Delhi High Court
Jagat Talkies Distributors And ... vs The Municipal Corporation Of ... on 3 December, 2007
Author: S R Bhat
Bench: S R Bhat
JUDGMENT
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.
1. The petitioner is aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority under the Public Premises ( Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, (herafter called "the Act") dated 25th October, 2007. That order had upheld the eviction directed by the Estate Officer, on 16-2-2005.
2. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details and mention of intervening proceedings, are narrated below. M/s Maidens Theatres Ltd. were lessees of land which was given to Novelty Cinema. The land was owned by the erstwhile Delhi Municipal Committee. The structure was owned by M/s Maidens Theatre Ltd.; after a protracted litigation between parties, i.e. M/s Jagat Distributors and M/s Maidens and the Standing committee of the Municipal Committee, which was succeeded by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereafter "MCD"), a compromise was arrived at between the parties. This led to a resolution by MCD on 2-5-1967 by which lease of the land and superstructure was granted; a deed was executed on 5-6-1968. The lease was for a period of 10 years, effective from 1-4-1960, with an option for renewal. Another lease was executed in favor of late Shri Kanwal Narain (appellant in another proceeding, i.e. 28/2005, also a party, through his legal representative, in the present proceeding). The said lease contained a stipulation permitting the lessee to sub-let the premises; pursuant to that condition, the suit lands were given to Jagat Talkies. This, it is claimed, was within the knowledge of MCD. The latter had been issuing No objection certificate to the petitioners for use of the premises as a cinema hall. The petitioners continued in possession of the premises after expiration of the lease; its validity was extended for a further period, till 31-3-1980. A request was made, prior to that date, on 18-10-1979, and 16-11-1979, for further extension of the lease validity; yet, even before the expiry of the lease (i.e. 31-3-1980) the MCD issued a notice, dated 26-12-1979, asking the petitioners to hand over vacant possession. The request for further extension was not acceded to. Eventually, on 14-4-1981, notice was issued by MCD to the petitioners under Section 4 of the Act, asking them to vacate the premises.
3. The petitioners challenged the show cause notice through writ proceedings before this Court. On 18-11-2004, the writ petition was rejected. Eventually, on 16-2-2006, the Estate Officer passed an eviction order. The matter was carried in appeal, though unsuccessfully, to the appellate court. By the impugned order, the appeal was rejected.
4. It was urged by Shri M.C. Dhingra, learned Counsel that the petitioner's long use and occupation of the premises had crystallized into a lease. The license arrangement was terminated in 1980. Yet the petitioners could not be called unauthorized occupants, under the Act, since their possession, and repeated issuance of MCD licenses amounted to extension of their permissive user. In such a case, the respondents could not have formed opinion that the petitioners were unauthorized occupiers.
5. Learned Counsel relied upon letters of MCD, based on joint inspection of the premises, dated 6-1-2005, and the No Objection certificate issued on 24-1-2005, 27-1-2005 and 9-2-2005 for the grant of license to the petitioner. All these were sought to be relied upon in proceedings before the Estate Officer, but without any avail.
6. Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court, reported as Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai to the following effect:
18. our opinion, in the field of contracts the State and its instrumentalities ought to so design their activities as would ensure fair competition and non-discrimination. They can augment their resources but the object should be to serve the public cause and to do public good by resorting to fair and reasonable methods. The State and its instrumentalities, as the landlords, have the liberty of revising the rates of rent so as to compensate themselves against loss caused by inflationary tendencies. They can - and rather must - also save themselves from negative balances caused by the cost of maintenance, payment of taxes and costs of administration. The State, as the landlord, need not necessarily be a benevolent and good charitable Samaritan. The felt need for expanding or stimulating its own activities or other activities in the public interest having once arisen, the State need not hold its hands from seeking eviction of its lessees. However, the State cannot be seen to be indulging in rack-renting, profiteering and indulging in whimsical or unreasonable evictions or bargains.
7. Reliance was also placed upon the judgment in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras and submitted that the State's instrumentalities could not evict their tenants merely on the basis of the lease of the premises having expired.
8. I have examined the materials placed on record. There is no dispute that the suit property falls within the scope of the expression "public premises" under the Act. With the decision of the Supreme Court in Maganlal Chhaganlal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay 1974 (2) SCC 402 and the subsequent five judge Bench decision in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank as well as the recent decision in Crawford Bayley & Co v. Union of India there is no room for argument that State rent enactments have primacy over the Act; equally pleas such as the onerous or harsh nature of the procedure prescribed under the Act, being discriminatory, stand negatived. The complaint about arbitrariness, therefore, has to be seen in the context of each given case.
9. As noticed earlier, the lease was originally for ten years; it was extended for another period of ten years. When it was about the expire, the MCD issued a notice asking the petitioners to vacate the premises. Had the petitioners any right to renewal, after the first renewal, they could have enforced it through appropriate proceedings. No condition or stipulation existed which obliged the MCD to renew and continually renew the lease period, even after the first renewal.
10. As regards the submission that the MCD is deemed to have granted extension, in view of the issuance of liecenses, there is no indication from the documents filed in that regard. The copies indicate that the permission was purely temporary, and subject to other requirements. No rule, or statutory provision was brought to the notice of the court in support of the plea that the MCD ever acceded to the renewal request; on the other hand, all indications are to the contrary.
11. The free play in the joints, granted by virtue of the provisions of the Act, were noticed in a subsequent passage, in Wadia's case (supra), in the following terms:
19. balance has to be struck between the two extremes. Having been exempted from the operation of rent control legislation, the courts cannot hold them tied to the same shackles from which the State and its instrumentalities have been freed by the legislature in their wisdom and thereby requiring them to be ruled indirectly or by analogy by the same law from which they are exempt. Otherwise, it would tantamount to defeating the exemption clause consciously enacted by the legislature. At the same time the liberty given to the State and its instrumentalities by the statute enacted under the Constitution does not exempt them from honouring the Constitution itself.
12. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the approach of the Estate Officer, or illegality with the order of the Appellate Authority, under Section 9 of the Act. The petition, therefore has to fail; it is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
