Delhi High Court
Shri Deepak Kumar Sharma vs M/S Domino???S Pizza Ltd. on 17 April, 2009
Author: V.K.Shali
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Writ Petition (Civil) No. 20081/2005
Date of Decision : 17.04.2009
Shri Deepak Kumar Sharma ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. H.K. Chaturvedi, Advocate
Versus
M/s Domino's Pizza Ltd. ...... Respondent
Through : Mr. N. K. Jha, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner in the instant writ petition has challenged the
interlocutory order passed by the learned Labour Court No.I in LCA
No. 81/2004 in case titled Mr. Deepak Sharma Vs. M/s Domino's
Pizza India Ltd.
2. By virtue of the aforesaid order, the learned Labour Court has
dismissed the application of the claimant/petitioner seeking framing of
issues and adducing of evidence before deciding the said petition.
The facts of the case relevant to decide the issue are that the petitioner
filed a petition under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 wherein he claimed that he was working with the
respondent/management from 26th June, 1997 and his monthly salary
was Rs.5804/-. It was alleged by him that his services were
terminated on 12th August, 2004 without compliance of the provisions
of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore, the
said termination was void ab initio. Accordingly, the petitioner has
filed the petition claiming his salary from the date of termination i.e.
12th August, 2004 till the date of filing of the petition along with
interest @ 18%. The respondent filed its written statement and took
objection regarding the maintainability of the petition itself on the
ground that there is no pre-existing right or claim of the petitioner
after the termination of the service which could be granted to him in
exercise of powers by the Court under Section 33 C (2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was further stated that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case titled Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs.
Ganesh Razak & Anr. 1995 LAB I.C. 330 has specifically laid down
that claim for entitlement of workmen to certain benefit cannot be
granted under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 if
there is no pre-existing right or recognition of a money claim.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
4. The legal position laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Ganesh Razak case (supra) is not in dispute. So the job which is left
to the learned Labour Court to do is to only calculate the amount of
money which is payable to such workman. In Jeet Lal Sharma Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court-IV 84 (2000) DLT 706, a Single
Judge of this Court has also followed the same view. This legal
position could not be refuted by the learned counsel of the petitioner.
5. Therefore, I find that there was no infirmity in the order which
has been passed by the learned Labour Court in the impugned award
dated 3rd August, 2005 so as to warrant any interference by this Court
in exercise of its power of judicial review because the petitioner's claim
is neither recognized nor adjudicated in any Forum or Labour Court
earlier.
6. In addition to this, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.P.
Maheshwari Vs. Delhi Admn. Vs. Ors 1983 3 SCR 949 has laid down
that the nature of jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory and not
appellate, and therefore, the exercise of such a jurisdiction should not
be resorted to so as to hamper the work of the special tribunal at the
interlocutory stage and on preliminary issues. It has been observed
that the tribunals like Industrial Tribunal are constituted to decide
expeditiously special kind of disputes, and therefore, jurisdiction to
decide is not of stifled by all means of preliminary objections and
"journeying up and down".
7. The present writ petition seems to be doing the same thing what
has been prohibited by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It seems the
whole ploy of the petitioner seeking setting aside the impugned award
and directing the learned Labour Court to frame issues and permit
him to adduce evidence is nothing but only to prolong proceedings so
as to burn the energy and patience of the respondent so as to force
them to arrive at some kind of settlement. This cannot be permitted
to be done.
8. For the foregoing reasons mentioned above, I am of the
considered opinion that the writ petition is without any merit, and
accordingly, the same is dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
APRIL 17, 2009
KP
