Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 2078 Del
Judgement Date : 25 November, 2008
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 07.11.2008
% Judgment delivered on: 25.11.2008
+ (1) W.P.(C) 19350/2006
MALARVIZHI ELANGOVAN ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. R.K. Saini with Mr. Nikhil
Bhalla, Advocates.
versus
DIRECTOR OF ESTATES & ORS ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajesh Mahajan, Advocate for
NDMC.
Ms. Namrata Toppo for Mr. R. V.
Sinha, Advocate for respondents 1
and 2.
And
(2) W.P(C)No.19447/06
GANGA DEVI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. R.K. Saini with Mr. Nikhil
Bhalla, Advocates.
versus
DIRECTOR OF ESTATES & ORS ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajesh Mahajan, Advocate for
NDMC.
Ms. Namrata Toppo for Mr. R. V.
Sinha, Advocate for respondents 1
and 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may Yes
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
W.P(C) Nos.19350/06 & 19447/06 Page 1 of 22
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest?
VIPIN SANGHI, J.
1. I am dealing with the aforesaid two petitions by this common
judgment since the facts are more or less identical, except that the
specific dates in the two cases are different. The appeals preferred
by the petitioners in these two petitions under Section 9 of the Public
Premises (Occupation of Unauthorized Occupants) Act ("The Act" for
short) have been dismissed by the Ld. Additional District Judge by a
common order impugned herein. For the present, I am narrating the
relevant facts in W.P.(C) No.19350/06 preferred by Malarvizhi
Elangovan.
2. The Directorate of Estates made an allotment of stall no.4 DIZ
Area, Baba Kharag Singh Marg, New Delhi in favour of one Mohd.
Zaffar on licence basis on 5.8.1998. The said allotment was made
after inviting a tender. The licence was valid for a period of three
years. Clause 16 of the licence deed, being relevant is reproduced
herein below:-
"The allotment of the shop/stall is being made for a limited period of three years. The Government shall, however, sympathetically consider renewal of the licence for a further period of three years with a like term permitting further renewal if the licensee has not been in default of any term of the licence; provided always that the total period of licence together with renewed term shall not in any case exceed 30 years and further that the renewal of the licence, if any, shall be subject to increase in the
licence fee as may be found reasonable by the Government and fulfillment by the licensee of such terms and conditions of the licences as may be prescribed by the Government from time to time."
3. During the currency of the said licence, the original licencee,
Mohd. Zaffar entered into a partnership with the petitioner on
11.05.1999 to jointly carry out business from the licenced premises.
4. The partnership deed aforesaid was dissolved on 20.1.2002
and the assets and liabilities of the said firm were taken over by the
petitioner. The petitioner continued to be in occupation of the stall
and also continued to pay the enhanced license fee to the Directorate
of Estate.
5. In the allotment letter dated 5.8.1998, it was stipulated that
the premises shall not be transferred or sublet to any other person and
in case of default, the allotment would be cancelled straightaway and
premises resumed by the Government besides taking any other action
that the Govt. may be advised. Clause 8 of the licence deed prohibited
the licensee from permitting any other person from using the same
without the previous consent in writing of the government. In default
of the said condition, the licensee was liable for ejectment. The
licensee was also precluded from introducing any partner or from
parting with possession of the premises or otherwise carrying on any
business in the premises with any other person or to assign, transfer,
charge or otherwise alienate his interest in the premises.
6. Even prior to the issuance of the licence in favour of Mohd.
Zaffar, the Directorate of Estates issued an office order on 25.7.1996.
By this order, the Government decided to allow regularization of
shops/stalls etc in the names of partners/occupants who had come
into occupation of the premises on or before 20.01.1989, on certain
terms and conditions.
7. Admittedly the petitioner's case was not covered by the said
office order since the said order applied only in respect of the
shops/stalls and platforms in respect whereof the persons/occupants
had come into occupation on or before 20.10.1989.
8. The Directorate of Estates issued a public notice dated
06.08.2001. By this notice, the Director of Estates invited applications
from occupants of fourteen markets for grant of ownership rights.
Amongst the categories of persons who were eligible for consideration
for grant of ownership rights, occupants who had come in undisputed
occupation after 20.10.1989 and upto 31.08.2000 were also included.
However the petitioner's case was not covered by this notice, since the
market at Baba Kharak Singh Marg was not enlisted as one of the
markets to which this notice applied.
9. Director of Estates issued a show cause notice to Sh. Mohd.
Zaffar on 11.03.2004 alleging breach of conditions of the licence. It
was alleged that he had sublet the stall and he had made unauthorized
construction. He was asked to explain why the allotment be not
cancelled. The petitioner responded to the Show Cause Notice, and
this was followed by an order dated 27.05.2004, cancelling the licence
granted to Mr. Mohd. Zaffar at the expiry of the month of August
2004.
10. The Estate Officer/Directorate of Estates initiated eviction
proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants), Act 1971 by addressing notices dated 11.03.2004 to "All
persons concerned in particular Sh. Mohd. Zaffar", under Section 4 of
the Act. It was alleged in the notice that Mohd. Zaffar had continued
in occupation of the premises in question even after its allotment stood
cancelled w.e.f. 1.9.2004 vide Department of Estates Order dated
27.05.2004. These proceedings were defended by the petitioner
before the Estate Officer. The said notice culminated in an eviction
order dated 15.12.2005 passed under Section 5(1) of the Act. An
appeal was preferred by Malarvizhi Elangovan, the present petitioner,
before the District Judge under Section 9(1) of the Act bearing PPA
No.18/06.
11. In the case of Ganga Devi (the petitioner in W.P.(C)
No.19447/2006) the relevant facts are that the Directorate of Estates
allotted open stall No.1, DIZ Area, Baba Kharag Singh Marg, New Delhi
to one Sh. Maheshi Dhaundiyal on licence basis on 04.08.1998. A
partnership was entered into between Sh. Maheshi Dhaundiyal and the
petitioner on 12.06.2000 for jointly carrying out the business of motor
vehicle repair/job work and accessories from the stall in question. This
partnership was dissolved on 03.08.2000 and the petitioner took over
all the assets and liabilities of the partnership including all rights, title
and interest in the allotment of the premises in question. It appears
that the allotment in favour of Sh. Maheshi Dhaundiyal was cancelled
w.e.f. 01.09.2004 vide letter dated 27.05.2004 and the Estate Officer
initiated proceedings under Section 4 of the Act against him and all
other person concerned by issuing a notice. The petitioner responded
in response to the show cause notice before the Estate Officer. The
same culminated into the passing of the eviction order dated
15.12.2005 by the Estate Officer. The petitioner Smt. Ganga Devi
preferred an appeal before the District Judge bearing P.P.A.
No.15/2006 under Section 9(1) of the Act.
12. By a common order passed in the aforesaid two appeals, the
learned Additional District Judge has dismissed the appeals on the
ground that the petitioners had failed to show that the allotment of the
premises in question had been regularized in their respective favour.
13. The first submission of Mr. Saini, learned counsel for the
petitioners in both the writ petitions, is that the allotments in question
had been made by inviting tenders. The allotments were made purely
for commercial considerations. The licence was renewable for a period
of upto 30 years with periodic enhancement in the lincence fee. The
primary concern of the respondents was that the licence fee is
regularly paid and the stalls/premises in question are utilized for the
purpose for which the licence was granted, and that the other terms
and conditions of the licence are complied with. It really does not
matter as to who is in occupation of the premises. The respondent,
Directorate of Estates, had even earlier on two different occasions,
recognized the transferees/ occupants and regularized the licence in
their favour. He submits that there is no reason why the petitioners
should not have been treated similarly. The further submission of Mr.
Saini is that during the pendency of the petitioners appeals before the
learned District Judge the Directorate of Estates had transferred the
market in question to the NDMC by issuing a public notice. The
relevant part of the public notice reads as follows: -
"Government of India had decided to transfer the markets under the control of Land & Development Office, Directorate of Estates and Central Public Works Department (except Indira Chowk, Rajiv Chowk and I.N.A. Complex) comprising shops and flats, over the shops (excluding as the general pool flats, over the shops in R.K. Puram Market, Srinivaspuri, Andrews Ganj, Nanakpur and Lancer Road Markets) to the New Delhi Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation of Delhi on "as is where is" basis.
Consequent upon transfer of these markets, NDMC and MCD will function as the Lessor or Licensor, in respect of shops and flats in these markets and shall exercise all powers being performed by Land & Development Office, Directorate of Estates and Central Public Works Department as the case may be as lessor or licensor, in the matter of substitution/mutation of title, Gift Permission, Sale Permission, Mortgage Permission, Conversion of lease hold into freehold, change of use of premises, regularization/restoration of allotment of shops etc.
The transfer of Markets will take effect from 01st April, 2006 and transfer of all records shall be completed by 30th April, 2006.
With effect from 1.4.2006, all applications in respect of these markets may be submitted to the concerned local body. The names and addresses of the nodal officers of the local bodies are give below:
New Delhi Municipal Council Sh. D. Verma, Director (Recovery) NDMC,
10th Floor, Palika Kendra, Sansad Marg, New Delhi - 110001.
(Tel. No.23340638)" (emphasis supplied)
14. He submits that once the market in question had been
transferred to the NDMC, post 01.04.2006 the NDMC was obliged to
follow its own stated policy for allowing mutation in favour of a
partner/sub-lettee, which the NDMC had been applying in respect of
the markets which were already under its control and management.
He submits that the NDMC has a uniform and ongoing policy for this
purpose. The petitioner has placed on record the gist of the said policy
as downloaded from the website of the NDMC. The relevant extract
from the said policy reads as follows:
"TRANSFER OF ALLOTMENT Transfer of allotment is made as per policies/resolutions of NDMC.
Partnership:
Partnership or subletting is allowed after enhancement of licence fee at rates fixed by Council from time to time."
15. Mr. Saini further submits that the treatment meted out to the
petitioners by the NDMC is also partisan, inasmuch as, in respect of
another similar appeal being P.P.A. No.127/2005 preferred by one Mrs.
Poonam Singh, also a sub-lettee in the same market, which was
decided on 13.04.2006 (and the appeals in the case of the petitioners
were decided later on 05.12.2006), the learned ADJ had remanded the
case back for reconsideration by the Estate Officer. However, when
the petitioners appeals were heard the respondent NDMC did not act
fairly by bringing to the notice of the learned ADJ the order passed in
the case Poonam Singh, who was identically situated. It is argued that
in all fairness, the respondents should have themselves pointed out
the order passed in Poonam Singh's case so that their appeals could
also be remanded back before the Estate Officer for reconsideration.
16. I may, at this stage, take note of certain other developments
which have taken place during the pendency of the writ petition. The
writ petitions had earlier come up before the Court on 08.09.2008. It
had then been brought to the notice of the Court that there were
substantial amounts of damages outstanding from the petitioners
which had not been paid by them. Since the interim stay of
dispossession had been granted in both these writ petitions at the
initial stage subject to payment of licence fee/ damages, this Court
vacated the interim stay in both the matters. Both the writ petitioners
preferred Letters Patent Appeals bearing L.P.A. Nos.556/2008 and
558/2008, respectively, against the orders dated 08.09.2008. The
said LPAs were dispossessed off by the by the Division Bench on
15.09.2008. The Division Bench requested this Court to dispose off
the writ petitions within a period of three months from the date of the
said order and granted relief against dispossession subject to their
depositing the amounts due.
17. The matters were thereafter listed before this Court on
01.10.2008 by the Registry. They were listed for hearing on
05.11.2008. On 05.11.2008 they were directed to be listed on
06.11.2008. In the meantime, the petitioner in W.P.(C)
No.19350/2006 filed C.M. No.15102/2008 seeking a direction to the
respondent Nos.1 & 3 to disclose whether the NDMC has approached
the Central Government for granting permission to regularize the
stalls/shops in the market in question, in the name of the
occupants/partners, and if so, to disclose the reply of the Central
Government. The petitioners also sought information with regard to
the actual date of implementation of the said proposed regularization.
Since the said application was moved by the petitioner only on
04.11.2008 i.e. just before the date of hearing, I did not permit an
adjournment of the matter to call for a reply in the said application,
particularly considering the fact that the petitioners had agreed to the
disposal of the writ petitions within three months from the date of
order of the Hon'ble Division Bench. Counsel for the NDMC, Mr.
Mahajan categorically stated that there is no such proposal sent by the
NDMC to the Central Government, as is sought to be made out by the
petitioners in C.M.No. 15102/2008. After the arguments were heard
and judgment reserved on 7.11.2008, the learned counsel for the
petitioner, Mr. Saini mentioned another application on 17.11.2008 with
advance copy to counsel for the respondents, which was permitted to
be listed on 18.11.2008. By moving C.M.No.15669/08 in
W.P(C)No.19350/2006, the petitioners sought to place on record the
information/document received from the respondent NDMC in
response to the queries made under the Right to Information Act.
After hearing the parties, I directed that the documents filed along
with the application would be taken into account. Based on the said
documents, another submission of Mr. Saini, learned counsel for the
petitioners is that a proposal is pending before the Government of
India, recommended by the NDMC to regularize the shops/stalls in the
name of the occupants/partners, in a similar fashion as had been done
in the year 1996 and 2001 by the Directorate of Estates.
18. These petitions are opposed by the learned counsel for the
NDMC.
19. Mr. Mahajan submits that admittedly the petitioner's case is
not covered by the office order dated 25.07.1996 issued by the
Directorate of Estates or by the public notice dated 06.08.2001
aforesaid. Admittedly, the allotment in favour of the erstwhile
licensees had been cancelled in both the cases and proceedings under
the Act had been initiated. There was no defence raised by the
petitoners and the Estate Officer had rightly passed the eviction
orders. Mr. Mahajan submitted that vide a notification dated
24.03.2006 bearing SO-404(E) issued by the Ministry of Urban
Development, the Central Government decided to transfer the markets
under the land and development office, Directorate of Estates and
Central Public Works Department comprising of shops and flats over
the shops to, inter alia, the NDMC on "as is where is" basis. Clause 3
of the said notification provides as follows:
"On transfer of these markets, New Delhi Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation of Delhi will function
as the lessor or Licensor, in respect of shops and flats in these markets and shall exercise all powers being performed by Land & Development Office, Directorate of Estates and Central Public Works Department, as the case may be, as the lessor or licensor. The guidelines and procedure followed by Land & Development Office and Directorate of Estates in the matter of substitution/mutation of title, Gift Permission, Sale Permission, Mortgage Permission, Conversion of lease hold into freehold, change of use of premises, regularization/restoration of allotment of shops etc., change of trade, conferment of ownership rights, recovery of misuse/damages charges etc. may also be followed by the local bodies viz. New Delhi Municipal Council and Municipal Corporation of Delhi."
20. Mr. Mahajan submits that in respect of the markets
transferred to NDMC, which included the premises in question situated
on Baba Kharag Singh Market, the NDMC had decided to continue to
apply the same guidelines as were in application when these markets
were under the control and jurisdiction of the Directorate of Estates
and the set of rules and guidelines, inter alia, for the purpose of
transfer of allotment in favour of the partner / occupant being
followed by NDMC in relation to various other markets under its
management from before had not been made applicable to such
transferred markets. He also argued that the case of Poonam Singh
was materially different from that of the petitioners. He submits that
in the case of Poonam Singh, the remand was directed by the learned
ADJ to the Estate Officer for re-consideration, primarily for two
reasons: the first was that the appellant Poonam Singh had relied
upon the cases of Ved Rajol, occupant of Stall No. 6 and Sh. Nasir
Ahmed, occupant of Stall No. 7. The cases of both these occupants
was covered by the scheme of regularization floated by the Directorate
of Estates on 25.07.1996 as these occupants had come into occupation
of premises on or before 20.01.1989. Mr. Mahajan has produced
photocopies of the partnership deeds executed by the original allottees
in favour of Sh. Ved Rajol and Sh. Nasir Ahmed respectively which are
dated 22.08.1988 and 19.02.1988. Secondly, the learned ADJ in the
case of Poonam Singh had found that the appellant Poonam Singh had
not been given a proper hearing, and that there was a violation of
principle of natural justice in her case. Mr. Mahajan, therefore, argues
that the case of Poonam Singh cannot be relied upon by the petitioners
and there was no discrimination in the approach of the respondents
before the Estate Officer or the learned ADJ against the petitioners.
Mr. Mahajan also relied upon Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. U.O.I
(2000) 10 SCC 664 to submit that the courts, in exercise of their
jurisdiction, would not transgress in the field of policy decisions as the
courts are ill equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision of the
Government. When two or more options or views are possible, and
after considering them the Government takes a policy decision, it is
then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in
a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.
21. Mr. R.K. Saini, counsel for the petitioner made his
submissions in the rejoinder. Mr. Saini submitted that the
discriminatory approach of the respondent vis-à-vis Poonam Singh's
case lay in not bringing to the notice of the learned ADJ the fact that
the case of Poonam Singh is not covered by the public notice dated
25.07.1996 issued by the Directorate of Estates. It is argued that the
respondent should have pointed out in the case of Poonam Singh that
the cases of Ved Rajol and Nasir Ahmed are distinct from that of
Poonam Singh, which the respondents deliberately did not do. It is
also argued that the so called policy adopted by the respondent NDMC
to apply a different set of rules and guidelines in relation to markets
transferred to NDMC vide notification dated 24.03.2006 is
discriminatory. Once the transferred markets became a part of the
pool of markets being managed by the NDMC, there was no rationale
in treating the said markets differently and in denying the benefit of
the same liberal policies which the NDMC applies to other markets
owned and managed by it from before.
22. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties I am
inclined to agree with the submissions of the petitioners and to allow
the writ petitions.
23. The premises in question was allotted to the original allottees
against public auction and by charging licnese fee. The license fee
itself was revised from time to time. These allotments were not made
out of any other consideration apart from monetary considerations.
The original license deed itself shows that the intention was to grant a
long term license of up to 30 years. Therefore, unless there was a
serious and un-remedied breach of an essential term of the license,
normally the same would not be terminated. No doubt the license of
the original allottees, in the present cases, were terminated since it
was not open to induct a partner or to transfer or sublet the premises
to a stranger without the prior permission of the Directorate of
Estates. It cannot be argued that the said breach was not a material
breach and that the termination of the licnese as originally done by the
Directorate of Estates was bad in law. However, the matter does not
end there. While the appeals filed by the petitioners under Section 9
were pending before the learned ADJ, Baba Kharag Singh Market stood
transferred to the NDMC. On transfer of the market to NDMC, the
NDMC became entitled to exercise the power being exercised by the
Land & Development Office, Directorate of Estates as licenser. Mr.
Mahajan, to justify the adoption of a different policy in respect of the
transferred markets, from the policy adopted in markets owned and
governed by it from before, has laid great emphasis on Para 3 of the
notification dated 24.03.2006 which states: "The guidelines and
procedure followed by Land & Development Office and Directorate of
Estates in the matter of substitution/mutation of title, Gift Permission,
Sale Permission, Mortgage Permission, Conversion of lease hold into
freehold, change of use of premises, regularization/restoration of
allotment of shops etc., change of trade, conferment of ownership
rights, recovery of misuse/damages charges etc. may also be followed
by the local bodies viz. New Delhi Municipal Council and Municipal
Corporation of Delhi." The submission of Mr. Mahajan is that the
markets were transferred to the NDMC with the express stipulation
that the guidelines and procedures followed by Land & Development
Office and Directorate of Estates, inter alia, in the matter of
substitution / mutation of title would continue to govern the occupants
of the shops / stalls being transferred and, therefore, the NDMC is
justified in not applying its more liberalized norms to such markets.
24. I do not agree with the interpretation given by the
respondents to the notification dated 24.03.2006. By the aforesaid
extract of Para 3 of the notification dated 24.03.2006, in my view, the
Central Government desired that after transfer of the markets to, inter
alia, NDMC, the rights and privilege being enjoyed by the occupants in
relation to, inter alia, mutation/substitution of title should be
preserved so that the occupants are not faced with either more
stringent rules and regulations or a complete ban in that regard.
However, it could not mean that if more liberalized policies and norms
were in vogue in the NDMC in relation to any of the matters including
substitution/mutation of title, the occupants of the transferred markets
would be denied the benefit of such policies and norms. Once the
markets were being transferred, inter alia, to NDMC it was not for the
Land & Development Office or the Directorate of Estates to tell the
transferee NDMC how it should deal with the aspects of, inter alia,
substitution/mutation, except to say that the pre existing rights of the
occupants be not adversely affected. While providing for the
protection of the rights of the allottees/occupants, inter alia, in respect
of substitution/mutation of ownership, all that the Central Government
did was to recognize the vested rights of the allottees/occupants, since
the same could not have been altered to their disadvantage merely on
account of the transfer of ownership and management of the markets
to, inter alia, the NDMC. The NDMC was not, and could not have been
prohibited its own policy with regard to the manner in which it deals
with occupants and allottees inter alia in relation to substitution /
mutation of title. The imposition of such a condition by the Directorate
of Estates while transferring the markets to, inter alia, NDMC would
militate against the concept of the transfer itself, which clearly states
that "on transfer, NDMC.......... will function as the lessor or licensor in
respect of shops an shall exercise all powers being performed
by.............. Directorate of Estates as lessor or licensor". The aforesaid
interpretation of the notification dated 24.03.2006 also finds support
from the stand taken by the Directorate of Estates in their response
dated 08.07.2008 to the communication dated 21.05.2008 sent by the
NDMC. The NDMC sent a communication dated 21.05.2008 to the
Directorate of Estates, Ministry of Urban Development, which stated as
follows:
"Sir,
The representative of market associations of the markets transferred to NDMC by the Dte of Estates are time and again representing for revision of prescribed cut off date i.e. 20-10-89 for transfer of shops in the names of the occupants entered into premises on sub-letting/partnership basis and are running their business.
Their representation have been examined and considered and it has been felt that as the cut off date is quite old now nearly about 20 years thus requires revision as many shops may have changed hands and operating business without paying any enhanced licence fee to the NDMC.
It is, therefore, requested to guide in this matter on priority."
25. In response, the Directorate of Estates, vide their reply dated
8.7.2008, after setting out the policy being followed by it till the time it
was dealing with the market in question, further stated as follows:-
3. Subsequently, a decision was taken by the Cabinet in October 2005 to transfer all markets under control of DOE, CPWD and L&DO to Local Bodies on "as is where is basis." Accordingly, all records was transferred to NDMC/MCD. In this background the representations of the associations of the non-ownership markets were further considered upto the level of Hon'ble Minister of Urban Development and it was decided that since the administration of markets have been transferred to local bodies, decision in this regard may be left upon them.
4. In view of the above facts and having regard to the fact that all powers to administer the markets now rest with NDMC/MCD, the concerned local body i.e. the NDMC may take appropriate action in this particular case at their end."
26. The Directorate of Estates, therefore, did not even remotely
suggest that its policies, which were being implemented till the market
in question was under its control and regulation, should be continued
to be applied by the NDMC. The decision has been left to NDMC to
take since the market stands transferred to it. In all fairness, the
respondent NDMC should have itself placed the aforesaid documents
on record. At least when the petitioner made a categorical statement
that the NDMC has itself favourably recommended the
substitution/mutation in favour of the occupants, the NDMC should not
have denied the same. Instances like this erode the confidence that
the Court reposes in favour of public bodies in relation to their
statements on the assumption that they would act fairly as no one has
a personal interest in the matter.
27. Since the refusal of the NDMC to substitute/mutate the
stalls/shops in question stems from its wrong interpretation and
understanding of the meaning of para 3 of the notification dated
24.3.2006, the same cannot be sustained. Having itself recommended
the grant of permission to substitute/mutate the shops/stalls in favour
of the occupants, so as to be able to recover the enhanced licence fee,
the respondent NDMC has not been able to show any good reason not
to go by its own recommendation despite the Directorate of Estates
giving it a "go ahead" to do as it considers proper.
28. No doubt, the court would not interfere with a policy decision
of the Government merely because the policy adopts one of the many
possible views. However, that does not mean that if the policy
adopted by the NDMC is discriminatory the Court has to remain a mute
spectator. If the policy itself is discriminatory and arbitrary, the Court
will certainly step in to remove the discrimination and arbitrariness in
the policy decision. Even in Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. U.O.I
(supra) the Court held that "the Court, no doubt, has a duty to see
that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's
fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent
permissible under the constitution".
29. Once the transferred markets have got merged in the pool of
markets being managed by the NDMC from before, it does not stand to
reason that the NDMC should adopt a different yardstick in respect of
such transferred market and give the occupants / allottees of such
markets step motherly treatment. Merely because market in question
i.e. Baba Kharag Singh Market has fallen into the lap of NDMC by
virtue of the notification dated 24.03.2006, it does not mean that the
policy with regard to substitution/mutation of ownership for that
market can be different from the one adopted by NDMC for all other
markets managed by it. The purpose of granting permission to the
occupant to seek substitution/mutation of the shop/stall in his favour
is to be able to recover the enhanced license fee. As aforesaid, the
shops/stalls in question were given only for monetary considerations.
The classification of the transferred markets, like the Baba Kharag
Singh Market differently from the markets managed by the NDMC from
before does not bear a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be
achieved, i.e. to recover the enhanced license fee. On the contrary,
the said object would stand defeated as stated by NDMC itself in its
letter dated 21.05.2008 aforesaid. The classification is therefore
arbitrary and discriminatory and is quashed. The policy of NDMC to
recognize substitution / mutation of title in favour of partner /
sublettee also does not appear to be restricted to only such cases
where the original allotment has not been cancelled.
30. An appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding. The
NDMC became the licensor and manager of the market in question
during the pendency of the appeals of the petitioners before the
learned ADJ. It, therefore, cannot be said that the eviction
proceedings had attained finality by the time NDMC assumed charge of
the market in question. As soon as the NDMC became the owner and
manager of the said market, the occupants who were still in
occupation of the premises in question became entitled to seek relief
in terms of the stated policy of the NDMC for substitution / mutation in
their respective favour. The respondent NDMC could not have ignored
such a request. It was the positive case of the petitioners both before
learned Estate Officer and the learned ADJ, that they were entitled to
regularization of allotment in view of Government's policy and that
they had represented in this regard. From the impugned order, it
appears that the representation of the petitioners and 10 others were
rejected. From the communication dated 31.10.2005 of Sh. Gulam
Nabi Azad extracted in the order of the learned ADJ, it is seen that at
the time of rejecting the representation of the petitioners seeking
regularization of the allotment in their favour, the issue was not
viewed in the light of the fact that the markets stood transferred to
NDMC vide notification dated 24.03.2006. In fact the said decision
rejecting the representation is of 31.10.2005, that, is even prior to the
issuance of the said notification of March, 2006.
31. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the NDMC is
bound to consider the representation of the petitioners for substitution
/ mutation of the allotment in favour of the petitioners by application
of its policy for transfer of allotments in such like cases and cannot
treat the petitioners differently only on the ground that their stalls are
situated in a market which had been transferred to in March 2006, and
is not in a market which NDMC had been managing from before.
32. I accordingly quash the impugned orders passed by the
learned ADJ in the two cases and direct the NDMC to process the case
of the two petitioners for transfer of allotments in their respective
favour in accordance with its policies. However, in case the petitioners
do not comply with the terms and conditions that may be laid down by
the NDMC in terms of its policy for transfer of allotment, the
petitioners shall be liable to be evicted from their respective stalls
occupied by them. The petition stands disposed of leaving the parties
to bear their respective costs.
(VIPIN SANGHI) JUDGE
NOVEMBER 25, 2008 as/rsk/dp
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