Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 1606 Del
Judgement Date : 23 April, 2009
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Writ Petition (Civil) No. 18147/2006
Date of Decision : 23.04.2009
Sh. Raghubir Singh (Driver) ......Petitioner
Through: Mr.M.Hassain, Advocate
Versus
Delhi Transport Corporation ...... Respondent
Through : Ms.Arati Mahajan, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has challenged the award dated 22nd May, 2006
passed by the Industrial Tribunal-II in ID No. 11/2004 in case titled
Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Shri Raghubir Singh. By virtue of
which the learned Tribunal instead of directing reinstatement and
payment of back wages had granted a onetime lump sum
compensation of Rs.15,000/-
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the
quantum of compensation which has been awarded to the
petitioner/driver in the instant case is grossly inadequate, keeping in
view the fact that the petitioner has rendered approximately four years
of service and the fact that in case he would have been directed to be
reinstated then he would have continuously worked for a long period
of time till the age of superannuation. It has also been urged by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not been
given litigation expenses for conducting the matter both before the
Conciliation Officer and then before the Labour Court as well.
3. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent/DTC has
contended that the total quantum of service which has been put by the
petitioner as a driver with the respondent/DTC was 3 ½ years out of
which for 1 ½ years he had worked as on retainer basis which
practically means on daily wage basis. In this system, as and when
his services would be requisitioned, he would be paid his wages.
Thereafter, he was converted on a monthly basis and put on probation
and for this purpose during probation he worked for approximately
two years, however, even during this short tenure of 3 ½ years the
conduct of the petitioner/driver was not befitting that of a driver on
account of the fact that he frequently indulged in absenteeism on
several occasions because of which the functioning of the public
transport system was jeopardized.
4. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent
/DTC that there are judgments to the effect that there is no straight
jacket formula has been evolved for taking various factors into
consideration while calculating the compensation. This aspect has
been dealt with by the Apex Court in different judgments and different
points like the length of service served or yet to be served, conduct of
employee, wages earned by him, capacity of the employer to pay
compensation, etc. are taken into consideration. The chances of the
workmen having gainfully employed during the period of alleged
termination have been taken into account.
5. In all these cases, the learned counsel for the respondent/DTC
contended that the quantum of compensation which had been
awarded to the workman was in the range of Rs.10,000/- to
Rs.30,000/-. Reliance in this regard was placed on case titled Nagar
Mahapalika Vs. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2113, Branch
Manager, M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation
Ltd. & Anr. Vs. S.C. Pandey 2006 (2) SCALE 619 and I.T.C.
Monghyr, Bihar Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna, Bihar
1978 (3) SCC 504.
6. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the
respective sides and also gone through the award of the learned
Labour Court.
7. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner was
working as a driver. It has also come on record that the conduct of
the petitioner even as a driver had not been befitting that of a driver.
The learned Labour Court has observed that the petitioner had
absented himself from duty on several occasions was irregular in
performance of his duties.
8. The petitioner who was admittedly functioning as a driver of a
public transport system was expected to maintain high degree of
punctuality and efficiency because much will depend on the drivers of
the public transport system to maintain the overall efficiency and
punctuality of the fleet which has to transport the people of the city on
daily basis. Therefore, this factor if taken into consideration certainly
goes against the petitioner/driver. The second factor which has been
taken into consideration is the total number of years of service where
broadly speaking there is not much of difference between the learned
counsel for the parties. The petitioner is contending that he had
served the organization for a period of four years. The learned
counsel for the respondent has contended that he has actually served
for a period of 3 ½ years out of which 1 ½ years he was on a retainer
basis which practically means as daily wager. This aspect has not
been refuted by the learned counsel for the petitioner from the record,
thereby we are left with total service of approximately of two years
having been rendered by the petitioner with the respondent/DTC.
9. The petitioner in the writ petition itself has stated that his basic
salary at the time of his alleged termination was Rs.322/- or so and
other allowances which he would have earned. Accordingly, the salary
of the petitioner would have been in an around of Rs.600/- or so per
month. The petitioner had rendered service with the respondent/DTC
for the period of 2 years or so and if quantum of compensation is
calculated, it would be more than two years' wages, if calculated @
Rs.600/- per month.
10. Another aspect of the matter which perhaps seems to have
weighed with the learned Tribunal while fixing the compensation is the
fact the petitioner was working as a driver of a heavy duty vehicle and
a skilled person of his type would hardly remain idle even during the
period when his services were terminated. In addition to this, there
was a considerable gap between the date of his termination and the
date of award, and therefore, I feel that the learned Labour Court was
practically right in fixing onetime lump sum compensation of
Rs.15,000/- to be paid to the petitioner in exercise of its powers under
section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
11. So far as the question of payment of litigation expenses is
concerned, this is certainly not a prayer in the writ. As regards the
litigation expenses for conducting the proceedings before the learned
Labour Court, it was for the petitioner to make a prayer to the said
forum and the Tribunal was to consider the request of the petitioner
either to allow or disallow the said prayer. Even in the present writ
petition, there is no prayer to the effect that while computing the
compensation, the factum of the litigation expenses which the
petitioner might have incurred in carrying out the entire exercise
ought to have taken into account. Therefore, this aspect of the matter
seems to be totally an after thought.
12. For the foregoing reasons mentioned above, I do not find any
illegality, perversity or any violation of rule and regulations of principle
of natural justice, and therefore, there is no merit in the writ petition
and accordingly the same is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
V.K. SHALI, J.
APRIL 23, 2009 KP
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