Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 1944 Del
Judgement Date : 4 November, 2008
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI
MAC App. No. 651 of 2007 & CM No.9328 of 2008
% Judgment reserved on: 24th September, 2008
Judgment delivered on: 4th November, 2008
United India Insurance Company Ltd.,
R.O.-II, Scope Minar,
Lakshimi Nagar,
Delhi-110092. ....Appellant
Through: Mr.S.L.Gupta, Adv.
Versus
1.Smt.Reeta Devi,
w/o Late Sh.Dinesh
2.Master Ravinder,
s/o Late Sh.Dinesh
(Minor through his natural guardian,
Mother Smt.Reeta Devi, respondent No.1)
(both are residents of C-43/8,
Indraprashta Colony,
Nathupura, Delhi-84.
3.Subhash Chander,
s/o Sh.mehar Chander
r/o R.G. B-453, Raghubir Nagar,
New Delhi, (Onwer/Driver) ....Respondents.
Through: Mr.Jatinder kumar, Adv. for
respondents 1 & 2.
MAC App.No. 651 of 2007 Page 1 of 32
Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
V.B.Gupta, J.
United Insurance Company Limited, the appellant
in this case, has filed the present appeal under Section
173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short as „Act‟)
challenging the award dated 10th September, 2007
passed by Sh.Chandra Shekhar, Judge, MACT, Delhi
(for short as „Tribunal).
2. The facts in brief of the present case are that on
13th June, 2006 at about 4.15 p.m., deceased Dinesh
along with his wife Reeta Devi was going to Vaishno
Mata Mandir, Gulabi Bagh, Delhi. At the time of
crossing the road, that is, Kali Dass Marg, Vaishno
Mata Mandir, Gulabi Bagh, Delhi, a speeding TSR
No.DL-1RE-4701 came from the side of Chowki No.2 in
a rash and negligent manner and hit the deceased
Dinesh resulting in injuries. Deceased was taken to
Hindu Rao Hospital, Delhi but during the day time he
expired.
3. The vehicle was being driven by respondent No.3
Subhash Chander who is also the owner of the
offending vehicle. Later on respondent No.3 did not
appear and vide order dated 14th May, 2007 passed by
the Tribunal, he was proceeded against ex parte.
4. Respondent No.3 in his written statement stated
that neither he nor the vehicle in question ever
involved in the accident. This respondent rendered the
helping hand at the spot and even called the Police and
since the answering respondent could not tell about
the offending vehicle, for that reason alone, the
claimants falsely implicated him. It is denied that TSR
in question was involved in the accident.
5. Appellant-Insurance Company in its written
statement has admitted that the offending vehicle was
insured with it at the time of accident. Further, it is
stated that the offending vehicle was being driven in
contravention of the terms and conditions of the
insurance policy and as such the appellant is not liable
to pay any compensation.
6. Vide the impugned judgment, the Tribunal
awarded a compensation of Rs.14 lacs to the claimants
along with 7% interest per annum from the date of
institution till the date of award.
7. It has been contended by the learned counsel for
appellant that the income of the deceased comes to
Rs.6086/- per month after deducting personal expenses
and thus, the Tribunal has erred by doubling the
income of deceased as Rs.6,751/- per month, without
making any personal deduction. The Tribunal wrongly
applied the multiplier of 17 for the age of 33 years,
which is on very higher side.
8. Further, the Tribunal has taken the future
prospects of the deceased whereas, the deceased was
not eligible or qualified for the promotion.
9. Moreover, the widow is entitled to family pension
and other benefits and therefore the award is to be
reduced.
10. Lastly, it is contended that it is unjustified that
the bank interest on the FDR on the principal award
amount of Rs.14 Lacs should fetch more interest than
the income of the deceased and the principal amount
shall remain intact as it is forever.
11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
claimants has contended that the judgment of the
Tribunal is well reasoned and compensation awarded
by the Tribunal is just and sufficient and there is
nothing wrong with the findings of the Tribunal.
12. PW2 Smt. Reeta Devi in her evidence by affidavit
has stated that deceased was employed in MCD as
Mali and was earning about Rs.7,000/- per month and
has bright future prospects and his income would have
increased many fold with the passage of time and
experience.
13. Claimants have examined PW1 Sh. Sharafat Khan,
Bill Clerk, MCD who has clearly stated that deceased
Dinesh was a permanent employee in MCD working as
Mali on a gross salary of Rs.6,751 and was entitled for
next increment which was to be made available on
1.04.07 and his date of retirement was 28.02.2033 and
has proved salary certificate Ex.PW1/1.
14. In the absence of any other evidence, income of
the deceased has to be taken at Rs.6,751/- per month
at the time of accident according to the salary
certificate, Ex.PW1/1.
15. As regards the age of the deceased, PW2 Smt.
Reeta Devi in her evidence has stated that at the time
of the accident, deceased was 33 years old.
16. This evidence is duly corroborated by the
photocopy of High School certificate. According to
which date of birth of deceased is 1st March, 1973.
17. Thus, the Tribunal rightly held the age of the
deceased as 33 years.
18. The object of payment of compensation under the
Motor Vehicles Act is to compensate the dependants of
the deceased for the loss of dependency due to the
death of the earning member. The Court has to assess
the quantum of compensation payable to the
dependants which is just proper and reasonable. The
amount of compensation is to be fixed in such a
manner so that it does not amount to undue
enrichment of the dependants since the Court is to
determine the amount of compensation "which it
appears to it to be just". Some amount of guess work
is always allowable in fixing the monthly income as
well as the loss of dependency and consequently the
quantum of compensation.
19. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v.
Krishna Bala & Ors., III (2006) ACC 361 (SC), the
Apex Court has highlighted the manner of fixing
the appropriate multiplier and computation of
compensation and has observed as under:
"6. Certain principles were highlighted by this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti, 1966 (3) SCR 649 in the matter of fixing the appropriate multiplier and computation of compensation. In a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependents is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. "How much has the widow and family lost by the father's death?" The answer to this lies in the oft-quoted passage from the opinion of Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., All ER p.665 A-B, which says:-
"The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment.
Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or
basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt."
7. There were two methods adopted to determine and for calculation of compensation in fatal accident actions, the first the multiplier mentioned in Davies case (supra) and the second in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd., 1951 (2) All ER
448.
8. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalizing the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In, ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed-up over the period
for which the dependency is expected to last."
Further Court held that;
"10. In regard to the choice of the multiplicand the Halsbury's Laws of England in Vol. 34, Para 98 states the principle thus:
"98. Assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976- The courts have evolved a method for calculating the amount of pecuniary benefit that dependants could reasonably expect to have received from the deceased in the future. First the annual value to the dependants of those benefits (the multiplicand) is assessed. In the ordinary case of the death of a wage-earner that figure is arrived at by deducting from the wages the estimated amount of his own personal and living expenses.
The assessment is split into two parts. The first part comprises damages for the period between death and trial. The multiplicand is multiplied by the number of years which have elapsed between those two dates. Interest at one-half the short-term investment rate is also awarded on that multiplicand. The second part is damages for the period from the trial onwards. For that
period, the number of years which have elapsed between the death and the trial is deducted from a multiplier based on the number of years that the expectancy would probably have lasted; central to that calculation is the probable length of the deceased's working life at the date of death."
11. As to the multiplier, Halsbury states:
"However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependants can invest their damages, the lump sum award in respect of future loss must be discounted to reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being that the dependants will each year draw interest and some capital (the interest element decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the passage of years), so that they are compensated each year for their annual loss, and the fund will be exhausted at the age which the court assesses to be the correct age, having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such as illness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarial evidence is admissible, but the courts do not encourage such evidence. The calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest. In practice about 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and
inflation is disregarded. It is assumed that the return on fixed interest bearing securities is so much higher than 4 to 5 per cent that rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax payer. The multiplicand is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure."
20. In Sarla Dixit and Anr. v.Balwant Yadav &
Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1272, the Apex Court has
observed as under;
"So far as the adoption of the proper multiplier is concerned, it was observed that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is a more difficult exercise".
21. Thus, the Apex Court applied a multiplier of 15
only when the deceased was 27 years old.
22. In General Manager, Kerala State Road
Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Mrs.
Susamma Thomas and others, AIR 1994 SC 1631),
the age of deceased was 39 years and the Apex Court
has applied the multiplier of 12 only.
23. In Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State
Transport Corporation Ltd. v. K.I. Bindu and
others, 2006 ACJ 423, the age of deceased was 34
years and the Apex Court has applied the multiplier of
13 only.
24. In the present case, the Tribunal has applied the
multiplier of 17 as per Second Schedule of the Act,
which is on the higher side in view of the above
decisions.
25. Applying the above-said principles, the monthly
income of the deceased comes to Rs.10,126/- p.m., that
is by doubling the income of deceased and dividing it
by 2 (Rs.6,751 + Rs.13,502 / 2). After deducting 1/3rd
on account of personal expenses, the total loss of
monthly income comes to Rs.6,751/-. Thus, the total
loss of annual income comes to Rs.81,012/- and after
adopting the multiplier of 12, the total loss of
dependency comes to Rs.9,72,144/-.
26. The Tribunal has also awarded Rs.22,796/- on
account of loss of consortium, love and affection and
funeral expenses. The total compensation comes to
Rs.9,94,940/- which is rounded off to Rs. 10 lacs.
Accordingly, the compensation awarded by the
Tribunal is modified to that extent.
27. One of the plea of the appellant is that Bank
interest on the FDR of principal amount shall fetch
more interest than the income of the deceased.
28. Section 168 of the Act reads as under;
"168. Award of the Claims Tribunal-On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each
of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:
Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct".
29. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down
that, on receipt of application for compensation under
Section 168, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the
parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry
into the claim and will make an award determining the
amount of compensation, which appears, to it, to be
just, and specify the person or persons to whom
compensation is to be paid by the insurer or owner or
driver of the vehicle, involved in the accident, or by all
or any of them, as the case may be. It will, thus, be
seen that the amount of compensation, payable to the
claimant in respect of an accident, involving the death
of, or bodily injury, to persons, arising out of the use of
motor vehicles, or damages to any property is
discretion of the Claims Tribunal. Accordingly, the
Claims Tribunal has to, on some sound and rational
basis, depending upon peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine fair compensation payable to the
claimants. It would, thus, appear that the Claims
Tribunal has a very vide discretion in the matter of
award of compensation.
30. Further, the Claims Tribunal is expected to fix
such compensation which may appear, to it, to be just.
"Just" compensation would mean „reasonable‟
compensation for the injury, caused in an accident,
resulted due to the negligence of a motorist, including
the driver of the bus. So, „Just‟ would mean
appropriate, equitable, or proper. It signifies that the
compensation amount should be so assessed as to
make provision for the legal representatives of the
deceased to receive or earn such pecuniary benefits as
they could have obtained from the deceased if he had
lived his normal life. The grant of compensation
amount, which would enable the legal representatives
of the deceased to earn more pecuniary benefit than
one that had been available to them from the deceased
during his life time, would not be proper and grant of
compensation amount which would not enable such
legal representatives to earn as much pecuniary
benefit as was available to them from the deceased
during his life time, would not be equitable. Therefore,
the compensation to be assessed which can be termed
„Just‟, as contemplated by Sec.168 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, should be such as would, if the same is
prudently invested in some scheduled Bank, earn
interest, which would be equal to the pecuniary
benefit, which had been available to the legal
representatives from the deceased if he had not died
due to the accident which resulted from the negligent
user of the motor vehicle. The earning capacity of the
deceased, normal expectancy of his life, status of his
family and estimate of the financial assistance, which
he could be expected to give to his legal
representatives, if he had lived his normal age, are
some of the relevant factors which can render
assistance in the determination of a fair or just
compensation. Determination being dependant on
several imponderable, in assessment of compensation,
there is likely to be some margin of error. But,
compensation must be reasonably assessed with
moderation. The word „Compensation‟ is of wide
importance and legal terms, like „Corpus Juris
Secundum‟ and „words and Phrases‟, have devoted
pages to the explanation of the meaning of this word.
According to Black‟s Law Dictionary, „compensation‟
implies indemnification reparation, making amends or
balancing of loss and gains and so on."
31. In Nav Bharat Builders and another v.
Pyarabai and Ors., 1985 ACJ 79, the Court has
observed as under;
"It cannot also be forgotten that provision for payment of compensation was introduced in the Motor Vehicle Act primarily to safeguard interests of the dependents of the deceased. Therefore, it is the duty of the Tribunal to see that the dependents do not fall prey to machinations or be subjected to deceit or fraud. Provision for payment of compensation is part of a social security scheme and the dependents cannot be permitted to be robbed by anti-social elements. This is more so, because many times dependents are from lower strata of society, are illiterate and ignorant of
their rights and had no chance in life to see or handle such a big amount. Therefore, they are not able to understand what is in their best interest. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the Tribunal to assist and guide them. Section 110-B has used the expression "compensation" and not damages. It empowers the Tribunal to determine "just compensation" and specify a person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This determination is known as award. Loss of life cannot be measured in terms of money nor the loss of life of main bread-earner can fully be compensated. However, while determining the just compensation, the loss to the claimant of future pecuniary benefit is relevant. Therefore, while determining the compensation, sometimes it is taken into consideration as to how much interest will be earned on the lump sum awarded. The reason for this is obvious. A prudent man receiving lump sum amount, so as to make good his loss over a period, is expected to invest it and to use it gradually. The word "just" used in section 110-B has wider import. Therefore, in our view, the use of expressions like "just compensation" and "award" is indicative of the intention of the legislature. It is implicit in these expressions that the Tribunal is duty bound to act in a just and reasonable manner so that the fruits of the award will reach the dependents. Since the
Act has conferred jurisdiction upon the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine just compensation and specify the person or persons to whom it shall be paid it impliedly also grants the power of doing such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to achieve the said purpose. Jurisdiction and power conferred upon the Tribunal to award just compensation are coupled with a duty. While passing an award for compensation, the Tribunal is duty bound to guard the interests of the dependents for whose benefit it is made. The Tribunal cannot act as an onlooker, but is duty-bound to pass consequential orders to protect the dependents from exploitation, malpractices and misapplication of compensation money".
32. In G.M. Orissa State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mahender Rout and Others., 1985
ACJ 124, it was held that;
"In its anxiety to alleviate the sufferings of those who are suddenly struck by the bolt of misfortune, the legislature provided a cheap and summary remedy before the Tribunals. The contribution of the Tribunals and the Courts should be ensured that the benefits reach the helpless persons. Complaints are rife that benefits received ultimately by the claimants are only nominal and the anxiety of the
legislature and the exercise by the Tribunals and Courts are all in vain. The fruits of the beneficial measures do not reach the real beneficiaries. Large slices of the amounts are snatched by persons lurking around the corner and the unfortunate minors, widows, aged parents and injured look helplessly on. The Tribunals and the Courts, to be effective delivery agents, having regard to the salutary object, should ensure that the benefits are real and lasting and not empty and ephemeral. A mode has to be devised so that the amounts awarded as damages are not frittered away or snatched by the person assisting in the litigation. Where minors are involved, the responsibility is greater. They have lost their dear one. The law intervenes with a view to substituting the pecuniary loss in terms of damages.
But the intervention would not be effective and real if such minors and others are not assured that the pecuniary benefits which they would have otherwise enjoyed, if the accident had not taken place, are to be had in future too. It is proper in equity that the Tribunals and Courts extend that assurance. The way lies in devising a mode for enjoyment. In the litigation some amount may have been spent and other expenses may have been incurred. The Tribunals could, having regard to facts and circumstances direct payment of a portion of the amount outright and investment of the
balance, so that the corpus remaining intact, the return therefrom would continue to contribute to the welfare of the dependants. I may in this connection refer to a pregnant observation of the Supreme Court in Bishan Devi v. Sarbaksh Singh, 1978 ACJ 496 (S.C.).
.. .. ... In most cases it is seen that a lump sum payment is not to the advantage of the dependants as large part of it is frittered away during litigation and by payment to persons assisting in the litigation... ... ..."
33. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamlaben
Sultansinh Jadav and Ors., AIR 1993 Gujarat 171,
the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court has observed as
under;
"In our view, in this country, there would not be a legal hitch in paying compensation by periodical instalments because Section 110-B (as it was) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 specifically employer the Claims Tribunal to award just compensation. The phrase 'just compensation' would include payment of compensation by periodical instalments.
This question is also considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan
Devi v. Sirbaksh Singh, AIR 1979 SC 1862 (supra), and the Court suggested that, instead of lump sum payment, it would be advantageous to pay minimum compensation by regular monthly instalments with a liberty to the dependants to pursue their remedies before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal if they are not satisfied with the minimum compensation. The relevant observations are as under (para 21):
"The insurance companies are now nationalised and the necessity for awarding lump sum payment to secure the interest of the dependants is no longer there. Regular monthly payments could be made through one of the nationalised banks nearest to the place of residence of the dependants. Payment of monthly instalments and avoidance of lump sum payment would reduce substantially the burden on the insurer and consequently of the insured. Ordinarily in arriving at the lump sum payable, the Court takes the figure at about 12 years payment. Thus in the case of monthly compensation of Rs. 250 payable, the lump sum arrived at would be between 30,000 and 35,000. Regular monthly payment of Rs. 250 can be made from the interest of the lump sum alone and the
payment will be restricted only for the period of dependency of the several dependants. In most cases it is seen that a lump sum payment is not to the advantage of the dependants as large part of it is frittered away during litigation and by payment to persons assisting in the litigation. It may also be provided that if the dependants are not satisfied with, the minimum compensation payable they will be at liberty to pursue their remedies before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal."
The Court further observed;
"In view of the aforesaid discussion and the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan Devi, AIR 1979 SC 1862 (supra), by this Court in the case of Muljibhai, (1982) 23 (1) Guj LR 756 (supra) and by other High Courts, as stated above, it would be in the interest of justice to direct the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to award compensation amount by periodical instalments only and not in lump sum. This type of order is required to be passed to see that:
(i) the major part of the compensation amount reaches the victims or their dependents:
(ii) large part of the compensation amount is not frittered away;
(iii) victims or their dependents are not again left at the mercy of the Society; and
(iv) the amount, which is paid by the nationalised Insurance Companies, serves its purpose and the socio- economic object of the legislation is not defeated".
34. So, keeping in view the principles laid down in the
above decisions, it would be just and reasonable if
provision is made for each of the dependents as per
their ages by way of monthly payment and also secure
the interest of the claimants till they would have
remained dependent upon the earnings of the
deceased.
35. Since deceased were earning Rs.6,751/- per
month and was contributing about Rs.4,500 p.m.
towards his family members who are the present
claimants, the share of each of claimant under these
circumstances, is assessed as under;
1. Smt. Reeta Devi Rs.3,000/- p.m.
2. Master Ravinder Rs.1,500/- p.m.
36. The present claim petition was filed on 12th July,
2006. Now, the appeal is being decided in November,
2008 and, by December, 2008, about 30 months would
have passed. So, for these 30 months, claimants are
entitled to compensation @ Rs.4,500/- p.m. and
accordingly for this period, the amount of
compensation comes to Rs.4,500 x 30=1,35,000/-. Out
of Rs.1,35,000/-, Rs. 1,00,000/- be paid to respondent
No.1/Reeta Devi, widow of the deceased, while
Rs.35,000/- be paid to respondent No.2/Master
Ravinder, minor son of the deceased.
37. As far as compensation for future period is
concerned, i.e. from 1st January, 2009 onwards,
respondent No.1 shall be paid Rs.3,000/- p.m. till her
death or her re-marriage, whichever is earlier.
38. Respondent No.2/Ravinder will be paid monthly
payment of Rs.1,500/- till he attains the age of 25 years
or till his marriage, whichever is earlier.
39. Both claimants shall have to furnish "Life
Certificate" to the United India Insurance Company
Ltd. once in a year i.e. in the month of January every
year. However, Smt. Reeta Devi shall have to furnish a
certificate to this effect also that she has not re-
married. These certificates are to be submitted to the
Insurance Company in January, 2009 and thereafter
every year.
40. Further, keeping in view the run-away inflation
and price rise and the fact that deceased‟s salary
would have increased with the passage of time, the
Claimants shall be entitled to increase in compensation
by 25% after every 5 years on their monthly
compensation i.e. the claimants shall get 25% increase
in the monthly compensation with effect from January
2014 and second increase w.e.f. 2019 and so on,
subject to the abovesaid limitation in respect of
attaining the age of 25 years by respondent
No.2/Master Ravinder and subject to re-marriage of
respondent No.1/Smt. Reeta Devi.
41. Since respondent No.2/Ravinder is minor, his
share of monthly compensation shall be paid to his
mother Smt. Reeta Devi/respondent No.1till the minor
attains age of majority. After respondent No.2 attains
age of majority, thereafter, the monthly payment shall
be made to him in his name by Account Payee cheque
only.
42. The appellant/United India Insurance Company
shall send the respective share of monthly payment to
the claimants by way of crossed cheques by 10th of
every month at the addresses mentioned in the memo
of the parties or at any other address to be furnished
by the claimants to the Insurance Company directly.
43. In case, there is any default on the part of the
Insurance Co. in making payment in time, the
claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of
10% (ten per cent) per annum for the delayed
payment.
44. As far as compensation from the date of the filing
of the petition i.e. from 12th January, 2006, till
December, 2008 is concerned, this amount of
compensation i.e. Rs.1,35 000/- as already stated
above, shall be deposited by appellant within a period
of two months from today failing which appellant shall
be liable to pay interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of
this judgment till realization.
45. Out of this, Rs.1 lac being the share of respondent
No.1 be paid to her by way of „Account Payee‟ cheque
in her name.
46. As far as Rs. 35,000/- being the share of
respondent No.2 is concerned, his share be deposited
in a bank in a Fixed Deposit A/c for the period till the
minor claimant attains his age of majority and
thereafter, it be paid to him along with the interest as
per the Bank‟s Rules.
47. Minor shall furnish attested copy of the Birth
Certificate or the School Leaving Certificate to United
United India Insruance Company Ltd. for calculating
his age of majority.
48. In the present case, Rs.50,000/- has already been
awarded as interim compensation. However, this
amount of interim compensation shall not be
deductable from the amount which is being awarded to
the claimants now.
49. Vide order dated 17th January, 2008, passed by
this Court, the appellant was directed to deposit Rs.10
lacs within a period of two weeks and operation of the
impugned award was stayed.
50. This amount of Rs. 10 lacs along with interest, if
any, lying in deposit, shall be paid to the appellant only
after the appellant comply with the directions passed
herein above by this Court, with regard to payment of
Rs.1,35,000/- and first instalment of monthly payment
to the claimants.
51. The present appeal is disposed of accordingly.
52. No order as to costs.
53. Copy of this judgment be sent to all the Tribunals
for information and compliance.
54. Trial court record be sent back.
November 4, 2008 V.B.GUPTA, J.
rs/Bisht
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!