Shanta Bhagati W/O Late Shri ... vs Delhi Development Authority, ...
2006 Latest Caselaw 118 Del

JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. The Appellant is aggrieved by the judgment order dated 30th August 2005 passed by a learned Single Judge in WP (C) No. 1861 of 2005 whereby even though the writ petition was allowed, the Appellant was directed to pay interest to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) @ 12% per annum.

2. We are of the view that the grievance of the Appellant is justified and the appeal deserves to be allowed since there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to award interest to the DDA.

3. The Appellant's husband was registered with the NPRS Scheme, 1979 floated by the DDA for allotment of an MIG flat. In 1980, the Appellant's husband changed his residence and this was admittedly intimated to the DDA. Unfortunately, though not unsurprisingly, the concerned officer of the DDA did not take note of the change of address.

4. In a draw held in 1999, the Appellant's husband (who had since passed away) was allotted a flat but intimation thereof was sent at the earlier address with the result that the Appellant did not receive it.

5. Sometime later, the Appellant took up the issue of the non-allotment of a flat with the Vice Chairman of the DDA. The Vice Chairman gave her a personal hearing and was apparently satisfied that she ought to have been allotted a flat on her turn. Accordingly, he passed an order on 28th April, 2004 directing that she be allotted an alternative flat at the cost prevalent in 1999.

6. Consequent to the order of the Vice Chairman, the Appellant was included in the draw of lots held on 2nd July, 2004 and was allotted a flat. Unfortunately, she still did not receive any demand cum allotment letter, even though persons who had participated in a later draw in November, 2004 had received allotment letters. The Appellant says that she visited the office of the DDA on several occasions but was not issued the demand cum allotment letter for extraneous considerations. Under these circumstances, she was compelled to approach the writ Court for a direction to the DDA to issue her a demand cum allotment letter.

7. The prayer made by the Appellant was granted by the learned Single Judge who directed the DDA to allot her the flat as per the draw of lots by charging rates as of October, 1999. However, the learned Single Judge expressed the view that the DDA would be entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the said demand.

8. We are of the opinion that there was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to award interest to the DDA. Each such case has to be considered on its own peculiar facts.

9. It is said that the Appellant was not vigilant enough and ought to have known that the time for the allotment of her flat had come, particularly when wide publicity was given in the newspapers. This may be so; but at the same time we cannot overlook the fact that the Appellant is a widow and from her signature on her affidavit, she seems to be semi-literate. In view of her apparent station in life, she could hardly be expected to be as vigilant as the average man on the street, nor could it be said with certainty that she is literate enough to regularly go through the newspapers.

10. While it may be normal human conduct to look forward with anticipation to the allotment of a flat, that heightened eagerness ought not to be expected to last for 20 years, as in this case. On the other hand, it seems contrary to normal human conduct that if the Appellant knew of the allotment in her favor in 1999, she would have not bothered about it. If the level of expectancy is assumed to remain high for 20 years, it is unlikely that it will suddenly ebb when the event actually takes place. Therefore, for the DDA to contend that the Appellant had a mischievous intention in not accepting the allotment in 1999 is not only theoretical but a little far-fetched.

11. It must also not be forgotten that the Appellant was entitled to expect the DDA to be vigilant enough and note her change of address. It is possible that she expected intimation to be sent to her at her new address and was therefore a little more relaxed than the average man on the street. The concerned officer of the DDA who ought to have noted the change of address is an officer of the State and the burden of responsibility on him is far greater than that on a private citizen. If the State is remiss in carrying out its duty and responsibility, the citizen should not be faulted, even if his remissness is comparatively greater. Consequently, we hold that since the DDA was remiss in the performance of its obligations, it is not entitled to any interest.

12. We may also note that the rate of interest (12% per annum) awarded by the learned Single Judge is unusually high. In Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. the Supreme Court awarded interest for motor accident claims based on the Reserve Bank of India rates as followed by nationalized banks @ 9% per annum on the date of the decision. Today, the homepage on the website of the Reserve Bank of India (http://www.rbi.org.in) informs us that as far as the lending/deposit rates are concerned, the prime lending rate for public sector banks is 10.25% - 10.75%, while the savings bank rate is 3.5% and the deposit rate is 5.25% - 6.25%.

13. If it is assumed that the Appellant had invested her savings for the flat with a nationalized bank in October 1999, it is unlikely that she would have received a much higher rate of interest than the present rate. Therefore, to saddle her with interest @ 12% per annum effectively amounts to penalizing her. We, therefore, think that it will be appropriate to follow the lead given by the Reserve Bank of India and to direct that in transactions such as the present, which are not commercial transactions, the Court should not award interest to the DDA at more than 6.25% per annum, particularly since interest is only an accretion on the capital and nothing more.

14. With these findings and observations the appeal is allowed. The Appellant will be entitled to costs from the DDA of Rs. 5000/- payable within four weeks from today.