Delhi High Court
Ganga Pashad Tiwari vs Khyber Pass Mess Hostel Committee ... on 27 November, 2008
Author: Mukul Mudgal
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ 7. LPA 2118/2006
DATE OF DECISION : 27th November, 2008
GANGA PASHAD TIWARI ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. A.K. Jain, Advocate.
versus
KHYBER PASS MESS HOSTEL COMMITTEE & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Ms. Jyoti Singh and Mr. Ankur Chhibbar,
Advocates.
Mr. D.K. Pandey for Mr. V.K. Tandon, Advocates for
Respondent No. 3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKUL MUDGAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the digest?
JUDGMENT
MUKUL MUDGAL, J: (ORAL)
1. This appeal challenges the order dated 15th September, 2006 passed
by learned Single Judge of this Court. In the impugned judgment, the
learned Single Judge, in our opinion, has taken a view which has
completely misinterpreted Section 33 (C) (2) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (hereinafter to be referred as the 'Act').
2. The learned Single Judge has observed in paragraph-6 of the
impugned judgment as under:-
"6. A perusal of the record would show that the award
dated 14.12.1989 passed by Labour Court N. VII was an
ex-parte award and the court had not considered the
question whether the petitioner was a workman or not.
The present award which is subject matter of challenge
was not before the same Presiding Officer who presided
the Labour Court VII. The present proceedings were
under Section 33C(2) while the earlier award was on a
reference made by the appropriate Government. It is
settled law that the judgment and opinion of one Labour
Court is not binding on the other Labour Court. It is only
the judgments of High Court and Supreme Court which
have binding effect on the lower courts. Labour Court
No. III which passed the impugned award was not bound
by the findings given by Labour Court VII. Every
subordinate court has to give judgments and orders in
conformity with the law laid down by High Courts and
Supreme Court. The law laid down by Supreme Court
has a binding effect on the lower courts under Article 14
of the Constitution of India and could not have been
ignored by the Labour Court."
(emphasis supplied)
3. In our view, the impugned judgment in holding that a Labour Court
under Section 33C(2) of the Act is not bound by the findings given by the
earlier Labour Court has totally misconstrued Section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the impugned judgment is in fact contrary
to the settled position of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State of U.P. and Anr. vs. Brijpal Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 58 and the
following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:-
(i) Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. vs. Suresh Chand, (1978)2SCC144,
(ii) Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr, (1995) 1
SCC 235
(iii) State Bank of India vs. Ram Chandra Dubey and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC
73.
4. In fact, the learned Single Judge has totally erred in observing that it
is settled law that the judgment and opinion of one Labour Court is not
binding upon the other Labour Court. This judgment has totally lost sight
of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs.
Brijpal Singh (supra). In paragraph-10 of the aforesaid judgment, the
hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"10. .............. Thereafter, the labour Court, in the instant
case, cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an
Industrial Tribunal and entertain the claim made by the
respondent herein which is not based on an existing right
but which may appropriately be made the subject matter
of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10
of the I.D. Act. Therefore, the Labour Court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim made by the
respondent herein under Section 33C(2) of the I. D. Act
in an undetermined claim and until such adjudication is
made by the appropriate forum, the respondent-workman
cannot ask the Labour Court in an application under
Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act to disregard his dismissal
as wrongful and on that basis to compute his wages."
5. Section 33C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read as
following:-
"33C. RECOVERY OF MONEY DUE FROM AN
EMPLOYER.
(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an
employer under a settlement or an award or under the
provisions of Chapter VA or Chapter VB the workman
himself or any other person authorised by him in writing
in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman,
his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other
mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate
Government for the recovery of the money due to him,
and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any
money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount
to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in
the same manner as an arrear of land revenue :
Provided that every such application shall be made
within one year from the date on which the money
became due to the workman from the employer:
Provided further that any such application may be
entertained after the expiry of the said period of one
year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the
applicant had sufficient cause for not making the
application within the said period.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the
employer any money or any benefit which is capable of
being computed in terms of money and if any question
arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount
at which such benefit should be computed, then the
question may, subject to any rules that may be made
under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may
be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government
within a period not exceeding three months.
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour
Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such
period by such further period as he may think fit."
6. A bare perusal of the said sub-sections (1) and (2) show that all
that the labour court is required to do is to compute the amount
capable of being payable to the employee and to permit a Labour
Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act to revisit the finding arrived at
the time the award was rendered would lead to judicial anarchy
besides rewriting both Sections 33C(1) and (2). We are, therefore, not
in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge.
This apart we believe that whenever in a judgment it is written that it
is settled law it would be appropriate that the relevant judgment be
referred according to which the law is stated to be settled. By not
following such a practice it becomes extremely difficult for an
Appellate Court to examine a judgment in appeal.
7. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed but in the circumstances
without costs. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside.
The matter is now remanded back to the Labour Court to determine
the amount due to the petitioner under the award dated 14th December,
1989. Taking into account, the fact that the matter has been pending
for almost two decades, the Labour Court is directed to dispose of the
matter not later than four months from the first hearing which is fixed
as 7th January, 2009. The Registry of this Court is directed to send
back the record of the Labour Court by courier on or before 25th
December, 2008.
MUKUL MUDGAL, J
MANMOHAN, J
NOVEMBER 27, 2008
sb
