Delhi High Court

The New India Assurance Co.Ltd. vs Mohinder Dev & Ors. on 4 December, 2008

Author: V.B.Gupta

*      HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI

          FAO No.85/1983 & CM No.2358/1983

%            Judgment reserved on:19th November, 2008

             Judgment delivered on 4th December, 2008


The New India Assurance Co.Ltd.
Area Office-Gulab Bhawan
(Rear Block), 6, Bahadur Shah
Zafar Marg, New Delhi-2                  ....Appellant

                 Through:Mr.Salil Paul, Adv.

                           Versus

1.Mohinder Dev
S/o Arjun Dass,
R/o House No.2627, Chelawali
Pati, Muktsar Khas, P.S.
Muktsar Distt. Faridkot.

2.M/s Jangir Singh Bhajan Singh
R/o Bhatinda Road, Main Petrol
Pump, Muktsar, Distt.Faridkot.

3.Mrs.Kamlesh Sethi
Widow of late Sh.Leela Dhar Sethi

4.Miss Geeta Sethi,
D/o late Sh.Leela Dhar Sethi

5.Master Anish Sethi
S/o late Sh.Leela Dhar Sethi

6.Smt.Thakuri Devi
W/o late Shri Deena Nath Sethi
R/o B/28-B, Vijay Nagar,

FAO No.85/1983                                 Page 1 of 31
 New Delhi-110009.                   ...Respondents.

                 Through:Mr.V.P.Chaudhary, Sr.Adv.
                         with Mr.Nitinjya Chaudhary
                         and Ms.Sushma Sachdeva,
                         Advs. for R-3 to 6.

Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
   be allowed to see the judgment?                   Yes

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?                Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported
   in the Digest?                                    Yes

V.B.Gupta, J.

Present appeal has been filed by the appellant-

Insurance company under Section 110-D of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1939 ( as amended) (in short as „Act‟)

against the award dated 22nd February, 1983 passed by

Mr.P.R.Thakur, Judge Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal,

Delhi (for short as „Tribunal‟).

2. Brief facts of this case are that deceased, Sh.

Leela Dhar Sethi, on 15th November, 1981 at about 2.15

p.m. was going on his cycle from Azadpur side towards

Rana Partab Bagh passing through State Bank Colony

and G.T.Karnal Road, when a truck No.PUA-3788

driven rashly and negligently by respondent No.1 came

at a fast speed from the opposite direction and came on

extreme wrong side of the road and struck against the

cycle of the deceased. As a result of the impact,

deceased fell on the road and his head was crushed

under the wheels of the truck.

3. The truck is owned by respondent No.2 and is

insured with the appellant.

4. Vide impugned judgment, the Tribunal passed an

award in the sum of Rs.1,25,880/- and awarded 12%

interest per annum, from the date of petition till the

date of payment.

5. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the

present appeal, while respondents 3 to 6 have filed

cross-objections against the award, under Order 41

Rule 22 CPC.

6. Notice of this appeal was issued to the

respondents and respondent No.1 was served by

publication but did not appear, whereas, counsel for

respondent No.2, appeared initially, but later on he

absented.

7. Arguments have been advanced by learned

counsel for the appellant as well as counsel for

respondents 3 to 6.

8. The first contention of learned counsel for the

appellant is that the liability of appellant-Insurance

Company, in the present case, is limited to the extent of

Rs.50,000/- only, as per policy proved on record.

9. The next contention is that the Tribunal erred in

not calling the respondent No.2, the owner to produce

the original insurance policy which is in his possession

and the Tribunal wrongly rejected the application of

appellant filed under Order 11 Rule 14 CPC.

10. It is also contended that the Tribunal should have

taken into consideration the true copy produced by the

appellant as correct, since the owner intentionally has

withheld the original policy and the appellant was

unable to file the carbon copy of the insurance policy as

the same has been misplaced at the time of shifting

from the branch office of the appellant at Malot in

Jullunder to its divisional office and, thus, the true copy

ought to have been allowed to be produced.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his

contentions cited various judgments, namely, Gopal

Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and Ors.

1968 SC 1413 where it had been laid down that;

"Where a party in possession of best evidence which would throw light on the issue on controversy withholding with it, the Court ought to draw an adverse inference against him notwithstanding that onus of proof does not lie on him."

12. In another decision of Apex Court, Sh.M.L.Sethi

v. Shri R.P.Kapur 1972 SC 2379, while discussing

the provisions of Order 11 Rule 12 CPC, it has been laid

down that;

"The documents sought to be discovered need not be admissible in

evidence in the enquiry or proceedings."

13. Lastly, it has been contended that strict rule of

evidence are not applicable to the claim proceedings

under the Act and on this point learned counsel cited

decision of Apex Court, namely, Union of India v.

T.R.Varma AIR 1957 SC 882, in which it has been

held that;

"The Evidence Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character."

14. On the other hand, it has been contended by

learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 that appellant

has failed to establish this fact that the insurance policy

in this case was limited, since there is no policy on

record. Though the policy were summoned from the

owner but he did not produce it and as such under

these circumstances, the appellant was to produce the

secondary evidence, that is, carbon copy of the

insurance policy but the same was not produced and

instead it placed on record, the true copy which is not

admissible in evidence.

15. In support of his contention, learned counsel cited

Tejinder Singh Gujral v. Inderjit Singh and Anr.

2007 ACJ 37 in which it was held that;

"The learned Tribunal, however, committed an error in opining that the insurance policy was not required to be proved. Learned single Judge of the High Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the insurance policy having not brought on record, a presumption would arise that the liability of the insurer was unlimited."

16. The Tribunal has dealt this issue in detail, and

gave its reasoning as under;

"In the present case, the owner-cum- insured has been contesting the proceedings throughout. What was, therefore, required in the circumstances was that in case, the Insurance Company wanted to prove the fact that its liability was limited to Rs.50,000/-, it ought to have called upon the insured- the respondent No.2 to have produced on record the original Policy of Insurance which the respondent No.3 had issued, to the respondent No.2. During the entire course of proceedings, no such notice

was served by respondent No.3 on the respondent No.2, requiring the later to produce the original Policy of Insurance issued to it."

"Secondary evidence cannot allowed to be led unless and until it is established on record that the primary evidence is not available or is not forthcoming. Section 66 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence of the contents of the documents shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is or to his attorney or pleader, such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law and if no notice is prescribed by law, then such notice as the Court considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case."

"Let us now deal with the circumstances in which the copy of the Insurance Policy was alleged to have been proved as Ex.RW1/A by the statement of RW1, the official witness from the office of the respondent-Insurance Company. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties as to whether the copy of the Insurance Policy has been validly and legally proved, notwithstanding its exhibition as Ex.RW1/A, it will be necessary to discuss in detail the testimony of RW1/A. Sh.Parween Wadhawan was the Assistant from the Legal Department of the respondent- Insurance Company at New Delhi. He produced the true copy of the Insurance

Policy in respect of the vehicle in question, which was valid from 24.1.1981 to 23.1.1982. He deposed that the Insurance Policy in question was issued by Malout office in District Jullunder. The true copy of the Insurance Policy, according to this witness, was signed by Sh.S.S.Sharma, Inspector, whose signatures he identified on account of the fact that he had been receiving the communications from him, duly singed by him in the course of discharge of his official duties. Such true copy of the Insurance Policy was exhibited as Ex.RW1/A with observations that the mere fact that the Policy has been exhibited as RW1/A will not mean that it had been conclusively proved in accordance with the procedure of law. In his cross- examination, he made revaluations which indeed make his statement devoid of any value. He stated that Sh.S.S.Sharma, Inspector was still working in the office; that the true copy of the Insurance Policy produced on record was not the office copy which was prepared simultaneously with the preparation of the original Insurance Policy; that he had never seen Sh.S.S.Sharma, Inspector signing in his presence nor he had ever met him nor he could even identify him. He stated that according to the procedure, carbon copies of the Policy are prepared simultaneously at the time of issuance of the Original Policy. One such carbon copy is maintained by the issuing Inspector in his record while the other

carbon copy is sent to the Mechanisation Department which, as at present, is at New Delhi. It is thus clear that there were at least two carbon copies prepared at the time of issuance of the original Policy of Insurance, and it has not been proved that neither such carbon copy of the Insurance Policy is available or traceable either in the record of the issuing Inspector who is still alive and kicking and also working in the office of the Insurance Company or in the record maintained in the Mechanisation Department of the Insurance Company at New Delhi."

"It is not in dispute that by charging extra premium, a Insurance Company can undertake enhanced liability beyond the limits of statutory liability provided in the statute. It was, therefore, very essential for the respondent No.3 in the present case to have proved on record the fact that no extra premium to cover any extra liability had been charged from the insured in case it wanted to prove that its liability was that as fixed under Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939."

"It is in any case clear that the alleged true copy produced on record by RW1 cannot at all be said to be a valid document to prove the contents of the original Policy of the Insurance. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the carbon copies of the Policy of the Insurance available in the record of the Insurance Company having not

been brought on record and proved, it can be safely said that the Insurance Company has not been able to prove its liability being limited to Rs.50,000/- only as alleged in its written statement. The present case is a fit case where presumption ought to be drawn against the Insurance Company, and the Insurance Company has to be held liable for the full amount irrespective of Section 95(2) of the Act, and the liability of the Insurance Company will be co- extensive with the amount of award."

17. It may be pertinent to point out that, the appellant

moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with

Section 151, CPC seeking permission to bring on record

carbon copy of the original Insurance Policy and the

reason given by the appellant in the application was

that appellant-Insurance Company could not file the

carbon copy of the Insurance Policy before the Tribunal

as the same was misplaced due to the shifting of the

branch office and despite due diligence and best

efforts, the same could not be traced out. Now, the

carbon copy of the same has been traced out from its

own record.

18. Kailash Gambhir, J. vide order dated 20th

February, 2008, dismissed the application holding that;

"The main defence of the appellant before the Tribunal was that it had limited liability and for proving the said fact it was imperative on the part of the appellant to have proved the carbon copy of the insurance policy in accordance with law. On the failure of the appellant to prove the insurance policy before the Tribunal, the appellant cannot be permitted to fill the lacuna and gaps at this belated stage, more particularly when the appellant has failed to give any plausible explanation for filing the carbon copy of the policy at this stage. It is matter of record that appellant did not send any notice under Order 12 Rule 8 CPC to the owner of the offending vehicle for production of the original insurance policy and also failed to offer any explanation as to why the carbon copy could not be produced from the Mechanization Department of the insurance company where also the parallel records are maintained."

Further held;

"The exercise of due diligence, both when such evidence was either not within his knowledge or could not be produced at the relevant stage and also when the same is sought to be produced at the belated stage is required to be explained by the party invoking the said provision of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. In

the present case, the appellant has failed to disclose such exercise of due diligence on its part. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the present application and the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant."

19. It is, thus, apparent from the record, that carbon

copy of the insurance policy was neither placed nor

proved before the Tribunal. Once the application for

additional evidence of the appellant-insurance company

has been rejected, the appellant cannot be permitted to

re-agitate again that appellant filed application under

Order 11 Rule 14 CPC and the true copy of insurance

policy was proved on record, so it should be taken as

secondary evidence.

20. Since, the secondary evidence, that is, carbon

copy of the insurance policy, has not been placed or

proved on record, a presumption would arise that the

liability of the insurer was unlimited and I do not see

any reason to differ with the findings given by the

Tribunal.

21. Accordingly, the findings of the Tribunal on this

issue are affirmed and it is held that the Insurance

policy in this case was unlimited.

22. However, I express my deep anguish and sorrow

upon the callous attitude of the appellant-Insurance

Company, in filing this appeal when appellant knew

from the day one, that there is no legal force in their

appeal, but still they persisted in pursuing the matter

for over a quarter century.

23. The provisions as enacted in the Act were brought

in the statue book to grant relief to the victim of an

accident or his dependant/s by way of compensation.

These obviously are beneficial provisions to give relief

to a person who has suffered grievous injury or to the

dependants of a victim who are left without a bread

earner. The object thereof cannot be permitted to be

frustrated.

24. The law relating to award of compensation in

motor accident cases has developed enormously. It is a

good sign. Judicial pronouncements, dealing with the

subject, have greatly widened the horizons in this field.

New principles have been enunciated to cover various

concepts of damages. Enough care has been taken to

see that the victim, in case of personal injuries, and the

dependents in cases of fatal accidents, do not suffer

incalculably due to the accident in question and

decisions make an attempt to equate, as for as possible,

the misery with the compensation awarded, though

money compensation cannot be considered to be in any

way equal to the injuries sustained or the life lost.

Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages have to be

carefully determined. Need for future case is more, so

that the victim or the dependents do not lead a

miserable life. [State of Himachal Pradesh v.

Shrichand Kishan Hazri (1990) 1 Ac.C.C. 44]

25. In the present case, the Tribunal awarded

compensation after a protracted trial and instead of

letting the poor victims of the road accident, live in

peace and have little solace, the appellant/Insurance

Company is after their blood and has filed the present

appeal.

26. It appears that the present appeal has filed by the

appellant mechanically, without any legal justification

and there being no application of judicious mind and

not taking into consideration, the various decisions of

the Apex Court and various High Courts.

27. In its anxiety to alleviate the sufferings of those

who are suddenly struck by the bolt of misfortune, the

legislature provided a cheap and summary remedy

before the Tribunals. The contribution of the Tribunals

and the Courts should be ensured that the benefits

reach the helpless persons. Complaints are rife that

benefits received ultimately by the claimants are only

nominal and the anxiety of the legislature and the

exercise by the Tribunals and Courts are all in vain.

28. In Oriental Insurance Co. v. Zarifa and others,

AIR 1995 J & K 81, the Jammu and Kashmir High

Court has observed as under;

"Before concluding, it is also observed that it is a social welfare legislation under which the compensation is provided by way of Award to the people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed in the vehicular accident. These people who sustain injuries or whose kith and kins are killed, are necessarily to be provided such relief in a short span of time and the procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the Act, under which such compensation is to be paid to such claimants."

29. When application for additional evidence filed on

behalf of appellant was dismissed, at that very time, the

appellant-Insurance Company ought to have gracefully

accepted its defeat in this long drawn legal battle, but it

still persisted in "flocking the dead horse".

30. The public sector undertakings, such as the

appellant, who have enormous manpower and financial

resources, did not let the poor victims of road accident,

live in peace and had prolonged this legal battle for

more than 25 years in its zeal to see that the road

accident victims, do not get more than Rs.50,000/-.

31. In the present case, the accident took place in

1981, that is, more than 27 years ago. Deceased who

died in this unfortunate road accident, was aged 40

years, is survived by the claimants, his wife aged 35

years at that time and now 62 years old, minor

daughter then (aged 9 years) now 36 years, minor son

then (6 years old) and now 33 years and mother aged

then (67 years old) now 94 years old.

32. The young widow, minor children and aged

mother, were awarded compensation in 1983, so that

they could have some solace and could fulfill some of

their essential and necessary requirements of life in a

comfortable manner but the appellant-Insurance

Company left no stone unturned in depriving them of

the benefits of this social legislation.

33. These public sector undertakings who have their

full fledge legal departments, should not go on filing

appeals mechanically in every matter. Before filing any

appeal, matter should be examined at highest level by

their legal branch so that there is no wastage of

manpower and financial resources of the Insurance

Company and they should make every effort to reduce

the frivolous and dead litigation.

34. Thus, I do not find any legal force in this appeal

and the same is liable to be dismissed with costs of

Rs.25,000/-

CM No.9328/2008(cross objections)

35. It is contended by learned counsel for the

claimants that while calculating the salary of the

deceased, the Tribunal did not consider future

prospects, since deceased would have got yearly

increment and would have been benefited by

promotion, as well as by upward revision of salary.

36. The other contention is that the Tribunal wrongly

made deduction of 50% from the total amount of the

deceased. Keeping in view the fact that the deceased

left behind two minor children besides widow and aged

mother, Tribunal should not have made deduction of

more than 25%. Moreover, no amount for loss of

consortium, love and affection and for funeral expenses

have been paid.

37. It is also contended that the Tribunal fixed

quantum of compensation on a much lower side and

wrongly reduced interest to 6% per annum from date of

petition till the date of payment. The interest ought to

have been maintained at 12% per annum.

38. Learned counsel for the claimants in support of its

contention cited various judgments namely; U.P.State

Road Transport Corporation v.Trilok Chandra and

Ors., 1996 ACJ 831, Sarla Dixit and Anr. V.Balwant

Yadav and Ors., 1996 ACJ 581, General Manager,

Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v.

Susamma Thomas and Ors., 1994 ACJ 1, Hussan

Bano and Ors v.Subhash Chand and Ors. 2003 ACJ

1114.

39. On the other hand, it has been contended by

learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal has

rightly calculated income of the deceased and for future

prospects, there was no evidence and as such the

compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and fair.

40. The object of payment of compensation under the

Motor Vehicles Act is to compensate the dependants of

the deceased for the loss of dependency due to the

death of the earning member. The Court has to assess

the quantum of compensation payable to the

dependants which is just proper and reasonable. The

amount of compensation is to be fixed in such a manner

so that it does not amount to undue enrichment of the

dependants since the Court is to determine the amount

of compensation "which it appears to it to be just".

Some amount of guess work is always allowable in

fixing the monthly income as well as the loss of

dependency and consequently the quantum of

compensation.

41. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. v.

Krishna Bala & Ors., III (2006) ACC 361 (SC), the

Apex Court has highlighted the manner of fixing

the appropriate multiplier and computation of

compensation and has observed as under:

"6. Certain principles were highlighted by this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti, 1966 (3) SCR 649 in the matter of fixing the appropriate multiplier and computation of compensation. In a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded to the dependents is the pecuniary loss suffered by them as a result of the death. "How much has the widow and family lost by the father's death?" The answer to this lies in the oft-quoted passage from the opinion of Lord Wright in Davies v.

Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., All ER p.665 A-B, which says:-

"The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was required or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due regard to uncertainties, for instance, that

the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculation and doubt."

7. There were two methods adopted to determine and for calculation of compensation in fatal accident actions, the first the multiplier mentioned in Davies case (supra) and the second in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd., 1951 (2) All ER 448.

8. The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the loss of dependency or the multiplicand having regard to the circumstances of the case and capitalizing the multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier is determined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimants whichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. In, ascertaining this, regard should also be had to the fact that ultimately the capital sum should also be consumed-up over the period for which the dependency is expected to last."

Further Court held that;

"10. In regard to the choice of the multiplicand the Halsbury's Laws of

England in Vol. 34, Para 98 states the principle thus:

"98. Assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976- The courts have evolved a method for calculating the amount of pecuniary benefit that dependants could reasonably expect to have received from the deceased in the future. First the annual value to the dependants of those benefits (the multiplicand) is assessed. In the ordinary case of the death of a wage-earner that figure is arrived at by deducting from the wages the estimated amount of his own personal and living expenses.

The assessment is split into two parts. The first part comprises damages for the period between death and trial. The multiplicand is multiplied by the number of years which have elapsed between those two dates. Interest at one- half the short-term investment rate is also awarded on that multiplicand. The second part is damages for the period from the trial onwards. For that period, the number of years which have elapsed between the death and the trial is deducted from a multiplier based on the number of years that the expectancy would probably have lasted; central to that calculation is the probable

length of the deceased's working life at the date of death."

11. As to the multiplier, Halsbury states:

"However, the multiplier is a figure considerably less than the number of years taken as the duration of the expectancy. Since the dependants can invest their damages, the lump sum award in respect of future loss must be discounted to reflect their receipt of interest on invested funds, the intention being that the dependants will each year draw interest and some capital (the interest element decreasing and the capital drawings increasing with the passage of years), so that they are compensated each year for their annual loss, and the fund will be exhausted at the age which the court assesses to be the correct age, having regard to all contingencies. The contingencies of life such as illness, disability and unemployment have to be taken into account. Actuarial evidence is admissible, but the courts do not encourage such evidence. The calculation depends on selecting an assumed rate of interest. In practice about 4 or 5 per cent is selected, and inflation is disregarded. It is assumed that the return on fixed interest bearing securities is so much higher than 4 to 5 per cent that rough and ready allowance for inflation is thereby made. The multiplier may be increased where the plaintiff is a high tax payer. The multiplicand is based on the rate of

wages at the date of trial. No interest is allowed on the total figure."

42. In Sarla Dixit and Anr. v.Balwant Yadav &

Ors.,(supra), the Apex Court has observed as under;

"So far as the adoption of the proper multiplier is concerned, it was observed that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is a more difficult exercise".

43. Thus, in this case the Apex Court applied a

multiplier of 15 only when the deceased was 27 years

old.

44. Sarla Dixit was followed by the Apex Court in

Bijoy Kumar Dugar vs. Bidyadhar Dutta and Ors.

AIR 2006 SC 1255 in which it was held;

"It is by now well-settled that the compensation should be the pecuniary

loss to the dependants by the death of a person concerned. While calculating the compensation, annual dependency of the dependants should be determined in terms of the annual loss, according to the them, due to the abrupt termination of life. To determine the quantum of compensation, the earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident and the amount, which the deceased was spending for the dependants, are the basic determinative factors. The resultant figure should then be multiplied by a „multiplier‟. The multiplier is applied not for the entire span of life of a person, but it is applied taking into consideration the imponderables in life, immediate availability of the amount to the dependants, the expectancy of the period of dependency of the claimants and so many other factors.

Contribution towards the expenses of the family, naturally is in proportion to one‟s earning capacity."

45. In General Manager, Kerala State Road

Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Mrs.

Susamma Thomas and others, (supra) the age of

deceased was 39 years and the Apex Court has applied

the multiplier of 12 only.

46. In Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State

Transport Corporation Ltd. v. K.I. Bindu and

others, 2006 ACJ 423, the age of deceased was 34

years and the Apex Court has applied the multiplier of

13 only.

47. As per claim petition, the deceased was aged 40

years and the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 19 which

is admittedly on much higher side.

48. With regard to the future prospects in Bijoy

Kumar Dugar vs. Bidyadhar Dutta and Ors.

(Supra), it has been laid down that :-

"The claimants have to prove that the deceased was in a trade where he would have earned more from time to time or that he had special merits or qualifications or opportunities which would have led to an improvement in his income. There is no evidence produced on record by the claimants regarding future prospects of increase of income in the course of employment or business or profession, as the case may be."

49. In the present case, there is no evidence brought

on record by the claimants to show the future

prospects of the deceased. This contention, in my

view, is not tenable to sustain it.

50. Coming to the deduction of 50% from the total

amount of the deceased, in New India Assurance Co.

Ltd. vs. Charlie and another, AIR 2005 Supreme

Court 2157, the Apex Court observed as under;

"What would be the percentage of deduction for personal expenditure cannot be governed by any rigid rule or formula by universal application. It would depend upon circumstances of each case. In the instant case the claimant was nearly 37 years of age and was married. Therefore, as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, 1/3rd deduction has to be made for personal expenditure."

51. Since in the present case, the deceased left behind

the widow, two minor children and aged mother, 1/3rd

deduction towards personal expenses, would have been

quite reasonable but Tribunal wrongly deducted 50 per

cent towards personal expenses of the deceased.

52. Nevertheless, the multiplier of 19 adopted in this

case by the Tribunal is far excessive in view of the

various decisions of the Apex Court. So, the claimants

should have no grudge regarding 50% deduction and

not getting anything towards loss of consortium, love

and affection and future prospects since multiplier of

19 is not being reduced.