Nanak Builders And Investors Pvt. ... vs Lakhbir Sawhney And Ors.
2008 Latest Caselaw 698 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. This is an application for impleadment filed on behalf of Thomson Press (India) Ltd. claiming that it is the owner in respect of the suit property. It is claimed that the suit property was sold to the applicant by the defendants by sale deeds executed on 03.04.2001.

2. The suit has been filed by the plaintiff seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 29.05.1986 allegedly entered into between the plaintiff and the two defendants. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff drew my attention to the order passed on the very first day when the suit came up for hearing on 04.11.1991. The defendants were represented on caveat and the learned Counsel for the defendants had stated on that date that till the disposal of IA No. 11488/1991 the defendants would not transfer or alienate the flat in question. The said application (IA No. 11488/1991) was disposed of on 26.02.2007 and the order dated 04.11.1991 was made absolute for the duration of the suit.

3. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff, therefore, submits that any sale or transfer, which was purported to have been made after the order dated 04.11.1991, would be in gross violation of the undertaking given on behalf of the defendants. Apart from this, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff referred to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sanjay Gupta v. Kala Wati for the proposition that in a specific performance suit the Us is between the parties to the agreement and strangers cannot be impleaded as parties. This decision was appealed against before the Division Bench, which dismissed the appeal by a judgment and/or order dated 19.01.2001 passed in FAO (OS) No. 5/2000. The Division Bench look the view that in a suit for specific performance the court has to decide the existence of an agreement between the parties and if the agreement is found to be valid in law and enforceable, the court will grant a decree for its performance. The lis is between parties to the agreement only. The appellant in that case was nowhere mentioned in the agreement which was the subject matter of the suit for specific performance and, therefore, the appellant was held to be a complete stranger so far as the controversy in the suit was concerned.

4. The Division Bench observed that the law on this point was well settled and held that a third party like the appellant therein need not to be impleaded as a party in a suit for specific performance as such a person was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court by way of a special leave petitions being SLP (C) Nos. 9761-9763/2001. The Supreme Court had dismissed the special leave petitions by an order dated 01.10.2001.

5. The present application is entirely covered by the said decision. As such, the present application for impleadment would not be maintainable. The same is dismissed.