Vibrant Institute Of Technology vs All India Council For Technical ...
2009 Latest Caselaw 3286 Del

                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
*
+                     Writ Petition (Civil) No.10104/2009

%                       Date of Decision: 21.08.2009

Vibrant Institute of Technology                    .... Petitioner
                       Through Mr.Brijinder  Singh    Chahar,    Sr.
                                Advocate with Mr.Alok Sangwan,
                                Advocate

                                  Versus

All India Council for Technical Education & Others .... Respondents
                       Through Mr.Jatan Singh, Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR

1.     Whether reporters of Local papers may be                 YES
       allowed to see the judgment?
2.     To be referred to the reporter or not?                   YES
3.     Whether the judgment should be reported in               YES
       the Digest?


ANIL KUMAR, J.

*

1 The petitioner has challenged the action of the respondent

rejecting the case of petitioner for grant of letter of intent on the ground

that the settlement deed for creating of trust and the property settled

with the Trust cannot be considered, as the said mode of Transfer of

Property is not contemplated as per handbook of approval process

under which the property can be transferred to the Trust only by sale

deed, gift deed and lease deed for thirty years.

2. Brief facts to comprehend the controversies raised by the parties

are that the petitioner is a public charitable Trust registered under the

Indian Trust Act and is the owner of land measuring 15.25 acres at

Kalikkamapatti Village, next to National Highway 7, Athoor Taluk,

District Dindigul, Tamil Nadu. The petitioner filed a proposal for

establishment of a new engineering and technology institution in the

name of Vibrant Institute of Technology to the respondents.

3. The land on which the proposed technical institution is to be

started was purchased by above trustee Thiru T. Dakshinamoorthy by

way of a registered sale deed from Crown Tanning Company dated 20th

November, 2006.

4. Thiru T. Dakshinamoorthy created a public Trust, namely, "Shri

Vijay Ganesh Public Charitable Trust" on 19th March, 2008 and also

settled his land/immovable properties with the said Trust on 19th

March, 2008. According to petitioner, the property settled with the

Trust stood transferred irrevocably on settlement of the Trust and as

per Section 5 & 6 of the Trust Act, the transfer of property is irrevocable

and the properties vest in the public charitable Trust. According to the

petitioner, the objective of the Trust is for welfare of general public and

in furtherance of its objection, the said Trust had decided to set up a

new technical institution in the name of Vibrant Institute of Technology.

5. The petitioner contended that Revenue Authorities acknowledged

the ownership of the Trust over the land which was settled with the

Trust on 19th March, 2008 and issued no Encumbrance certificate. The

Mutation entries were also affected in favour of the petitioner Trust by

the Revenue Authorities and they also issued other relevant certificates.

In the circumstances, it is contended that Shri Vijay Ganesh Public

Charitable Trust is the legal and rightful owner of the said land and the

said land has a clear title. The petitioner also applied for the change of

land use to the Tehsildar of the area, who issued a certificate allowing

the change of the land use for educational purpose by order dated 27th

March, 2008.

6. That after the petitioner applied for the proposal for

establishment of a new engineering and technology institution,

appearance was put before the Hearing Committee of the respondent on

4th February, 2009. During the hearing, it is contended that the

respondents demanded registered sale deed in favour of the

applicant/petitioner Trust.

7. The petitioner has contended that it was clarified that the land

belonging to the founder Trustee was settled by him with the Trust at

the time of its creation and, therefore, no sale deed is required and

there is no defect in the title of the property which vests with the Trust.

The petitioner has asserted that the respondents did not accede to the

plea raised by the petitioner and rather referred the matter for opinion

and consideration by its Legal Cell. Thereafter a deficiency letter dated

23rd March, 2009 was issued. The deficiency letter dated 23rd March,

2009 stipulated that as per the approval process, the ownership of the

land documents should be in the name of the Society/Trust through a

registered sale deed or an irrevocable registered gift deed or a

government lease for a minimum period of 30 years from the concerned

authority of the government and as the ownership of the land

documents has not been submitted, therefore, the request is rejected

and since the proposal is for the block period 2009-2010, the

respondents reconsideration can be made at any time within the block

period on submission of appropriate document.

8. Pursuant to the letter dated 23rd March, 2009 rejecting the

request of the petitioner on the ground that the Trust has not produced

the sale deed/gift deed or a registered lease deed for 30 years, the

petitioner sent a communication dated 21st April, 2009 stipulating inter

alia that the Managing Trustee has not mortgaged and shall not

mortgage the land to any agency. It was also contended that the Trust,

"Shri Vijay Ganesh Public Charitable Trust" was settled by a trust

document on 19th March, 2008 and since the land belong to the founder

Trustee, the land was settled with the Trust by the registered deed

No.717 of 2008 which was also duly registered. The petitioner also

submitted a legal opinion. The opinion submitted by the petitioner from

District Registrar and Collector under Section 31 of the Stamp Act

contended that deed of declaration of Trust is capable of effecting a

transfer of immovable property described in the schedule of the deed in

favour of Trust, therefore, the property has become the absolute

property of the said Trust. It was also stated that according to the

Article 64(A) of the Indian Stamp Act, the maximum stamp duty

chargeable for this type of transfer is fixed at Rs.180/-, however, the

document is on a stamp of Rs.250/-. In the circumstances, it was held

that the document is duly stamped.

9. Despite the representation and the legal opinion given by the

petitioner, the representation dated 21st April, 2009 pursuant to order

dated 23rd March, 2009 was rejected by the respondents by order dated

15th June, 2009 contending inter alia that there is a legal defect in the

ownership of the land as the Trust/Society has not paid the stamp duty

payable for conveyance of title of ownership of land. It was contended

that as per the provision of Clause 2.6.6 (C) of AICTE Regulation, 2006,

the proposal cannot be accepted and the petitioner can apply afresh in

the prescribed format for establishment of a technical institution for the

next academic year.

10. The petitioner, therefore, filed a statutory appeal before All India

Council for Technical Education on 24th June, 2009. The petitioner

challenged the alleged condition of transfer of property in favor of the

Trust only by way of sale deed as per the Handbook of Approval

Process. The last date for issuing of letter of intent was 30th June, 2009

and, therefore, the petitioner also filed a Writ Petition (Civil) No.9711 of

2009. The plea of the petitioner that his appeal be decided within 10

days was accepted by the respondents relying on the decision in Civil

Writ Petition No.9568 of 2009 filed by Silver Oak Society. The petitioner

had contended that though the appeal filed by Silver Oak Society was

allowed, the petitioner's appeal has been rejected by letter dated 3rd

July, 2009. The respondent again held that to prove the ownership of

the land by the Trust, the petitioner is liable to produce ownership

document in the form of registered sale deed, irrevocable gift deed or a

government lease for a minimum period of 30 years and no other

documents. The settling of the land by the founder trustee in favor of

the Trust was also not accepted on the ground that the stamp duty is

payable on the value of the property as on conveyance. The petitioner

has contended that he was not given any hearing on the appeal and the

appeal has been dismissed mechanically.

11. That aggrieved by the decision of the respondent not to issue

letter of intent on the ground that in order to establish ownership of the

land as per the provisions of handbook of approval process and the

same cannot be established by a duly registered Trust deed settling the

property with the Trust, the petitioner has filed the present petition.

12. The petitioner has contended that the respondents have not

considered the tenor of Section 5 of the Indian Trust Act, which is as

under:-

"5. Trust of immovable property - No trust in relation to immovable property is valid unless declared by a non-testamentary instrument in writing signed by the

author of the Trust or the Trustee and Registered, or by the will of the author of the Trust or of the Trustee.

Trust of moveable property - No trust in relation to moveable property is valid unless declared as aforesaid, or unless the ownership of the property is transferred to the Trustee.

These rules do not apply where they would operate so as to effectuate a fraud."

13. According to the petitioner, the Trust deed had been executed

under Section 5 of the Trust Act which was duly registered before the

Office of the District Registrar, Dindigul, and, therefore, the property of

the settler of the Trust vest with Shri Vijay Ganesh Public Charitable

Trust. The petitioner had paid a sum of Rs.12,160/- as conveyance

charges for creation of Trust to the District Registrar, Dindigul, and

opinion of the concerned authority has also been produced to show that

the stamp duty had been paid under Section 31 of the Indian Stamp

Act.

14. The petitioner has impugned the action of the respondents on the

ground that the petitioner has been discriminated inasmuch as letter of

intent has been issued to similarly situated trust and the societies.

According to the respondents, the petitioner is adopting pick-and-

choose method. The petitioner contended that in case of Silver Oak

Society, the Writ Petition (Civil) No.9568 of 2009 was allowed directing

the respondents to consider the appeal of the said society and pursuant

thereto appeal was accepted and letter of intent was granted to that

society on 29th June, 2009. According to the petitioner, the alleged

legal advice could not be acted upon because it is the function of the

respondents as statutory body to take an independent decision. It is,

however, contended that the alleged legal advice is contrary to law and

reflective of mechanical appreciation of the modes of conveyance of

rights in the property to Trust/society. The petitioner has also

contended that the orders dated 23rd March, 2009; 15th June, 2009 and

3rd July, 2009, smacks of non-application of mind by statutory

authority acting mechanically on the advice/legal opinion rendered by

the Legal Adviser of All India Council for Technical Education who have

also rendered opinion contrary to established law in the facts and

circumstances.

15. The action of the respondents is also challenged on the ground

that the alleged condition of not accepting a Trust deed duly executed

where the settler settles the immovable property with the Trust and

insist on a sale deed is contrary to law and in any case such a condition

has not been published in any Gazette and is not statutory in nature. It

is asserted that the procedure evolved by the respondents is not in

consonance with the Regulations nor it is in consonance with Section

10(k) of All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 which do

not contemplate any such condition.

16. The petition is opposed by the respondent contending inter-alia

that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India are limited and the petitioner is not entitled to seek interference in

the decision making of the regulatory body which has acted in

accordance with AICTE Act and the regulations framed thereunder. It is

contended that there is no fault in the decision not

permitting/accepting the deed of trust settling the property with the

trust as a document transferring rights in the property to the trust. It is

also contended that the petitioner had not described the document of

title correctly in the application, a copy of which is annexed as

Annexure P8, as it has been defined as a registered sale deed dated 19th

March, 2008 whereas no sale deed was executed. It is pleaded that the

petitioner is relying on a Deed of Declaration of Trust dated 19th March,

2008 executed by the founder of the trust who was the owner of

aforesaid piece of land and the said document is not recognized as a

valid land document as per the handbook for approval process in which

norms and standards for starting new technical education institutions

have been framed and incorporated under Section 23 of AICTE Act

which empowers the council to frame regulations to carry out the

purposes of the Act. According to the respondents as per clause 4.3.3 of

the handbook for approval process the respondent council recognized

ownership documents in the name of the Trust/society for the proposed

land to be used by the society only in the form of registered sale

deed/irrevocable gift deed (registered)/irrevocable Government lease (in

original) (for a minimum period of 30 years). It was admitted that the

proposal of the petitioner was finally rejected by letter dated 3rd July,

2009. It is also contended by the respondents that the proposal for

starting a technical institution by the petitioner society was not found

acceptable as the land was transferred by way of Deed of Trust dated

19th March, 2008 wherein there is disposition of vesting of immovable

properties to the trust. It is asserted that the stamp duty is payable on

the value of the property as in case of conveyance which in the present

case, according to the respondent has not been paid.

17. Regarding the discrimination viz a viz another society namely

Silver Oak Society, it is contended that the case of the petitioner is

entirely different in as much as that society was the direct owner of the

land by virtue of a State Legislation whereas there is no ownership of

the land as per the norms and standard laid down in the regulations

framed by the respondent council in the AICTE Act.

18. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the

provisions of All India Council for Technical Education Act and the

regulations framed thereunder namely All India Council for Technical

Education (AICTE) grant of approval for starting new technical

institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and

increase/variation of intake capacity of seats for the courses or

programmes and extension of approval for the existing technical

institutions Regulations, 2006, herein referred to `Regulation'.. The

learned counsel has also relied on 2004 IV Apex Decision (SC) 615,

Bharati Vidhyapeeth (Deemed University) and Ors v. State of

Maharashtra and Anrs; II (2008) CLT 60 SC Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v.

Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat & Ors, W.P(C) No.1365/2007, Kiran

Chaudhary v. Indian Airlines Ltd decided on 31st May, 2007 and

2006(1) AD (Delhi) 539, All India Council for Technical Education v.

Ombir Kaushik and Ors in support of the pleas and contentions on

behalf of respondents. The learned counsel also relied on a decision

dated 18th February, 2009 in Civil Appeal No.4349/2004, All India

Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan and Ors

whereas the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on an order

dated 29th April, 1998 of a Single Judge in Tagore Educational Trust v.

All India Council for Technical Education.

19. Perusal of the regulations framed by the respondents, it is

apparent that the land requirement for establishment of a new technical

institution for purpose of engineering/technology colleges is 3 acres in

mega cities like Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai and Mumbai and 5 acres in

metro cities including State capitals and 10 acres in other cities.

20. The regulations 2006 do not lay down any other requirement

except the area of the land which would be required for starting an

engineering/technical course. The learned counsel for the respondents

is also unable to show anything in the Regulations, 2006 restricting the

transfer of land in favour of a trust or a society only on the basis of a

sale deed, an irrevocable gift deed and a lease deed for 30 years. The

respondents have a handbook for approval process. Clause 4.3.3 of

Stage III of the Evaluation of Proposal contemplates that the hearing

committee shall meet at least once in a month to process the proposals

and an applicant society/trust should make a presentation before

hearing committee with the original documents which include land

documents in original showing ownership in the name of the

trust/society in the form of registered sale deed/irrevocable gift deed

(registered)/irrevocable Government lease (in original) (for a minimum

period of 30 years) by the concerned authority of Government. It also

stipulates that in case the land documents are in vernacular language,

notarized English translation of the document shall be produced.

21. In the letter dated 3rd July, 2009 declining the proposal of the

petitioner trust the grounds taken are that as per the provision of

handbook of approval process the trust does not fulfill the criterion laid

down for ownership of the land and the stamp duty is payable on the

value of the property as on the conveyance which has not been paid by

the trust.

22. Before taking the decision dated 3rd July, 2009 the deficiency

letter dated 23rd March, 2009 was sent contending that no sale deed is

available in the name of the trust and since the proposal is valid for a

block period of 2009-2012 the request for reconsideration can be made

anytime within the block period. In reply to the deficiency letter it was

categorically communicated by letter dated 21st April, 2009 that Shree

Vijay Ganesh Public Charitable Trust was formed on 19th March, 2008

through registered trust document No.717/2008 and 333/2008 and at

the time of incorporation of the trust founder transferred the land of

15.25 acres to the trust by registered trust deed which was registered

as document No.717/2008. Along with the letter, a legal opinion was

also sent dated 23rd June, 2009 which is as under:-

"Referring the AICTE letter cited above, you have sought a clarification and opinion regarding the chargeability of stamp duty for document No.717/2008 of District Registrar Office, Dindigul. On a thorough scrutiny of the deed relevant acts and rules especially Indian Stamp Act and Registration Act, 1908, I am of the opinion that the document viz., 717/2008 of District Registrar of Dindigul is a deed of "Declaration of Trust" which is capable of effecting a transfer of immovable property described in the schedule of the deed in favour of trust namely "Shree Vijay Ganesh Public Charitable Trust". It extinguishes the right of the founder Thiru T.Dakashinamoorthy and now became the absolute property of the abovesaid trust.

According to Rule 64(A) of Indian Stamp Act, maximum stamp duty chargeable for this type of instrument is fixed at Rs.180 only. The document has borne a duty of Rs.250/-. So I am of the opinion that the document is duly stamped. This opinion is given under the authority of Section 31 of the Indian Stamp Act.

District Registrar & Collector under Section 31 Stamp Act.

23. Perusal of the documents filed by the petitioner also reveals that

a receipt for Rs.12,160/- is produced detailing an amount of

Rs.12,000/- paid as registration fee, Rs.100/- paid as computer fee,

Rs.50/- paid as Section 30(1) fee and Rs.10/- paid as acknowledgement

fee. Despite these documents the respondents have held in their order

dated 3rd July, 2009 that the stamp duty is payable on the value of the

property as on conveyance. Neither the respondents have justified in

their counter affidavit as to how the stamp duty on a registered deed by

which the trust was created and the founder trustee had settled his

property is not properly stamped or that the stamp duty paid is

contrary to the provisions of Stamp Act or how the opinion given under

Section 31 of the Stamp Act by the District Registrar and Collector is

not correct. The learned counsel for the respondents is also unable to

show that the opinion given under Section 31 of the Stamp Act is not

correct. The opinion allegedly given by the legal department of the

respondent has not been produced. The reason for the legal department

to come to the conclusion that the document is not properly stamped,

in the circumstances is not understandable. If the opinion given by

District Registrar and Collector under Section 31 of the Stamp Act is

not correct, the respondents were obliged to file a counter opinion based

on the provisions of the Stamp Act or any other regulation. The

approach of the respondent seems to be that under the regulations they

can say anything and do anything and it is not amenable for review by

any authority nor even by the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

24. In the circumstances, the plea of the respondents that the

document is not properly stamped and stamp duty in accordance with

law has not been paid cannot be accepted. The conveyance charges in

accordance with law has been paid and the document has been

executed in accordance with law on the appropriate stamp paper and is

duly registered. The objection of the respondent in this regard is,

therefore, rejected. The objection has been raised by the respondents

without application of mind and without any basis.

25. The other contention of the respondent is that in order to

consider the application of an institute for grant of affiliation, for the

purpose of ascertaining the rights of the Trust/Society in the land, only

three documents as detailed in the handbook of approved process can

be taken into consideration and any other document, even if it is

executed in accordance with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act

or some other enactment and which is duly registered and properly

stamped in accordance with law, cannot be accepted. Learned counsel

for the respondents has vehemently contended that the regulations

framed under All India Council for Technical Education Act have been

approved by the Supreme Court of India and the decision taken under

the regulation not to accept any other document except three

documents as detailed in the handbook for approval process cannot be

faulted. In Bharthiya Vidyapeeth (supra) relied on by the respondents.

Central Government on the advice of University Grants Commission

had conferred the status of deemed university of Bharthiya Vidyapeeth

and the deemed university was allowed admission to be made in the

respective medical, engineering and dental colleges under the stream of

common entrance test conducted by the State authorities till 1995-

1996 and thereafter they decided to keep themselves outside the scope

of the said authority. The writ petitions were filed challenging the

admission rules to medical, engineering and dental colleges whereby the

colleges run by Bharthiya Vidyapeeth were included in the admission

proposed to be controlled by CET authorities. The High Court after

considering the petition had dismissed the writ petition and in the

appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the regulations and

guidelines subject to which the deemed university status was granted

would cover all the relevant functions to be performed by the deemed

university including the matters which were sought to be regulated by

the State under the Act and Rules by including deemed university

within the definition of the term "Educational Institution" and the order

of the High Court was set aside and the appeals filed in the Supreme

Court were allowed and the writ petition was allowed to the extent of

restraining the respondents to enforce their instructions for brining the

institutions of Bharthiya Vidyapeeth with the stream of common

entrance test examination. Apparently, the case of the present

respondents is distinguishable. Under the regulations framed by the

respondents, the only requirement is the area of the land which is

required for starting an engineering college and the regulations do not

specify in what manner the rights in the land is to be acquired by the

institutions. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the

handbook for approval process are merely the guidelines which has

been formulated by the respondents, however, they do not acquire the

same status as that of the Regulations. Learned counsel for the

respondents is unable to show that the handbook of approval process

which are sort of the guidelines will become the regulations or the

handbook for approval process has been approved in the manner so as

to become the regulations at par with Regulations, 2006 of the

respondents.

26. This cannot be disputed by the respondents that if the properties

are settled with the Trust at the time of creation of the Trust by the

founder trustee, the ownership of the immovable property will vest with

the Trust. This has also not been disputed by the respondents that an

institution run by a Trust is entitled for affiliation from the respondents

provided such an institution meets the requirement for grant of

affiliation. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that

since under the Regulations, the respondents have the power to carve

out a procedure, they are within their rights to accept some documents

pertaining to lands executed under the provisions of Transfer of

Property Act and in accordance with the provisions of Stamp Act and

Registration Act and not to accept other documents which though may

be validly executed but the same will not be acceptable to the

respondents. To buttress his point, it is contended that it is a policy

matter and the court should not interfere with such decisions taken by

the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents have also

contended that accepting some documents like sale deed, gift deed,

lease deed (30 years) and not accepting other documents executed in

favour of the institution seeking affiliation is reasonable and is not to be

interfered by the court. Regarding the reasonable classification, learned

counsel for the respondents has relied on II (2008) CLT 60, Supreme

Court, Hindu Prateek Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat and others

holding that the closure of slaughter house for few days during

`Paryashan' out of respect for sentiments of Jain community is not

violative of fundamental rights to do trade and business as guaranteed

by Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It was held that such a

restriction is not excessive. The Supreme Court had further held that

even non-vegetarians can remain vegetarian for the short period of nine

days out of respect for feeling of one community and in the

circumstances closure of slaughter house in that period will not be

excessive restriction and the order passed by the Municipal

Corporation, Ahmedabad was held to be valid.

27. The Regulations pertaining to land requirements for

establishment of new technical institution only contemplates the area

which an institution must have for running an engineer/technology

institution. The hand book of approval process, however, restricts the

acquisition of such lands by the Trust/Society only by a sale

deed/irrevocable gift deed/irrevocable government lease for a minimum

period of 30 years. This classification contained in the hand book for

approval process is valid or not is the point to be considered. Learned

counsel for the respondents in support of this classification has

submitted that if conveyance of rights in the land is permitted by any

other types of documents, it will result into a number of institutions

applying for affiliation.

28. Though a reasonable classification is permissible, however, to

pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be

fulfilled, namely, that the classification must be found on an intelligible

differentia which distinguishes person or things that are grouped

together from others left out of the group, and that the differentia must

have a rational relation to objects sought to be achieved by the

statute/rule/regulations in question. The yardstick or parameters or

classification may be founded on different basis, however, what is

necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of

classification and the object of the Act/Regulation under consideration.

In Ram Krishna and others v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others,

AIR 1958 Supreme Court 538, the Supreme Court had held on the

basis of various other decisions that Article 14 contemplates

discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by procedure. In

the present case though the Regulations do not carve out a distinction

in respect of documents by which the rights in the land are transferred

to a Trust/Society seeking affiliation but by the procedure adopted by

the respondent, a classification has been done whereby the rights

transferred in the land in favour of Trust/Society seeking affiliation by

any other documents then stipulated in the hand book for approval

process, are not to be considered.

29. One of the reasons for classification given by the learned counsel

for the respondents for classification is that other documents

conveyancing rights in the immovable properties, if are taken into

consideration will lead to flood gate of the institution applying for

affiliation. This cannot be termed to be an intelligible differentia. A

reasonable classification is one which includes all persons or things

similarly situated with respect to the performance of the law. The

Regulation 2006 clause III only contemplates the area which is required

by an institution for running an engineering/technology college and

does not contemplate the way the rights are to be acquired. The rights

in the immovable property can be transferred or conveyed by many

modes as contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. Restricting

the approval only by sale deed/gift deed/irrevocable government lease

deed for 30 years does not seem to have any rationale in the present

facts and circumstances. The reason given by the learned counsel for

the respondent that taking into consideration other legal and valid

document conveying rights in the property will lead to a large number of

institution applying for affiliation cannot be termed to be rational and

having any object for which the alleged classification has been done by

the respondent in the hand book for approval process. If the Regulation

contemplates only the area, which a trust/society must own for purpose

of running engineering/technology institution, then permitting

conveyance of rights only by sale deed/gift deed/a government lease

deed for 30 years, has no rational and cannot be permitted.

30. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that

deeds other than as stipulated in the handbook of the procedure can be

set aside easily. This plea is without any legal basis. If the sale

deed/gift deed conveys the rights in the immovable property till such

conveyance deeds are set aside, for same reason, a trust deed settling

properties will equally convey the rights in the property to the

trust/society, till it is set aside. No distinction can be carved out on the

plea of the learned counsel for the respondents.

31. Learned counsel for the respondent is unable to give any

plausible reason as to why a trust deed settling the properties by a

founder trustee in the trust which is stamped according to law should

not be considered and the properties which are acquired by a

trust/society pursuant to sale deed or a gift deed should be considered.

This is not disputed by the respondents that under law, a founder

trustee can settle his properties with the trust on execution of an

appropriate instrument which is duly stamped and registered.

32. In the circumstances, on the grounds as raised by the

respondents, the issue of letter of intent/Letter of approval to the

petitioner could not be denied. Therefore, for the forging reasons, the

decisions communicated to the petitioners by letters dated 03.07,2009;

15.06.2009 and 23.03.2009 are liable to be set aside. The respondents

are liable to issue letter of intent/Letter of approval to the petitioner for

the block year 2009-2010.

33. Therefore the writ petition is allowed. The decisions of the

respondents in letters dated 03.07,2009; 15.06.2009 and 23.03.2009

are set aside. The respondents are directed to issue letter of

intent/Letter of approval to the petitioner for the block year 2009-2010

forthwith. Considering the facts and circumstances the respondents are

also liable to pay costs of Rs.30,000/- to the petitioner.

August 21, 2009. ANIL KUMAR J.

'K/Dev'