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United India Insurance Co.Ltd. vs Smt.Reeta Devi & Ors.
2008 Latest Caselaw 1944 Del

Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 1944 Del
Judgement Date : 4 November, 2008

Delhi High Court
United India Insurance Co.Ltd. vs Smt.Reeta Devi & Ors. on 4 November, 2008
Author: V.B.Gupta
*       HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI

MAC App. No. 651 of 2007 & CM No.9328 of 2008

%             Judgment reserved on: 24th September, 2008

              Judgment delivered on: 4th November, 2008


United India Insurance Company Ltd.,
R.O.-II, Scope Minar,
Lakshimi Nagar,
Delhi-110092.                                ....Appellant

                     Through: Mr.S.L.Gupta, Adv.

                              Versus

1.Smt.Reeta Devi,
w/o Late Sh.Dinesh

2.Master Ravinder,
s/o Late Sh.Dinesh
(Minor through his natural guardian,
Mother Smt.Reeta Devi, respondent No.1)
(both are residents of C-43/8,
Indraprashta Colony,
Nathupura, Delhi-84.

3.Subhash Chander,
s/o Sh.mehar Chander
r/o R.G. B-453, Raghubir Nagar,
New Delhi, (Onwer/Driver)                 ....Respondents.

                     Through: Mr.Jatinder kumar, Adv. for
                              respondents 1 & 2.




MAC App.No. 651 of 2007                            Page 1 of 32
 Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
   be allowed to see the judgment?                   Yes

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?                Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported
   in the Digest?                                    Yes

V.B.Gupta, J.

United Insurance Company Limited, the appellant

in this case, has filed the present appeal under Section

173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short as „Act‟)

challenging the award dated 10th September, 2007

passed by Sh.Chandra Shekhar, Judge, MACT, Delhi

(for short as „Tribunal).

2. The facts in brief of the present case are that on

13th June, 2006 at about 4.15 p.m., deceased Dinesh

along with his wife Reeta Devi was going to Vaishno

Mata Mandir, Gulabi Bagh, Delhi. At the time of

crossing the road, that is, Kali Dass Marg, Vaishno

Mata Mandir, Gulabi Bagh, Delhi, a speeding TSR

No.DL-1RE-4701 came from the side of Chowki No.2 in

a rash and negligent manner and hit the deceased

Dinesh resulting in injuries. Deceased was taken to

Hindu Rao Hospital, Delhi but during the day time he

expired.

3. The vehicle was being driven by respondent No.3

Subhash Chander who is also the owner of the

offending vehicle. Later on respondent No.3 did not

appear and vide order dated 14th May, 2007 passed by

the Tribunal, he was proceeded against ex parte.

4. Respondent No.3 in his written statement stated

that neither he nor the vehicle in question ever

involved in the accident. This respondent rendered the

helping hand at the spot and even called the Police and

since the answering respondent could not tell about

the offending vehicle, for that reason alone, the

claimants falsely implicated him. It is denied that TSR

in question was involved in the accident.

5. Appellant-Insurance Company in its written

statement has admitted that the offending vehicle was

insured with it at the time of accident. Further, it is

stated that the offending vehicle was being driven in

contravention of the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy and as such the appellant is not liable

to pay any compensation.

6. Vide the impugned judgment, the Tribunal

awarded a compensation of Rs.14 lacs to the claimants

along with 7% interest per annum from the date of

institution till the date of award.

7. It has been contended by the learned counsel for

appellant that the income of the deceased comes to

Rs.6086/- per month after deducting personal expenses

and thus, the Tribunal has erred by doubling the

income of deceased as Rs.6,751/- per month, without

making any personal deduction. The Tribunal wrongly

applied the multiplier of 17 for the age of 33 years,

which is on very higher side.

8. Further, the Tribunal has taken the future

prospects of the deceased whereas, the deceased was

not eligible or qualified for the promotion.

9. Moreover, the widow is entitled to family pension

and other benefits and therefore the award is to be

reduced.

10. Lastly, it is contended that it is unjustified that

the bank interest on the FDR on the principal award

amount of Rs.14 Lacs should fetch more interest than

the income of the deceased and the principal amount

shall remain intact as it is forever.

11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

claimants has contended that the judgment of the

Tribunal is well reasoned and compensation awarded

by the Tribunal is just and sufficient and there is

nothing wrong with the findings of the Tribunal.

12. PW2 Smt. Reeta Devi in her evidence by affidavit

has stated that deceased was employed in MCD as

Mali and was earning about Rs.7,000/- per month and

has bright future prospects and his income would have

increased many fold with the passage of time and

experience.

13. Claimants have examined PW1 Sh. Sharafat Khan,

Bill Clerk, MCD who has clearly stated that deceased

Dinesh was a permanent employee in MCD working as

Mali on a gross salary of Rs.6,751 and was entitled for

next increment which was to be made available on

1.04.07 and his date of retirement was 28.02.2033 and

has proved salary certificate Ex.PW1/1.

14. In the absence of any other evidence, income of

the deceased has to be taken at Rs.6,751/- per month

at the time of accident according to the salary

certificate, Ex.PW1/1.

15. As regards the age of the deceased, PW2 Smt.

Reeta Devi in her evidence has stated that at the time

of the accident, deceased was 33 years old.

16. This evidence is duly corroborated by the

photocopy of High School certificate. According to

which date of birth of deceased is 1st March, 1973.

17. Thus, the Tribunal rightly held the age of the

deceased as 33 years.

18. The object of payment of compensation under the

Motor Vehicles Act is to compensate the dependants of

the deceased for the loss of dependency due to the

death of the earning member. The Court has to assess

the quantum of compensation payable to the

dependants which is just proper and reasonable. The

amount of compensation is to be fixed in such a

manner so that it does not amount to undue

enrichment of the dependants since the Court is to

determine the amount of compensation "which it

appears to it to be just". Some amount of guess work

is always allowable in fixing the monthly income as

well as the loss of dependency and consequently the

quantum of compensation.

19. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v.

Krishna Bala & Ors., III (2006) ACC 361 (SC), the

Apex Court has highlighted the manner of fixing

the appropriate multiplier and computation of

compensation and has observed as under:

"6. Certain principles were highlighted by this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti, 1966 (3) SCR 649 in the matter of fixing the appropriate multiplier and computation of compensation. In a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependents is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. "How much has the widow and family lost by the father's death?" The answer to this lies in the oft-quoted passage from the opinion of Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., All ER p.665 A-B, which says:-

"The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment.

Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or

basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt."

7. There were two methods adopted to determine and for calculation of compensation in fatal accident actions, the first the multiplier mentioned in Davies case (supra) and the second in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd., 1951 (2) All ER

448.

8. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalizing the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In, ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed-up over the period

for which the dependency is expected to last."

Further Court held that;

"10. In regard to the choice of the multiplicand the Halsbury's Laws of England in Vol. 34, Para 98 states the principle thus:

"98. Assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976- The courts have evolved a method for calculating the amount of pecuniary benefit that dependants could reasonably expect to have received from the deceased in the future. First the annual value to the dependants of those benefits (the multiplicand) is assessed. In the ordinary case of the death of a wage-earner that figure is arrived at by deducting from the wages the estimated amount of his own personal and living expenses.

The assessment is split into two parts. The first part comprises damages for the period between death and trial. The multiplicand is multiplied by the number of years which have elapsed between those two dates. Interest at one-half the short-term investment rate is also awarded on that multiplicand. The second part is damages for the period from the trial onwards. For that

period, the number of years which have elapsed between the death and the trial is deducted from a multiplier based on the number of years that the expectancy would probably have lasted; central to that calculation is the probable length of the deceased's working life at the date of death."

11. As to the multiplier, Halsbury states:

"However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependants can invest their damages, the lump sum award in respect of future loss must be discounted to reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being that the dependants will each year draw interest and some capital (the interest element decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the passage of years), so that they are compensated each year for their annual loss, and the fund will be exhausted at the age which the court assesses to be the correct age, having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such as illness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarial evidence is admissible, but the courts do not encourage such evidence. The calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest. In practice about 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and

inflation is disregarded. It is assumed that the return on fixed interest bearing securities is so much higher than 4 to 5 per cent that rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax payer. The multiplicand is based on the rate of wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure."

20. In Sarla Dixit and Anr. v.Balwant Yadav &

Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1272, the Apex Court has

observed as under;

"So far as the adoption of the proper multiplier is concerned, it was observed that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is a more difficult exercise".

21. Thus, the Apex Court applied a multiplier of 15

only when the deceased was 27 years old.

22. In General Manager, Kerala State Road

Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Mrs.

Susamma Thomas and others, AIR 1994 SC 1631),

the age of deceased was 39 years and the Apex Court

has applied the multiplier of 12 only.

23. In Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State

Transport Corporation Ltd. v. K.I. Bindu and

others, 2006 ACJ 423, the age of deceased was 34

years and the Apex Court has applied the multiplier of

13 only.

24. In the present case, the Tribunal has applied the

multiplier of 17 as per Second Schedule of the Act,

which is on the higher side in view of the above

decisions.

25. Applying the above-said principles, the monthly

income of the deceased comes to Rs.10,126/- p.m., that

is by doubling the income of deceased and dividing it

by 2 (Rs.6,751 + Rs.13,502 / 2). After deducting 1/3rd

on account of personal expenses, the total loss of

monthly income comes to Rs.6,751/-. Thus, the total

loss of annual income comes to Rs.81,012/- and after

adopting the multiplier of 12, the total loss of

dependency comes to Rs.9,72,144/-.

26. The Tribunal has also awarded Rs.22,796/- on

account of loss of consortium, love and affection and

funeral expenses. The total compensation comes to

Rs.9,94,940/- which is rounded off to Rs. 10 lacs.

Accordingly, the compensation awarded by the

Tribunal is modified to that extent.

27. One of the plea of the appellant is that Bank

interest on the FDR of principal amount shall fetch

more interest than the income of the deceased.

28. Section 168 of the Act reads as under;

"168. Award of the Claims Tribunal-On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each

of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:

Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.

(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct".

29. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down

that, on receipt of application for compensation under

Section 168, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the

parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry

into the claim and will make an award determining the

amount of compensation, which appears, to it, to be

just, and specify the person or persons to whom

compensation is to be paid by the insurer or owner or

driver of the vehicle, involved in the accident, or by all

or any of them, as the case may be. It will, thus, be

seen that the amount of compensation, payable to the

claimant in respect of an accident, involving the death

of, or bodily injury, to persons, arising out of the use of

motor vehicles, or damages to any property is

discretion of the Claims Tribunal. Accordingly, the

Claims Tribunal has to, on some sound and rational

basis, depending upon peculiar circumstances of each

case, determine fair compensation payable to the

claimants. It would, thus, appear that the Claims

Tribunal has a very vide discretion in the matter of

award of compensation.

30. Further, the Claims Tribunal is expected to fix

such compensation which may appear, to it, to be just.

"Just" compensation would mean „reasonable‟

compensation for the injury, caused in an accident,

resulted due to the negligence of a motorist, including

the driver of the bus. So, „Just‟ would mean

appropriate, equitable, or proper. It signifies that the

compensation amount should be so assessed as to

make provision for the legal representatives of the

deceased to receive or earn such pecuniary benefits as

they could have obtained from the deceased if he had

lived his normal life. The grant of compensation

amount, which would enable the legal representatives

of the deceased to earn more pecuniary benefit than

one that had been available to them from the deceased

during his life time, would not be proper and grant of

compensation amount which would not enable such

legal representatives to earn as much pecuniary

benefit as was available to them from the deceased

during his life time, would not be equitable. Therefore,

the compensation to be assessed which can be termed

„Just‟, as contemplated by Sec.168 of the Motor

Vehicles Act, should be such as would, if the same is

prudently invested in some scheduled Bank, earn

interest, which would be equal to the pecuniary

benefit, which had been available to the legal

representatives from the deceased if he had not died

due to the accident which resulted from the negligent

user of the motor vehicle. The earning capacity of the

deceased, normal expectancy of his life, status of his

family and estimate of the financial assistance, which

he could be expected to give to his legal

representatives, if he had lived his normal age, are

some of the relevant factors which can render

assistance in the determination of a fair or just

compensation. Determination being dependant on

several imponderable, in assessment of compensation,

there is likely to be some margin of error. But,

compensation must be reasonably assessed with

moderation. The word „Compensation‟ is of wide

importance and legal terms, like „Corpus Juris

Secundum‟ and „words and Phrases‟, have devoted

pages to the explanation of the meaning of this word.

According to Black‟s Law Dictionary, „compensation‟

implies indemnification reparation, making amends or

balancing of loss and gains and so on."

31. In Nav Bharat Builders and another v.

Pyarabai and Ors., 1985 ACJ 79, the Court has

observed as under;

"It cannot also be forgotten that provision for payment of compensation was introduced in the Motor Vehicle Act primarily to safeguard interests of the dependents of the deceased. Therefore, it is the duty of the Tribunal to see that the dependents do not fall prey to machinations or be subjected to deceit or fraud. Provision for payment of compensation is part of a social security scheme and the dependents cannot be permitted to be robbed by anti-social elements. This is more so, because many times dependents are from lower strata of society, are illiterate and ignorant of

their rights and had no chance in life to see or handle such a big amount. Therefore, they are not able to understand what is in their best interest. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the Tribunal to assist and guide them. Section 110-B has used the expression "compensation" and not damages. It empowers the Tribunal to determine "just compensation" and specify a person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. This determination is known as award. Loss of life cannot be measured in terms of money nor the loss of life of main bread-earner can fully be compensated. However, while determining the just compensation, the loss to the claimant of future pecuniary benefit is relevant. Therefore, while determining the compensation, sometimes it is taken into consideration as to how much interest will be earned on the lump sum awarded. The reason for this is obvious. A prudent man receiving lump sum amount, so as to make good his loss over a period, is expected to invest it and to use it gradually. The word "just" used in section 110-B has wider import. Therefore, in our view, the use of expressions like "just compensation" and "award" is indicative of the intention of the legislature. It is implicit in these expressions that the Tribunal is duty bound to act in a just and reasonable manner so that the fruits of the award will reach the dependents. Since the

Act has conferred jurisdiction upon the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine just compensation and specify the person or persons to whom it shall be paid it impliedly also grants the power of doing such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to achieve the said purpose. Jurisdiction and power conferred upon the Tribunal to award just compensation are coupled with a duty. While passing an award for compensation, the Tribunal is duty bound to guard the interests of the dependents for whose benefit it is made. The Tribunal cannot act as an onlooker, but is duty-bound to pass consequential orders to protect the dependents from exploitation, malpractices and misapplication of compensation money".

32. In G.M. Orissa State Road Transport

Corporation v. Mahender Rout and Others., 1985

ACJ 124, it was held that;

"In its anxiety to alleviate the sufferings of those who are suddenly struck by the bolt of misfortune, the legislature provided a cheap and summary remedy before the Tribunals. The contribution of the Tribunals and the Courts should be ensured that the benefits reach the helpless persons. Complaints are rife that benefits received ultimately by the claimants are only nominal and the anxiety of the

legislature and the exercise by the Tribunals and Courts are all in vain. The fruits of the beneficial measures do not reach the real beneficiaries. Large slices of the amounts are snatched by persons lurking around the corner and the unfortunate minors, widows, aged parents and injured look helplessly on. The Tribunals and the Courts, to be effective delivery agents, having regard to the salutary object, should ensure that the benefits are real and lasting and not empty and ephemeral. A mode has to be devised so that the amounts awarded as damages are not frittered away or snatched by the person assisting in the litigation. Where minors are involved, the responsibility is greater. They have lost their dear one. The law intervenes with a view to substituting the pecuniary loss in terms of damages.

But the intervention would not be effective and real if such minors and others are not assured that the pecuniary benefits which they would have otherwise enjoyed, if the accident had not taken place, are to be had in future too. It is proper in equity that the Tribunals and Courts extend that assurance. The way lies in devising a mode for enjoyment. In the litigation some amount may have been spent and other expenses may have been incurred. The Tribunals could, having regard to facts and circumstances direct payment of a portion of the amount outright and investment of the

balance, so that the corpus remaining intact, the return therefrom would continue to contribute to the welfare of the dependants. I may in this connection refer to a pregnant observation of the Supreme Court in Bishan Devi v. Sarbaksh Singh, 1978 ACJ 496 (S.C.).

.. .. ... In most cases it is seen that a lump sum payment is not to the advantage of the dependants as large part of it is frittered away during litigation and by payment to persons assisting in the litigation... ... ..."

33. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kamlaben

Sultansinh Jadav and Ors., AIR 1993 Gujarat 171,

the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court has observed as

under;

"In our view, in this country, there would not be a legal hitch in paying compensation by periodical instalments because Section 110-B (as it was) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 specifically employer the Claims Tribunal to award just compensation. The phrase 'just compensation' would include payment of compensation by periodical instalments.

This question is also considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan

Devi v. Sirbaksh Singh, AIR 1979 SC 1862 (supra), and the Court suggested that, instead of lump sum payment, it would be advantageous to pay minimum compensation by regular monthly instalments with a liberty to the dependants to pursue their remedies before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal if they are not satisfied with the minimum compensation. The relevant observations are as under (para 21):

"The insurance companies are now nationalised and the necessity for awarding lump sum payment to secure the interest of the dependants is no longer there. Regular monthly payments could be made through one of the nationalised banks nearest to the place of residence of the dependants. Payment of monthly instalments and avoidance of lump sum payment would reduce substantially the burden on the insurer and consequently of the insured. Ordinarily in arriving at the lump sum payable, the Court takes the figure at about 12 years payment. Thus in the case of monthly compensation of Rs. 250 payable, the lump sum arrived at would be between 30,000 and 35,000. Regular monthly payment of Rs. 250 can be made from the interest of the lump sum alone and the

payment will be restricted only for the period of dependency of the several dependants. In most cases it is seen that a lump sum payment is not to the advantage of the dependants as large part of it is frittered away during litigation and by payment to persons assisting in the litigation. It may also be provided that if the dependants are not satisfied with, the minimum compensation payable they will be at liberty to pursue their remedies before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal."

The Court further observed;

"In view of the aforesaid discussion and the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan Devi, AIR 1979 SC 1862 (supra), by this Court in the case of Muljibhai, (1982) 23 (1) Guj LR 756 (supra) and by other High Courts, as stated above, it would be in the interest of justice to direct the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to award compensation amount by periodical instalments only and not in lump sum. This type of order is required to be passed to see that:

(i) the major part of the compensation amount reaches the victims or their dependents:

(ii) large part of the compensation amount is not frittered away;

(iii) victims or their dependents are not again left at the mercy of the Society; and

(iv) the amount, which is paid by the nationalised Insurance Companies, serves its purpose and the socio- economic object of the legislation is not defeated".

34. So, keeping in view the principles laid down in the

above decisions, it would be just and reasonable if

provision is made for each of the dependents as per

their ages by way of monthly payment and also secure

the interest of the claimants till they would have

remained dependent upon the earnings of the

deceased.

35. Since deceased were earning Rs.6,751/- per

month and was contributing about Rs.4,500 p.m.

towards his family members who are the present

claimants, the share of each of claimant under these

circumstances, is assessed as under;

1. Smt. Reeta Devi Rs.3,000/- p.m.

2. Master Ravinder Rs.1,500/- p.m.

36. The present claim petition was filed on 12th July,

2006. Now, the appeal is being decided in November,

2008 and, by December, 2008, about 30 months would

have passed. So, for these 30 months, claimants are

entitled to compensation @ Rs.4,500/- p.m. and

accordingly for this period, the amount of

compensation comes to Rs.4,500 x 30=1,35,000/-. Out

of Rs.1,35,000/-, Rs. 1,00,000/- be paid to respondent

No.1/Reeta Devi, widow of the deceased, while

Rs.35,000/- be paid to respondent No.2/Master

Ravinder, minor son of the deceased.

37. As far as compensation for future period is

concerned, i.e. from 1st January, 2009 onwards,

respondent No.1 shall be paid Rs.3,000/- p.m. till her

death or her re-marriage, whichever is earlier.

38. Respondent No.2/Ravinder will be paid monthly

payment of Rs.1,500/- till he attains the age of 25 years

or till his marriage, whichever is earlier.

39. Both claimants shall have to furnish "Life

Certificate" to the United India Insurance Company

Ltd. once in a year i.e. in the month of January every

year. However, Smt. Reeta Devi shall have to furnish a

certificate to this effect also that she has not re-

married. These certificates are to be submitted to the

Insurance Company in January, 2009 and thereafter

every year.

40. Further, keeping in view the run-away inflation

and price rise and the fact that deceased‟s salary

would have increased with the passage of time, the

Claimants shall be entitled to increase in compensation

by 25% after every 5 years on their monthly

compensation i.e. the claimants shall get 25% increase

in the monthly compensation with effect from January

2014 and second increase w.e.f. 2019 and so on,

subject to the abovesaid limitation in respect of

attaining the age of 25 years by respondent

No.2/Master Ravinder and subject to re-marriage of

respondent No.1/Smt. Reeta Devi.

41. Since respondent No.2/Ravinder is minor, his

share of monthly compensation shall be paid to his

mother Smt. Reeta Devi/respondent No.1till the minor

attains age of majority. After respondent No.2 attains

age of majority, thereafter, the monthly payment shall

be made to him in his name by Account Payee cheque

only.

42. The appellant/United India Insurance Company

shall send the respective share of monthly payment to

the claimants by way of crossed cheques by 10th of

every month at the addresses mentioned in the memo

of the parties or at any other address to be furnished

by the claimants to the Insurance Company directly.

43. In case, there is any default on the part of the

Insurance Co. in making payment in time, the

claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of

10% (ten per cent) per annum for the delayed

payment.

44. As far as compensation from the date of the filing

of the petition i.e. from 12th January, 2006, till

December, 2008 is concerned, this amount of

compensation i.e. Rs.1,35 000/- as already stated

above, shall be deposited by appellant within a period

of two months from today failing which appellant shall

be liable to pay interest @ 10% p.a. from the date of

this judgment till realization.

45. Out of this, Rs.1 lac being the share of respondent

No.1 be paid to her by way of „Account Payee‟ cheque

in her name.

46. As far as Rs. 35,000/- being the share of

respondent No.2 is concerned, his share be deposited

in a bank in a Fixed Deposit A/c for the period till the

minor claimant attains his age of majority and

thereafter, it be paid to him along with the interest as

per the Bank‟s Rules.

47. Minor shall furnish attested copy of the Birth

Certificate or the School Leaving Certificate to United

United India Insruance Company Ltd. for calculating

his age of majority.

48. In the present case, Rs.50,000/- has already been

awarded as interim compensation. However, this

amount of interim compensation shall not be

deductable from the amount which is being awarded to

the claimants now.

49. Vide order dated 17th January, 2008, passed by

this Court, the appellant was directed to deposit Rs.10

lacs within a period of two weeks and operation of the

impugned award was stayed.

50. This amount of Rs. 10 lacs along with interest, if

any, lying in deposit, shall be paid to the appellant only

after the appellant comply with the directions passed

herein above by this Court, with regard to payment of

Rs.1,35,000/- and first instalment of monthly payment

to the claimants.

51. The present appeal is disposed of accordingly.

52. No order as to costs.

53. Copy of this judgment be sent to all the Tribunals

for information and compliance.

54. Trial court record be sent back.

November 4, 2008 V.B.GUPTA, J.

rs/Bisht

 
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