Chief Commissioner of Income Tax,
which is the next promotional post. He became eligible to be
considered for this post against the vacancies of the year 2004-05.
The DPC, which considered his case for promotion in its meeting
held on 25.11.2005, found him „fit‟ for promotion. But his name for
inclusion in the panel for promotion was not approved by the
Appointing Committee of the Cabinet (for short, „ACC‟) because of
the reason that he had been inflicted with penalty of reduction in
time-scale of pay, which was imposed after holding a departmental
inquiry vide orders dated 7.10.2004. Though this penalty was for a
period of three years and expired on 7.10.2007, the respondent was
denied promotion even after the period of the said penalty was
over. In the interregnum, as many as 55 persons junior to the
respondent have been promoted to the post of Chief Commissioner
of Income Tax.
49. The respondent, against the aforesaid denial, approached the Central
Administrative Tribunal by means of an application under Section 19
of the Administrative Tribunals Act. This application has been
allowed by the Tribunal vide its judgment dated 20.10.2008
directing that he be given promotion with effect from the date when
the punishment period got over. The Department was directed to
do the needful within three months of receipt of the certified copy of
the order. However, the petitioners perceived the said direction has
not legally valid and, therefore, feeling aggrieved by that, present
writ petition is filed.
50. As noted above, the respondent herein was appointed as Income Tax
Officer (ITO) on the basis of Civil Services Examination in the year
1972. He got promotions from time to time and raised to the rank
of Commissioner of Income Tax. During the period 1995-97, he
acted as Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Mumbai. At that
time, memorandum of charge dated 21/24.11.95 was issued against
him by the petitioners herein, followed by charge memo dated
28.2.1997 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for major
penalty proceedings. A departmental inquiry was held, which
culminated in the report dated 29.4.1999 submitted by the Inquiry
Officer holding the charges as proved. On that basis, disciplinary
authority passed orders dated 7.10.2004 imposing the penalty of
reduction by 3 stages in the time-scale of pay for a period of three
years upon the respondent with further direction that during this
period, the respondent shall not earn increments and that will have
the effect of postponing his future increments of pay as well.
51. After the imposition of the penalty vide orders dated 7.10.2004, the
case of the respondent for promotion to the post of Chief
Commissioner of Income Tax was considered by the DPC in its
meeting held on 25.11.2005 against the supplementary vacancies for
the year 2004-05. The DPC found him „fit‟ for promotion against
those supplementary vacancies of the year 2004-05. As per the
practice and procedure, his name was forwarded to the ACC for
approval. However, ACC did not approve the recommendation of
the DPC for promotion of the respondent on the ground that the
penalty of reduction in time-scale of pay was imposed on him as
recently as on 7.10.2004. Note dated 31.12.2005 in this behalf,
which was prepared for ACC under the signatures of Shri B.K.
Chaturvedi, the then Cabinet Secretary, reads as under :-
"3. The officer at Sl.No. 01 of the panel for the year 2004-
05, Shri Arindam Lahiri does not appear to be suitable for
promotion as a penalty of reduction of pay was imposed on
the officer as recently as 7th October, 2004."
52. It may be pointed out at this stage that DPC in its meeting held on
25.11.2005 also undertook the exercise in respect of vacancies for the
year 2005-06 as well. However, the respondent was found „fit‟ for
promotion against vacancies of the year 2004-05, his case was not
even considered for promotion by the DPC against the vacancies of
the year 2005-06. For filling up of the vacancies of the year 2006-
07, DPC was convened on 29.9.2006. The case of the respondent
was considered, but result kept in sealed cover on the ground that
there was no vigilance clearance given in his case (though during the
course of arguments before the Tribunal, it was admitted by the
petitioners that reason for keeping the DPC result in sealed cover was
imposition of penalty vide orders dated 7.10.2004 for period of
three years and was, thus, still in operation). For the vacancies of
2007-08, case of the respondent was again considered by the DPC
which was held in August 2007. This time, however, the respondent
was declared „unfit‟ for promotion.
53. The penalty order passed against the respondent herein has already
been set aside by us in WP (C) No. 13640/2006. This penalty was
the only reason, even as per the petitioners herein, to deny the
promotion to the respondent to the post of Chief Commissioner of
Income Tax. Even if fresh penalty order is passed, that would be
much lesser. Further, the charge which remains is miniscule of the
charges originally levelled against the petitioner. Had this position
been before the Appointing Authority, the respondent would have
been promoted. Interestingly, even when this penalty was taken into
consideration, the respondent was recommended for promotion.
Therefore, this writ petition warrants to be dismissed on this ground
alone. However, notwithstanding the above, we still proceed to
examine the judgment of the Tribunal on the presumption that
penalty was rightly imposed.
54. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the
exercise undertaken by the DPC on 25.11.2005 and finding the
respondent fit for promotion is only recommendatory in nature.
Competent authority is the ACC and it is within the discretion of the
ACC to accept or reject the recommendation of the DPC. In the
instant case, ACC had rejected the proposal of the DPC, that too for
valid reasons, namely, infliction of the penalty as a result of the
departmental inquiry which had been imposed as recently as on
7.10.2004. He, thus, submitted that it was not a case where the ACC
deferred the promotion during the currency of the penalty period.
Conscious decision was taken not to promote the respondent
because of the said penalty. Therefore, there was no question of
giving him the promotion on the expiry of the said penalty period.
He further submitted that no employee has vested right in getting the
promotion once it is shown that discretion is exercised for valid
reasons and the judicial authorities would not interfere with such a
discretion or issue any mandamus directing giving of the promotion.
55. Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioners, was vehement in his
submission that the Tribunal had acceded its jurisdiction while
exercising the power of judicial review, which was limited to the
decision making process and in this case it could not be shown as to
how the decision of the ACC, the appointing authority, was vitiated
on account of the decision making process. To buttress his aforesaid
submissions, learned counsel placed strong reliance upon the
following judgments:-
(i) Shankarsa Dash v. Union of India
(1991) 3 SCC 47
"7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified
for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit,
the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be
appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the
notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates
to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire
any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so
indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the
vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence
of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the
vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if
the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to
respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the
recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This
correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and
we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of
Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and Ors. (1974) 3 SCC 220;
Miss Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana and Ors. (1986) 4 SCC
268 and Jitendra Kumar and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1985)
1 SCC 122.
(ii) Union of India & Ors. v. K.V. Jankiraman & Ors.
(1991) 4 SCC 109
"28. The Tribunal has also struck down the following portion in the
second sub-paragraph after Clause (iii) of paragraph 3 which reads
as follows: "If any penalty is imposed on the officer as a result of the
disciplinary proceedings or if he is found guilty in the court
proceedings against him, the findings in the sealed cover/covers shall
not be acted upon" and has directed that if the proceedings result in
a penalty, the person concerned should be considered for
promotion in a Review DPC as on the original date in the light of
the results of the sealed cover as also the imposition of penalty, and
his claim for promotion cannot be deferred for the subsequent DPCs
as provided in the instructions. It may be pointed out that the said
sub-paragraph directs that "the officer's case for promotion may be
considered in the usual manner by the next DPC which meets in the
normal course after the conclusion of the disciplinary/court
proceedings". The Tribunal has given the direction in question on
the ground that such deferment of the claim for promotion to the
subsequent DPCs amounts to a double penalty. According to the
Tribunal, "it not only violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
compared with other employees who are not at the verge of
promotion when the disciplinary proceedings are initiated against
them but also offends the rule against double jeopardy contained in
Article 20(2) of the Constitution". The Tribunal has, therefore, held
that when an employee is visited with a penalty as a result of the
disciplinary proceedings there should be a Review DPC as on the
date when the sealed cover procedure was followed and the review
DPC should consider the findings in the sealed cover as also the
penalty imposed. It is not clear to us as to why the Tribunal wants
the review DPC to consider the penalty imposed while considering
the findings in the sealed cover if, according to the Tribunal, not
giving effect to the findings in the sealed cover even when a penalty
is imposed, amounts to double jeopardy. However, as we read the
findings of the Tribunal, it appears that the Tribunal in no case
wants the promotion of the officer to be deferred once the officer is
visited with a penalty in the disciplinary proceedings and the
Tribunal desires that the officer should be given promotion as per
the findings in the sealed cover.
29. According to us, the Tribunal has erred in holding that when
an officer is found guilty in the discharge of his duties, an imposition
of penalty is all that is necessary to improve his conduct and to
enforce discipline and ensure purity in the administration. In the first
instance, the penalty short of dismissal will vary from reduction in
rank to censure. We are sure that the Tribunal has not intended that
the promotion should be given to the officer from the original date
even when the penalty imparted is of reduction in rank. On
principle, for the same reasons, the officer cannot be rewarded by
promotion as a matter of course even if the penalty is other than
that of the reduction in rank. An employee has no right to
promotion. He has only a right to be considered for promotion.
The promotion to a post and more so, to a selection post, depends
upon several circumstances. To qualify for promotion, the least that
is expected of an employee is to have an unblemished record. That
is the minimum expected to ensure a clean and efficient
administration and to protect the public interests. An employee
found guilty of a misconduct cannot be placed on par with the
other employees and his case has to be treated differently. There is,
therefore, no discrimination when in the matter of promotion, he is
treated differently. The least that is expected of any administration is
that ii does not reward an employee with promotion retrospectively
from a date when for his conduct before that date he is penalised in
praesenti. When an employee is held guilty and penalised and is,
therefore, not promoted at least till the date on which he is
penalised, he cannot be said to have been subjected to a further
penalty on that account. A denial of promotion in such
circumstances is not a penalty but a necessary consequence of his
conduct. In fact, while considering an employee for promotion his
whole record has to be taken into consideration and if a promotion
committee takes the penalties imposed upon the employee into
consideration and denies him the promotion, such denial is not
illegal and unjustified. If, further, the promoting authority can take
into consideration the penalty or penalties awarded to an employee
in the past while considering his promotion and deny him
promotion on that ground, it will be irrational to hold that it
cannot take the penalty into consideration when it is imposed at a
later date because of the pendency of the proceedings, although it is
for conduct prior to the date the authority considers the promotion.
For these reasons, we are of the view that the Tribunal is not right
in striking down the said portion of the second sub-paragraph after
Clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum. We, therefore,
set aside the said findings of the Tribunal.
30. In the circumstances, the conclusions arrived at by the Full
Bench of the Tribunal stand modified as above. It is needless to add
that the modifications which we have made above will equally
apply to the Memorandum of January 12, 1988."
(iii) Union of India & Ors. v. N.P. Dhamania & Ors.
1995 Supp (1) SCC 1
"18. It will be clear from the above that the recommendations of the
DPC are advisory in nature. Such recommendations are not binding
on the appointing authority. It is open to the appointing authority
to differ from the recommendations in public interest. That is
beyond doubt.
19. Notwithstanding the fact that it is open to AAC which alone is
the appointing authority and not the Minister concerned, as urged
by the respondent to differ from the recommendations of the DPC,
it must give reasons for so differing to ward off any attack of
arbitrariness. Those reasons will have to be recorded in the file. It
requires to be stated at this stage that we have perused the file in
the instant case. We find no reasons have been recorded for
differing from the recommendations of the DPC. That is why the
tribunal also inter alia observes in the impugned judgment as under :
"However, the counsel for the respondent felt helpless in the
matter and he failed to provide us any inkling of what
prevailed with the ACC in dropping the petitioner and four
others out of the select panel of 59 officers."
(iv) Union of India and Others v. Kali Dass Batish & Anr.,
(2006) 1 SCC 779
"15. In this matter, the approach adopted by the Jharkhand High
Court commends itself to us. The Jharkhand High Court approached
the matter on the principle that judicial review is not available in
such a matter. The Jharkhand High Court also rightly pointed out
that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in the selection list gave
him no right, and if there was no right, there could be no occasion
to maintain a writ petition for enforcement of a non-existing right."
56. Mr. Sandeep Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent, stoutly contested the arguments advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner. His submission was that, when read in
proper perspective, the reason for denying the respondent his
promotion was only the aforesaid penalty, which was still operative
at that time and, therefore, there was no fault in the directions given
by the Tribunal to make the promotion effective on the expiry of the
penalty period i.e. w.e.f. 7.10.2007. He also referred to the
communication dated 23.12.2005 from the office of the Chief
Commissioner of Income tax, Bangalore addressed to the
respondent, as per which the respondent was asked to intimate his
choice of posting "consequent on promotion to the cadre of CCIT by
28.12.2005, since the same has to be communicated to the Board."
As per this letter, argues the learned senior counsel, the respondent
was treated as promoted to the cadre of CCIT and, therefore, he was
asked to give his choice of postings. He also referred to some of the
orders of this court passed in WP (C) No. 13640/2006 where issue of
promotion was taken up by the Court on the miscellaneous
application filed by the respondent in this behalf in the said writ
petition. Reference was also made to the Government instructions
contained in Comptroller & Auditor General of India Circular No.
NGE/38/1990 (497-N.2/39-90) dated 30.8.1990, which are
reproduced in Swamy‟s Compilation of Seniority and Promotion,
and particularly para 12.2 of the said instructions, which reads as
under :-
"12.2 An officer whose increments have been withheld or who
has been reduced to a lower stage in the time-scale, cannot be
considered on that account to be ineligible for promotion as
the specific penalty of withholding promotion has not been
imposed on him. The suitability of the officer for promotion
should be assessed by the Committee as and when occasion
arises. They will take into account the circumstances leading to
the imposition of the penalty and decide whether in the light
of overall service records of the officer and the fact of the
imposition of the penalty, he should be considered for
promotion or not. Even where the Committee considers that
despite the penalty the officer is suitable for promotion, the
officer may be promoted only after the currency of the
penalty."
57. On the basis of the aforesaid provision, his submission was that the
suitability of the respondent for promotion to the post of Chief
Commissioner of Income tax was to be assessed by the DPC after
taking into account the circumstances leading to the imposition of the
penalty.
58. Having regard to the said penalty as well as the overall service record
of the respondent, it was for the DPC to consider as to whether the
respondent was fit for promotion or not. It is obvious that even
after taking into consideration the circumstances which led to
imposition of the penalty, the DPC found the respondent „Fit‟ for
promotion. When seen in this context, it would be obvious that the
ACC did not approve the recommendation of the DPC only for the
reason that the said penalty was still in operation inasmuch as due to
the aforesaid provisions, even if the DPC finds an officer suitable for
promotion, such an officer can be promoted only after the currency
of the penalty. Learned counsel also took support from the reasons
given by the Tribunal while allowing the OA of the respondent.
59. We have considered these submissions. We are of the opinion that it
is a case where in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we should not interfere with
the direction given by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment. From
the minutes of the DPC meeting held on 25.11.2005, it is clear that
the DPC had found the respondent fit for promotion even after
taking into consideration the penalty imposed upon the respondent
herein. The note of the Cabinet Secretary, which was prepared for
ACC, has to be read in this backdrop. The Tribunal is right that it is
only because the period of penalty had not been over the
recommendation was that the respondent should not be promoted
at that stage. Matter would have been different if after taking into
consideration the said penalty, the DPC would have held the
respondent to be "unfit" for promotion inasmuch as it is within the
jurisdiction of the DPC to check the overall record of the candidate.
However, as mentioned above, penalty was taken into
consideration.
60. We may also take note of Para 12.2 of the Government Instructions
dated 30.8.1990 as per which, when the employee is found fit for
promotion, notwithstanding the penalty, such promotion is to be
given after the currency of the penalty. Moreover, had the intention
of ACC was to deny the promotion outright, even when DPC had
recommended the case of the respondent for promotion finding him
"fit", as per the procedure ACC would have sent the matter back to
the DPC, which was not done.
61. Taking into consideration all these factors into account, the order of
the Tribunal needs no interference. However, in the passing, we
may note that though the Tribunal had rendered its judgment on
20.10.2008 and gave three months‟ time to the petitioners to do the
needful, that was not done and after a lapse of almost four months,
the present petition is filed. In the process, valuable time is lost and
the respondent is almost driven to the wall, who is retiring on
31.03.2009. Therefore, while dismissing this writ petition, we direct
the petitioners to place the matter before the ACC for clearance of
the respondent‟s case for promotion to the post of Chief
Commissioner of Income Tax. The exercise in this behalf shall be
completed within two months from the date of receipt of copy of
this order.
(A.K. SIKRI)
JUDGE
(SURESH KAIT)
JUDGE
March 20, 2009
nsk
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP (C) No. 7054 of 2009
Union of India & Ors. . . . Petitioners
through : Mr. R.V. Sinha, Advocate
VERSUS
Arindam Lahiri . . . Respondent
through : Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. D.C. Pandey, Advocate
CORAM :-
THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
to see the Judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J.
For orders, see WP (C) No. 13640/2006.
(A.K. SIKRI)
JUDGE
(SURESH KAIT)
JUDGE
March 20, 2009
nsk
