Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 1166 Del
Judgement Date : 6 April, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO No. 827/2003
Judgment reserved on: 19.03.2008
% Judgment delivered on: 6.4.2009
Bhirbhan ...... Appellant
Through: Mr. J. S. Kanwar, Advocate.
versus
Shiv Narain & Ors.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr. S. S. Panwar, Advocate for
Respondent No.4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? No
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J.
1. The present appeal arises out of the award of compensation
passed by the Learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal on 01.9.2003 for
enhancement of compensation. The learned Tribunal awarded
compensation of Rs.26,000/- (50% of Rs.52,000/- deducted on account
of contributory negligence on the part of appellant) alongwith an
interest @ 6% PA for the injuries caused to the claimant appellant in
the motor accident.
2. The brief conspectus of facts is as under:
3. On 14.5.1996, at about 5:30PM, appellant was sitting on the
driver seat in the bus bearing registration no. DL-1P-8665 by keeping
his leg outside the window of driver seat and was talking to some
driver. The appellant's bus was standing on the bus stop and bus
bearing registration no. DL-1P-6605 came in a rash and negligent
manner from side of Novelty Cinema and hit the bus in which appellant
was sitting near the front driver door side of the bus, as a result of
which, the right leg of the appellant was crushed and he fell down.
4. A claim petition was filed on 10.4.97 and an award was made on
1.9.2003. Aggrieved with the said award enhancement is claimed by
way of the present appeal.
5. Sh. J.S. Kanwar, counsel for the appellant claimant urged that the
award passed by the learned Tribunal is inadequate and insufficient
looking at the circumstances of the case. He assailed the said
judgment of Learned Tribunal firstly, on the ground that the tribunal
erred in holding that there was 50% contributory negligence on the
part of the appellant. It is also submitted that Ld. Tribunal erred in
awarding only Rs.5000/- towards pain and suffering. The counsel
further stated that Ld. Tribunal erred in not awarding any
compensation towards loss of amenities and other non-pecuniary
losses. The counsel submitted that appellant was a driver by
profession and he was earning Rs.3660/-per month . Due to the
accident, he suffered 10% disability because of which he was unable to
drive vehicle and was removed from his service also. The counsel
pleaded that in this case, the loss of earning capacity should have
been taken as 100% considering the nature of job, the appellant was
doing at the time of accident. It is also submitted that Ld. Tribunal has
not considered the future prospects and advancement in life of
appellant. Further the counsel pleaded that the counsel erred in
awarding an interest of 6% p.a instead of 9% p.a.
6. Per contra Sh. S.S. Panwar counsel for the respondent no. 4
contended that the award passed by the Ld. Tribunal is just and fair
and does not require interference by this court.
7. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. In a plethora of cases the Hon'ble Apex Court and various High
Courts have held that the emphasis of the courts in personal injury
cases should be on awarding substantial, just and fair damages and
not mere token amount. In cases of personal injuries the general
principle is that such sum of compensation should be awarded which
puts the injured in the same position as he would have been had
accident not taken place. In examining the question of damages for
personal injury, it is axiomatic that pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads
of damages are required to be taken in to account. In this regard the
Supreme Court in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva
Shetty, (2003) 7 SCC 197, has classified pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages as under:
"16. This Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. 9 laying the principles posited: (SCC p. 556, para 9)
" 9 . Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant:(i) medical attendance; ( ii ) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; ( iii ) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include ( i ) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; ( ii ) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the
claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; ( iii ) damages for the loss of expectation of life i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; ( iv ) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life."
9. In the instant case the tribunal awarded Rs. 32,500/- for expenses
towards medicines; Rs.500/- for conveyance expenses; Rs.5000/- for
mental pain and sufferings; Rs.10,000/- on account of permanent
partial disability and Rs. 4000/- on account of loss of earnings.
10. As regards mental pain & suffering, the tribunal has awarded Rs.
5,000/- to the appellant after considering Schedule II to the MV Act. On
perusal of the award, it is manifest that the as per the MLC the
appellant sustained fracture of femur and remained in LNJP Hospital for
one month. Medical record of Dua Nursing Home dated 25/7/1996 to
30/11/1996, 27/11/2000 and 24/6/2003 proves that the appellant took
treatment there for plating of right femur as an outdoor patient and
stayed there only for three days. Considering the kind of injuries
sustained by the appellant and also considering that no revision in the
Second Schedule has taken place after the same was introduced in the
year 1994 although under Section 163(3), the Central Government is
required to amend the Second Schedule keeping in view the cost of
living by appropriate notification in the Official Gazette from time to
time. I feel that the compensation in this regard should be enhanced to
Rs. 15,000/-.
11. As regards the compensation towards permanent disability, I feel
that the tribunal has erred in not awarding the same according to the
settled principles of law. The income of the appellant was duly proved
at Rs. 3,600/- pm as per the salary certificate issued by appellant's
employer, Ex. PW3/46. Nothing has come on record to prove the future
prospects of the appellant and therefore, the future prospects of the
appellant cannot be considered. The age of the appellant at the time of
the accident was 35 years and the 10% disability of the appellant was
duly proved on record as Ex. Pw3/4. As per second schedule the
multiplier prescribed at the age of 35 is 17, therefore, after
considering all these factors, the compensation towards disability is
awarded at Rs. 73,440/- (3,600 x 12x 10/100 x 17) to the appellant.
12. As regards loss of amenities, resulting from the defendant's
negligence, which affects the injured person's ability to participate in
and derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily life, and the
individual's inability to pursue his talents, recreational interests,
hobbies or avocations. I feel that the tribunal erred in not awarding the
same and in the circumstances of the case same is allowed to the
extent of Rs. 10,000/-.
13. As regards loss of earnings, the income of the appellant was duly
proved at Rs. 3,600/- pm as per the salary certificate issued by
appellant's employer, Ex. PW3/46. On perusal of the award, it is
manifest that the as per the MLC the appellant sustained fracture of
femur and remained in LNJP Hospital for one month. Medical record of
Dua Nursing Home dated 25/7/1996 to 30/11/1996, 27/11/2000 and
24/6/2003 proves that the appellant took treatment there for plating of
right femur as an outdoor patient and stayed there for three days. The
tribunal assessed income of the appellant at Rs. 4,000/- pm by taking a
round figure and awarded Rs. 4,000/- towards loss of income for 1
month, the period during which the appellant could not work. I do not
feel that the tribunal committed any error in this regard and hence, the
award is not interfered with in this regard and compensation towards
loss of income is taken at Rs. 4,000/-.
14. As regards the issue of interest that the rate of interest of 6% p.a.
awarded by the tribunal is on the lower side and the same should be
enhanced to 9% p.a., I feel that the rate of interest awarded by the
tribunal is on the lower side and fair and requires interference. No
rate of interest is fixed under Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988. The Interest is compensation for forbearance or detention of
money and that interest is awarded to a party only for being kept out
of the money, which ought to have been paid to him. Time and again
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the rate of interest to be
awarded should be just and fair depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case and taking in to consideration relevant
factors including inflation, policy being adopted by Reserve Bank of
India from time to time and other economic factors. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, I do not find any infirmity in the award
regarding award of interest @ 6% pa by the tribunal and the same is
not interfered with.
15. In view of the discussion made here in above, Rs. 32,500/- is
awarded for expenses towards medicines; Rs.500/- for conveyance
expenses; Rs.15000/- for mental pain and sufferings; Rs.10,000/- for
loss of amenities of life; Rs. 73,440/- on account of permanent partial
disability and Rs. 4000/- on account of loss of earnings. Thus the total
compensation comes to Rs.1,35,440/-
16. As regards the issue of contributory negligence of the deceased, I
feel that the tribunal committed no error. The omission to do what the
law obligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner, mode or
method envisaged by law would equally and per se constitute
negligence on the part of such person. If the answer is in the
affirmative, it is a negligent act. Where an accident is due to
negligence of both parties, substantially there would be contributory
negligence and both would be blamed. In a case of contributory
negligence, the crucial question on which liability depends would be
whether either party could, by exercise of reasonable care, have
avoided the consequence of the other's negligence. Whichever party
could have avoided the consequence of the other's negligence would
be liable for the accident. If a person's negligent act or omission was
the proximate and immediate cause of death, the fact that the person
suffering injury was himself negligent and also contributed to the
accident or other circumstances by which the injury was caused would
not afford a defence to the other. Contributory negligence is applicable
solely to the conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there has been an act
or omission on the part of the plaintiff which has materially contributed
to the damage, the act or omission being of such a nature that it may
properly be described as negligence, although negligence is not given
its usual meaning. It is now well settled that in the case of contributory
negligence, courts have the power to apportion the loss between the
parties as seems just and equitable. Apportionment in that context
means that damage is reduced to such an extent as the court thinks
just and equitable having regard to the claim shared in the
responsibility for the damage. It is the case of the appellant himself
that he was sitting on the driver seat in the bus bearing registration no.
DL-1P-8665 by keeping his leg outside the window of driver seat and
was talking to some driver. The appellant's bus was standing on the
bus stop and bus bearing registration no. DL-1P-6605 came in a rash
and negligent manner from side of Novelty Cinema and hit the bus in
which appellant was sitting near the front driver door side of the bus,
as a result of which, the right leg of the appellant was crushed and he
fell down. Clearly, in the first place the appellant should not have sat in
such a manner so as to invite problem for himself. He should have
been cautious as it is written inside of all the buses and it is taught
even to each and every child by their parents that one should keep
their body inside the bus, not even a finger should be put outside a
window as the same may cause some accident. The appellant himself
being a driver did not abide by the said rule and moral teaching of the
elders and resultantly, met with an accident.
17. From the above discussion, it is manifest that no doubt mainly
the bus driver of the bus bearing registration no. DL-1P-6605 was
negligent but the appellant also contributed to the said accident which
led to the injuries sustained by him in the accident. Thus, clearly the
appellant was 50% liable for negligence and I do not find any infirmity
as regards the tribunal imputing liability on the injured. Therefore, no
interference is made in the award on this count. Hence, after making
50% deduction towards contributory negligence of the appellant, the
total compensation comes to Rs. 67,720/-
18. In view of the above discussion, the total compensation is
enhanced to Rs. 67,720/-from Rs. 26,000/- along with interest @ 7.5%
per annum from the date of institution of the present petition till
realisation of the award and the same should be paid to the appellant
by the respondent no. 4.
19. With the above directions, the present appeal is disposed of.
6.4.2009 KAILASH GAMBHIR, J
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