Citation : 2008 Latest Caselaw 2298 Del
Judgement Date : 19 December, 2008
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.B. No.222/2008 in Crl. APPEAL No.110/2008
% Date of Decision: 19.12.2008
Dalip Singh .... Appellant
Through Mr.R.N. Mittal, Sr. Advocate with
Mr.Manoj Kumar, Advocate.
Versus
The State .... Respondent
Through Mr.M.N. Dudeja, APP for the State
along with SI Satvinder Singh and ASI
Gopi Chand, P.S. Malviya Nagar.
Mr.Chandra Shekhar, Advocate for the
complainant.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be Yes
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in No
the Digest?
ANIL KUMAR, J.
*
1. The appellant/applicant seeks suspension of his sentence during
the pendency of the appeal and his release on bail on the ground that
he has been in custody since 31st October, 2000 and he has a good
prima facie case in his favour and the balance of convenience also lies
in his favour and there is likelihood of his success in the appeal. It is
also contended that according to the various pronouncements of the
Supreme Court and this Hon‟ble Court, in cases of life convicts, if such
a convict is in custody for a period of more than five years then he
deserves to be released on bail.
2. The appellant is stated to be a permanent resident of Gurgaon,
Haryana having roots in the society and, therefore, it is contended that
there is no likelihood of his fleeing from justice.
3. The applicant had also filed an application for interim suspension
of his sentence on the ground that the wife of the applicant is suffering
from angina and she had to undergo angiography in Criminal M.B
No.343/2008 which was allowed by order dated 7th March, 2008 and
the applicant‟s sentence was suspended upto 24th March, 2008 and he
was directed to be released on interim bail on furnishing personal bond
for Rs.25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of
the trial Court. The interim bail granted to the applicant was somehow
extended on same terms and conditions by order dated 24th March,
2008 upto 11th April, 2008. On 11th April, 2008 the matter was
adjourned to 23rd April, 2008 and interim bail was extended on the
same terms and conditions. On 23rd April, 2008 the matter was again
adjourned to 7th May, 2008 and the interim bail was extended till 7th
May, 2008. On 7th May, 2008 the regular bench did not assemble.
Therefore, the matter was adjourned to 13th May, 2008 and interim bail
was also extended till 13th May, 2008. On 13th May, 2008 the matter
was ordered to be listed before another bench as one of the Hon‟ble
Judge had recorded the evidence of prime witnesses as Additional
Sessions Judge and, therefore, the matter was adjourned to 20th May,
2008 and the interim bail was extended. On 20th May, 2008 the matter
was again adjourned to 4th August, 2008 and the interim bail was
extended till 4th August, 2008. On 4th August, 2008 the counsel for the
complainant appeared and pleaded that he has a right to be heard and
oppose the bail application and at his request the matter was renotified
for 5th November, 2008 and the interim bail was extended. On 5th
November, 2008 adjournment was sought by the counsel for the State
and, therefore, the matter was adjourned to 28th November, 2008 and
the bail was extended. On 26th November, 2008 an application was filed
before 28th November, 2008 for adjournment on account of bereavement
in the family of the learned counsel for the applicant and, therefore,
28th November, 2008 date was cancelled and the matter was adjourned
to 16th December, 2008 and the interim bail was extended. The matter
has been heard on 16th December, 2008, 18th December, 2008 and 19th
December, 2008 and interim bail was extended till today.
4. The learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the
angiography had been completed. The interim suspension of the
sentence was granted on account of angioplasty which was to be done
on the wife of the applicant which has already been done and, therefore,
there are no grounds to further extend the interim suspension of
sentence and interim bail of the applicant.
5. The learned counsel for the applicant has sought regular
suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal and his
release on bail primarily on the ground that the applicant has already
undergone 7 years of sentence. The learned counsel has taken us
through the evidence in detail and has pointed out certain alleged
contradictions. He has contended that though the applicant was alleged
to have driven the car no finger prints were picked up from the car.
Great emphasis has been alleged by the learned counsel on the fact that
though the mobile was used to convey the ransom calls, however,
neither any mobile was recovered nor any record of service provider has
been established to show that the calls were made nor it has been
established that the phone was in the name of the applicant.
6. The learned counsel has also emphasized that seven persons
namely PW.1 Sh.Rajinder, PW.2 Sh.Gajraj Singh, PW.5 Sh.Dharam Vir,
PW.6 Sh.Ratti Pal, PW.7 Sh.Jagmal Singh and PW.10 Sh.Ramesh have
not supported the version of the prosecution. The learned counsel has
also contended that non production of the driver who was abducted
along with Subhash Batra is fatal to the case of the prosecution.
7. The learned counsel has also referred to the testimony of PW.8
Sh.Shyam Sunder brother of Sh.Subhash Batra who was allegedly
kidnapped by the applicant and has stated that even he has not
supported the prosecution version. The learned counsel has taken us
through the testimony of PW.4 Sh.Subhash Batra who was allegedly
kidnapped and has contended that his testimony is not in consonance
with his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
hence, he cannot be termed as reliable witness for conviction of the
applicant.
8. Mr.Mittal, learned senior counsel has also contended that there
was no test identification parade and an application filed on 16th
November, 2008 few days after the alleged incident was not allowed by
the Court and consequently adverse inference has to be taken.
According to him nothing has been recovered.
9. The learned counsel has also emphasized that taking into
consideration the testimonies of the some of the witnesses, which
include pw4, pw9 and pw17 and the version stated in the FIR, no case
under Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code is made out as there were
no threats for any bodily harm to Sh.Subhash Batra which is an
essential ingredient of Section 364A and in absence of the same, if any
case which could be made out against the applicant, it could only be of
Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and in the circumstances
continuous incarceration of the applicant is contrary to law. The
learned counsel has also asserted that at the time Sh.Subhash Batra
was recovered from the Haveli the premises was not even bolted and in
the circumstances it is not reasonable to infer any threat to such
person. Difference in the ransom demands as in the FIR the amount of
ransom is not stipulated whereas there are different versions regarding
the amount of ransom being Rs.28 lakhs and Rs.35 lakhs have been
given, which casts doubts about the veracity of the prosecution case
and in the circumstances the applicant has a prima facie case. The
learned counsel has also referred about the revolver which was
recovered and which was deposited, however, the same has been
missing.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on 2003
Crl.Law Journal 1262, Bhagwan Singh and Ors Vs. State of M.P to
contend that on account of failure to hold a test identification parade,
the applicant cannot be saddled with the offence alleged to have been
committed by him. Reliance has also been placed on 149(2008) DLT
306 (DB), Rafiq & Anr Vs. State to contend that in absence of evidence
in regard to any threat to cause death or hurt to the kidnapped person
and only simple ransom demands made, will not bring the offence
under Section 364A of IPC and the case will only fall under Section 363
of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel for the appellant has also
relied on 2007 (1) JCC 216, Lal Ram Vs. State (GNCT) of Delhi; Madan
Gopal Vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2006 (1) JCC 461; 133
(2006) DLT 315 (DB), Ajay & Anr. V. State of NCT of Delhi; 97(2002)
DLT 776 (DB), Id.Mohd Vs. State; Sudhir Aggarwal & Anr. V. State of
NCT of Delhi, 2005(2) JCC 1049; 2001 (2) JCC (Delhi) 181, Priya Swami
v. The State (N.C.T of Delhi); 2000 Crl.L.J. 4619, Dadu alias Tulsidas v.
State of Maharashtra and AIR 1977 SC 2147, Kashmira Singh v. State
of Punjab to contend that the applicant is entitled for suspension of his
sentence and his release on bail in the facts and circumstances.
11. Mr.Dudeja, learned APP for the State has refuted the pleas and
contentions raised by Mr.Mittal, learned senior counsel for the
applicant. Relying on AIR 2004 SC 4865, Malleshi Vs. State of
Karnataka; Suman Sood alias Kamal Jeet Kaur Vs. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 2007 SC 2774 para 57 and Vinod Vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 2
SCC 466, it is contended that in order to attract the provision of Section
364A what is required to be proved is that the accused kidnapped or
abducted the person and kept him under detention after such
kidnapping and abduction and that the kidnapping or abduction was
for ransom. He contended that if the evidence on record is analysed in
this background of Section 364A of Indian Penal Code, the inevitable
conclusion is that kidnapping was done with a threat to cause death or
hurt to such person and such conduct gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension that such person can be put to death or hurt. The
learned counsel for the State, Mr.Dudeja has also relied on (2004) SCC
638, Kishori Lal v. Rupa and Ors to contend that only in exceptional
cases suspension of sentence and grant of bail should be granted
during the pendency of appeal in the High Court. He stated that in the
said case direction by the High Court in respect of releasing the convict
on bail merely on the ground that during the trial he had not misused
the liberties was set aside and the order for suspension of sentence of
the High Court was set aside.
12. The learned counsel has also contended that period undergone is
not the criterion for suspending the sentence nor the regular
suspension can be granted on the ground that the appellant/applicant
was on interim bail and during the period of interim bail he has not
exploited the liberty granted to him.
13. Regarding non lifting the finger prints, it is contended that the
driver of the vehicle had given the statement that he had washed the
vehicle and in the circumstances no finger prints could be lifted.
Regarding non performing the TIP it has been pointed out that PW.4
Sh.Subhash Batra has categorically stated that the appellant is a
dismissed constable from Delhi Police and he is a terror in the area and
he runs a notorious group by the name of D.K and he knows the
applicant and the other accused very well since past number of years.
In the circumstances, it is contended that not performing TIP was not
fatal.
14. Perusal of the testimony of PW.4 Sh.Subhash Batra reveals that
he deposed categorically that the applicant with other accused had
confined him and his driver in a farm house for 6-7 hours and then
made him make telephonic calls on his residence at about 5.30 PM and
he talked to his wife from the mobile phone given by the applicant. He
deposed that he had told his wife that he was in problem and his son
should be called and, therefore, the call was again made at about 6.45
PM by the applicant to find out if his son had arrived home or not.
Since his son had arrived the call was again made and he spoke to his
son and told that the applicant with other accused are demanding two
crores and he would be let off only if the demand is met. It was also
deposed by PW.4 that the applicant had told him that in case the
demand is acceptable they should display a white flag at the top of the
house indicating that the ransom demand raised by the applicant
another accused is acceptable to them. The victim has also deposed
that he and his driver were removed to village Badshahpur in a maruti
car in a haveli and they were lodged in a dingy and dark room of the
haveli.
15. We have perused the entire testimony of PW.4. though there are
certain portions of depositions of PW.4 which are not in consonance
with his statement under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
however, on considering the entirety of facts and circumstances it
cannot be held that the deposition of PW.4 is unreliable. Similarly, the
deposition of his son and his wife cannot be held to be unreliable prima
facie in the facts and circumstances.
16. The various alleged discrepancies relied on by the learned
counsel, Mr.Mittal does not appear to be such so as to make the
testimonies of the victim, his son and his wife untrustworthy and to be
rejected in totality. They alleged discrepancies in the totality of facts and
circumstances appears to be only embellishments and on account of
imperfection of memory. The allegation that one witness stated that
plain paper was put in the attaché case while the other called it raddi of
newspaper will not be such a discrepancy so as to disbelieve the entire
prosecution case in the facts and circumstances or to hold that prima
facie no case is made out against the appellant.
17. The driver Santosh could not be examined because the summons
sent to him were received back as he was not traceable and had gone to
Nepal. The victim had not only known the applicant for past couple of
years but he had correctly identified them in the Court and his
testimony about the time he was kidnapped and various other factors
have also been corroborated from the testimonies of PW.9 and PW.17.
The decision to put plain paper which can also be termed as raddi
newspaper was taken by the police according to the testimony of the
son of the victim PW.9.
18. It is no more res integra that a decision is only an authority for
what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio
and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from
the various observations made in it. The ratio of any decision must be
understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said
long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually
decides, and not what logically follows from it. It is well settled that a
little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference
in the precedential value of a decision. In P.S.Rao Vs State, JT 2002 (3)
SC 1, the Supreme Court had held as under:
". There is always a peril in treating the words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusion in two cases.
In Rafiq v. State, 1980 SCC (Crl) 946 it was observed as under:
"The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to another case without having regard to the fact situation and circumstances obtaining in two cases."
19. The judgments relied on by the applicant are clearly
distinguishable. In the case of Rafiq (Supra) relied on by the applicant
the testimony was of a child witness which was not very reliable and
consequently insistence for corroborative evidence to child‟s testimony
was sought as there was absence of any evidence in the child testimony
regarding threat to the life or the body was sought. In contradistinction
the testimony on the record categorically reflects the threats extended
to the victim. PW.4 had told that threats were given to him by the
applicant and other accused that if the amount of ransom is not paid he
would be done to death. The son of the victim has also deposed that the
accused had told "Apney Pitaji Se Pyar Hai to Paisa ka intjam kar lo aur
apne ghar pe safed jhanda laga lo". In considering the entirety of the
testimonies and even the testimonies of those witnesses who are alleged
to have not supported the prosecution version, it cannot be held that no
threats were given to the victim. The testimonies of the witnesses who
have not supported the version of the prosecution cannot be rejected
altogether.
20. In Bhagwan Singh & Ors (Supra) the child witness was vacillating
in the course of his deposition. The child was six years of age and
consistency in his deposition was not expected and therefore it was held
that there was a possibility of the child witness being tutored. In such
circumstances it was held that there should have been a TIP.
Apparently the facts and circumstances of the present case are quite
distinguishable. In Lala Ram (Supra) a Division Bench of this Court had
suspended the sentence in a case under Section 376 of IPC where the
prosecutrix had not even told her mother or anyone else in regard to the
alleged rape committed by the convict and in the circumstances the
sentence of the convict was suspended. In Surender Singh (Supra) a
Single Judge of this Court had suspended the sentence as the
conviction was only on the statement under Section 164 of the Criminal
Procedure Code and the prosecutrix was not even examined in the
Court. In Madan Gopal (Supra) a Division Bench had granted the
suspension of sentence which was denied only on account of the convict
committing an offence under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC
while he was undergoing his sentence. In Ajay & Anr (Supra) a Division
Bench had suspended the sentence in the facts and circumstances of
the said case without commenting on the merits and consequently, the
ratio of the said case cannot be of any assistance of the applicant.
Similarly, on the basis of the precedents relied on by the applicant, ID
Mohd (Supra), Sudhir Aggarwal & Ors (Supra) and other cases it
cannot be held that the applicant is entitled for regular suspension of
his sentence and his release on bail.
21. At the time of consideration whether the applicant is entitled for
suspension of sentence and his release on bail during the pendency of
the appeal, it is not appropriate to go into meticulous examination of
the evidence which the learned counsel for the appellant wants the
Court to do and to deal in detail with the rival contentions and to
embark on a final determination of the contentions raised against any
such determination, as even tentative determination may influence the
decision in the appeal of the applicant.
22. Mr. R.N.Mittal, learned senior counsel for the appellant, has
contended that the applicant be allowed to withdraw the application for
suspension of sentence and his release on bail, in case this Court is not
inclined to grant the suspension of sentence and release him on bail
during the pendency of appeal. We do not accede to the plea of the
counsel for the Appellant/Applicant. We have considered the rival
contentions and have also gone through the record before us. After
consideration of the contentions and the record and in the entirety of
facts and circumstances of the case that the appellant has already been
convicted of a serious offence under Section 364A IPC and was not on
bail during the course of trial and we are not inclined to suspend the
sentence of the applicant during the pendency of the present appeal.
23. In the circumstances, the application of the applicant for regular
suspension of the sentence and his release on bail is, therefore,
dismissed. We have also held that the applicant is not entitled for
extension of his interim suspension of sentence and his interim bail
which was on account of ill health of his wife. The interim suspension
had been extended from time to time on account of adjournment of the
case. There are no grounds to extend the interim suspension of
sentence in the facts and circumstance. Consequently, the
appellant/applicant who is present in person in Court be taken into
custody and be sent to judicial lock up Patiala House Courts, New Delhi
to be sent to Central Jail from where he was released on interim bail.
With these directions the application is disposed of. It is, however,
clarified that anything stated hereinabove shall not be an expression of
final opinion on the final merits of the appeal.
Crl. M.A. Nos.13987/2008 & 13986/2008
The learned counsel for the applicants/complainant contends
that the applications do not survive and he seeks to withdraw the
applications. Dismissed as withdrawn.
Dasti under the signature of the Court Master.
ANIL KUMAR, J.
December 19, 2008 V.K. SHALI, J. „k‟
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