Murari Lal And Ors. vs The Chairman, Airports Authority ...
2007 Latest Caselaw 1672 Del

JUDGMENT

Mukundakam Sharma, C.J.

1. These appeals are preferred against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge on 31st May, 2007 dismissing the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein. Since the question which arise for our consideration in both these appeals is similar, we propose to dispose of both these appeals by this common judgment and order, taking LPA No. 1069/2007 as the lead case.

2. Lands of the appellants in village Nangal Dairy came to be acquired by the Land Acquisition Collector by issuing notification dated 23rd January, 1965 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued by the Competent Authority on 26th December, 1968. After the aforesaid notices were issued, land acquisition proceedings were initiated by the Land Acquisition Collector and award came to be passed on 7th September, 1972 wherein compensation for various parcels of lands acquired has been determined by the Collector. Incidentally, the aforesaid acquisition of lands coincided with the acquisition of the lands situated in village Nangal Dewat.

3. Residents of the village Nangal Dewat challenged the aforesaid acquisition by filing a writ petition which was registered as WP(C) 481/1982 titled Daryao Singh v. Union of India, which was disposed of on 3rd August, 2001. During the pendency of the said writ petition in this Court, a statement was made by the Airport Authority of India that a rehabilitation scheme was being prepared in respect of the lands acquired in village Nangal Dewat. On making the aforesaid statement, the writ petition was withdrawn as the said land owners of village Nangal Dewat would be receiving not only compensation as determined under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act but they would be also receiving alternative land as a part of a rehabilitation package.

4. Subsequently, land owners of the village Nangal Dewat filed writ petitions in this Court contending inter alia that their lands should not be allowed to be taken possession of by the Airports Authority of India so long as they are not rehabilitated on the alternative lands, stated to be allotted to them. At that stage, a statement was made on behalf of the Airports Authority of India that the said land owners who would be given alternative lands would be given rent for their land so as to enable them to construct their houses in the relocated area in the meantime. The writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge. Appeals filed against the said order by the land owners were also disposed of with some additional directions. The learned Single Judge referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Khullar and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. , dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants holding that in view of the said decision the question of considering the plea of the appellants for alternative land does not arise in absence of any scheme for alternative allotment of land.

5. Aggrieved by the said decision, the present appeals have been filed on which we have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.

6. The appellants herein are now seeking similar reliefs and same benefit as was granted by the Airport Authority of India to the land owners and residents of Nangal Dewat as according to them there can be no discrimination between similarly situated persons particularly when lands, both in village Nangal Dewat and in village Nangal Dairy, were acquired by the Competent Authority for public purpose i.e. for use of Airport Authority of India. It was submitted before us that when similarly situated persons were given benefits of resettlement and rehabilitation, similar benefits should also be extended to the appellants herein.

7. However, one aspect that needs specific mention at this stage is that the appellants were land owners and residents of Nangal Dairy and there was no challenge to the acquisition proceedings in respect of their land and that no specific scheme was announced by the authority for their rehabilitation. Referring to the letter dated 9th November, 1972 issued by the Delhi Development Authority to the Secretary (L&B), Delhi Administration it was submitted that there was a proposal for rehabilitation of the villagers of Nangal Dairy as well. In the said letter it was mentioned that a survey was carried out in the village Nangal Dairy wherein it was indicated that the said colony had 485 jhuggis and 102 structures and that out of the 102 structures, 46 were shops or shops-cum-residential and other 56 were purely residences. In the aforesaid communication, DDA requested the Secretary (L&B) that a decision may be taken regarding the place of shifting the aforesaid village also. It is also indicated therein that DDA would prefer rehabilitation of the village near Village Palam in the vicinity of the site where the villagers of village Manglapuri would be rehabilitated.

8. The respondents however have taken a stand, both before the learned Single Judge and before this Court, that there was no rehabilitation Scheme for the residents of Nangal Dairy and it was only for the residents of village Nangal Dewat that a Scheme of rehabilitation was taken up and propounded.

9. The appellants have already been dispossessed from their lands and the respondents have now taken over possession of the said land particularly after the award was passed. The appellants will be entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The said Act does not require any scheme for allotment of alternative land. The appellants cannot claim a statutory or legal right under which they are claiming allotment of residential plots. Counsel appearing for the appellants could not dispute that no Scheme has been propounded by the respondents for rehabilitation of the appellants and no such document has been placed on record. He had also admitted that if there is no such Scheme, he has no case at all. The claim is on the ground of discrimination. It is crystal clear from the records that the case of the appellants cannot be equated with that of the land owners and residents of village Nangal Dewat. So far as the residents of Nangal Dewat are concerned acquisition proceedings were challenged and in the proceeding pending in the Court the respondents had stated that a Scheme is propounded for rehabilitation of the residents/land owners of village Nangal Dewat. Thereafter and on the basis of the statement, the writ petition was disposed of. The appellants herein did not challenge and question the acquisition proceedings. The said Scheme was fine tuned under various orders of the Court and, therefore, the said persons stand on a different footing. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Khullar and Anr. (supra). The said decision, instead of helping the appellants, supports the stand and contention of the respondents as pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. The said decision was also in respect of the Scheme of rehabilitation devised for the residents of the residential areas of village Nangal Dewat. Paragraphs 35 & 36 of the said judgment, which are relevant for the purpose of deciding this case, are extracted below:

35. The first document to be considered is a letter dated December 5, 1986 written by the Joint Director of industries to the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, informing him that the position regarding acquisition of land occupied by the industrial units in Mahipalpur-Nangal Dewat area and providing of alternate plots to the land owners was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary shortly. An enquiry was made as to whether awards had been announced in respect of affected industrial units in that area. The Deputy Commissioner was also requested to intimate regarding the steps taken to provide alternative lands to the affected units so that the whole position was brought to the notice of the Chief Secretary. This letter does not refer to any decision taken by the Government to provide alternate site. At best the matter was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary.

36. It appears that earlier a Joint Survey Report had been submitted sometime in August, 1983 with a view to assess the needs of the different ceramic industries located on the Mehrauli-Mahipalpur Road which had to be shifted in view of the expansion of Palam airport. On the basis of the survey conducted by the Committee, the industries were classified in three groups. The appellants fell in the first category, namely those who had a turnover of Rs.15 lakhs and above with an area of 5 acres in their possession on ownership basis. The Committee recommended that they be allowed 25000 sq,yards each. The Committee also made its recommendations with regard to the other two categories of industries and assessed that the total requirement of land would be about 20.86 acres if such allotments were to be made. It also noticed the fact that the aforesaid factories were located over an area of 25.70 acres.

10. Ratio of the aforesaid decision which are extracted above clearly indicates that the Scheme was framed only for the village of Nangal Dewat and that too for residential lands and no other scheme was farmed for rehabilitation of either industrial units or commercial units or for residential purposes of any other villages including that of Nangal Dairy. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that there is any discrimination between similarly situated persons of two villages. It is not even the case of the appellants even in the writ petitions that at any point of time any specific scheme was framed by the respondents for rehabilitation of the residents and land owners of village Nangal Dairy. The documents referred to and relied upon by the appellants in support of their case are the letters of the Delhi Development Authority. DDA could not have introduced or propounded such a Scheme. There is no order of the Competent Authority deciding to have such a rehabilitation Scheme for the land owners of Nangal Dairy. Counsel for the appellants has submitted that records would indicate existence of such a scheme which is explicitly and clearly denied by the respondents. Facts mentioned above do not warrant for a roving and fishing inquiry.

11. That being the position, we find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. These appeals have no merit and the same are accordingly dismissed.