Sh. Ram Kishan vs The Secretary Labour And Anr.
2006 Latest Caselaw 1847 Del

JUDGMENT

Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.

1. By this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the Award dated 02.07.2001, passed by Labour Court-I, whereby the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the claim of the petitioner was frivolous and actuated by greed and not by law.

2. Briefly the facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this writ petition are that writ petitioner was working with the respondent No. 3, M/s Pan American World Airways, as Junior Agent Cargo in the year 1984. The management was to retrench those workmen who were employed in the cargo services because it had decided to discontinue the cargo services. However, management gave an offer to the employees, including the petitioner that in case an employee resigns, he shall be paid an ex gratia amount of Rs. 60,000/- apart from other dues. The petitioner in view of this offer resigned from the services on 27.1.1984 and received payment of Rs. 60,000/- and other dues. After receiving the dues in January 1984, he raised an industrial dispute after about 15 years that he had not received the full dues and his resignation was not voluntary. He claimed that he was illegally retrenched in the year 1984. The dispute was referred to the Labour Court vide notification dated 5.11.1999 in the following terms:

Whether Shri Ram Kishan voluntarily resigned from his services or his services were terminated by the management illegally and/or unjustifiably and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this regard?

3. In statement of claim filed before the Labour Court, petitioner took the stand that he had not signed his resignation letter voluntarily and was forced to sign the same. The Labour Court after recording evidence of both the sides came to the conclusion that the resignation was tendered by the petitioner not only voluntarily but after understanding all the facets of resignation. He had not contacted the management as alleged by him after receiving the amount. He malafidely raised the dispute that he had not tendered resignation voluntarily. There was no ground to raise dispute whatsoever.

4. Petitioner has challenged the Award passed by the Labour Court on the ground that Labour Court could not follow the definition of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and wrongly held that the claim of the petitioner was vague. The Labour Court wrongly came to the conclusion that he had voluntarily resigned. The order of the Labour Court was perverse because he had categorically stated that his signatures were obtained on the resignation against his wishes.

5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. The contents of petitioner's resignation letter are as under:

Dear Sir,

I understand that consequent to discontinuance of Freighter Service from Delhi effective December 1, 1983, Pan American World Airways is contemplating reduction of staff. I understand that the axe may fall on persons of my category/

Normally, in the case of retrenchment, only 15 days wages for every completed year of service is paid by way of retrenchment compensation apart from one month's notice. this amount is, however, totally inadequate for the purpose of rehabilitation of the workman. If, however, Pan American is willing to pay me an ex gratia amount of Rs. 60,000/- in addition to 15 days wages for each completed year of service and one month's notice pay, then I would find this amount handy and I would not have difficulty in rehabilitating myself.

I, therefore, tender my resignation, which is conditional on your paying the compensation as desired above.

If you accept the above offer, I undertake not to raise any further dispute against Pan American on any grounds whatsoever whether by way of dues or reemployment or in any other form. this is, of course, apart from my normal dues.

Thanking you, Very truly yours, Sd/-

Dated: January 27, 1984 (Ram Kishan)

7. A perusal of the above letter would show that the plea of the petitioner that he was made to sign a printed form of the resignation letter, is false and baseless. Language of the letter itself shows that letter was written after consideration and deliberation and weighing the pros and cons of resignation. Such a letter could not have been obtained by force or under any false pretext. The petitioner's plea that he had not voluntarily resigned on the face of it is liable to be rejected. The Labour Court committed no mistake in dismissing the plea of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner had appeared in the witness box and his evidence has been considered by the Labour Court. From his evidence it is also apparent that the petitioner had approached the Labour Court with unclean hands, only with a motive to extract something more.

8. The findings of the Labour Court is that the petitioner's resignation was voluntary and it was not a case of the retrenchment or termination of a workman. It is a finding of fact and this Court cannot, in exercise writ jurisdiction, sit as a Court of appeal over the finding of the fact arrived at by the Tribunal. Supreme Court in - R.M. Yellatti v. Asstt. Executive Engineer, laid down that while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, High Court does not exercise power of appellate authority and cannot substitute its own view in place of view of Labour Court.

9. The claim of the petitioner should also have been dismissed by the Labour Court on the ground of delay and latches. The petitioner resigned in January 1984. He raised industrial dispute after 15 years. No dispute survives with the lapse of such a long time. If the petitioner was aggrieved and had a case that he was retrenched in January 1984, he should have approached the appropriate government for referring the dispute in 1984 itself or within a reasonable time. There is no explanation given by the petitioner as to why he approached the appropriate government after 15 years. Although the provisions of Limitation Act does not apply in case of industrial dispute but that does not give a license to anybody to keep sleeping over the matter and raise a dispute after any number of years. A stale dispute cannot be considered as an industrial dispute. Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors. 2000(1) SLR 636, has held:

Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after lapse of about seven years of order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent.

10. I consider this writ petition should be dismissed with costs as it is a case of gross misuse of the judicial process. I hereby dismiss this petition with costs of Rs. 5000/- to be deposited with Delhi Legal Services Committee, Delhi High Court, New Delhi. In case cost is not deposited, the same be realized by the Registrar (General) of this Court as land revenue.