Bhagwant Singh vs Sardar Manmohan Singh And Ors.
2007 Latest Caselaw 1329 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. This criminal revision petition has been filed by the complainant (Bhagwant Singh) and is directed against the judgment dated 23.08.1999 delivered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi acquitting the accused Manmohan Singh (respondent No. 1), Sushil Kumar (respondent No. 4), Premdev Jaggi (respondent No. 2) and Narender Kaur (respondent No. 3) in respect of the offences they were charged for. Manmohan Singh, Sushil Kumar, Premdev Jaggi and Narender Kaur faced trial under Sections 307/34 IPC for allegedly attempting to commit the murder of Damyanti Kaur who is the wife of the complainant (Bhagwant Singh). The said accused also faced trial under Sections 324/34 for allegedly voluntarily causing simple injuries by throwing acid on Bhagwant Singh and Manjit Kaur (daughter of Bhagwant Singh).

2. The case for the prosecution was that Bhagwant Singh was a tenant of the accused Premdev Jaggi in a portion of House No. 7/12, Tilak Nagar, Delhi. In the tenanted portion, the said Bhagwant Singh resided Along with his wife (Damyanti) and daughter (Manjit Kaur) as also his son. Apparently, there was discord between Bhagwant Singh and Premdev Jaggi which was based upon a landlord-tenant dispute in respect of the said portion of the house under the tenancy of Bhagwant Singh. It was the case of the prosecution that on 07.07.1986, there was an altercation between Bhagwant Singh and Premdev Jaggi. The matter was apparently settled with the intervention of people from the locality. It was further alleged that on the next day, i.e., on 08.07.1986, at about 10 p.m., the incident in question took place. It was alleged that at that point of time, Bhagwant Singh, his wife (Damyanti) and daughter (Manjit Kaur) were in their room. From that place, the entrance of the house was visible and they saw that a two-wheeler had stopped in front of the house. The two-wheeler was driven by Manmohan Singh and another person was the pillion rider. Both these persons got off the two-wheeler. The other person had a bottle in his hand which Manmohan Singh took while entering the house. Immediately thereafter, Premdev Jaggi and his wife (Narender Kaur) are alleged to have exhorted the said Manmohan Singh and the other person to teach their tenant a lesson. Thereupon, it was alleged that Manmohan Singh violently threw the bottle into the room in which Bhagwant Singh, his wife (Damyanti) and daughter (Manjit Kaur) were present. The bottle burst on impact with the floor and and the acid flew in all directions. Bhagwant Singh, Damyanti and Manjit Kaur all received acid burn injuries. It is alleged that immediately thereafter, the accused persons ran away from the scene. As per the MLCs, Damyanti received 30% acid burns, Bhagwant Singh received 10% acid burns and Manjit Kaur received 8% acid burns. Exhibit PW-4/A is the MLC concerning Bhagwant Singh and it indicates that he received acid burns on the front of his left leg and knee as also on the front of his right leg and foot. Exhibit PW-4/B is the MLC pertaining to Damyanti which indicates that the acid burn injuries were of a grievous nature both on the front and the back and that she remained hospitalised from 08.07.1986 to 04.08.1986. Exhibit PW-4/C is the MLC pertaining to Manjit Kaur and it indicates that she received 2% acid burns on her left arm and 6% acid burns on the front of both of her legs.

3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge examined the evidence in detail and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Additional Sessions Judge noted that there can be no doubt that on the night of occurrence, Bhagwant Singh, Damyanti Kaur and Manjit Kaur received the injuries as indicated in the MLCs. However, he was concerned with the real question as to how and in what manner the injuries were caused. He noted that the case of the prosecution was that accused (Manmohan Singh) threw acid as a result of exhortation made by the landlord and his wife. He also noted the defense version that Bhagwant Singh lost his cool on seeing Manmohan Singh and that he brought an acid bottle from the toilet and while he was advancing towards Manmohan Singh, his wife tried to prevent him and in the process, the bottle fell on the floor and burst causing injuries to Bhagwant Singh, his wife (Damyanti) and his daughter (Manjit Kaur).

4. The trial court while examining the question of motive behind the alleged incident as per the prosecution story came to the conclusion that the motive could not have existed. The trial court noted that when the altercation took place initially on 07.07.1986 between Bhagwant Singh and Premdev Jaggi, the matter was compromised. The terms of compromise were reduced to writing and the same had been exhibited as Exhibit PW-9/D-A. According to that document, people of the locality had intervened in the dispute and they had agreed to give their decision on 11.07.1986 and the parties had agreed to abide by their decision. It is in this context that the trial court observed that:

Any prudent man in the position of Prem Dev Jaggi would have preferred to wait till 11.7.86 for the decision of the arbiters and he would not have done anything to prejudice their mind before the date of decision. As long as the people of the locality had not given their decision as undertaken in Ex. PW9/D- A, there was hope for the landlord and he could have reasonably expected that he would be able to get the premises vacated without much fuss. He must have appreciated that by inviting any person to throw acid on the tenant before the date of decision he would frustrate the compromise and thereby give a handle to the tenant to wriggle out. Therefore, I am not prepared to believe that accused Prem Dev Jaggi and his wife invited the other accused on 8.7.86 with a mischief in mind and with the object of causing injuries to the tenant and his family.

5. The trial court then considered the nature of injuries and tried to match it with the prosecution version. It came to the conclusion that the injuries were totally incompatible with the posture in which Damyanti Kaur claimed to be sitting at the time of occurrence and that this in itself created a doubt about the prosecution story. The learned Additional Sessions Judge noted that both PW-2 (Damyanti Kaur) and PW-3 (Bhagwant Singh) stated that when Manmohan Singh threw the bottle, Damyanti Kaur was sitting with her back against the wall and that the bottle fell in front of her. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that if that was the case, then the injuries ought to have been on the front portion and there could not have been any injury on her back. However, the MLC (Exhibit PW-4/B), which pertains to Damyanti Kaur, revealed that she received injuries both on the front as well as on the back portion of her two legs as well as her lower back. Thus, he came to the conclusion that the MLC was totally incompatible with the posture in which Damyanti Kaur claimed to be sitting at the time of occurrence.

6. Doubts also arose in the mind of the learned Additional Sessions Judge with regard to the prosecution version that all the accused ran away after the occurrence. It was noted that the evidence on this aspect was conflicting. While PW-3 (Bhagwant Singh) did say that all the four accused ran away after the occurrence, PW-2 (Damyanti Kaur) used the word?both? implying thereby that only two accused ran away. PW-7 (Charanjit Singh), who is the son of Bhagwant Singh and who was purportedly standing outside the house, stated that he had seen Manmohan Singh and Sushil going away on the scooter. This, therefore, did not explain as to what Premdev Jaggi and his wife (Narender Kaur) did. Did they also run away or did they remain in the house

7. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was also not impressed by the fact that when Manmohan Singh was arrested on 09.07.1986, he was still wearing the bush-shirt and banyan which had acid burns on them. In this context, he was of the opinion that it did not appeal to common sense that Manmohan Singh would carry the acid burnt clothes on his person for so long after the occurrence just in order to invite trouble for himself.

8. With regard to the acquisition of the acid bottle, the prosecution had alleged that Manmohan Singh had purchased the same from the shop of PW-1 (Narayan Dutt). However, Narayan Dutt did not support the prosecution's version inasmuch as he had stated that he did not sell any bottle of acid to Manmohan Singh. This also dented the case of the prosecution, in the view of the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

9. With regard to accused Sushil Kumar, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not even prepared to believe that he had gone to the house of Bhagwant Singh on the night of the occurrence or that he had shared a common intention with the other accused. For all these reasons, the trial court found that the prosecution had not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts and, therefore, acquitted the accused.

10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on the point of injuries as well as the place of injuries. She submitted that the medical reports were duly proved and the injuries on Damyanti Kaur were opined to be grievous. She further submitted that the identity of the accused persons as well as the roles played by them had been stated in the FIR and were duly proved by the prosecution witnesses. As regards the fact that Manmohan Singh was wearing acid burnt clothes, it was submitted that although he was arrested on 09.07.1986, it was only after a few hours of registration of the FIR and, therefore, it was natural for him to be wearing those clothes at the time of his arrest. It was also submitted that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in concluding that the accused Sushil Kumar could not have had a common intention merely because he was holding the acid bottle. It was contended by the learned Counsel that an acid bottle emits a pungent smell and it could not be presumed that he was not aware of the contents thereof. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had misdirected himself in coming to the conclusion that Sushil Kumar was unaware of the contents and, therefore, did not share a common intention with the other accused. It was, therefore, submitted that the order of acquittal deserves to be set aside and the matter be remanded to the trial court for retrial. The learned Counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance on the decision of Ram Briksh Singh and Ors. v. Ambika Yadav and Anr. wherein the Supreme Court had observed that "the revisional court can set aside an order of acquittal and remit the case for retrial where the trial court overlooked material evidence in passing the order".

11. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4, submitted that the trial court had properly examined and weighed the evidence of the prosecution and thoroughly considered the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the legal aspects. He submitted that no legal irregularity or impropriety in the conduct of the trial has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Khetra Basi Samal and Anr. etc. v. The State of Orissa etc. 1970 CRI.L.J. 369 : , he submitted that in a revision petition at the instance of a private complainant, the revisional court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and upset the findings of fact. He also submitted that there is no grievance that the trial court had shut out any evidence which the prosecution wanted to produce or that the trial court had admitted any inadmissible evidence or overlooked any material evidence. He submitted that the trial court, after examining the entire evidence produced by the prosecution, came to the conclusion on an appreciation of evidence that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Having once come to such a conclusion, there was no option left with the trial court, but to acquit the accused. He, therefore, submitted that what the petitioner is seeking to do is to ask this Court to re-appreciate the evidence, which is not permissible.

12. With regard to the powers of revision of the High Court, a series of decisions have been rendered by the Supreme Court. Those decisions include:

(i) D. Stephens v. Nosibolla ;

(ii) K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra pradesh and Anr. ;

(iii) Dhirendra Nath Mitra and Anr. v. Mukanda Lal Sen ;

(iv) Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh ;

(v) Ramu v. Jagannath 1995 SCC (Cri) 181;

(vi) Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and Anr. 1998 SCC (Cri) 1574;

(vii) Hydru v. State of Kerala: (2004) 13 SCC 374.

The principles that can be culled out from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court with regard to the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are that the powers are very limited and that the revisional court does not function as a court of appeal and, therefore, cannot re-appreciate the evidence. It cannot interfere with an order of acquittal unless it is an exceptional case of procedural irregularity or overlooking of material evidence or misreading of the same, which is manifest and, which results in a flagrant miscarriage of justice. As noted in D. Stephens (supra), the revisional jurisdiction sought to be invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal cannot be so invoked merely because the lower court had taken a wrong view of the law and misappreciated the evidence on record. As pointed out in Dhirendra Nath Mitra (supra), it may well be that a different view of the available evidence could have been taken, but that would not be enough to justify interference in revision upon an application by a private party to set aside an order of acquittal. In Hydru (supra), the Supreme Court observed that if upon re-appreciation of the evidence, two views are possible, it is not permissible even for the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to interfere with the same, much less in a revision petition where the powers are much narrower.

13. From the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is apparent that what he is requesting this Court to do is to re-appreciate the evidence. The sum and substance of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the trial court misappreciated the evidence on record and ought to have returned a finding of guilt, rather than of acquittal. If the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted by this Court, then it would amount to a re-appreciation of the evidence which is not permissible. As indicated above, the trial court has examined the entire evidence and has considered the question of motive, the nature of injuries, the corroboration amongst the prosecution witnesses with regard to various parts of the incident in question, etc. After doing so, the trial court in its wisdom has arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. No procedural impropriety or irregularity of such a nature as would warrant interference in a revision petition has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner. Therefore, the only way this Court could upset the findings arrived at by the trial court would be by re-appreciating the evidence on record and arriving at a different conclusion. As already indicated above, this course of action is not open to this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal.

For these reasons, this revision petition is dismissed.