Delhi High Court
Delhi Transport Corporation vs Surinder Pal on 17 July, 2007
Equivalent citations: 142 (2007) DLT 595
Author: S N Dhingra
Bench: S N Dhingra
JUDGMENT
Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the legality of the award dated 3rd August, 2004 whereby the Industrial Tribunal 11, Karkardooma Court, Delhi held that the order dated 29th April, 1992 of termination of the respondent workman was illegal and unjustified and the workman was entitled for reinstatement of service with full back wages.
2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this writ petition are that respondent was working as a conductor with the petitioner. He was chargesheeted on 10th January, 1992 because of his continuous unauthorized absence from duty with effect from 18th July, 1991. An inquiry was conducted as per rules and regulations and in the inquiry, the respondent was found guilty of the charge. The Depot Manager issued a show cause notice to the respondent dated 9th April, 1992 as to why he should not be removed from service and thereafter an order of termination of service of the respondent was passed. The petitioner made an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short "the Act") to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the decision of removal of respondent from service and a notice of the application was sent to the respondent. The application was contested by the respondent before the Industrial Tribunal in O.P. No. 175 of 1992. The Industrial Tribunal framed an issue regarding validity of the inquiry in following terms:
Whether the applicant held a legal and valid inquiry against the respondent according to the principles of natural justice.
3. Both parties led evidence before the Tribunal. After the evidence in respect of entire matter was led before the Industrial Tribunal, the Industrial Tribunal considered the evidence and heard the arguments and passed an order dated 10th February, 2000 holding that the termination of respondent by the petitioner was valid and that the petitioner had been able to establish all the ingredients of the provisions of Sections 32(2)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the application under Section 32(2)(b) of the Act. This order of the Industrial Tribunal was not challenged by the respondent and attained finality.
4. The respondent thereafter raised an industrial dispute and filed an application before the Industrial Tribunal under Section 11A of ID Act which was listed at ID No. 214 of 2001. In the ID, the Industrial Tribunal framed following issues:
1. Whether fair and proper enquiry was conducted by the management? OPM
2.If the first issue fails whether workman has committed misconduct?
3. Whether due process was adopted while passing the order of removal and one month wages were remitted to workman? OPM
4. As per terms of reference.
5. The Industrial Tribunal gave a finding in respect of the issue No. 1 that proper inquiry was not conducted and also held other issues against the petitioner and passed the impugned award.
6. A perusal of the award would show that the Industrial Tribunal did not look into the order dated 10th February, 2002 passed on the application under Order 32(2)(b) of the Act and had not considered the findings given earlier on the issue of fair inquiry and passed the award.
7. It is argued by the counsel for the petitioner that since the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 32(2)(b) of the Act was not challenged by the petitioner and attained finality, the issue of inquiry being fairly conducted by the petitioner could not be re-agitated and could not be re-decided by the Industrial Tribunal as this had become res judicata. The Industrial Tribunal could not have held that the inquiry was bad. The entire award was vitiated because the Industrial Tribunal ignored the earlier order passed between the same parties in respect of the same dispute. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent argued that the earlier order was not binding on the Industrial Tribunal and res judicata was not applicable. It is argued that Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act had given enhanced powers to the Tribunal and the Tribunal while adjudicating the Industrial Dispute under Section 11 of the Act was not bound by principles of CPC and grant of approval on the application would not operate as res judicata. The respondent relied upon Management of DTC v. Ram Kumar 1982 LIC 1378.
8. The above judgment of this Court relied upon by the respondent does not seem to have taken note of the judgment of Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in B.B. Coal Co. v. Ram Parvesh AIR 1964 SC 486 wherein the Supreme Court observed that where a domestic inquiry is held and the Tribunal after considering approval on an application under Section 32(2)(b) gives approval of termination, it cannot in subsequent proceedings hold that the domestic inquiry was not held properly. If the inquiry had not been done properly, the Tribunal would not have given approval of dismissal but once the Tribunal held that the inquiry was proper and gave approval of dismissal, such approval having become final, the Tribunal cannot give another finding on the same issue again.
9. This Court in J.S. Joshi v. Commercial Management of Air India in WP(C) No. 7299/2002 decided on 14th November, 2006 observed that the finding of the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act approving the application if not challenged becomes final and Industrial Tribunal if once held that the inquiry was fairly conducted cannot reverse the findings and hold that the inquiry was not fairly conducted.
10. Although CPC is not applicable in case of Industrial Disputes, but the basic principles of natural justice and the broad principles of CPC are applicable in case of Industrial Disputes before the Tribunal. If a Tribunal has given findings after recording evidence, that the inquiry was fair and just and the Tribunal gives approval on the application under Section 32(2)(b) of the Act and this finding is not challenged, the finding becomes final and shall operate as res judicata between the parties. The same Industrial Tribunal in an industrial Disputes raised by the workman in respect of the same dispute, cannot reverse the earlier finding. In subsequent Industrial Disputes under Section 11A of the Act, the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over its earlier findings given under Section 32(2)(b) of the Act and reverse the findings. That would amount to judicial impropriety. The Industrial Tribunal is bound by earlier findings given between the parties in respect of the same dispute and same issue. Even a Tribunal of coordinate jurisdiction is bound by the earlier decision. It is settled canon of principles of law that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided and no man should be vexed twice over the same cause. The doctrine of res-judicata is based on sound principles of equity good conscience and justice.
11. In view of my foregoing discussion, I find that the impugned award dated 3rd August, 2004 is bad in law and contrary to the judicial norms and the Industrial Tribunal has totally went wrong in ignoring the earlier findings between same parties which was given by it after contest. The award is hereby set aside. No orders as to costs.
