Ram Phal vs Union Of India & Ors.
2008 Latest Caselaw 883 Del

*                IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                            C.W.P No.718/1987

%                       Date of decision: 1.7.2008

         Ram Phal                                   ....... PETITIONER
                             Through: Mr.Anil Mittal, Advocate.



                                    Versus

         Union of India & Ors.                   ........ RESPONDENTS
                           Through: Ms.Saroj Bidawat, Advocate.



CORAM :-
     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR

     1. Whether reporters of Local papers may               YES
        be allowed to see the judgment?

     2. To be referred to the reporter or not?              YES

     3. Whether the judgment should be reported             YES
        in the Digest?

ANIL KUMAR, J.

1. The petitioner, a dismissed conductor of Delhi Transport

Corporation, seeks quashing of his dismissal order contained in

letters dated 20th September, 1985, 20th May, 1986 and 3rd March,

1987 and he seeks a declaration that Regulation 14 of DRTA

(Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 is ultra

vires, void and violative of Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the

Constitution of India. The petitioner has also claimed that he is

deemed to be in continuous employment and, therefore, he is entitled

for reinstatement with all consequential benefits including back wages

and continuation in service.

2. The brief facts to comprehend the controversies are that the

petitioner was appointed as a Conductor with respondent No.2 on 24th

April, 1982 and he was given Badge No.12652. During his service

with the respondent No.2, petitioner fell sick and he was absent from

19th May, 1985 to 5th June, 1985. He alleged that he had submitted a

leave application to the respondent No.2. The petitioner also

contended that he was diagnosed suffering from Tuberculosis. The

petitioner was undergoing treatment at Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia

Hospital.

3. A notice dated 26th August,1985 was given to the petitioner on

account of his absence from duties with effect from 19th May, 1985

and because the leave application submitted by him was without any

medical certificate for the period 19th May, 1985 to 5th June, 1985. It

was stated in the notice that he had not been reporting for the duty at

Depot and he had also not submitted any application after 6th June,

1985. The notice also stipulated that on 18th May, 1985 only 14 days

leave was due to him which could only be regularized on submission

of medical certificate. He was also intimated that on his failure to

produce requisite medical certificate, the period of his leave from 19th

May, 1985 could only be regularized as extraordinary leave without

pay. Reliance was placed on Para 14(10) (b) of DRTA (Conditions of

Appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 and it was contended that

extraordinary leave without pay beyond three months and up to 18

months could be granted, in case of employee suffering from

Pulmonary Tuberculosis or Tuberculosis of any other part of the body.

The notice categorically stipulated that in case petitioner failed to

submit the requisite medical certificate in reply to the notice, the

period of leave/absence beyond three months will not be regularized

and he will be deemed to have resigned from his appointment with

effect from 19th August, 1985 under regulation 14(10) (b) of DRTA

(Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 without

any further reference and intimation to him.

4. The case of the petitioner is that he submitted a medical

certificate dated 12th September, 1985 issued by the Medical Officer,

Dr. Ram Manohar Lal Hospital, New Delhi. The medical certificate

stipulated that period of absence from 19th July, 1985 till 12th

September, 1985 for 56 days was absolutely necessary for restoration

of petitioner‟s health as he was suffering from Tuberculosis. Another

medical certificate of the same date was also issued by Dr.A. Sahay

for the period 20th May, 1985 upto 18th July, 1985 stipulating that the

leave was necessary for restoration of petitioner‟s health from

Tuberculosis. A copy of the letter dated 16th September,1985 has also

been produced by the petitioner to show that by the said

communication which was addressed by the Depot Manager of the

respondent Corporation to the Medical Superintendent, Dr. Ram

Manohar Lohia Hospital, the Depot Manager had sought clarifications

regarding the certificates on the ground that it did not bear any serial

number. Information was also sought from the Hospital, whether the

petitioner was hospitalized for T.B or was under treatment only and

why the petitioner was not referred to T.B. Hospital. This information

was sought by the Depot Manager to regularize the period of absence

of petitioner from duty for the period 19th May, 1985 to 12th

September, 1985.

5. The copy of the said communication sent by the Depot Manager

to the Medical Superintendent, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, has

also been produced by respondent No.2 as Annexure R1 with the

endorsement dated 19th September, 1985 by the hospital that the

medical certificates produced by the petitioner were issued by Dr.A.

Sahay and his case was not referred to T.B. Hospital as it was not

thought proper to do so.

6. On 20th September, 1985, however, the dismissal order was

issued against the petitioner without considering the medical

certificate produced by him pursuant to notice dated 26th August,

1985 and the clarification sought by the respondent from the Medical

Superintendent, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital was also not taken

into consideration. The dismissal order only stipulated that the

absence of the petitioner beyond three months cannot be regularized

under clause 14(10) (b) of DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and

Service) Regulation, 1952, and, therefore, the petitioner is deemed to

have resigned his appointment from the respondent No.2 Corporation

with effect from 19th August, 1985 in accordance with the Clause

14(10) (e) of DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Service)

Regulation, 1952.

7. The petitioner made representation on 21st September,1985

against the order of his deemed dismissal dated 20th September,

1985. Another representation dated 10th March, 1986 was also sent.

The representations seeking quashing of deemed dismissal order and

seeking reinstatement were rejected by order dated 20th May, 1986.

An appeal dated 3rd July, 1986 was also filed by the petitioner which

was also declined and the order of rejection of appeal was

communicated to the petitioner by communication dated 3rd March,

1987.

8. The petitioner, therefore, filed the present petition on 12th

March, 1987 seeking the relief of reinstatement and back wages. The

learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on AIR 1966 Supreme

Court 492, Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan; D.K. Yadav v. JMA

Industries Limited, (1993) 3 SCR 930 and Syndicate Bank v. General

Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association & Anr., (2000) 5 SCC 65

to contend that even if there is a clause in the Regulation of the

Corporation for deemed resignation, the principle of natural justice

have to be read into it, and an opportunity ought to have been given

to the petitioner, no matter how the regulation had described it.

According to the learned counsel, not giving an opportunity to the

petitioner before his dismissal is contrary to Article 311 of the

Constitution of India. The learned counsel also contended that the

alleged unauthorized absence from duty is also mis-conduct as per

standing order No.4 of the Standing Orders governing the Conduct of

Employees of DTC and as per Regulation 15 of the DRTA Regulations,

1952, a detailed procedure of charge sheet for obtaining reply from

the employees and then holding inquiry has been prescribed before

imposition of any punishment. Consequently, it has been prayed that

the order of dismissal dated 20th September, 1985 and declining the

request of the petitioner dated 20th May, 1986 to reinstate him be set

aside and the order dated 3rd May, 1987 dismissing the appeal of the

petitioner be set aside and the petitioner be reinstated with continuity

of service and full back wages.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on a judgment

of a Division Bench of this Court dated 7th May, 2002 in LPA Nos.208,

181, 28-38 of 2002, Delhi Transport Corporation v. Daya Nand &

others upholding the decision of a single Bench holding that the

termination of the services of the employees of DTC without giving an

opportunity of hearing was not valid and sustainable.

10. The respondent No.2 has contested the petition contending inter

alia that the petitioner was appointed as daily wage conductor with

effect from 25th October, 1978 and was granted monthly rates with

effect from 25th April, 1979 and after his probation period was over,

he was confirmed on the post with effect from 24th April, 1980. It was

asserted that the petitioner was in the habit of taking excessive leave

and he was a habitual absentee. According to the respondent no.2,

the petitioner performed his duties for one day on May 18th, 1985 and

thereafter an undated application was received from him for grant of

leave on the ground of illness. Another application was received on

28th May, 1985 for grant of leave from 19th May, 1985 to 25th May,

1985. It is asserted that two more applications were received from the

petitioner on 31st May, 1985 and 6th June, 1985 for grant of leave on

the same ground but none of the applications were supported by any

medical certificate. The respondent no.2 further contended that letters

dated 24th July, 1985 and 6th August, 1985 were sent to the petitioner

to report to the Medical Officer of the respondent no.2 or to submit

medical certificate in support of his medical sickness. Ultimately a

notice dated 26th August, 1985 was sent and consequent thereto

petitioner sent two medical certificates from the Doctors of Ram

Manohar Lohia Hospital advising him rest for the period 20th May,

1985 to 18th July, 1985 and for the period 19th July, 1985 to 12th

September, 1985. On receiving the medical certificates, a letter was

written by the respondent no.2 to the Medical Superintendent asking

as to why the certificates submitted by the petitioner do not bear any

serial numbers. It was also enquired as to whether the petitioner was

under hospitalization for T.B or under careful treatment and as to

why the petitioner was not referred to the T.B Hospital.

11. The respondent no.2 admitted that a reply was received from

the Medical Superintendent that medical certificate do not bear any

serial number and that it was not thought proper to refer the

petitioner to the T.B Hospital. The plea of the respondent no.2 is that

the explanation given by the hospital was not satisfactory and as

petitioner was a habitual absentee and as he had forfeited the

confidence reposed in him, he was dismissed and he is not entitled for

the relief of reinstatement.

12. The petitioner filed an additional affidavit relying on an office

order dated 6th February, 1991 stipulating that it has been decided

not to invoke clause 14 (10) of the D.R.TA (Conditions of Appointment

and Service) Regulations, 1952 in cases where the employees

remain/are found absent without prior permission or prior sanction of

leave. By the said order the concerned units were also advised to take

disciplinary action against such employees in accordance with the

standing orders governing the conduct of D.T.C employees. The

petitioner contended that in case the respondent no.2 was not

satisfied with the medical certificates and the explanation given by the

concerned medical hospital, then he should have been given an

opportunity before resorting to invocation of clause 14(10) (c) of

D.R.T.A (Conditions of appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952. It

was further asserted that the medical certificates were issued by the

concerned doctors and that the respondent no.2 cannot contend that

the explanation given by the hospital was not satisfactory.

13. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties in detail. The

order impugned by the petitioner dated 20th September, 1985 only

stipulates that since the petitioner had remained absent for more

than three months, his absence beyond the period of three months

cannot be regularized under clause 14(10) (b) of D.R.T.A (Conditions

of appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 and therefore it was

declared that he has deemed to have resigned his appointment from

the respondent no.2 w.e.f 19th May, 1985. From the said order it is

apparent that neither the medical certificates given by the petitioner

from Dr.Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital were considered nor the

explanation sought from the said hospital was considered. In the

counter affidavit filed by the respondent no.2 it is rather contended

that the explanation given by the hospital was not found to be

satisfactory. The genuineness of the medical certificates given by the

petitioner were doubted on the ground that they did not bear any

serial number. The hospital however, admitted that the medical

certificates were genuine. In the circumstances how the explanation

given by the hospital was not satisfactory has not been explained by

the respondent no.2. This cannot be doubted, in the facts and

circumstances that the petitioner was suffering from tuberculosis.

Can the rest advised by the medical hospital on the ground that the

petitioner was suffering from tuberculosis be denied on the ground

that the case of the petitioner was not referred by the Hospital to the

T.B. Hospital? The respondent no.2 is unable to show how the leave

sought by the petitioner could be denied to him in the present facts

and circumstances and how clause 14(10) (c) of D.R.T.A (Conditions of

appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952 could be invoked in the

present facts and circumstances.

14. It is no more res-Integra that when a statutory functionary

makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged

by the reasons mentioned therein and cannot be supplemented by

fresh reasons. The order dated 20th September, 1985 is based on the

ground that the absence beyond three months could not be

regularized. The medical certificates given by the petitioner have not

been considered at all nor the explanation given by the Medical

Hospital pursuant to the clarification sought by the respondent no.2.

The respondent no.2 could not contend in the facts and

circumstances that the explanation given by the Medical Hospital

regarding the two medical certificates and the petitioner suffering

from Tuberculosis was not found to be satisfactory. The Apex Court in

AIR 1978 SC 851 = (1978) 1 SCC 405, Mohinder Singh Gill v. The

Chief Election Commissioner had held that the orders cannot be

supplemented by fresh reasons as otherwise an order bad in the

beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a

challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out.

Consequently the respondent no.2 cannot validate its order dated 20th

September, 1985 on the ground that the explanation given was not

satisfactory. The Apex Court in case of Mohinder Singh Gill(supra) in

para 8 at page 417 had held as under:

"8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanj (AIR 1952 SC 16):

"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself."

15. The petitioner has been dismissed from service on the basis of

Regulation 14(10) of the respondent Corporation which is as under:-

"10(a). Extraordinary leave without pay may be granted to an employee in Special circumstances:-

i) when no other leave is admissible, or

ii) when other leave is admissible but the employee concerned applies in writing for the grant of extraordinary leave.

b) The duration of extraordinary leave shall not ordinarily exceed three months on any one occasion. In exceptional cases; it may be extended to eighteen months subject to such conditions as the Authority may be general or special orders prescribed only when the employee concerned is undergoing treatment for:-

                    i) Pulmonary      tuberculosis    in   a   recognized
                    sanatorium, or

ii) Tuberculosis of any other part of the body by a qualified tuberculosis specialist, or

iii) leprosy in a recognized leprosy institution or a specialist in leprosy recognized as such by the State Administrative Medical Officer concerned.

Note:-1. The concession of extraordinary leave upto eighteen months will be admissible also to an employee, who for want of accommodation in any recognized sanatorium at or near the place of his duty receives treatment at his residence under a tuberculosis specialists recognized as such by the State Administrative Medical Officer concerned and produces a certificate signed by that Specialist to the effect that he is under his treatment and that he has reasonable chances of recovery on the expiry of the leave recommended.

Note 2:- The concession of extraordinary leave upto eighteen months under this scheme will be admissible only to those employees, who have been in continuous service of the authority for a period exceeding one year.

c) Where an employee fails to resume duty on the expiry of the maximum period of extraordinary leave granted to him, or where such an employee, who is granted a lessor amount of extraordinary leave than the maximum amount admissible, remains absent from duty for any period which together with the extraordinary leave granted exceeds the limit upto which he could have been granted such leave under clause (b), he shall be deemed to have resigned his appointment and shall, accordingly cease to be in the employment of the authority.

d) The officer empowered to grant leave may commute retrospectively periods of absence without leave into extraordinary leave.

e) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub clause (b) extraordinary leave may be granted in excess of the limit of three months to an employee who is in receipt of disablement or sickness benefit from the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, in order to allow him a total period of six months absence from duty."

16. The question before the Court is whether the petitioner could be

dismissed from service without any enquiry on the basis of D.R.T.A

(Conditions of appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952. In the case

of Jai Shankar (Supra) relied on by the petitioner the Supreme Court

was concerned with a similar regulation which was as under:-

"13. An individual who absents himself without permission or who remains absent without permission for one month or longer after the end of his leave should be considered to have sacrificed his appointment and may only be reinstated with the sanction of the competent authority."

17. Regarding the said regulation it was held by the Apex Court that

the regulation involves a punishment for overstaying one's leave and

the burden is also thrown on the incumbent to secure reinstatement

by showing cause. It was observed that though the Government is

entitled to impose punishment of discharge or removal from the

service but this cannot be done and should not be done without at

least telling such a person that the authorities propose to remove him

and giving him an opportunity of showing cause as to why he should

not be removed. It was held by the Apex Court that a removal is

removal and even after abandonment of service by overstaying one's

leave, an opportunity must be given to the person against whom such

an order is proposed, no matter how the regulation describes it and

not to give any opportunity is to go against Article 311 of the

Constitution of India.

18. Comparison of the Regulation 13 in the case of Jai Shankar

(Supra) and Regulation 14(10)(C) reflect that they are quite similar.

Under the regulation of the respondent Corporation, if an employee

fails to resume duties on the expiry of maximum period of

extraordinary leave granted to him, he is deemed to have resigned his

appointment and would cease to be in employment of the authority.

As has been held in the case of Jai Shankar (Supra) such deemed

resignation of an employee of respondent Corporation which is also

without affording him an opportunity of hearing, will be contrary to

and shall be against Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The

respondent no.2, therefore, cannot be allowed to take shelter under

their Regulation 14(10)(c) for deemed resignation of the petitioner and

his removal from the service without giving him an opportunity of

hearing and without conducting an enquiry against him.

19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on

D.K.Yadav (Supra) where the Apex Court had held that deemed

abandonment of the service and losing the lien on the appointment

under Clause 13(2)(iv) of the certified standing orders was arbitrary,

unjust, unfair and violative of Article 14, as the principle of natural

justice must be read into the standing order. The principle of natural

justice contemplates that no man should be condemned unheard and

consequently not even a valid act can affect the rights of such a

person and no decision must be taken which will affect the right of

any person without first being informed of the case and without giving

him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case and an order

involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules

of natural justice. It was held that it is not so much to act judiciously

but to act fairly that is by adopting a procedure which must be just,

fair and reasonable. In this case the management had not conducted

any domestic enquiry nor had given the employee any opportunity to

put forth his case and, therefore, the abandonment of the service and

losing the lien of the employee under Clause 13(2)(iv) was held to be

invalid and the employee was granted reinstatement with 50% of the

back wages.

20. In another judgment relied on by the petitioner, Syndicate Bank

(Supra) the reliance was placed by the Supreme Court on D.K.Yadav‟

case (Supra). The Supreme Court had also held that an enquiry would

have been necessary, if the employee had submitted his explanation

which was not acceptable to the employer or that the employee

reported for duty but was not allowed to join the employer. In either

case, it was held that the enquiry would have been necessary.

21. In a number of petitions which were filed against the different

awards with respect to various workmen who had been dismissed by

the respondent no.2/Corporation invoking clause 14 (10) of D.R.T.A

(Conditions of appointment and Service) Regulation, 1952, holding the

dismissal of the workmen to be illegal and invalid, the Learned Single

Judge had dismissed the writ petitions filed by the respondent no.2

Corporation. The lead matter in this batch of petitions was DTC Vs

Om Kumar decided on 19th October, 2001 being WP(C) 4231/1997 =

2002 III AD (DELHI) 52. The respondent no.2 corporation had

challenged the judgment of Single Judge in the Appeal which appeals

were also dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 7th May,

2002. The Special leave petition filed against the order of the Division

Bench was also dismissed. These facts were also noticed by another

Single Judge in 2007 V AD (DELHI) 461, DTC Vs Govt. of NCT Delhi &

ors. The learned Single Judge in para 4 on page 462 had held as

under:

4. Counsel for the respondent states that during the pendency of the present writ petition, the issue that is the subject matter of the present writ petition was dealt with by a learned Single Judge of this Court in a batch of matters, the lead matter being 2002 III AD (DELHI) 52 = WP (C) No.4231/1997 entitled DTC Vs. Om Kumar, decided on 19.10.2001, wherein the Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the DTC, petitioner therein, against different awards passed with respect to various workman on the same ground, by holding that invocation of Clause 14 (10) (c) of the Regulations by the petitioner/ management was not legal. The petitioner DTC then challenged the aforementioned order by filing a series of appeals before the Division Bench of this Court. Vide judgment dated 7.5.2002, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeals filed by the petitioner/ DTC and upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The said judgment was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court by the petitioner. It is stated by counsel for the parties that the said SLPs have been disposed of by giving certain directions to the parties to the effect that the respondent/ workmen therein shall be reinstated without allowing any claim for back wages and that the period covered shall be taken into account by the DTC/ management for the purpose of continuity of service so that retrial/ pensionary benefits could be availed of by the respondent/ workmen. It was also ordered that if the respondent/ workmen filed their joining reports within three weeks of the said order at the Headquarter of the DTC, their joining reports shall be considered by the authorities and with these directions, the petitions were disposed of.

22. Therefore, in the present facts and circumstances, the order

dated 20th September, 1985 dismissing the services of the petitioner

without holding any enquiry and without giving a reasonable

opportunity to the petitioner, merely on the basis of invoking clause

14 (10) of D.R.T.A (Conditions of appointment and Service)

Regulation, 1952 cannot be sustained and therefore, the order of

dismissal dated 20th September, 1985 is set aside and the petitioner is

reinstated with continuity of service and a direction is given to the

respondent no.2 to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service.

23. The next question is whether the petitioner is entitled for back

wages as the order of his termination has been set aside and if so how

much? The Learned counsel for respondent no.2 has contended that

the petitioner is not entitled for any back wages as his services were

terminated in 1985. She has relied on an order dated 25th April, 2006

of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals nos.7110-7111 of 2004. In the

said appeals, the Supreme Court without going into question of law

raised and considering the special circumstances involved in the

interest of justice had reinstated the employees without their claim for

back wages as the respondents/employees were willing to join back

without laying any claim for back wages. It is apparent that in the

said matter before the Supreme Court the workmen had agreed to

reinstatement without laying claim for back wages. In another matter

relied on by the respondent no.2, WA 13 of 2004, DTC Vs Naresh

Kumar decided on 30.05.2006, since the writ appeal was got

adjourned by the parties awaiting the decision in the case of Prakash

Chand (supra), the writ appeal was disposed of ordering re-

instatement of the employee subject to his foregoing all claims of back

wages. The order of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Chand

(supra) was a consent order and the parties before the Division Bench

in the matter of Naresh Kumar (supra) also followed the same and

gave implied consent whereby the employee did not claim back wages.

In another order dated 16.10.2006, Ram Kishan Vs DTC in WP(C)

15176 of 2006 the Single Judge had rather stayed the recovery of the

back wages already paid to the employee and had also ordered that

the amount already recovered be paid back to the employee within a

period of four months. Reliance was placed by the Single Judge in the

case of Ram Kishan (supra) on the order of the Division Bench in LPA

No. 156 of 2001, Ram Dutt Vs DTC & anr where it was held that the

period during which the employee remained out of the service will be

taken into account for the purposes of continuity so that

retrial/pensionary benefits could be given to the employee. Since the

employee had agreed not to claim back wages, it was also ordered that

the employee will not claim any back wages for the period when he

was out of service. All the orders relied on by the respondent no.2 in

the facts and circumstances are distinguishable. The Supreme Court

had allowed reinstatement in the case of Prakash Chand (supra)

without back wages as the employees had agreed to forgo their claim

for back wages.

24. Another Single Judge of this Court in the matter of DTC Vs

Govt. of NCT (supra)rather in similar circumstances had modified the

award of the Labor Court granting full back wages to 50% of the back

wages. Considering the facts and circumstances and the trends of the

orders passed from time to time, in the present facts and

circumstances it will be just an appropriate if 50% of the back wages

are awarded to the petitioner. The petitioner is not awarded full back

wages as he has not contributed anything to the organization.

25. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons the writ petition is

allowed and the impugned order dated 20th September, 1985

dismissing the petitioner from the service of the respondent no.2 is set

aside and the petitioner is reinstated with continuity of service but

with 50 per cent of the back wages. The petitioner in the facts and

circumstances be reinstated within two weeks. The petitioner is

directed to report to the headquarter of the respondent no.2 within

two weeks and on petitioner reporting for duty, his joining report be

accepted by the concerned authority. The back wages in terms of this

order be calculated and paid to the petitioner within four weeks.

Considering the facts and circumstance, the parties are however, left

to bear their own costs.

July 01, 2008. ANIL KUMAR J.

„Dev‟