P.K. Sharma vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi
2007 Latest Caselaw 2290 Del

JUDGMENT

G.S. Sistani, J.

1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India impugning the award dated 11.10.2006 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi (hereinafter, 'the Industrial Tribunal') in I.D. No. 40/2006 (Old I.D. No. 47/2005).

2. The petitioner was appointed as a Data Entry Operator on ad hoc basis by the respondent vide Office Order No. 55 of 2001 dated 26.03.2001. He was entitled to draw salary against the vacant post of Head Clerk, S.A.U., Minto Road, Delhi. The petitioner started discharging his duties with effect from 27.03.2001. However, vide order dated 5.2.2004, the respondent directed the petitioner not to mark his attendance thereby bringing the latter's services to a halt.

3. Pursuant to the termination of his services by the respondent, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute. The industrial dispute was referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal vide notification F - 24(110)/05- Lab./5257-61 dated 24.02.2005. The reference was in the following terms: 'Whether services of Sh. P.K. Sharma, s/o Sh. C.B. Sharma, have been terminated by the management illegally and/or unjustifiably, and if so, to what sum of money as monetary relief along with consequential benefits in terms of existing laws/government notifications and to what other relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect'? 'Whether Sh. P.K. Sharma, s/o Sh. C.B. Sharma, is entitled to be regularized in the service of the post of Data Entry Operator from the initial date of his appointment i.e. from 27.03.2001 with all consequential benefits. If so, what directions are necessary in this respect'?

4. On the basis of the facts and evidence on record, the Industrial Tribunal vide award dated 11.10.2006 came to the conclusion that as the case of the petitioner fell under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it could not be said that the termination of his services constituted illegal retrenchment and thus he was not entitled to the relief of reinstatement. It was further concluded that as the appointment of the petitioner in the capacity of Data Entry Operator was on an ad hoc basis and as there were no notified recruitment rules sanctioning the said post, the respondent was under no positive obligation to regularize his services.

5. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition, seeking, inter alia, that the award dated 11.10.2006 be set aside. The petitioner has also pleaded with this Court that the respondent be directed to reinstate him on the post of Data Entry Operator and that he be entitled to his salary and allowances with effect from the date of his removal from service.

6. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Industrial Tribunal, whilst holding the petitioner not entitled to reinstatement and regularization of his services, has premised its decision on an incorrect application of facts and the law. To substantiate his contention, learned Counsel has put forth two assertions:

(i) Firstly, on account of the petitioner having worked with the respondent continuously for a period of more than 240 days immediately prior to the date of termination of his services, the sudden termination of his services without compliance with the mandatory conditions of notice, compensation, etc., as stipulated under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, constitutes illegal retrenchment thereby entitling him to the relief of reinstatement with consequential benefits.

(ii) Secondly, as the petitioner was a regular appointee of the respondent and the post of Data Entry Operator held by him still continues to exist, and further, as the petitioner has completed the statutory period of 240 days of continuous service, his services are liable to be regularised.

7. Per contra, the respondent has refuted with vehemence the assertions put forth by the petitioner submitting as under:

(i) Firstly, the petitioner was appointed ad hoc as a Data Entry Operator under a contract of employment for a specific period of time on the expiry of which his services were dispensed with. On account of the services of the petitioner being purely contractual in nature, the termination thereof is valid in terms of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus he is not entitled to the relief of reinstatement.

(ii) Secondly, the petitioner is not entitled to regularisation of his services as Data Entry Operator inasmuch as there is neither any sanctioned post of Data Entry Operator in the M.C.D. nor any notified Recruitment Rules for the said post.

8. In view of the rival contentions of the parties herein, as elucidated in foregoing paragraphs, two important questions arise for consider of this Court:

(i) Whether the termination of the petitioner's services by the respondent constitutes illegal retrenchment thereby entitling him to the relief of reinstatement with other consequential benefits?

(ii) Whether the services of the petitioner are liable to be regularised by the respondent?

Re: Illegal Retrenchment

9. In order to ascertain whether the termination of the services of the petitioner constitutes illegal retrenchment, it is first and foremost necessary to appreciate the meaning and scope of the expression 'retrenchment' as well as the distinction between legal and illegal retrenchment.

10. Retrenchment, in labour and service jurisprudence, connotes the discharge of surplus labour in a running or continuing industry for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment by way of disciplinary action. The reasons behind the discharge of labour as surplusage in a running or continuing industry may be multifarious, viz. change in the economic policy of the industry, rationalisation in the industry, installation of a new labour saving machinery, etc.,.

11. Statutorily, the expression 'retrenchment' is defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as under:

Section 2(oo): 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action

12. The use of the words 'for any reason whatsoever' in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 purportedly accords a very wide interpretation to the meaning of 'retrenchment' so as to include any and every termination in its fold. However, the latter part of Section 2(oo) circumscribes the scope of the expression 'retrenchment' by carving out four exceptions thereto. These four exceptions are enumerated hereunder:

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or

(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or

(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.

13. It is noteworthy that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not impose an absolute embargo on retrenchment. What the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 aims, in essence, is to protect the manner in which retrenchment is carried out by the management. In this regard, Section 25F, contained in Chapter VA of the said Act, assumes relevance as it lays down the conditions which the management must mandatorily comply with before retrenching a workman. The conditions stipulated in Section 25F of the Act are reproduced thus:

Section 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until-

(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and

(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.

14. Implicit in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is the distinction between legal retrenchment and illegal retrenchment. A retrenchment effected after due compliance with the mandatory conditions stipulated in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 constitutes legal retrenchment. A fortiorari, any retrenchment effected in derogation of any of the conditions stipulated in the said Section 25F constitutes illegal retrenchment. However, while retrenching a workman in accordance with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it also needs to be ensured that the workman has rendered 240 days of continuous service preceding the date of his retrenchment.

15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the Labour Court in its award dated 11.10.2006 has failed to appreciate that the retrenchment of the petitioner by the respondent constitutes illegal retrenchment. It is vehemently contended that the petitioner had completed the statutory period of 240 days preceding the date of his retrenchment and thus his services could not have been terminated by the respondent without due compliance with the mandatory conditions under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

16. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has opposed the aforesaid contention of the petitioner submitting that as the petitioner was appointed on an ad hoc basis for a specific period, the termination of his services by the respondent by effluxion of time could not be said to be retrenchment in terms of Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is adduced that when the services a workman are terminated in terms of Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, such termination does not warrant compliance of the mandatory conditions of Section 25F of the Act, and thus, does not constitutes illegal retrenchment.

17. In order to effectively appreciate the contentions of both parties, Sub-clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which constitutes an exception to the definition of retrenchment, may be recalled thus:

Section 2(oo): Retrenchment means-but does not include- (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein;

18. Sub-clause (bb) was inserted to Section 2(oo) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by way of an amendment in the year 1984. The legislative intent behind this insertion was to exclude this particular class of employees who are engaged on a contractual basis for a specific period from the rigour of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sub-clause (bb) seeks to exclude the following from the purview of retrenchment: (i) the termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned, on its expiry; or (ii) the termination of the contract of employment in terms of a stipulation contained in the contract, in that behalf. The expression 'such contract' used in the latter part of Sub-clause (bb) refers to the 'contract of employment between the employer and the workman', mentioned in the first part. Therefore, if there is a stipulation in 'the contract of employment between the employer and the workman', providing the mode and manner of the termination of service, such termination of service has now specifically been excluded from the definition of retrenchment by this sub-clause. The cases contemplated under both parts, therefore, will not be retrenchment.

19. In S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, reported at , a scheme for absorption of workmen who were appointed for digging, laying cables, erecting poles, drawing lines and other connected works was proposed by the management which came into force with effect from 1.10.1989. Those workmen whose names were not included for regularisation under the said scheme and whose services had been terminated in pursuance thereof, raised industrial disputes before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. The matter was eventually referred by the appropriate Government to the Court in exercise of its power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Apex Court, whilst ascertaining whether the case of the workmen fell within the ambit of Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, laid down the following four-fold test:

13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied:

(i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration;

(ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simpliciter, while providing, inter alia, that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project;

(iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract; and

(iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the above said terms by the employer at the commencement of the employment. (at page 37, para 13)

20. In view of the test laid down in S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka (supra), an important question that arises in the instant case is - whether the termination of the services of the petitioner by the respondent has been carried out in terms of Sub-cause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 thereby excluding such termination from the purview of retrenchment?

21. It is nobody's case that the petitioner herein was appointed by the respondent on an ad hoc basis. It would be quite relevant at this stage to look at the dictionary meaning of the expression 'ad hoc'. The Black's Law Dictionary (Eight Edition) states that 'ad hoc' is a Latin phrase meaning 'formed for a particular purpose'. In Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (the Indian Edition of 1977), the expression 'ad hoc' has been defined to mean: 'For this special purpose'. In Webster's New Dictionary, 'ad hoc' has been defined to mean: 'Pertaining to or for the sake of this case alone'. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary (the Indian Edition of 1990), the expression 'ad hoc' has been defined as: 'For a particular (usually exclusive) purpose'. In view of these dictionary meanings of the expression 'ad hoc', an ad hoc appointment would mean an appointment for a specific purpose. A specific purpose could be appointment in a leave vacancy, appointment to a post created for a limited period or duration, appointment to a post till the regularly selected candidate after following the prescribed procedure is made available and the like.

22. Learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of the parties before the Labour Court wherein the petitioner had expressly admitted that his appointment to the post of Data Entry Operator was purely ad hoc in nature and that the respondent had not issued any formal advertisement calling applications for recruitment to the said post. It is contended that it is on the basis of the said admission of the petitioner that the Labour Court in its award dated 11.10.2006 has come to a categorical finding that services of the petitioner being ad hoc in nature, the termination thereof was effected in terms of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 thus obviating the application of Section 25F of the Act. In this regard, paragraphs 12 and 13 of the award dated 11.10.2006 are relevant and reproduced thus:

12. The workman as WW1 during his cross-examination has made the following statements:

It is correct that I have not appliedagainst any advertisement against the said post. It is correct that I was appointed on ad hoc basis only, I am not aware that any other data entry operator, appointed by MCD, I cannot give any name of a person who has been appointed as data entry operator by MCD as I was appointed.

13. In view of the above discussions, it is held that since, the workman is admitted to be appointed as Data Entry Operator on ad hoc basis for specific purpose and that there is no sanctioned post and that there are no notified recruitment rules, the workman is not entitled to reinstatement and regularization on the post of Data Entry Operator. The employment of the workman with the management is for a specific purpose. The facts on record indicate that there is no sanctioned post of Data Entry Operator with the management till date. Therefore, the act of the management does not amount to violation of Section 25F, in view of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.

23. Learned Counsel for the respondent has further contended that the petitioner, at the time of his appointment, was well aware that his services were ad hoc in nature and that they had been availed by the respondent only for a limited period for completion of a specific project. To make good his point, counsel has placed on record a copy of the Appointment Order no. Tax/SAU/Estt./2001/75, dated 26.3.2001, which is appended as Annexure P-2 at page 25 of the Paper Book and is reproduced thus:

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Assessment and Collector Department Special Assessment Unit Minto Road, New Delhi - 110002.

No.Tax/SAU/Estt./2001/75 Dated:26.3.2001

OFFICE ORDER NO. 55/2001

The Commissioner, MCD., vide his orders dated 16.3.2001 has been pleased to approve the appointment of Shri P.K. Sharma son of Shri C.B. Sharma for the post of Data Entry Operator in the Assessment and Collection Department on ad hoc basis in the pay scale of Rs.4500-12-7000 with immediate effect. Shri P.K. Sharma is hereby posted in Computer Cell, S.A.U., Minto Road and he will draw his salary against the vacant post of Head Clerk, S.A.U., Minto Road.

Sd./-

(SANJAY GIHAR) Jt. Assessor and Collector (Admn.) S.A.U.

24. Learned Counsel for the respondent has further placed on record a copy of Office Order No.PD/IPP-VII/2007/201, dated 14.05.2007, to clarify that the services of the petitioner as Data Entry Operator were availed by the respondent during the period 1994-2002 for the project, namely, 'India Population Project- VIII'. The office Order dated 14.5.2007 also gives out the names of the other persons, besides the petitioner, who were recruited as Data Entry Operators by the respondent on a contractual basis for completion of the said Project which is stated to have been funded by the World Bank. The said Office Order, appended at page 52 of the Paper Book, is reproduced thus:

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI OFFICE OF THE PROJECT DIRECtor IPP-VII 16, Rajpur Road, IVth Floor Rear building, Civil Line Zone, Delhi - 110054.

NO. PD/IPP-VII/2007/201 Dated: 14.5.07.

Subject:-Clarification in r/o the Data Entry Operators working in IPP-VII.

In reference to letter No.Tax/HQ/Admn./Court Cases/P.K. Sharma/2007/58 dated 09.05.07 regarding the subject.

In this connection it is submitted that during the Project period of 1994-2002 of India Population Project-VIII, World Bank Aided Project recruitment of following Data Entry Operators (DEOs) were made the details which is as below:

 S. Name of DEO  Father's Name   Date of Appointment     Pay     Salary Drawn   Remarks
No.                             Working on regular/    Scale
                                Ad hoc contract basis
1 Sh. Sandeep  S/o Sh. Satbir   24.06.1996 on ad hoc  Regular  Regular salary Presently 
  Kumar        Singh                                 4000-100-6000             working date
                                                                               of regulari- 
                                                                               zation in the 
                                                                               office of Addl.
                                                                               Cm. (H) since 
                                                                               01.09.2001
                                                                               in diverted
                                                                               12-09-2002
                                                                               capacity.
2 Ms. Ritu     D/o Sh. M.K.    11/11/97               Contract   Rs. 8000/-    consolidated
  Makhija      Makhija                              5000-100-8000 p.m.  
3 Sh. Sandeep  S/o S.K. Bhatia 27.07.1998             Contract   Rs.6000/-     consolidated
  Bhatia                                            4000-100-6000 p.m.        
4 Sh. Deepak   S/o R.S. Verma  10.11.1997             Contract   Rs. 6000/-    consolidated
   Kumar                                            4000-100-6000 p.m.
  

Submitted for information and n.a. please.
 

Chief Medical Officer 

DDAO/PP-VIII 
                                                 Dy. Assessor and Collector (Admn.)
 

25. It is thus the case of the respondent that the petitioner was engaged by the respondent only for a specific project and after the completion whereof his services were dispensed with in terms of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 thereby bringing such termination outside the purview of retrenchment. To canvas his argument that termination of the services of a workman engaged in a time-bound project does not mandate observance of the conditions under Section 25F of the said Act, learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma, reported at as well as Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh v. Anil Kumar Mishra and Ors. reported at .

26. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, rejoins by fervently contending that even in those cases where a workman has been employed in a time-bound project, the automatic cessation of his services by effluxion of time amounts to retrenchment and is thus no reason to dispense with the mandatory conditions stipulated in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, particularly when such workman has completed the statutory period of 240 days of continuous service with the management. To buttress this point, learned Counsel has placed reliance on L. Robert D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr. reported at AIR 1982 SC 854, Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, reported at , M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Ors. reported at AIR 1977 SC 31, and The State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, reported at AIR 1976 SC 111.

27. The contentions of the petitioner, I am afraid, are not acceptable to me.

28. The Appointment Order dated 26.3.2001 as well as the clarification made by the respondent vide Office Order dated 14.05.2007 amply establish the ad hoc nature of the petitioner's services thus bringing the termination thereof within the fold of Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is noteworthy that the petitioner, too, has not controverter that his services were ad hoc in nature and were liable to be terminated on the completion of the project. Reliance by the petitioner on L. Robert D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr. (supra), Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala,(supra) M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa and Ors. (supra), and The State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, (supra), thus, appears to be misplaced inasmuch as the said decisions were pronounced prior to Section 2(oo)(bb) entering the Statute Book. It is trite law that a decision ceases to binding if an inconsistent statute or statutory rule is enacted subsequent to its pronouncement. In view of the insertion of Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is respectfully submitted that the decisions of L. Robert D'souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr. (supra) Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (supra), etc., have become abrogated and cannot be relied upon in matters pertaining to illegal retrenchment.

29. Further, it is true that the manifest object of complying with the mandatory conditions under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is to so compensate the workman for loss of employment so as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until he finds fresh employment. However, in a case where the workman is employed ad hoc on a contractual basis for a specific project and is aware that his services would be terminated after completion of the project, compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 becomes uncalled for and may be dispensed with by the management. The petitioner's plea that he had completed statutory period of 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding the termination of his service also does not come to his rescue. It is to be borne in mind that mere completion of the prescribed statutory period of 240 days of continuous service does not ipso facto entitle the workman to the protection in terms of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In other words, the compliance of the mandatory conditions under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is called for only when there has been retrenchment in the first place. A workman, the termination of whose services does not constitute retrenchment in terms of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot take the plea of illegal retrenchment even if such workman has completed 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding the termination of services. I am emboldened in my said views by a plethora of judicial decisions viz. Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbara Singh, reported at , S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka (supra), Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishan and Ors. Ltd., reported at , etc., wherein the Apex Court has unequivocally opined that non-cthe non-compliance with the mandatory conditions of notice, the services of a workman employed on a stop-gap basis for completion of a specific scheme project will not amount to violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, notwithstanding that such workman has completed 240 days of service.

30. In view of the settled position of law that termination of the services of a workman, when effected in terms of Sub-clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not warrant compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25F of the same Act, I find no infirmity in the stand taken by the Industrial Tribunal in its award dated 11.10.2006 holding the petitioner not entitled to reinstatement. Re: Regularisation

31. In the next leg of his submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently pleaded with this Court that on account of the petitioner having completed the statutory period of 240 days of continuous service with the respondent, his services are entitled to be regularized. It is submitted that the sudden termination of his services is not only discriminatory but also violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

32. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has countered the aforesaid contentions of the petitioner submitting that services of the petitioner are not liable to be regularized inasmuch as there is no sanctioned post of Data Entry Operator available with the respondent-MCD and neither are there any notified recruitment rules or policy regularizing the said post. To canvass his argument that temporary employees engaged on an ad hoc basis and paid on piece rate basis for certain clerical work are not entitled to regularization of their services even if they have completed 240 days of continuous service, counsel for the respondents has relied upon Dharwad District Public Works Departments v. State of Karnataka, reported at , Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, U.P. v. Anil Kumar Mishra and Ors. reported at , Director Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava, reported at , UPSC v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela and Ors. reported at 2006 (2) SC 137 and Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported at .

33. In light of the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi and Ors. reported at , it is no longer res integra that absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary/contractual, casual, daily wage, ad hoc employees de hors the rules and constitutional scheme of public employment cannot be granted by the Courts.

34. In view of the trite position of law, as laid down in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi and Ors. (supra), I am of the considered view that the services of the petitioner herein to the post of Data Entry Operator cannot be regularized de hors the recruitment rules sanctioning the said post. The petitioner, at his end, has not been able to controvert that there are no notified rules sanctioning the post of Data Entry Operator. Moreover, when the petitioner has no legally enforceable right to be appointed to the post of Data Entry Operator, the question of violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India does not arise.

35. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the view that the Industrial Tribunal has correctly held the petitioner not entitled to reinstatement and regularisation of his services. The stand taken by the Industrial Tribunal in its award dated 11.10.2006 is well supported by evidence as well as cogent reasons, and thus, I find no grounds to interfere therewith.

36. This writ petition accordingly stands dismissed with no orders as to costs.