Iron & Steel Mazdoor Morcha, Delhi ... vs M/S Kumar Industries
2009 Latest Caselaw 1201 Del

*             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                   WP (C) Nos. 88/2007

%                            Judgment delivered on: 06.04.2009

Iron & Steel Mazdoor Morcha, Delhi (Regd.)    ...... Petitioner
                    Through: Mr. Puneet Saini, Advocate

                    versus

M/s Kumar Industries                        ..... Respondent
                         Through: Mr. K.K. Sabharwal, Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR

1.     Whether the Reporters of local papers may         Yes
       be allowed to see the judgment?

2.     To be referred to Reporter or not?                Yes

3.     Whether the judgment should be reported           Yes
       in the Digest?

KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (Oral)

*

1. By way of this writ petition filed under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the

impugned award dated 8.12.2002 whereby the claim of the

petitioner was rejected.

2. Brief facts relevant for deciding the present petition

are as under:-

The case of the petitioner union is that on 10.6.1999

a resolution was passed by the workmen for the grant of certain

legal benefits. It was the grievance of the petitioner union that

employees of the respondent management were not getting legal

benefits so they demanded minimum wages, bonus, PF, ESI

uniforms, House Rent Allowance, pair of shoes, safety shoes and

gloves, over time, annual festival holiday, casual leave,

appointment letter, etc. Before the Tribunal the management

stopped appearing and was proceeded ex-parte. The

statements of workmen were recorded but all of them stated

that they were entitled for two sets of uniform, house rent

allowance and pairs of shoes but without specifically mentioning

any legal right to claim these benefits. In the background of

this, the Tribunal held that the workmen were not entitled for

any relief and answered the award against the workmen. Hence

the present petition.

3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that all the

workmen who are members of the petitioner union are entitled

for two sets of uniform, house rent allowance and pairs of shoes

and the tribunal without appreciating the case set up by the

petitioners declined the said relief.

4. Opposing the present petition of the petitioner, Mr.

K.K. Sabharwal, counsel for the respondent at the outset

submits that the present petition is bad on account of delay and

latches as the impugned award has been challenged after a

lapse of more than four years. Counsel further submits that

nowhere in the entire petition the petitioner has offered any

explanation for such a long delay in filing the present petition.

Counsel further submits that the petitioner failed to prove and

establish their case before the Tribunal and therefore the claim

of the petitioner was rejected even though, the

respondent/management was proceeded ex-parte. Counsel

thus submits that petitioner has no merits to succeed in the

present petition.

5. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the

record.

6. No doubt that no limitation has been prescribed

under the Industrial Disputes Act to challenge the impugned

award but that would not mean that any party can choose to

assail the award of the Tribunal at any time so likes. The

cardinal principle of law is that a party who feels aggrieved with

the order of any adjudicatory authority must approach the

superior court at the earliest possible time and if such a party is

prevented to approach the higher court within a reasonable time

then sufficient explanation should be offered in the petition as to

what prevented the petitioner to approach the court within a

reasonable time. In this regard, the hon'ble Apex Court in U.P.

Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh - (2006) II SCC 464 observed

as under:-

9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana5 this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case6. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage."

10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta7 it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi8 gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case8. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief."

11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy9 their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar10. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the

purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."

12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:

"In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:

(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and

(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part.

Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches."

7. Perusal of the petition shows that no such explanation

has been given by the petitioner as to why the award was not

challenged for such a long spell of four years. I, therefore, find

that the present petition is bad on account of delay and latches.

Even otherwise on merits as well I do not find there is any

irrationality or perversity in the impugned award as the Trbunal

has clearly held that none of the witnesses produced by the

petitioner were able to establish their case for their entitlement

of two sets of uniform, house rent allowance or pairs of shoes.

With the said findings of facts arrived at by the Tribunal and the

Tribunal being a final adjudicator of facts, I refrain myself to

interfere with the same. Even otherwise, the petitioners have

failed to advance any reason to point out as to how the said

findings are perverse or irrational. There is no merit in the

present petition, the same is hereby dismissed.

April 06, 2009                  KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.
pkv