Rakesh Kumar No.1912/T vs State (Nct Of Delhi)
2009 Latest Caselaw 863 Del

44
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+                             CRL.M.C.NO.2881/2007


# Rakesh Kumar, No.1912/T              ....      Petitioner
          Through    :    Mr. V.N. Jha, Advocate

                    Versus

State (NCT of Delhi)                       ....      Respondent
           Through        :     Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney for the State.


                                 ORDER

18.03.2009

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SISTANI

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ? Yes

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes

3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes

G.S. SISTANI, J. (ORAL):

Crl.M.C.No.2881/2007

1. This is a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside the

orders dated 13.7.2004 passed by learned Metropolitan

Magistrate and order dated 30.10.2004 passed by learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dismissing the revision petition

filed against the order dated 13.7.2004 of the Metropolitan

Magistrate and also for quashing of the proceedings against the

petitioner in the case FIR No.3/2002 under Section 304A IPC,

titled State Vs. Rakesh Kumar.

2. Necessary facts which have led to filing of the present petition

are that on 3.1.2002 at about 3:00 p.m. one constable Vijender

Singh along with head constable Sh.Totaram, posted at East

District Line as driver had come in a Government vehicle bearing

No.DL IV-6092 at Kendriya Bhandar for purchasing some articles.

Constable Vijender Singh parked the said vehicle at the side of

Raisina Road and was standing on the footpath while Head

Constable Totaram went to purchase some articles from

Kendriya Bhandar. At about 4:25 p.m. the petitioner while

driving a Government Traffic Crane bearing No.DL -1L-E-0611

came near the said vehicle as it was illegally parked. Sh.D.S.

Basera, Traffic Inspector ordered the petitioner to remove the

said vehicle from the no parking area. As directed by his

superior, the petitioner put the hook of their Government Traffic

Crane into the bumper of that vehicle and tightened the steel

rope so that the vehicle could be lifted. Vijender Singh, driver of

the said vehicle requested Sh.D.S. Basera, not to remove the

vehicle as it belonged to East District Line and further stated that

Head Constable Totaram had gone to Kendriya Bhandar for

purchasing some articles and was about to return. Thereafter

the traffic inspector Sh.D.S. Basera instructed the petitioner to

loosen the hook of the crane from the said parked vehicle. As

per the directions of his superior i.e. traffic inspector D.S. Basera,

the petitioner loosened the iron rope and accidentally one iron

hook struck on the head of a boy (Deepak), who was a member

of the vehicle lifting squad, and thereby he sustained severe

injuries. The injured, Deepak, was taken to the Ram Manohar

Lohia Hospital by the petitioner as well as the said constable

Vijender Singh, where the victim was declared brought dead.

3. On the basis of the statement/ complaint of Sh.Vijender Singh, an

FIR No.3/2002 was registered against the petitioner on the same

date under sections 304 -A IPC. On 12-13/5/2003, the

prosecution filed the charge-sheet/ challan before the trial court

without taking sanction under section 140 of the Delhi Police Act.

The trial court vide its order dated 13.5.2003 directed

registration of charge-sheet and took cognizance against the

accused (petitioner herein). Thereafter the petitioner is stated to

have filed an application before the learned Metropolitan

Magistrate for recalling the summoning order. Vide order dated

13.7.2004, the trial court dismissed the said application of the

petitioner and further framed notice under section 251 Cr.P.C.

against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order dated 13.07.2004,

passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, petitioner filed

revision petition under section 397 Cr.P.C. The said revision

petition was, however, dismissed by the learned ASJ vide order

dated 30.10.2004.

4. It is contended by counsel for the petitioner that in view of fact

that the provisions of section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, have

not been complied with, the case against the petitioner is not

maintainable as the said provision completely bars the

jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain institution of the

criminal proceedings, if the sanction of the administrator is not

obtained within the time allowed. Learned counsel for the

petitioner also submits that section 140 (1) of the Delhi Police

Act, bars the institution of the suits and prosecutions against a

police officer, if the alleged offence or wrong is committed by

him under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of such

duty or authority or such character and if it is instituted more

than three months after the date of the act complained of. It is

also contended that as per the proviso this period of three

months can be relaxed and the complaint can be entertained, if

it is instituted with the previous sanction of the administrator

within one year from the date of the offence, but not thereafter.

The offence was admittedly committed on 3.1.2002, thus

limitation for obtaining the previous sanction of the administrator

for institution of the criminal prosecution under Section 140 (1)

of the Delhi Police Act, expired on 2.1.2003. The challan in this

case was filed in the court by the prosecution on 12-13.5.2003

without obtaining the previous sanction from the administrator.

The sanction for institution of criminal proceedings was obtained

on 23.9.2003. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner

submits that the present criminal prosecution against the

petitioner is barred by virtue of the embargo created under

Section 140 (1) of the Delhi Police Act. Thus the trial court had

no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present case against the

petitioner.

5. The order dated 13.07.2004 passed by learned Metropolitan

Magistrate rejecting the application for recalling the summoning

order was primarily based on the ground that section 140 of the

Delhi Police Act will apply only to those cases where the act

concerned would have been done by the person charge-sheeted

in his official capacity. Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, does

not give protection in respect of the acts which have been done

by the person in ordinary capacity. Further Section 140 of the

Delhi Police Act does not give any umbrella of protection to acts

done in a rash or negligent manner or any illegal act. It is

submitted by learned counsel for the State that the sanction

under section 140 of the Delhi Police Act is required only in

respect of those act or acts which are done by an officer or other

person in respect of the offences or wrong committed by him

under the colour of duty or authority. The only requirement for

sanction under section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, is that the

alleged offence must have been done under the colour of duty or

authority or in excess of any such duty or authority or it was

done in the character aforesaid. Learned ASJ for the same

reasons had upheld the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate

dated 13.7.2004.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that both - learned

Metropolitan Magistrate as well as the learned ASJ - have come

to the conclusion that the act committed by the petitioner was

an offence under section 304A of the IPC and thus no sanction

was required under section 140 of the Delhi Police Act. Learned

counsel, however, submits that it was never the case of the

prosecution that a sanction is not required. For this, he submits

that respondent had obtained a sanction dated 23.9.2003 and

filed the same in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate. Filing

of this sanction pre-supposes the fact that a sanction was

required and thus he submits that both the learned Courts have

mis-directed themselves in coming to the conclusion that no

sanction was necessary. Counsel for the petitioner submits that

admittedly, the petitioner was on duty on the date of the incident

and he was following the lawful command of his superior. Thus,

a sanction was necessary so as to prosecute the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner in order to buttress his

argument has relied upon the case of Sankaran Moitra Vs.

Sadhna Das & Anr., 2006 (3) SCALE 414. wherein it was

observed in paragraphs 10 - 14, as under:

"10 We may first try and understand the scope of Section 197 and the object of it. This Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay [1955 (1) SCR 1177) explained the scope of Section 197 thus:

―Now it is obvious that if Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be applied, for of course it is no part of an official's duty to commit an offence and never can be. But it is not the duty we have to examine so much as the act, because an official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The section has content and its language must be given meaning. What it says is--

‗When any public servant ... is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty....' We have therefore first to concentrate on the word ‗offence'.

Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, that there was an ‗entrustment' and/or ‗dominion'; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was ‗in his capacity as a public servant'; third, that there was a ‗disposal'; and fourth, that the disposal was ‗dishonest'. Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an official capacity. Therefore, the act complained of, namely, the disposal, could not have been done in any other way. If it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act was official because the second accused could not dispose of the goods save by the doing of an official act, namely, officially permitting their disposal; and that he did. He actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an official capacity, and apart from the fact that he

did not pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he could have done it. Therefore, whatever the intention or motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it was equally official in the other, and the only difference would lie in the intention with which it was done: in the one event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty and in the other, in the purported discharge of it.‖

This Court therefore held in that case that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied and sanction was necessary and since there was none, the trial was vitiated from the start.

11. Again in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu [1955 (1) SCR 1302] this Court after referring to the decisions of the Federal Court and the Privy Council referred to earlier and some other decisions summed up the position thus:

―The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution.‖

After noticing the facts of that case, Their Lordships stated:

―In our judgment, even when the charge is one of misappropriation by a public servant, whether sanction is required under Section 197(1) will depend upon the facts of each case. If the acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them, then sanction under Section 197(1) would be necessary;

but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.‖

Their Lordships then quoted with approval the observations in the decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay (supra).

12. A Constitution Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [1955 (2) SCR 925], after holding that Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not violative of the fundamental rights conferred on a citizen under Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court observed:

―Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. It was argued that Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code vested an absolutely arbitrary power in the Government to grant or withhold sanction at their sweet will and pleasure, and the legislature did not lay down or even indicate any guiding principles to control the exercise of the discretion. There is no question of any discrimination between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction.‖ On the test to be adopted for finding out whether Section 197 of the Code was attracted or not and to ascertain the scope and meaning of that section, Their Lordships stated:

―Slightly differing tests have been laid down in the decided cases to ascertain the scope and the meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code; ‗any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty'. But the difference is only in language and not in substance. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What we must find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in

excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.‖ After referring to the earlier decisions of the Federal Court, the Privy Council and that of this Court, Their Lordships summed up the position thus:

―The result of the foregoing discussion is this: There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.‖ Their Lordships then proceeded to consider the stage at which the need for sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code had to be considered. Their Lordships stated:

―The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.‖

13. In the light of the above decision it does not appear to be necessary to multiply authorities. But we may notice some of them briefly. In Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. [(1973) 2 SCC 701] this Court held:

―While the law is well settled the difficulty really arises in applying the law to the facts of any particular case. The intention behind the section is to prevent public servants from being unnecessarily harassed. The section is not restricted only to cases of anything purported to be done in good faith, for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. Nor is it confined to cases where the act, which constitutes the offence, is the official duty of the official concerned. Such an interpretation would involve a contradiction in terms, because an offence can never be an official duty. The offence should have been committed when an act is done in the execution of duty or when an act purports to be done in execution of duty. The test appears to be not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by anyone else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of duty. The section cannot be confined to only such acts as are

done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor need the act constituting the offence be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. What is necessary is that the offence must be in respect of an act done or purported to be done in the discharge of an official duty. It does not apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant.

Expressions such as the ‗capacity in which the act is performed', ‗cloak of office' and ‗professed exercise of the office' may not always be appropriate to describe or delimit the scope of section. An act merely because it was done negligently does not cease to be one done or purporting to be done in execution of a duty.‖

In B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar [(1979) 4 SCC 177] this Court held

―18. In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged, be it one of commission or omission, must be one which has been committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under colour of the office held by him.‖

In Bakhshish Singh Brar v. Gurmej Kaur & Anr. [(1987) 4 SCC 663], this Court stated that it was necessary to protect the public servants in the discharge of their duties. They must be made immune from being harassed in criminal proceedings and prosecution, and that is the rationale behind Section 196 and Section 197 of the Code. But it is equally important to emphasise that rights of the citizens should be protected and no excesses should be permitted. Protection of public officers and public servants functioning in discharge of their official duties and protection of private citizens have to be balanced in each case by finding out as to what extent and how far is a public servant working in discharge of his duties or purported discharge of his duties, and whether the public servant has exceeded his limit. In the recent decision in Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar & Ors. [2(2006) 1 SCC 557] this Court after referring to the earlier decisions on the question stated:

―The section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining its applicability to any act or omission in the course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in the course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in the discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal

and wide construction so far its official nature is concerned.‖

14. Learned counsel for the complainant argued that want of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed, but it was only one of the defences available to the accused and the accused can raise the defence at the appropriate time. We are not in a position to accept this submission. Section 197(1), its opening words and the object sought to be achieved by it, and the decisions of this Court earlier cited, clearly indicate that a prosecution hit by that provision cannot be launched without the sanction contemplated. It is a condition precedent, as it were, for a successful prosecution of a public servant when the provision is attracted, though the question may arise necessarily not at the inception, but even at a subsequent stage. We cannot therefore accede to the request to postpone a decision on this question.‖

7. This petition has been vehemently opposed by learned APP for

the State on the ground that the act committed by the petitioner

can no way be said to be a lawful act based on a lawful

command. It is also contended that at this stage, it is not for this

court to quash the summoning order as the question with regard

to sanction should be decided at the final stage of adjudication.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties who have taken me

through the record of the case. The petitioner, admittedly was

deployed on deputation in the traffic department of the Delhi

Police and was working as a constable. On 3.1.2002, the date of

the incident, he was driving the crane bearing No.DL-1L-E0611.

When he reached Raisina Road, Delhi he found a vehicle bearing

No.DL IV-6092 parked illegally near Kendriya Bhandar, Raisina

Road, Delhi. Finding that the vehicle was parked illegally and in

a ‗no parking area', the petitioner on the directions of his

superior, put the hook of the said traffic crane into the bumper of

the parked vehicle so that the vehicle could be lifted and

removed from the no parking place. However, at the request of

the driver of the vehicle that the vehicle in question was a

government vehicle, the petitioner was directed by his superior

to loosen the iron rope so as to free the hook from the parked

vehicle. It is, at this stage that the iron nub struck on the head of

one Deepak, who was part of the vehicle lifting squad, standing

nearby and on account of the head injury suffered by him, he

was declared brought dead at the hospital.

9. The first and foremost question that arises before this Court is

whether the petitioner was acting in his official capacity while the

alleged offence was committed by him? In this case admittedly,

petitioner was the driver of the crane and had gone to the spot of

the incident to remove the vehicle bearing No.DL IV-6092 which

was illegally parked on the public road. The presence of the

petitioner at the spot was on account of his official duty. It is in

connection with this official duty and further as directed by his

superior (D.S. Baseria, who was the traffic inspector), that the

petitioner had lodged the hook of the crane into the vehicle

bearing No.DL IV-6092, in order to lift the same and remove it

from the no parking place. At this stage, the driver of the said

vehicle informed the superior of the petitioner that the vehicle

was a government vehicle and the occupant would return soon.

Thereafter, the petitioner was asked by his superior, who was

admittedly senior in rank to the petitioner, to remove the hook.

In pursuance of the lawful command of his superior, the

petitioner is stated to have loosened the rope to enable the boy

(Deepak), who was also part of the team to remove the hook. On

loosening the steel rope, the nub of the rope struck on the head

of that boy (Deepak), and who received severe injuries and this

ultimately resulted in his death. In my considered opinion, the

presence of the petitioner at the spot of the incident was part of

his official duty and not in furtherance of any illegal design. To

attach the hook to the vehicle was also in pursuance of the

lawful command of his superior, D.S. Baseria -traffic inspector -

and so was the act of loosening the steel rope, which resulted in

the death of the boy (Deepak). Applying the principles laid down

in the case of Sankaran Moitra (Supra) the act of the petitioner

can be said to be done in pursuance of his official capacity and

while performing duty as a traffic constable. Thus concomitantly,

a sanction under section 140 of the Delhi Police Act was

mandatory so as to institute proceedings against the petitioner.

To say that the provisions of section 140 of the Delhi Police Act

would not apply in the case of the petitioner as the act

committed by him was not part of his duty, would be incorrect.

10. The next question which requires my consideration is

whether the sanction obtained was as per section 140 of the

Delhi Police Act and whether the same was filed within the period

of limitation. It would be relevant to reproduce Section 140 of the

Delhi Police Act and the same reads as under:

"140. Bar to suits and prosecutions. (1) In any case of alleged offence by a police officer or other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such police officer or other person, by any act done under colour of duty or authority or in excess of an such duty or authority, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained and if entertained shall be dismissed if it is instituted, more than three months after the date of the act complained of:

Provided that any such prosecution against a Police Officer or other person may be entertained by the court, if instituted with the previous sanction of the Administrator, within one year from the date of the offence.

(2) In the case of an intended suit on account of such a wrong as aforesaid, the person intending to sue shall give to the alleged wrongdoer not less than one months notice of the intended suit with sufficient description of the wrong complained of, and if no such notice has been given before the institution of the suit, it shall be dismissed.

(3) The plaint shall set forth that a notice as aforesaid has been served on the defendant and the date of such service and shall state what tender of amends, if any, has been made by the defendant and a copy of the said notice shall be annexed to the plaint endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the plaintiff of the time and manner of service thereof‖

11. Having regard to the sequence of events and the relevant

dates in this case, it is observed that the offence was committed

on 3.1.2002 and thus in accordance with the proviso to section

140 (supra), sanction was to be obtained within a period of not

later than one year. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon S.I. Manoj Pant Vs. State of Delhi reported at 1 (1999)

CRR 39, in support of his submission that the period of one year

could not be enlarged by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate

under section 468 Cr.P.C. in asmuch as, Delhi Police Act being a

Special Act, the provisions of this act would override the general

provisions of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel relies on paragraphs 9, 10

and 11, which are reproduced below :-

―9. As indicated in the preamble, the Act was enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of police in the Union Territory of Delhi. It is axiomatic that it is a special enactment in respect of matters referred to therein and, thereforee, the provisions contained in a special law must prevail over the provisions contained in the general law, like the Code, which generally apply to all the complaints, challans etc., and other proceedings

connected thereto. Section 140 of the Act, falling in the miscellaneous Chapter XI, imposes certain restrictions and limitations in the matter of institution of suits and prosecutions against police officers in respect of the alleged offences or wrong acts by them. In my view, the Act being a special law, restrictions and limitations, enumerated therein should apply to cases falling within the ambit of Section 140 of the Act. Support to this view is lent by a decision of the Supreme Court in Prof. Sumer Chand v. Union of India and Ors. JT 1993 (5) SC 189, wherein while dealing with the question whether the period of limitation in filing a suit for malicious prosecution against a member of the Delhi Police is governed by the provisions of Section 140 of the Act or by Article 74 of the Limitation Act 1963, their Lordships held that since the Act is a special law, if the suit filed falls within the ambit of Section 140 of the Act, then the period of limitation for institution of the suit would be that prescribed in Section 140 and not the period prescribed in Section 74 of the Limitation Act.

10. Having held so, the next question for consideration is whether on the facts of the case can it be said that sanction accorded by the Lt. Governor on 11 February 1993 meets the requirements of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 140, the relevant part of which is reproduced below:

―Section 140: Bar to suits and prosecutions: (1) In any case of alleged offence by a police officer or other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such police officer or other person, by any act done under colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained and if entertained shall be dismissed if it is instituted, more than three months after the date of the act complained of:

Provided that any such prosecution against a police officer or other person may be entertained by the court, if instituted with the previous sanction of the Administrator, within one year from the date of the offence...............‖

11. Sub-section (1) provides that no prosecution for the offence or wrong, if committed or done, was of the character mentioned therein, shall be entertained and if entertained shall be dismissed if it is instituted more than three months after the date of the act complained of.

However, proviso thereto relaxes the said condition and permits entertainment of such prosecution by the Court, if it is instituted with the previous sanction of the Administrator within one year from the date of the offence.‖

12. I find that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate as well as the

learned ASJ have failed to apply their mind and dismissed the

application/revision of the petitioner only on the ground that

sanction under section 140 of the Delhi Police Act was not

necessary. In view of the decision rendered in the case of S.I.

Manoj Pant (Supra), I find that in the facts of this case, the

sanction was not obtained within the period of limitation, as per

the provisions of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act. The offence

herein was admittedly committed on 3.1.2002, thus limitation for

obtaining the previous sanction of the administrator for

institution of the criminal prosecution under Section 140 of the

Delhi Police Act, expired on 2.1.2003. The challan in this case

was filed in the court by the prosecution on 12-13.5.2003 without

obtaining the previous sanction from the administrator. The

sanction for institution of criminal proceedings was obtained on

23.9.2003. Thus it is crystal clear that the sanction for

prosecution was obtained well after the period of limitation was

over. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Manjula

Sinha Vs. State of UP & Ors., 2007 [3] JCC 2054, that if the

Court comes to the conclusion that continuance of proceedings

would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and

quashing all the proceedings would serve the ends of justice, the

proceedings should not be continued.

13. Having considered the fact that on account of the basic lacunae,

the complaint is not likely to succeed, there would be no useful

purpose in keeping the same pending. In the facts and

circumstances of this case and having regard to the provisions of

section 140 of the Delhi Police Act; taking into consideration that

the mandatory requirement of sanction was not fulfilled; and also

the fact that respondents had filed the sanction but beyond the

period of limitation, hence there exists no sanction in the eyes of

law, accordingly, this petition deserves to be allowed.

Consequently, order dated 13.7.2004 passed by the learned

Metropolitan Magistrate and order dated 30.10.2004 passed by

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in case FIR

No.3/2002 under Section 304A IPC, are set aside and

proceedings quashed against the petitioner.

14. Copy of this order be sent to Sh.Ajay Pandey, ACMM, Patiala

House, Delhi.

G.S. SISTANI, J.

March 18, 2009 ‗ssn'