Smt. Anita Diwan D/O Late Sh. Ram ... vs The State Govt. (Nct) Of Delhi
2007 Latest Caselaw 1623 Del

JUDGMENT

V.B. Gupta, J.

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the petitioner who is the complainant, for setting aside the impugned order dated 2nd March, 2007 passed by Sh.Rajiv Mehra, Addl. Sessions Judge, Delhi.

2. Petitioner had lodged the above mentioned F.I.R. against the accused persons and the case is pending before Metropolitan Magistrate for evidence.

3. On 1st February, 2007, an application under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. for seeking permission to compound the case was moved by the petitioner. Vide order dated 2nd February, 2007 the learned trial court rejected the application. Thereafter, petitioner filed revision before the court of Sessions and vide the impugned order the revision petition was also dismissed.

4. It is contended that the impugned order is unjustified and erroneous as the petitioner herself appeared before the court and showed her willingness to bury all the disputes and controversy against the accused persons and the learned trial court did not peruse the application of the petitioner supported by the affidavit which reflected that she is compromising without any force or pressure.

5. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner cited a decision of the Supreme Court reported as K. Kandasmy and Anr. v. K.P.M.V.P. Chandrasekran 2005 Crl.L.R. (SC) 398.

6. On the other hand, it has been argued by learned Counsel for the State that the offence under Sections 354 and 509 IPC can be compounded only with the permission of the court and the trial court has given sufficient reasons for not accepting the compromise and the offences are serious in nature and they are treated as crime against society and as such these are not to be compounded.

7. The relevant portion of the order dated 2nd February, 2007 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate reads as under:

I have enquired from the complainant as to why she is making statement for compounding to which she has uttered that since she has small children and she is employed and not able to get frequent leaves. She wants to withdraw the present complaint.

No plausible grounds disclosed. It is reflected from her statement that due to the delay in recording her evidence, she has become anxious and under the tension of anxiety, she has moved the present application.

In view of the submission, application is rejected.

8. While, the relevant portion of the impugned order passed by Addl. Sessions Judge reads as under:

In the matter in which, the offences are permitted to be compoundable by the permission of the court, the trial court is well within its power to know about the reason of compounding the offence. In the given facts and circumstances, if the court comes to the conclusion that compounding is not voluntary, which is an essential component for the permission to compound the offence then the court may be justified in declining to permit the compounding of the offence.

The case in hand is an example of such like a situation. In enquiry made by the court it may be seen from the record that it was found that the complainant was not voluntarily compounding the offence. Her decision to move such application was influenced by the various visits and delay in the trial which put her in an uncomfortable position as she has three children and she is employed and not getting frequent leaves. The decision of the trial court thus rejecting the permission cannot be called unjustified, as suffer from any illegality, irregularity and impropriety. No interference is required in the order of the trial court.

9. Now in the present petition, one of the ground challenging the impugned order is, That the petitioner has been compensated and she showed her willingness for not to pursue her complaint against the accused persons.

10. Before the trial court, this plea was not taken at all and now for the first time before this Court, this ground has been taken, which cannot be permitted at this stage.

11. Further, the crux of the F.I.R. lodged by the petitioner against the accused persons is that on 22nd May, 2003 one Rinku who was known to her made a telephonic call to her and called her to his office. There this Rinku stood near her and tried to take her on the bed but she objected and told him that she would raise an alarm, then he told her that by such objection she cannot get the job. Thereafter, he took her in a car and on the way two other boys were also called and during traveling one Pawan touched her body with sexual intention and then she tried to raise alarm and she wanted that legal action be taken against all four boys and she had given her statement in writing on being fully consciousness.

12. Though offences under Sections 354/509 IPC are compoundable, but only with the permission of the court and it is the duty of the court to see as to whether the offence which is being compounded is to be treated as crime against society or not and whether the complainant has compounded the offence without any force or pressure.

13. In the present case, there are concurrent findings by two courts below that the complainant was not voluntarily compounding the offence and, thus rightly, both the courts disallowed the compounding of the offence. The decision of the Supreme Court cited above is not applicable to the facts of present case since, that was a case under Section 500 IPC and the same is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand.

14. Recently in Smt. Satnam Kaur and Ors. v. State 2007(1)JCC 361 the question arose before this Court was regarding compounding of offences under IPC which are non-compoundable and are treated as crime against society. It was held:

Section 320(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides that offences mentioned in the table there under can be compounded by the persons mentioned in the Column No. 2 of the table. Further, Sub-section (2) provides that offences mentioned in the table could be compounded by victim with the permission of the Court. No doubt, even in respect of non-compoundable offences, the High Court can exercise the power and quash criminal proceedings if for the purpose of securing ends of justice, quashing of those proceedings becomes necessary. Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. , acts as guide for the High Court to determine whether to exercise the powers. under Section 482, Cr.P.C. in a given case or not. The Court held in that matter that there was no general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary. Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

Thus, it is clear that while exercising the inherent power for quashing under Section 482, Cr.P.C., it is for this Court to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue.

The edifice of criminal law is based on the principle that crime committed against the particular person is the crime against the society as well. Though in that particular case, the immediate victim may be the person who is affected by the said crime. This is the genesis beyond Section 320, Cr.P.C. which makes only trivial crimes as compoundable treating those offences as the ones which can be settled between the parties. But other offences, which are non-compoundable, are treated as crimes against society and, therefore, normally the consent of the victim to compound those offences may not be of any use. Balance is sought to be maintained by the judgment of the Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. (Supra) by giving the power to the High Court even in such cases but with rider that there are special features which may be present in a particular case and may warrant in the interest of justice and as a rule of expediency to give quietus to those proceedings. Therefore, in facts and circumstances of a given case, High Court has to come to a conclusion that whether it is expedient or in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings in view of the settlement between the parties, notwithstanding, a general rule that it is an offence against the society.

15. The courts below rightly did not compound the offences as the complainant did not voluntarily compound the offence. Moreover, the allegations made in the F.I.R. by the petitioner herself shows that offence committed by the accused persons is a crime against society and no permission to compound such type of heinous crime can be granted by any court.

16. Under these circumstances, no ground is made out for this Court to exercise extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the present petition is not maintainable and same is, hereby, dismissed.