Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 5319 Del
Judgement Date : 21 December, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl. M.C. No. 782/2008
Reserved on : 12.10.2009
Date of Decision : 21.12.2009
Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. & Ors. ......Petitioners
Through: Mr. Dinesh Mathur, Sr.
Adv. with Mr. A. K. Roy,
Adv. for the petitioners.
Versus
D. K. Sardana ...... Respondent
Through: Mr. S. C. Garg, Adv. for
the respondent.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers can be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J.
1. This is a petition filed by the petitioners for quashing of a
complaint no. 1073/2007 titled D. K. Sardana Vs. M/s Bharat
Heavy Electrical Ltd. and the order of summoning dated
30.05.2007.
2. Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of the present
petition are that respondent/complainant D. K. Sardana filed a
complaint against the petitioner company, BHEL, its Chairman-
cum-Managing Director Mr. Ashok K. Puri, Ms. Ambika Khatua,
Chief Vigilance Officer (since discharged), Sh. S. K. Jain, Director
(HR), Sh. Sanjay Verma, Deputy Manager (Finance) and Smt.
Anupama Parmar, Senior Accounts Officer under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instrument Act. The complainant alleged that he
was employed as senior accounts officer with M/s BHEL having
its office at Hindustan Time Building, K. G. Marg, New Delhi. It
is alleged that his services were terminated w.e.f. 11.11.2000
illegally. The present petitioners who are the accused in the
complaint, called the respondent/complainant for the purpose of
settlement of his account and issued him a cheque bearing no.
568832 drawn on ABN Amro Bank, Hansalaya, Building, 15
Barakhamba Raod, New Delhi for a sum of Rs.58,536/- towards
the full and final settlement of his entire claim. The aforesaid
cheque is alleged to have been signed by Sh. Sanjay Verma,
Deputy Manager (Finance) and Smt. Anupama Parmar, Sr.
Accounts Officer. It is alleged that on presentation, the cheque
was not honoured and he received intimation from the banker
HDFC that the payment of the aforesaid cheque was stopped by
the petitioners. It is further alleged that the
respondent/complainant had approached the two signatories of
the cheque who demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.5,000/-
for getting the cheque honoured. The petitioners no. 1 to 4 are
alleged to be accountable for Administration and Vigilance
Department for BHEL, and as they had failed to make the
payment despite a legal notice dated 17th March, 2007 having
been served on them consequently the complainant was
constrained to file the present complaint under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is alleged that the aforesaid
amount of Rs.58,536/- was payable to the
respondent/complainant on account of terminal benefits like
subsidized medical facilities, leave encashment, house rent
allowance without ceiling in revised pay, city compensatory
allowance, plant performance, profit sharing bonus/ex-gratia
and education assistance, etc.
3. The learned Magistrate after taking the evidence by way of
an affidavit of the respondent/complainant summoned the
petitioners for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. The exact language of order of summoning is
as under:
"C.C. No. 1073/2007
30.05.2007
PRESENT: Complainant in person.
I have already heard arguments on the point of summoning and perused the records carefully.
It is mentioned in the complaint that accused no. 1 to 4 are accountable being the Administrative and Vigilance Head in the Department and are looking after the affairs of M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited. The cheque has been issued by BHEL. Under these circumstances, therefore, the court is convinced that accused no. 1 should be summoned through the accused no.2. As per the reply dated 30.03.2007 of accused no. 1, 2 and 3, it was accused Sanjay Verma and Smt. Anupama Parmar, who were in knowledge and control over the affairs of the company as per delegation of power of the company. Accused no. 4 has been mentioned as Director of accused no.1. However, the Court is not concerned
how the Chief Vigilance Officer Smt. Ambika Khatua is liable for the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is sufficient material on record to summon the accused no. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 under Section 138 N.I. Act.
Issue summons against these accused persons on filing of PF/RC, AD and by duly authorized courier service to be filed within 20 days for 8.8.2007. Dasti be given, if desired. If the accused is resident of a place situated outside Delhi, the summons be served through the concerned Ld. CJM."
4. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of
summoning challenged the same by filing the present petition.
5. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners have made
the following submissions for the purpose of praying for
quashing of complaint and the summoning order.
a) The first submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners is that the notice dated 17th March, 2007 which is
purported to have been sent by the respondent/complainant is
not actually issued to the petitioner no.1/BHEL and
consequently the requirement of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act could not deemed to have been satisfied. The
learned senior counsel for the petitioners has drawn the Court's
attention to the notice dated 17th March, 2007 which is issued by
the respondent/complainant only to Sh. Ashok K. Puri, Smt.
Ambika Khatua, Sh. S. K. Jain, Sh. Sanjay Verma, and Smt.
Anupama Parmar. The contention of the learned senior counsel
for the petitioners is that essentially the grievance of the
respondent/complainant is against the petitioner/company
which is a juristic person, therefore, the notice under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ought to have been sent to
the company and only then the offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act qua the authorized signatories or the
Director by virtue of invocation of Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act could be made out.
b) The second submission made by the learned senior counsel
for the petitioners is that the petitioners Sh. S. K. Jain and Sh.
Ashok K. Puri or for that matter the other petitioners who are
impleaded as parties to the complaint are working in their official
capacities. There is not even a single averment in the complaint
that anyone of them was in-charge and responsible for the
conduct of day to day business of the company, therefore, the
essential requirement of Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is not satisfied and consequently the complaint
against Sh. Ashok K Puri, Managing Director-cum-Chairman,
and Sh. S. K. Jain, Director (HR) is unsustainable. So far as Mr.
Sanjay Verma and Smt. Anupama Parmar are concerned, it is
not stated that in what capacity they have been made a party in
the complaint although averment made in the complaint is that
they have signed the cheque.
c) The third submission made by the learned senior counsel
for the petitioners is that the dishonour of the cheque under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order to become
an offence must be either on account of insufficiency of funds or
exceed the arrangement given in the account on which the
cheque is issued and not for any other reason. Supplementing
this argument further it is contended that the cheque for a sum
of Rs. 58,536/- was issued in favour of the
respondent/complainant, the Accounts Branch had erroneously
calculated the amount of terminal benefits due and payable to
the respondent/complainant and the moment the notice dated
17th March, 2007 was received by the respondent/complainant
they had issued a reply to the petitioner to the said notice and
enclosed therewith a cheque for an amount of Rs.5,951/- which
was actually due and payable on account of terminal benefits to
the respondent/complainant. The respondent/complainant in
his complaint has nowhere stated the factum of an amount of
Rs.5,951/- having been received by him in response to the
notice. On the contrary, it is alleged that the
respondent/complainant has concealed not only the factum of
having received the aforesaid amount but has also not placed on
record before the learned Trial Court the reply sent by petitioners
no. 4 and 5 in response to the notice, where it was clearly denied
by them that any amount is due and payable to the
respondent/complainant other than the one which was paid to
him along with the reply to the said notice.
d) The fourth contention of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioners and which is supplementary to the third contention,
was that the respondent/complainant has been guilty of
concealment of facts in as much as the reply to the notice sent
by the petitioners no. 4 and 5 and the factum of having received
the amount of Rs.5,951/- has not been disclosed by the
respondent/complainant in the complaint. The learned senior
counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance in this regard on
MCD Vs. State of Delhi 2005 SCC (Cri.) 1322.
6. The respondent/complainant has refuted the arguments of
the petitioners and taken the plea that there is a presumption
that the cheque having been issued for a valid discharge of
liability and the plea which has been set up by the petitioners
now is only an afterthought which needs adjudication during the
course of trial and the complaint or the summoning order cannot
be quashed. So far as the question of notice having not been
issued on the company is concerned, it was contended that even
though no notice has been issued to the company since the
notice has been issued to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director
Sh. Ashok K. Puri of the company, therefore, it is deemed to be a
notice issued to the petitioner/company which will satisfy the
requirement of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Alternatively, it has been contended by the learned counsel for
the respondent/complainant that the Apex Court in case titled
Bimal Kumar Nopani Vs. State of U.P. 2006 (3) JCC NI 257
has held that it is not necessary even to implead the company in
a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act where
the prosecution of the Managing Director or the Director of the
said company is sought by a complainant.
7. I have carefully considered the respective submission of the
learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record.
8. At the outset, it must be submitted that a person who is
invoking the jurisdiction of the Court whether civil or criminal
must come to the temple of justice with clean hands. In the civil
cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court on case titled Chengalvaraya
Naidu (dead) by LR's Vs. Jagannath (dead) by LR's & Ors.
AIR 1994 SC 853 has categorically laid that fraud or concealment
of facts by a party at whatever stage it is detected will vitiate the
entire proceedings. Similarly, on the criminal side also in case
titled MCD Vs. State of Delhi & Anr. 2005 SCC (Crl.) 1322 while
dealing with the question of release of an accused under Section
4 of the Probation of Offender's Act, 1960 the Apex Court has
held that a litigant who comes to the Court and withholds a vital
document or suppresses the material facts in order to get an
advantage in the case can be summarily thrown out at any stage.
It was in this background that the Apex Court observed that
anybody who plays fraud on the Court can be summarily thrown
out and would not be granted any relief.
9. The principle of law which has been laid down by Apex
Court in case titled MCD Vs. State of Delhi & Anr. is aptly
applicable to the facts of the present case because the complaint
deserves to be quashed on this short ground itself. The
respondent/complainant was admittedly employed as a senior
accounts officer with the petitioner no.1/company and had been
dismissed from the service on account of abandonment of his
employment. The respondent/complainant was issued a cheque
for a sum of Rs.58,536/- towards his settlement of terminal
benefits but later on it was found that the amount was actually
Rs.5,951/-. The employees of the petitioner/company
accordingly issued instructions to the banker to stop the
payment and the moment the respondent/complainant issued a
notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on
17th March, 2007 intimating the drawer of the cheque that the
same has been dishonoured, they issued him a fresh cheque for
a sum of Rs.5,951/- and the signatories to the cheque i.e.
petitioners no. 4 and 5 who had signed cheque of Rs.58,536/- on
behalf of the company also sent an individual reply to the
respondent/complainant intimating him that the earlier cheque
was issued to him erroneously under a mistaken belief that such
a huge amount was due and payable, but the moment it came to
their notice that the amount actually admissible to the
respondent/complainant was only a sum of Rs.5,951/-, the
cheque for the said amount was dispatched to him. Therefore,
the actual amount which was due and payable to the
respondent/complainant was actually paid. The
respondent/complainant after having received the aforesaid
amount has chosen to file the complaint under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act by concealing these facts only to
gain unfair advantage of getting the petitioners summoned on
account of the official discharge of their duties, therefore, on this
short ground itself not only the complaint but the summoning
order dated 30.05.2007 deserves to be quashed.
10. The second point which arises for consideration is to the
effect the non dispatch of notice to the petitioner no. 1/company.
There is no dispute about the fact that the company is a juristic
person and a notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act ought to have been issued to the company as
the cheque was issued for on behalf of the said company by
petitioners no. 4 and 5. The notice has not been issued to the
company, therefore, the company could not have been made a
party because the very basic ingredient of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act was not complied with.
11. As regards the Chairman-cum-Managing Director Sh.
Ashok K. Puri and Director (HR) who are sought to be impleaded
in the capacity of their being in-charge and vicariously
responsible under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
a perusal of the Trial Court record clearly shows that this was
not the case which was set up for the respondent/complainant in
the complaint that these two officials were in-charge and
responsible for the day to day conduct of the business of the
company. In the absence of such an averment in the complaint
itself it could not be assumed that both of them were in-charge
and responsible so as to answer to the complaint of the
respondent/complainant for prosecution of a case under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
12. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is
that notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
is not required to be sent to the company is not a correct. The
judgment which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for
the respondent that a Director of a Company can be impleaded
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act without
being a party cannot be found fault with but that does not say
that no notice should be issued to the company itself. The
judgment which has been relied by the respondent/complainant
only lays down that the company may not be necessary party
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This
argument cannot be accepted in the instant case in as much as
the entire liability of claim of Rs.5,951/- arises qua the company
itself, the company is not made a party and in the absence of
notice having not been sent by the respondent/complainant to
the company itself the prosecution must fail and it could not be
justified that he could proceed against the Managing Director
and Director and that too without there being any averment
against them.
13. The next point which arises for consideration is that there
is no averment in the entire complaint that the cheque was
dishonoured on account of insufficiency of funds or on account
of exceeding the arrangements in the account on which the
cheque was drawn which is an essential requirement of Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the absence of such
an averment it could be safely said even the basic ingredients of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not satisfied.
14. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the considered
opinion that the complaint which is filed by the
respondent/complainant against the present petitioners is liable
to be quashed as it does not meet the requirement of initial
ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and
accordingly, the summoning order is also unsustainable. The
complaint no. 1073/2007 titled D. K. Sardana Vs. M/s Bharat
Heavy Electrical Ltd. and the order of summoning dated
30.05.2007 passed therein are quashed. A copy of this order be
sent to the learned Trial Court for information.
V.K. SHALI, J.
December 21, 2009 KP
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