Itpo vs V. Meera & Ors.
2009 Latest Caselaw 2975 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+      RFA(OS) No.35/2007

ITPO                            .....Appellant through
                                Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Sr.
                                Adv. with Mr Ravi Sikri,
                                Mr. Ayushya Kumar and
                                Mr. Gautam Talukdar, Advs.

                   versus

V. MEERA & ORS.                 ......Respondent through
                                Mr. Maheshwar Dass, Adv. for
                                Respondent No.3
                                Mr. Jayesh Kumar, Adv.
                                for Respondent No.4
                                Mr. Suresh Bharti, Adv. for
                                Respondent No.7
                                Mr. Suman Doval, Adv.
                                for Respondent No.10
                                Mr D.K.Garg and Mr Vijay Pratap
                                Singh, Advs.for Respondent No.18
                                Sheikh Imran Alam, Adv. for
                                Respondents Nos.5, 19 and 20
                                Mr Akhilesh Arora, Adv.
                                for Respondent Nos.11 to 14


%                        Date of Hearing : July 28, 2009

                         Date of Decision : August 03, 2009

       CORAM:
*      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAMAJIT SEN
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
       1. Whether reporters of local papers may be
          allowed to see the Judgment?                   No
       2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?         Yes
       3. Whether the Judgment should be reported
          in the Digest?                                 Yes

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1. In this Appeal, the Plaintiff has laid siege to the Order dated

12.10.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the suit

on the finding that it was clearly barred by limitation. The

Appellant/Plaintiff has filed a suit for recovery of Rupees

1,08,00,000/- against twenty of its employees, together with three

other persons (Defendants No.20-22) as beneficiaries of the

defalcation allegedly carried out by Defendant Nos.1-19. In the

Plaint, it has been averred that the Vigilance Department had

received information in December, 1996 in respect of this

defalcation. The Department submitted its Report in July, 1997. It

appears that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had

registered a First Information Report against all the Defendants

and filed a Chargesheet on 5.11.1997. Reliance has been placed by

the Plaintiff on several documents and actions carried out between

19.8.1997 and March, 1998. All this is succinctly stated in the

cause of action paragraph of the Plaint, which is in these words -

"That the cause of action arose for the first time on 14.7.1997

when the Vigilance Department submitted its report for further

investigation. It further arose in favour of the Plaintiff and against

the Defendants after the submission of the inquiry report by the

various Inquiry officers who were appointed by the Plaintiff to

conduct the inquiries against the Defendants. It further arose when

the Hon'ble High court has directed the Plaintiff vide its order

dated 23.1.2001 to take up appropriate proceedings against the

aforesaid defendants. It further arose when the CBI filed its

charge-sheet before the Special Court of CBI on 5.11.1997 and it is

still continuing as the Defendants have not paid the said amount".

2. The Order passed by this Court in a Public Interest Litigation

(PIL) reads as follows:-

From the affidavit filed by respondent Nos.2 and 3, it is apparent that as many as 19 officials were charge- sheeted. Out of 19 officials, seven officials have since been removed/dismissed from service on the basis of the findings of the Inquiry Officers. In respect of five officials, major penalties have been imposed. Two officials were exonerated as the charges framed against them could not be sustained for lack of evidence. In respect of remaining two officials, it is stated in the counter affidavit that the inquiry has been completed and appropriate orders of the Disciplinary Authority are awaited. The affidavit also discloses that cases against the officials who were involved in the scam have been registered by CBI under Section 120-B, 419, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. It is also stated that CBI has filed charge sheets against 21 persons including the officials of ITPO.

From the Inquiry Reports, we find that the company was defrauded/cheated of huge sum of money by the officials. This fact has been admitted in the counter affidavit.

Having regard to the Inquiry Reports and the counter affidavit, we direct that appropriate proceedings for recovery of the amounts of which the company was defrauded/cheated by the officials should be initiated. We hope and trust that the proceedings shall be initiated expeditiously.

The writ petition is disposed of with the above said direction and observations.

Dasti.

3. The learned Single Judge has correctly arrived at the

conclusion that Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is attracted

to the present case. In other words, the cause of action should not

have arisen prior to three years of 12.4.2001, the date on which

the Plaint was filed.

4. On a reading of the Plaint it becomes manifestly clear that

the cause of action arose on 14.7.1997 and the Suit, therefore,

ought to have been filed on or before 13.7.2000. We cannot agree

with Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant,

that the cause of action can only arise after the decision of the

Special Court of CBI before whom the Chargesheet had been filed.

If this argument is extended further, it would necessarily mean

that until the criminal cases are finally settled, that is, after a

possible appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court is exhausted, the

cause of action would not be seen to have arisen. Such an

argument has to be rejected no sooner it is stated.

5. It is next argued that in any event the directions of this Court

passed on 23.1.2001 would create a fresh cause of action, and if

so, the Suit is well within time, having been initiated within few

months of the directions given by the Division Bench in the PIL. It

is noteworthy that the Defendants/Respondents were not parties in

the PIL. In any event, even a Division Bench hearing PIL would not

have power to extend the limitation prescribed by the statute. It is

trite that delay in filing a suit cannot be condoned. It is quite

obvious to us that it had not been pointed out in the PIL that

litigation against the present Respondents/Defendants may have

become time-barred. Therefore, we find no merit in this

contention.

6. Finally, reliance has been placed by Mr. Jayant Bhushan on

the decision of a Single Judge in Anant Ram Negi -vs- State of

H.P., AIR 2003 HP 114. In that case, it was found that Article 91(b)

of the Schedule to the Limitation Act was applicable to the facts of

that case. This Article prescribes that for compensation for

wrongful taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining any other

specific movable property a period of limitation would be three

years depending upon when the period had been wrongfully taken.

Even if this Article were to be applied, we entertain no doubt that

the property in question, that is, funds and monies belonging to the

Appellant, had been defalcated before December, 1996. Delay in

completing a Departmental Inquiry cannot extend limitation;

otherwise, the statute of repose would never be attracted and

limitation would always remain open-ended. It is for the Court, and

not for the Plaintiff, to decide the culpability or liability of the

Defendants. The information gathered by the Vigilance Department

of the Plaintiff would also constitute the springboard for litigation.

The factual matrix in Anant Ram Negi thus is wholly dissimilar

since in that case the finding was to the effect that "the possession

of the defendants evidently became illegal when despite release

order passed by the concerned Court they failed to release the

case property or value thereof in its entirety to the plaintiff". In

the case in hand, the cause of action arose on each and every date

when the defalcation of funds took place.

7. We find no error in the impugned Order. The Appeal is

dismissed. Keeping in perspective the singular facts of the case, we

do not think it appropriate to impose costs on the Appellant as that

would enure to the benefit of the Respondents.

                                            ( VIKRAMAJIT SEN )
                                                  JUDGE




August 03, 2009                                   ( V.K. JAIN )
tp                                                JUDGE