Sohan Lal Jain Thru. Lrs vs Union Of India & Ors.
2008 Latest Caselaw 978 Del

                             Reportable
*             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                              RFA (OS) No. 10 of 1972

%                                                   Decided on : July 09, 2008

Sohan Lal Jain thru. LRs.                                 . . . Appellants

                       through :               Mr. Rano Mohanty, Advocate

              VERSUS

Union of India & Ors.                                     . . . Respondents

                       through :               Mr. Ranjeet Kr. Jha, Advocate
                                               for the Union of India.
                                               Mr. S.S. Dalal, Advocate for
                                               respondent Nos. 2 to 7.

CORAM :-
    THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
    THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

       1.     Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
              to see the Judgment?
       2.     To be referred to the Reporter or not?
       3.     Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest?


A.K. SIKRI, J.          (ORAL)

1. This is the first appeal from the judgment and decree dated

20.12.1971 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit

No. 257/1969, which was filed by the appellants herein. The learned

Single Judge has dismissed the suit deciding the preliminary issue in

favour of the respondents herein, namely, the said suit was barred

under Sections 27 and 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation

and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 {hereinafter referred to as the „1954

Act‟}. In order to appreciate the controversy, we may first state, in

brief, the facts as stated in the plaint on the basis of which the suit

came to be filed.

2. Premises known as Shafiq Manzil situated at No. 2, Doctors Lane,

New Delhi (for short, „the suit property‟) was acquired by the

Government as evacuate property and was made part of the

compensation pool constituted under the 1954 Act. This property

was put to auction on two occasions with reserve price of

Rs.2,50,000/-. However, these attempts were not successful. It was,

thus, put to auction third time again when the bid of one Shri

Balwant Singh at Rs.2,50,100/- was accepted in June 1960. Though

Shri Balwant Singh paid the initial amount, he failed to pay the

balance sale price. Hence the Settlement Authorities, vide order

dated 2.12.1960, forfeited the earnest money paid by Shri Balwant

Singh and cancelled the bid. Shri Balwant Singh filed appeal against

the order dated 2.12.1960, which was dismissed by the Appellate

Authority, namely, the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner, vide

his orders dated 2.8.1963.

3. After the dismissal of the appeal, the Settlement Authorities, under

the 1954 Act, put the suit property to auction once again by inviting

tenders. The appellants herein submitted his tender on 19.10.1963

quoting the price of Rs.2,51,400/- against the reserve price of

Rs.2,50,000/-. This was the highest price offered by the appellants/

plaintiffs, as found by the Regional Settlement Commissioner on

21.10.1963. However, before orders could be passed accepting the

bid of the appellants, Shri Balwant Singh filed writ petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the Circuit Bench of the

Punjab High Court at Delhi. We may note that before filing the said

writ petition, Shri Balwant Singh had filed revision petition as well,

which was dismissed by the Central Government. In the writ

petition, the High Court passed stay order dated 17.10.1963 against

acceptance of the tender. It was because of this stay order, no

formal acceptance of tender was sent to the appellants.

4. The writ petition filed by Shri Balwant Singh was subsequently

dismissed. On the dismissal of this petition, the appellants vide letter

dated 19.2.1965 requested the Rehabilitation Authorities to finalize

the sale in their favour. However, in the meantime, Shri Balwant

Singh preferred Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against the order passed

in the writ petition. Because of this reason, the appellants were

informed that his request for accepting the bid and issuing sale

certificate could not be accepted. Subsequently, however, the LPA

filed by Shri Balwant Singh was also dismissed by the Division Bench.

5. It so happened that in the meantime the appellants were called to

accept some additional terms in the lease to be executed by the land

and Development Officer. The appellants did not agree to the

revised terms. Their tender was ultimately rejected on 18.4.1966 and

orders were passed for selling the said property by public auction

once again.

6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 18.4.1966, the appellants

preferred appeal before the Chief Settlement Commissioner under

Section 23 of the 1954 Act. This appeal was dismissed on 12.9.1966.

Thereafter, the appellants preferred revision petition under Section

33 of the 1954 Act before the Central Government. This revision

petition was also dismissed.

7. After the dismissal of the appeal as well as revision petition, the

appellants filed Suit No. 257/1969 on the Original Side of this Court.

In this suit, the appellants averred that the Regional Commissioner

had confirmed the acceptance of tender and thereafter it had no

jurisdiction to review or recall its order or to make any other order

in relation to the acceptance of the tender of the appellants. On this

premise, averment was made that the order of the Regional

Settlement Commissioner was wholly without jurisdiction. It was

also pleaded that even otherwise it was totally illegal on the part of

the Regional Settlement Commissioner to revise the terms of the

auction and such an action on the part of the Regional Settlement

Commissioner or his superior was without any authority or

jurisdiction. It was also alleged that the appeal as well as revision of

the appellants were thus wrongly and illegally dismissed by the

Appellate as well as Revisional Authority. On this premise, it was

averred that the respondents herein had committed a breach of

contract as well as that of the provisions contained in the 1954 Act

and the Rules framed thereunder and they were liable to execute or

issue the sale certificate by specific performance of the contract.

Following prayers were made on the aforesaid pleadings contained

in the plaint, which are taken note of in brief :-

"51. That the Plaintiffs pray that a decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell referred to above, of property in suit (Shafiq Manzil No. 2 Doctors Lane) and the compliance of obligations under the provisions of Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 regarding the execution and issuance of sale deed or sale certificate in respect of property in suit and the possession thereof be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs and Defendants No. 8,9,10 and 11(a) and (b) against the Defendants No.1 to 7 with costs. In case this Hon‟ble Court finds that the decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell and compliance of statutory obligations regarding execution of sale deed or certificate and possession of suit property cannot be passed then in the alternative, a decree for recovery of damages to th extent of Rs.2,51,400/- including the refund of earnest money of Rs.12,600/- and the interest due thereon at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 19.10.1963 till the institution of the suit, be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs and Defendants No. 8,9,10 and 11(a) & (b) against the Defendants No. 1 to 7. It is further prayed that the Defendants No. 1 to 7 be restrained by decree for injunction from selling, transferring or disposing of the property in suit to any person or persons other than the Plaintiffs and Defendants No.8,9,10 and 11(a) and (b). The costs of the suit be also awarded."

8. The respondents herein filed the written statement and took various

objections to the maintainability of the suit. Apart from contending

that the bid of the appellants was never accepted and, therefore, no

concluded contract came into force, it was also submitted that the

suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 27 and

Section 36 of the 1954 Act. The learned Single Judge framed the

preliminary issue touching the maintainability of the suit in the

following manner :-

"Whether the suit is barred under the provisions of Section 27 and Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954? OPD 1 to 7"

This issue has been decided in favour of the respondents/

defendants holding that the suit is barred under the aforesaid

provisions, as a result whereof the suit of the appellants has been

dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 20.12.1971. Challenging

that judgment and decree, the present appeal is preferred.

9. We have heard the counsel for the parties at length.

10. At this stage it would be apposite to take note of the provisions of

Sections 27 and 36 of the 1954 Act, which read as under :-

"27. Finality of orders. - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or authority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.

xx xx xx

36. Bar of jurisdiction. - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act."

11. We have already taken note of the basic facts hereinabove. It is clear

from the reading thereof that after the cancellation of the bid of the

appellants herein, the appellants had availed statutory remedy of

appeal available to them under Section 23 of the 1954 Act. The said

section provides for appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner

and inter alia stipulates that any person aggrieved by an order of the

Settlement Commissioner or the Additional Settlement Commissioner

or an Assistant Settlement Commissioner of an managing corporation

under the said Act may, within thirty days from the date of the

order, prefer an appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The

appellants themselves perceived the order of cancellation of bid

passed by the Settlement Commissioner as the one passed under the

1954 Act and, therefore, availed this remedy of statutory appeal.

This appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed.

12. Section 33 provides further statutory remedy of revision to the

Central Government. It is to the following effect :-

"33. Certain residuary powers of Central Government - The Central Government may at any time call for the record of any proceeding under this Act and may pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder."

13. As mentioned above, the appellants availed this statutory remedy

also, but unsuccessfully. The question of jurisdiction of the Civil

Court is to be considered in the aforesaid perspective and

background. It is clear that in the 1954 Act the Legislature has

provided for the statutory remedies to challenge the orders passed by

the authorities. These are in the form of appeal and revision. Under

Section 27 of the 1954 Act, finality is attached to these orders.

Section 27, in no uncertain terms, states that not only the order shall

be final, it shall not be called in question in any court by way of

appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution

proceedings. Section 36 of the Act makes the position beyond the

pale of controversy or doubt as it bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court.

It is provided in Section 36 that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction

to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which

the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under

that Act is empowered by or under that Act to determine. Thus,

after the orders were passed by the Central Government, the

jurisdiction of Civil Court to challenge those orders is specifically

barred.

14. In view of the above provisions and having regard to Section 9 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, civil suit would not be

maintainable in the instant case. As noted above, in the plaint the

appellants had alleged that the orders passed by the authorities under

the 1954 Act were illegal. It was open to the appellants to challenge

those orders, on whatever grounds available to them, by invoking

extraordinary jurisdiction available to the appellants under Article

226 of the Constitution of India by preferring a writ petition. In fact,

this was the course of action which was adopted by Mr. Balwant

Singh as well, though he failed in his writ petition as well as Letters

Patent Appeal. Instead of preferring the said remedy, the appellants

filed civil suit, which was specifically barred. The learned Single

Judge has discussed nuances of the aforesaid provisions in

conjunction with the relevant case law in much detail. Our purpose

would be served in reproducing the relevant portion of the judgment

as we are agreeing with those conclusions :-

"Normally, the outseter of jurisdiction of a civil court to enforce a civil right cannot readily be acceded to. Where, however, there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the civil court or an examination of the scheme and provisions of a statute shows that adequate and sufficient remedies are provided by the statute for dealing with rights and liabilities arising under the statute, even if, there is no express bar of the jurisdiction of civil court, the bar can be inferred by implication. In the present case I am of the view that not only is there an express bar of the jurisdiction of the civil court but the scheme of the Act also shows that the decisions of the

Rehabilitation Authorities mentioned in the act cannot be questioned in civil court. To my mind none of the features which would take the present suit out of the ambit of the above rule are attracted. Indeed, applying the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Dbulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another,A.I.R.1969 Supreme Court 78 it has to be held that the controversy raised by the plaintiffs in the present suit is not entertainable in a civil court. The Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 is a complete code in itself in the matter of dealing with properties included in the compensation pool. Rule 91 framed under the Act sets out the complete procedure as well as the powers and the authorities in respect of a sale by tender. Against the decision of the Settlement Commissioner, as already noticed, an appeal is provided as well as a revision. Assuming that the Settlement Commissioner has erred in his order his error can be rectified by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and even if he has erred the same can be rectified by the Central Government. Section 36 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to consider the matter of the sale or rejection of the tender. No civil court can entertain any suit or adjudicate upon any question whether a particular property or right to or interest therein is or is not transferred or transferable. Section 27 makes the finality of orders passed by Competent Authorities unassailable in civil court. The provisions in the Act are analogous to Sections 28 and 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The same ratio which is attracted in the case of Sections 28 and 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act would be attracted in the case of Sections 27 and 36 of the Displaced Persons(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. It was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab and others v. Jafran Begum, A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 169 as under:-

Generally speaking the jurisdiction of the civil or revenue court is barred under Section 46 and no such court can entertain any suit or adjudicate upon any question "Whether a particular property or right to or interest therein is or is not evacuee property. Where the question whether certain properties are evacuee properties has been decided under Section 7 etc. , whether that decision is based on issues of fact or issues of law, the jurisdiction of courts is clearly barred under Section 46(a). No distinction can be drawn between decisions under Section 7 based on question of fact, and decisions based on question of law. The decision is made final whether based on issues of law or of fact by Section 28 and Section 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in matters which are decided under Section 7 whatever may be the basis of decision, whether issues of fact or of law and whether simple or complicated."

We are, therefore, in agreement with the view taken by the

learned Single Judge that such a suit was not maintainable.

15. We, thus, find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed

with costs.

(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE

(MANMOHAN SINGH) JUDGE

July 09, 2008 nsk