Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 1694 Del
Judgement Date : 22 September, 2008
OMP No.241-2006 Page No.1
REPORTABLE
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ OMP NO. 241 OF 2006
%
Date of Decision : September 22, 2008.
HARJI ENGG. WORKS PVT. LTD .... Petitioner/Objector
Through Mr. S.K.Sharma, Mr.Dhruv Kumra,
Advocates.
VERSUS
M/S BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD & ANR. .... Respondents.
Through Mr. B.K. Satija, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
SANJIV KHANNA, J.:
1. Harji Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd., the objector, was
awarded contract for erection, testing and commissioning of
eltrostatic precipitators at Ampara "B" Thermal Power Project vide OMP No.241-2006 Page No.2
LOI dated 28.8.91 issued by Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd., the
respondent.
2. Disputes arose between the parties and in terms of the
arbitration clause, one Mr. U.C. Gupta, Senior DGM of the
respondent was appointed as a Sole Arbitrator. However, on his
retirement, Mr. S.K. Sawhney, the then AGM of the respondent was
appointed as a Sole Arbitrator in 1997.
3. Mr. S.K. Sawhney has made and published, the award
dated 21.2.2006, partly allowing claims of both parties. The objector
has challenged the said award in the present petition under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996 (hereinafter referred
to as "Act", for short).
4. Paragraph 3 of the award reveals that the learned Sole
Arbitrator had entered reference on 01.10.1997 and had 27 effective
hearings before him. The last effective hearing was held on
14.11.2002. This is apparent from the reading of paragraph 3 of the
award dated 21.2.2006, which is as under:-
"In due compliance of my assignment as the Ld. Sole Arbitrator, the undersigned called for the ninth arbitration proceedings on 01.10.1997 and since then, 27 proceedings were conducted by the undersigned up to 14.11.2002 viz. on 01.10.1997 , 15.10.1997, 29.11.1997,8.12.19997,22.12.1997,07.02.199 8,23.04.1998, 08.05.1998, 20.5.1998, 26.5.1998, 20.11.1998, 30.12.1999, OMP No.241-2006 Page No.3
05.04.2000, 02.12.2000, 19.12.2000, 04.01.2001, 13.2.2001, 23.02.2001, 14.03.2001, 13.09.2001, 12.10.2001,18.10.2001, 24.10.2001, 15.1.2002, 08.04.2002, 10.10.2002 & 14.11.2002".
5. The award in question was made on 21.2.2006, 3 years after
the last effective hearing was held. Thus, there is substantial delay
between the last effective hearing and date on which the learned
Arbitrator had made and published this award. The delay was not
explained or justified in the impugned award. It was also submitted
that even hearings had not concluded. The objector urged that the
award was contrary to public policy. It was contented by the
respondent that the delay was occasioned by talks of compromise
and hearing was also held on 2.12.2003. It was also submitted that
hearing had concluded and even written arguments had been filed
by the parties. Challenge to the award should be examined on
merits alone.
6. Order sheet of the learned Arbitrator dated 14.11.2002, reads as
under:-
"1. Representatives of both the claimants as well as Respondents participated in the hearing as per the enclosed attendance sheet.
2. At the outset, Claimants requested that action taken by the Respondents on the set of papers handed over by them prior to the OMP No.241-2006 Page No.4
previous hearing and under study by the Respondents as conveyed in the last hearing be indicated. On this, the Respondents‟ representative submitted that the same is under scrutiny and can be discussed in the next hearing. However, he discussed various other issues with the Claimants in detail. The Claimants again requested the Respondents for early action in view of the considerable time already elapsed on the matter.
3. Both the parties were directed to come prepared in the next hearing with their claims and counter claims properly recorded with relevant evidence so that the matter can be pursued further.
4. The next date of hearing shall be intimated shortly".
7. Order sheet dated 14.11.2002 reveals that hearing in the
arbitration proceedings had not concluded and were still pending
consideration before the learned Arbitrator. Time had been taken by
the respondent for scrutiny of papers and submitting their reply.
Paragraph 3 of the order dated 14.11.2002 is a clear pointer that the
learned Arbitrator wanted to have further hearings in the matter.
Order dated 14.11.2002 is an answer to the contention of the
counsel for the respondent that the parties had filed their written
submissions and nothing remained to be urged. Written submissions
were filed in 1998; long before the order dated 14.11.2002 was
passed. Order dated 14.11.2002 passed by the learned Arbitrator is OMP No.241-2006 Page No.5
a complete answer to the said contention and discloses that the
arguments had not concluded and the parties were still required to
address and complete submissions. The respondent was to
scrutinize certain papers and thereafter file reply. The learned
Arbitrator had in paragraph 4 of the said proceedings therefore
observed that the next date of hearing shall be intimated to the
parties shortly.
8. Counsel for the respondent had drawn my attention to
proceedings dated 2.12.2003, which are as under:-
"38th Hearing held at BHEL PSNR NOIDA on 02.12.2003 at 4.00 PM.
1) Representatives of both the claimants and Respondents participated in the hearing as per the enclosed attendance sheet.
2) BHEL informed that they are still working on the compromising proposal given by M/s HEW, which may take some more time. Therefore, they requested for granting some more time for consideration of the proposal of M/s HEW.
3) Both the parties were directed to act fast on the issues so that further modalities are set forth.
4) The next hearing to review the case would be held in due course of time which will be notified accordingly".
OMP No.241-2006 Page No.6
9. Order dated 2.12.2003 does not find mention in
paragraph 3 of the award dated 21.2.2006 quoted above and rightly
so. On the said date, no effective hearing was held as is clear from
the said order. This also explains why in paragraph 3 of the award,
hearing held on 2.12. 2003 is not mentioned. The said paragraph
refers to effective hearings, which had taken place before the
learned Arbitrator. Paragraph 4 of the order dated 2.12.2003 is
again a pointer that further hearing was required by the learned
Arbitrator. Hearings had not concluded.
10. In these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the
contention of the counsel for the respondent that after 14.11.2002,
further hearing was held on 2.12.2003 and all pending issues were
argued before the learned Arbitrator. This is not supported by the
award in which the last date of hearing was mentioned as
14.11.2002 and not 2.12.2003. I may also note here that the
counsel for the objector was not present on 2.12.2003. It is,
therefore, apparent that no hearing had taken place on 2.12.2003,
though parties had appeared before the learned Arbitrator on the
said date.
11. It is the contention of the objector that Mr. S.K. Sawhney, Ld.
Arbitrator, had tendered his resignation as an employee of the
respondent, before he had signed the award and within a month OMP No.241-2006 Page No.7
thereafter, he joined a private company. This factual position is not
denied.
12. Does this delay of more than three years and thereafter the
haste, in which the award was made, make the award contrary to
public policy?
13. Way back in 1928, High Court of Bombay in Bhogilal
Purshottam versus Chimanlal Amritlal, reported at AIR 1928
Bom. 49, had held that delay in making of an award without any
reasonable excuse or cause to explain the said delay, amounts to
misconduct. Division Bench did not agree with the view that as there
was no express term fixing time period for making an award, it did
not amount to misconduct. Unconscionable and unexplained delay
amounts to misconduct. Even if no time was fixed for making of an
award, it was implied term in an arbitration clause that the award
should be made within a reasonable time. It was observed as
follows:-
"On the facts I would hold that it is clear that the award was not made within a reasonable time or anything approaching a reasonable time. Then, does that imply misconduct on the part of the arbitrator? If that delay, is not explained, in my judgment, it does imply misconduct on his part, because it was his duty to make up his mind and decide this dispute. It was his duty to see prima facie that the proceedings were conducted with reasonable diligence, and, if he so far failed in those duties, that he did nothing whatever for OMP No.241-2006 Page No.8
some five years, then in my judgment he failed in material respects in his ordinary duties as an arbitrator. That being so in my judgment, he was guilty of misconduct within the meaning of para. 15, and, accordingly, the award may be set aside."
14. This view was followed by Nagpur High Court in the case of
Keshava Lal Ram Dayal Kahar versus Laxman Lal Ram Kishan
Lal reported in AIR 1940 Nag. 386.
15. Sections 8, 9, 28 read with First Schedule, Clause 3 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 required an Arbitrator to proceed with
reasonable dispatch and subject to terms of the arbitration clause,
an award was required to be published within four months of
entering upon reference. Parties (and not the arbitrator) could
extend time by mutual consent or time could be extended by the
Courts. But Courts have refused to extend under section 28 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 on the ground of undue delay (See, State of
Punjab versus Hardyal reported in 1985(2) SCC 629 and
Flowmore Pvt. Ltd. versus National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd.,
reported in ILR (1996) 2 Del 476). An arbitrator could be removed
on failure to proceed with reasonable dispatch as per provisions of
Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940. There have been
cases where arbitrators have been removed for failing to proceed
with reasonable dispatch and delay. (Refer, Kali Charan Sharma OMP No.241-2006 Page No.9
versus State of U.P. reported in AIR 1985 Delhi 389, W.S.
Construction Company versus Hindustan Steel Works
Construction Company reported in AIR 1990 Delhi 134). Delay in
making an award was considered to be a grave misconduct
sufficient to set aside an award under Sections 30 and 33 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940.
16. The Act based on UNCITRAL Model Law seeks to ensure fast
and quick disposal and curtail delays (See, Sections 4,12,13,16, 23
and 34(3) of the Act). Commercial arbitration process should be
efficient and disputes decided expeditiously for trade and commerce
to prosper and grow. Contractual rights and obligations to have
meaning should be enforced. Delay defeats justice and encourages
breaches. Arbitration proceedings must be held with reasonable
dispatch and promptness. Arbitration proceedings are encouraged
because they are speedy alternative to court adjudication. Its
primary objective is fast and quick disposal of disputes between
parties without delays normally associated with court proceedings.
Arbitration implies timeous decisions and promptitude. It is policy of
law that arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged.
Arbitration proceedings, therefore, are expected to be prompt.
OMP No.241-2006 Page No.10
17. Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is not incorporated in
the Act. The Act does not prescribe specific period for making and
publishing the award but the underlying principle and policy of law
that arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged and
delayed, remains intact and embodied. Section 14 of the Act
stipulates that mandate of an arbitrator would terminate if he de juro
or de facto is unable to perform his functions or for other reasons
fails to act without undue delay. An arbitrator must use reasonable
dispatch in conducting the proceedings and making an award.
Undue delay leads to termination of the mandate of the arbitrator.
18. I may also note that under Section 14(2) of the Act in case
there is controversy whether mandate of an arbitrator stands
terminated, a party can apply to the court to decide on the
termination of the mandate. Russels on Arbitration, 22nd Edition at
pages 140 and 143 has referred to the provisions of the English
Arbitration Act, 1996 which stipulates that it is the duty of an
arbitration tribunal to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and
breach thereof is a ground for removal.
19. Under Section 34 of the Act, an award is void if it is contrary to
public policy. The expression „Public Policy‟ has been explained in
ONGC Ltd versus Saw Pipes Ltd., reported in (2003) 5 SCC 705
as under:-
OMP No.241-2006 Page No.11
"31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase "public policy of India" used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term "public policy" in Renusagar case it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be -- award could be set aside if it is contrary to:
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.
Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void."
20. It is natural and normal for any arbitrator to forget contentions
and pleas raised by the parties during the course of arguments, if
there is a huge gap between the last date of hearing and the date on
which the award is made. An Arbitrator should make and publish an OMP No.241-2006 Page No.12
award within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time is flexible
and depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. Is case
there is delay, it should be explained. Abnormal delay without
satisfactory explanation is undue delay and causes prejudice. Each
case has an element of public policy in it. Arbitration proceedings to
be effective, just & fair, must be concluded expeditiously. Counsel
for the respondent had submitted that this Court should examine
and go into merits and demerits of the claims and counter claims
with reference to the written submissions, claim petition, reply,
document etc. for deciding whether the award is justified. In other
words, counsel for the respondent wanted the Court to step into the
shoes of the Arbitrator or as an appellate court decide the present
objections under Section 34 of the Act with reference to the said
documents. This should not be permitted and allowed as it will
defeat the very purpose of arbitration and would result into full
fledged hearing or trial before the Court, while adjudicating
objections under Section 34 of the Act. Objections are required to
be decided on entirely different principles and an award is not a
judgment. Under the Act, an Arbitrator is supposed to be sole judge
of facts and law. Courts have limited power to set aside an award as
provided in Section 34 of the Act. The Act, therefore, imposes
additional responsibility and obligation upon an Arbitrator to make
and publish an award within a reasonable time and without undue OMP No.241-2006 Page No.13
delay. Arbitrators are not required to give detailed judgments, but
only indicate grounds or reasons for rejecting or accepting claims. A
party must have satisfaction that the learned Arbitrator was
conscious and had taken into consideration their contentions and
pleas before rejecting or partly rejecting their claims. This is a right
of a party before an Arbitrator and the same should not be denied.
An award which is passed after a period of three years from the date
of last effective hearing, without satisfactory explanation for the
delay, will be contrary to justice and would defeat justice. It defeats
the very purpose and the fundamental basis for alternative dispute
redressal. Delay which is patently bad and unexplained, constitutes
undue delay and therefore unjust.
21. Moreover in the present case learned Arbitrator has proceeded
to make and pronounce the award even without finally concluding
the hearings. Order-sheets reveal that hearings and argument had
not concluded on 14.11.2002 and thereafter no further arguments
were addressed but the matter was adjourned to be heard. Ld.
arbitrator was to fix a date for the said purpose and notify parties.
No substantial hearing took place on 2.12.2003 and the Arbitrator
also did not close the hearing. Learned Arbitrator on 2.12.2003 had
stated that he would inform parties about the next date of hearing.
Thereafter no date was fixed and no hearing was held. Learned
Arbitrator proceeded and has made and published his award. It is OMP No.241-2006 Page No.14
apparent that the ld. Arbitrator was in a hurry as he had resigned
and had to take up a new employment. The award in question is
contrary to principles of fair play and justice. Justice should not only
be done but should manifestly be seen to be done.
22. In view of the above, the award dated 21st February, 2006, is
set aside. The objector will be entitled to costs.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 22, 2008.
NA/P
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