Shri Mangi Lal Meena vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Others
2008 Latest Caselaw 1605 Del

*          HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI

+          Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4579 of 1998


                      Judgment reserved on: August 26, 2008

%                     Judgment delivered on: September 10, 2008


Shri Mangi Lal Meena
Ex-Sub-inspector No.D 1925
S/o Shri Jagannath Meena
R/o H.No.232, Gali No.10
I-Block, Hari Nagar Extn.
Badarpur, New Delhi-110044                          ..... Petitioner.

                      Through Dr. M.P. Raju with Ms. Y. Kalivi
                              Zhimomi, Advocates.
                      Versus

    1. Lt. Governor, Delhi
       Through Commissioner of Police
       Police Headquarters
       New Delhi.

    2. Shri Vijay Karan
       Ex-Commissioner of Police, Delhi
       To be served through Commissioner
       of Police, Delhi.

    3. Dy. Commissioner of Police (South)
       Police Headquarters, Delhi.

    4. Addl. Commissioner of Police
       South Range, Delhi.

    5. Shri Harbans Lal
       A.C.P., DE Cell (Vigilance)
       Delhi.


WP(C) No.4579/98                                              Page 1 of 6
      6. Central Administrative Tribunal,
        through its Registrar
        Principal Bench, Faridkot House
        Copernicus Marg
        New Delhi.                                     ..... Respondents

                                  Through Nemo

Coram:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.R. MIDHA

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
   be allowed to see the judgment?                                Yes

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?                             Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported
   in the Digest?                                                 Yes

MADAN B. LOKUR, J.

The question for our consideration is whether the

departmental inquiry held against the Petitioner was in accordance with

law or not. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Central

Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) that there was no error in the

conduct of the inquiry.

2. The Petitioner was a sub-inspector in the Delhi Police and a

departmental inquiry was held against him on the following charges:

(i) On 9.9.1988 while he was posted at P.S. Lajpat Nagar, he failed to report the action taken on D.D. entry No.14-A dated 9.9.1988 which was entrusted to him for enquiry.

(ii) On 9.9.1988 at about 10.30 P.M. the applicant along with Shri Sandeep Mehta and local police visited premises No.E-84, Lajpat Nagar, to the residence of one Shri Sudershan Kumar Sehgal and misbehaved and manhandled his brother and family members. He also ill- treated Shri Sehgal brothers and one Shri Dwarka Nath on the same night.

3. The inquiry officer found the Petitioner guilty of misconduct

and his report was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority, who then

passed an order dismissing him from service with effect from 10th

August, 1990. It appears that the Petitioner was under suspension from

21st November, 1989 to 5th February, 1990 and this period was treated as

not spent on duty.

4. Feeling aggrieved, the Petitioner filed an Original

Application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985

in which a large number of contentions were urged. Some of these

contentions were translated into oral submissions before the Tribunal.

They were all negatived by the Tribunal and that is how the Petitioner is

now before us.

5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner advanced three

contentions before us but we are not impressed with any one of them. It

was firstly submitted (without much vehemence) that there was no

evidence on the basis of which the Petitioner could have been held

guilty of the charges leveled against him.

6. We have gone through the evidence on record and find that

as many as 13 prosecution witnesses were examined followed by 9

defence witnesses. On a reading of the evidence, it is clear that this was

not a case of no evidence as contended by learned counsel. The persons

with whom the Petitioner is alleged to have misbehaved entered the

witness box and supported the complaint made against him. In our

opinion, the first contention urged by the Petitioner deserves to be

rejected.

7. It was then contended by learned counsel that the preliminary

inquiry report was not supplied to the Petitioner and, therefore, he was

unable to effectively cross-examine the witnesses. We find that no such

objection was raised by the Petitioner during the inquiry proceedings.

The Petitioner had access to the record of the preliminary inquiry and he

had cross-examined the witnesses on that basis. It is true that the

prosecution witnesses merely reiterated what they had stated in the

preliminary inquiry and did not make a detailed statement in the

examination-in-chief. But, as far as we are concerned, this did not cause

any prejudice to the Petitioner nor did the Petitioner complain against

this procedure. Perhaps the Inquiry Officer resorted to this procedure to

save time but as long as he made available to the Petitioner the

statement of the witnesses recorded in the preliminary inquiry, and as

long as the Petitioner could cross-examine the witnesses on the basis of

those statements, no prejudice was caused to him and none has been

shown to us. Therefore, we do not see any material irregularity having

been committed by the Inquiry Officer in following the procedure that

he did.

8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision of the

Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1974 SC 2335

but we find that this case is not at all applicable to the present situation.

In that case it was found that the statements of the witnesses during the

preliminary inquiry were not supplied to the delinquent official but only

a synopsis was given. In that context, it was held that the delinquent

official was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The

fact situation in the present case is different in as much as the Petitioner

had access to the statements of persons examined in the preliminary

inquiry.

9. The third contention of learned counsel for the Petitioner is

that the Inquiry Officer behaved as the prosecuting officer and,

therefore, the Petitioner was prejudiced. That the Petitioner must show

prejudice (and not merely allege it) as is now settled and in this

connection we may refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1986 SC 2118.

We find that the Petitioner did not raise any such contention relating to

prejudice before the Tribunal and so we do not think it appropriate to

permit him to raise this issue for the first time in the present writ

petition.

10. Moreover, we find that it is the Petitioner's submission that

merely because the Inquiry Officer questioned the witnesses, that by

itself vitiated the inquiry. This is too farfetched a proposition to accept.

Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not pointed out any specific

question or set of questions which could lead to the belief that the

Inquiry Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction. The contention is too

broad for acceptance.

11. No other point has been urged before us.

12. We do not find any merit in the writ petition. It is

accordingly dismissed.

                                              MADAN B. LOKUR, J



September 10, 2008                            J.R. MIDHA, J
vk

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