P.P. Resorts Pvt. Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. ...
2006 Latest Caselaw 2250 Del

JUDGMENT

S. Muralidhar, J.

Page 0066

1. These two writ petitions challenge the validity of a Notification dated 14.10.2005 issued by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi ('GNCTD') (Respondent No. 3 herein) under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 ('LAA') proposing to acquire the petitioners' lands located in Village Singhu for the purpose of the construction of the Guru Teg Bahadur Memorial at the Singhu Border, New Delhi. The petitioners also challenge the validity of the consequent declaration dated 9.1.2006 under Section 6 of LAA. The petitioner in W.P.(C) 2919 of 2006 (P.P. Resorts Pvt. Limited) (hereafter 'P.P. Resorts') claims to be the owner of lands comprised in Khasra Nos. 23/8, 23/9, 23/10, 23/13/1 situated in Village Singhu, and the petitioner in W.P. (C) 4517 of 2006 (Shammi Chawla) claims to be the owner of the lands comprised in Khasra Nos. 23/2/2 min (4-06), 23/3 min (4-0), 23/4 min (0-18) and 23/1/2 (1-18) also located in Village Singhu, Delhi. By its orders dated 1.3.2006 and 24.3.2006, while directing the notice to issue to the respondents, this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo with regard to title and possession of the lands in question as of those respective dates.

Background Facts

2. The facts leading to the filing of these petitions may be recounted. At a meeting held on 20.2.2003 by Finance Minister, GNCTD with the officers of the Delhi Tourism and Transportation Development Corporation Ltd (DTTDC) (Respondent No. 5 herein), it was informed that the GNCTD had decided to build a memorial at the entrance to Delhi on the National Highway to pay homage to the Sikh Gurus. Thereafter, steps were taken to commission designs for the proposed memorial from the certain architects. The location for the memorial was thereafter finalised as the Singhu border. Since this was abutting the National Highway, it was felt necessary to seek the permission of the Government of India and the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). It was further decided on 24.6.2003 to locate the memorial on one side of the highway. The land identified to the extent of 21 bighas was situated at the Singhu border and belonged to the PWD, GNCTD. On 30.6.2003 it was decided that the aforementioned piece of vacant land admeasuring 3.3.acres may be transferred to the DTTDC and on 2.1.2004 the land was handed over to DTTDC "for the purpose of building a memorial in the honour of Shri Guru Teg Bahadur at Singhu Border." A foundation stone was also laid on 18.2.2004 at the site in a public function.

3. The initial plan for the memorial was prepared and submitted to the Delhi Urban Art Commission (DUAC) for approval on 19.5.2004. The Sub-committee of DUAC visited the site on 21.9.2004 and on 29.9.2004 gave suggestions to improve the visibility and to give additional set back based on the revised NHAI guidelines in order to make "a strong visual statement." On the basis of above suggestion, revised plans were drawn up and the DUAC gave its conceptual approval of the proposal on 16.12.2004. As a result of the revised plan, more land was to be Page 0067 acquired. In the meanwhile, there were directions concerning the construction of a modern Vehicle Toll Registration Plaza in the adjoining area as per the directives of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This was also to be completed by 31.3.2005. Therefore, a decision was taken at a meeting on 28.3.2005 chaired by the Chief Secretary, GNCTD, following which a letter dated 16.5.2005 was addressed by the DTTDC to the Principal Secretary (UD), GNCTD stating that "the total area to be acquired has been worked out to 11.55 acres out of which 8.57 acres land is to be acquired for memorial proper which may be acquired in the first phase so that work can be taken up. The remaining area (2.98 acres) is for the development of a public park as suggested by the Chief Secretary in his inspection and may be acquired in the second phase."

4. On 14.10.2005, the notification under Section 4 came to be issued and the lands earmarked included those belonging to the petitioners. This notification was published in the Official Gazette on 17.10.2005. It is stated that the local publication of the notification in the locality took place on 19.10.2005. A copy was also published in the local newspapers on 8.11.2005. The notification invited objections to be filed under Section 5A LAA within thirty days from 14.10.2005. This was followed by the notification under Section 6 issued on 9.1.2006.

5. P.P. Resorts claims to have purchased some of the lands covered by the Section 4 notification on 15.7.2004 for constructing a Motel. The other petitioner Shammi Chawla had purchased certain other lands covered by the same notification by separate sale deeds dated 17.1.1988, 5.7.1988, 11.7.1988 and 6.12.1989. This petitioner claims that his lands were being used for running an ashram.

6. On 5.5.2005 P.P.Resorts applied to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi ('MCD') (respondent No. 4 herein) for sanctioning its building plans for the construction of a Motel. It is stated that P.P. Resorts complied with all the formalities as stipulated by the MCD in its letter dated 12.5.2005. On 17.11.2005, P.P. Resorts submitted for approval the drawings and corrected plans to the Labour Department and the Office of the Electrical Inspector, GNCTD. Pursuant to a query from the MCD, P.P.Resorts on 18.11.2005 applied to the SDM (Land Acquisition), Kanjhawala, Delhi for a 'No Objection Certificate' ('NOC') and for information on whether the land in question was the subject matter of land acquisition proceedings. On 22.11.2005, the SDM (Notification) informed P.P.Resorts that the lands in question have not been notified under Sections 4 and 6 LAA.

7. Pursuant to the letters dated 12.12.2005 and 19.12.2005 written by P.P.Resorts, MCD informed it that a sum of Rs. 37,42,800 would be required to be deposited with the MCD. This amount was deposited by P.P.Resorts on 26.12.2005.

8. On 27.12.2005 the MCD wrote the ADM (LA) seeking information on whether the MCD had any objection to the proposed construction of a Motel on the land in question. In reply to this letter, the SDM (Notification) vide letter dated 9.1.2006, for the second time, gave an NOC to the MCD informing the latter that the lands in question had not been notified Page 0068 under Sections 4 and 6 of the LAA. Acting on this information, the MCD sanctioned the building plans on 16.1.2006.

9. Both petitioners maintain that they were never aware of the land acquisition proceedings till February/March 2006. It is claimed that when P.P. Resorts commenced the construction work with regard to the Motel some time in February 2006, the GNCTD officials objected on the ground that the land was subject matter of land acquisition proceedings. It is stated that some time in March 2006 P.P. Resorts informed Shammi Chawla about these developments. Both petitioners say that they were shocked to hear that the land in question was subject matter of the land acquisition proceedings despite the fact that the SDM had, vide separate letters dated 22.11.2005 and 9.1.2006, given an NOC to the MCD stating to the contrary. To complete this narration, it should be mentioned that during the pendency of these proceedings, notices under Sections 9 and 10 LAA were issued. After examining of the claims filed in response to these notices, including the claim of P.P. Resorts, the LAC announced an Award on 20.7.2006 determining the land acquisition compensation payable for the lands in question.

Pleadings of the parties

10. The principal ground of attack of the petitioners in these writ petitions is that the land acquisition proceedings were not to their knowledge and that they have been unfairly deprived of an opportunity of filing objections to the acquisition under Section 5A of the Act. Since in any event PP Resorts had obtained NOCs from the SDM, who on two occasions had certified that the lands were not the subject matter of land acquisition proceedings, it had no reason to suspect otherwise. It is further pleaded that the purpose for which the land is being acquired is not a public purpose; the notifications do not satisfy the requirements of the law as regards their form and content and the procedure for their publication; that the acquisition proposal was not mooted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) as mandated by a policy circular of the Lt.Governor (Respondent No. 2 herein) and that the Master Plan for Delhi has been violated.

11. Respondent No. 4 MCD filed a counter affidavit on 10.3.2006 stating that the plans have been sanctioned on the basis of the NOC issued by the SDM (Notification). After the plans had been sanctioned, the office of the Additional District Magistrate (ADM)/Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) (North West), District Khanjhawala, Delhi informed the MCD that the SDM has sent an incorrect status report and that the land was being acquired for the construction of the Guru Teg Bahadur Memorial at Singhu Border. Since the MCD had already sanctioned the plan on the basis of the false status report received from the office of the SDM (SV), the MCD issued a show cause notice under Section 338 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act for revocation of the building plans already sanctioned.

12. On behalf of the GNCTD, it was stated that the Section 4 notification was published through all the three modes of publication, i.e., Official Gazette, local newspapers as well as in the locality in the presence of the local villagers. In that view of the matter, the question of depriving the petitioner of an opportunity to file objections under Section 5A did not arise. As regards the Page 0069 non compliance with the statutory requirements of the Master Plan for Delhi (MPD) under the Delhi Development Act 1957, it was stated by the respondents that since the lands have been acquired for a public purpose, there was no question of the MPD determining the validity of the land acquisition proceedings.

13. On behalf of the DTTDC, Respondent No. 5, the various steps preceding the land acquisition, the handing over of the lands to the DTTDC and the clearing of the plans thereafter were explained.

14. An additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the GNCTD, on 27.7.2006 where the origins of the proposal for construction of the memorial from 22.2.2003 onwards and the various stages thereafter were explained. It was pointed out that the SDM had issued had issued "false/incorrect status report on 22.11.2005" that the lands in question had not been notified under Sections 4 and 6 LAA. It was categorically stated: "report was issued by the SDM (Notification) without taking the comments of Narela Sub-Division and LAC (NW)." It was further pointed out that for a second time on 4.1.2006 "again without obtaining the comments of Narela Sub-division and LAC, the SDM (SV)/SDM (Notification) issued a false/incorrect status report." It was denied that the lands had to be acquired only through the DDA and further that "however in the present case, the requisite approval of the DDA for the project has been obtained." It was further stated that the requirement of the Master Plan would not determine the legality of the acquisition of land under the LAA.

15. Since the case of the petitioners rests primarily on the NOCs issued by the SDM on two occasions, this Court sought further details and passed the following Order on 30.8.2006:

Having taken into account the plea of Mr. Ravinder Sethi, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the SDM informed the MCD vide letter dated 9.1.2006 that the land in question has not been notified under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('Act'), we think it appropriate to require the learned Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 to file an additional affidavit explaining, in detail, the circumstances in which the said letter came to be issued by the SDM (Notification). Let the additional affidavit be filed within two days. Advance copy be given to learned Counsel for the petitioners who may file a response thereto by the next date of hearing.

16. In response to the above order, on 4.9.2006, the Respondents 2 and 3 filed a further additional affidavit explaining how the first NOC came to be issued. This affidavit also listed out the steps following the request made by the MCD (Building Department) vide letter dated 27.12.2005 to the ADM (LA) for an NOC in respect of the land in question. For a second time, the SDM issued the NOC on 9.1.2006 by-passing the ADM. It was then stated that the above developments came to the notice of the ADM only on 31.1.2006 when the DTTDC officers noticed that P.P.Resorts had started construction on the site. Thereupon, the ADM /LAC (NW) directed the SHO, Narela to stop the construction work and wrote the MCD on 7.2.2006 for cancellation of the sanctioned building plans. Page 0070 A charge sheet was issued and disciplinary action was initiated against the three Patwaries, a Naib Tehsildar and SDM (SV). The Disciplinary Authority placed the concerned SDM and Patwaries under suspension.

17. This affidavit stated that on 22.6.2006, an FIR was lodged against the said officials with the Anti-Corruption Department. It was stated in para 9 as under:

9. That the petitioner in connivance of the said officials obtained the said two NOCs. The same were not issued by following the normal procedure and have been issued in great hurry. As submitted above, the said two NOCs are not statutory documents and cannot impeach the statutory notifications issued by the competent authority in accordance with law and were duly published in the newspaper.

18. The affidavit further stated that an Award has already been made in respect of the lands in question on 20.7.2006. Significantly, P.P.Resorts filed its claim for compensation, which claim has been examined and disposed of by the LAC by the said Award. The petitioners have filed replies to the above additional affidavit denying the allegation of their 'connivance' in the grant of the NOCs. This will be referred to shortly hereafter.

Submissions of Counsel

19. Shri Ravinder Sethi, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted as under:

(a) The acquisition is not for a public purpose as defined within the categories enumerated under Section 3(f) LAA. The construction of a memorial is not a public purpose.

(b) The Khasra numbers mentioned in the Section 4 notification are not sufficiently clear to enable a land owner to know if his land is being acquired. Some of the lands belonging to the petitioner (Shammi Chawla) are not even mentioned in the Section 4 notification. He submits that this by itself would vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings and in support of this submission he places reliance on the decision in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory .

(c) The requirement, under Section 4 LAA, that the notification must be published in the locality is mandatory. There is nothing here to show that this was in fact done. Further there is a certain sequence to be followed under Section 4(1) LAA: First, the first notification should be published in the Official Gazette, secondly, in the local newspapers and only thereafter in the locality. Going by the pleadings, it is obvious that this sequence has not been followed. In support of this proposition, he relies on the decision in Narinderjit Singh v. The State of U.P. , State of Mysore v. Abdul Razar Sahib and Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal .

Page 0071

(d) The time period in the notification for filing objections was illusory if one went by the paper publication. There was a complete denial of the opportunity to file objections under Section 5A LAA and this too vitiated the entire acquisition process. He placed reliance on the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [2005] 7 SCC 622 and Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal [supra].

(e) Inasmuch as the acquisition was not initiated by the DDA as is mandated by a policy directive of the Respondent No. 2, it stood vitiated. He relied on the decision of this Court in Praveen Jain v. Union of India .

(f) The manner in which the plans for the memorial have been changed thrice, and the extent of land increased on each occasion, smacks of malafides. He further points out that the final plans submitted by the DTTDC have not yet been approved by the DUAC. There was no way the land owners could have inspected such a plan for the purposes of filing objections under Section 5A. The Section 6 therefore suffers from non-application of mind.

20. In reply, Mr. Sanjay Poddar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the definition of public purpose under Section 3(f) is an inclusive one and does not exclude the public purpose of the construction of memorial for a great religious leader of a prominent community in the country. In any event, what constitutes a public purpose is not justiciable. After the Section 6 declaration, the question does not even arise. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (now Maharashtra) , Kanaiyalal Maneklal Chinai v. State of Gujarat , Bajirao T. Kote (dead) by LRs v. State of Maharashtra and Pratibha Nema v. State of M.P. .

21. Referring to the pleadings and the records, he reiterates that the petitioners had connived with the officials, who are now being proceeded against departmentally, in obtaining the false NOCs. The MCD has since revoked the sanction of the building plans. As regards the plea of improper description of Khasra numbers, he points out that on the one hand the petitioners claim that they had no occasion to notice the publication in the newspapers, and on the other they were claiming that they were prevented from filing objections because such notification contained incorrect particulars. Further, even while making a claim for compensation in response to the notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the LAA, P.P.Resorts did not raise any such objection. He points out, with reference to the record, that the requirement of publication in the Page 0072 locality has been complied with. He submits that the circular requiring initiation of the acquisition proceedings by the DDA is not binding and cannot render the proceedings illegal. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Shri Bhagwan v. Union of India 1991 1 2nd (DEL) 215 (page 227 para 18) and the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Roshanara Begum v. Union of India which was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Murari v. Union of India . Further relying on Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. , he submitted that the Master Plan provisions cannot determine the validity of the acquisition of lands for a public purpose.

22. Mr. Sandeep Sethi, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the DTTDC took us through documents on the official record which reveal the entire sequence of events from 20.2.2003 onwards which has been adverted to hereinbefore. His basic submission was that the need to get revised the plans from time to time was not actuated by any collateral or oblique motive as projected by the petitioners. The revisions became necessary on account of the felt need to have a memorial as an outstanding symbol of the religious sentiments of the community while at the same time strengthening the objective of a secular state. Further the concerns expressed by the NHAI had to be accounted for as well.

23. Having heard the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we proceed to determine the various issued raised in the present petitions.

Determination of the issues

24. The first issue is whether the petitioners were in fact aware of the Section 4 notification which was published in the Official Gazette on 14.10.2005, in the locality on 19.10.2005 and in the local newspapers on 8.11.2005. P.P. Resorts claims that it first came to know of the notification much later i.e. on or around 31.1.2006 when they commenced construction on the site for the building of the Motel at which point the officials of the GNCTD objected and prevented them from going on with the construction. Shammi Chawla says he knew of it from P.P.Resorts even later. The petitioners also rely on the fact that on two occasions, i.e. 22.11.2005 and 9.1.2006, the SDM (Notification) of the Delhi Administration had issued NOCs certifying that the lands in question were not the subject matter of the land acquisition proceedings.

25. P.P.Resorts purchased the lands in question vide a sale deed dated on 15.7.2004. Shammi Chawla purchased his lands earlier. The moves to construct a memorial on the Singhu border were already afoot by this time. The foundation stone had been laid on 18.2.2004 on the adjoining site amidst great fanfare. If the petitioners had made inquiries in the locality it is quite possible they would have been informed of these developments. Page 0073 Even if one were to go by the fact that not everyone is able to read a government gazette, there is nothing to disbelieve the assertion of the GNCTD, on the basis of the records, that the publication in the locality took place on 19.10.2005. In this regard a reference may be made to the assertion in the additional affidavit dated 4.9.2006 of the GNCTD to the following effect:

3. That as submitted in the affidavits filed earlier, the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 14.10.2005 for 38 bigha and 10 biswa after obtaining approval of Hon'ble Lt. Governor on 6.10.2005. Notification under Section 4 dated 14.10.2006 was duly published in National Dailies of Times of India dated 8.11.2005 and Dainik Hindustan dated 8.11.2005. The copies of notification were also duly displayed in the village Singhu and village Singhola on 19.10.2005. Thus due publication was made as per the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is submitted that on the publication of the said notification, particularly on newspaper publication, all the concerned including the petitioner, deemed to have acquired the knowledge of the said notification. None including the petitioner cannot plead ignorance of the issuance of notification. The notification has also been published in the Official Gazette.

We have not been persuaded to doubt the correctness of the above assertion, made on the basis of the records of the case. If the petitioners chose to ignore the publication on 8.11.2005 in the newspapers, they did so at their own peril. The fact remains that all three modes of publication as spelt out in Section 4 did take place in the instant case.

26. Be that as it may, the narration of events as described in the additional affidavit dated 4.9.2006 of the GNCTD, does raise considerable doubts whether in fact the petitioner P.P.Resorts was unaware of the land acquisition proceedings. It is stated in para 4 of this affidavit as under:

4. That despite the said public notice in the newspaper, the petitioner vide letter purported to be addressed to the ADM (LA) dated 18.11.2005. The same appears to have been delivered in the office of the AADM on 18.11.2005. However from the records maintained by the SDM (SV), who issued the NOC at page 89 on 22.11.2005, that the same was not issued on the basis of the letter dated 18.11.2005 as filed at page 88, but on the basis of the photocopy of the same but addressed to SDM (HQ) and submitted on 21.11.2005. This letter was marked by the SDM to the Naib Tehsildar, without getting the same diarised. The Patwari on the same date i.e. 21.11.2005 without any verification from either the Land Acquisition branch or the concerned revenue Sub-Division of Narela moved a note sheet that the said land has not been notified. The Naib Tehsildar on the very next date simply endorsed the noting of Patwari to SDM (SV), who in turn on the same day issued the letter dated 22.11.2005 at page 89. It is submitted that the letter dated 18.11.2005 was accompanied by the letter dated 12.5.2005 (page 75 of the paper book) issued by the MCD. The Page 0074 request to issue NOC was made on 18.11.2005 pursuant to the letter dated 12.5.2005 issued by the MCD. Meaning thereby that the request though made after a period of more than six month, but the petitioner did not wait for a day and made another application by correcting the addressee by hand and secured the NOC on the very next day. The petitioner ever did not wait for the letter addressed and received by the ADM on 18.11.2005 to reach the SDM. The letter delivered to the ADM was not disposed of. The great hurry of the petitioner after issuance of notification in the newspaper is not understandable.

27. The fact that P.P. Resorts waited for six months after the submission of plans, i.e. till 18.11.2005, to seek an NOC from the SDM, when the Section 4 notification had already been published in the newspapers on 8.11.2005, and the manner in which the NOC was given on 22.11.2005, within four days, contrary to the official record does not speak well for the conduct of either the officials involved or the petitioner. What is even more curious is that P.P.Resorts addressed the letter dated 18.11.2005 seeking the NOC to the ADM, but the NOC was given by the SDM, who was an official subordinate to the ADM. Notwithstanding the P.P.Resort's denial that it was in any hurry to obtain such NOC after issuance of Section 4 notification in the newspapers, its reply to this additional affidavit of the GNCTD is not convincing at all. It says that it "made application on 21.11.2005 to the SDM as it was informed that the SDM was the right authority who issues notifications. There is no illegality committed by the petitioner and the NOC was issued as per the normal procedure followed in the office of the SDM." This explanation is also incorrect if one were to go by the letter dated 18.11.2005, a copy of which has been placed on the record. This letter by P.P.Resorts was originally addressed to "the ADM (LA) Sahab, Kanjhawala, Delhi." Below the letters "To" and the words "The ADM (LA) Sahab", the words "The SDM (HQ)" have been inserted by hand. It is, therefore, incorrect to assert that P.P.Resorts did not know that it was the ADM who was the right authority to issue this NOC. The reply is also silent about who gave the "advice" that the appropriate authority was the SDM. As it now transpires, the certification issued by the SDM, without the approval of the ADM to whom the request was made, was patently false. And stranger still, from that P.P. Resorts says, it appears such NOC was given in exactly one day's time.

28. We next come to the second NOC issued on 9.1.2006, the very day on which the Section 6 declaration was issued. This time the request by the MCD was to the ADM (LA) and not to the SDM. This letter dated 27.12.2005 was not originally marked to the petitioner. This has come out in the additional affidavit filed by the GNCTD in para 6 as under:

6. The MCD Building Department vide letter dated 27.12.2005 requested ADM (LA), Tis Hazari to issue NOC in favor of the petitioner in respect of the land in question. Though a copy of the said letter (page 95) was addressed to the petitioner, but the copy as placed on record is not the same. The same is a copy of the letter addressed and dealt with by the office of the ADM (LA), Tis Hazari. The same is not a certified copy Page 0075 of the letter as dealt with in the department. It is pertinent to mention herein that the petitioner has sought certain information under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, but no certified copy of the said letter was obtained from the answering respondent.

The events that transpired thereafter are stated in para 7 of the said affidavit as under:

7. The letter was forwarded to LAC (NW) on 29.12.2005, which was received at LAC office on 4.1.2006. The LAC marked the paper to Kanoongo (LA), who in turn marked it to Patwari (LA) on 5.1.2006. The Patwari (LA) on 5.1.2006 forwarded that letter to notification branch through Kanoongo and Naib Tehsildar (LA). The Patwari (Notification) submitted factually incorrect report to the Naib Tehsildar on 9.1.2006. On the same day, the Naib Tehsildar simply endorsed the report of the Patwari to the SDM, without even marking the file to the Tehsildar, who was on duty. The SDM on the same very day issued the NOC and sent to the MCD. It is submitted that while issuing the NOC (page 96) again no comments of Narela sub-division and LAC were obtained. The SDM (SV)/SDM (Notification) again issued a false/ incorrect status report on 9.1.2006 saying that the said land is not notified under Section 4 and 6 of the LA Act. This letter to the MCD was also issued in great hurry inasmuch as the SDM was away to USA to visit his wife and daughter and arrived on 9.1.2006 itself. It may be noted that the NOC was required as long as on 12.5.2005 but no such anxiety was shown by the petitioner in obtaining the same. The petitioner shown great hurry only after the notification was published in the newspaper. It is submitted that till the stage of issuance of notice under Section 9 of the LAA, the petitioner deliberately showed ignorance of the notification and tried to obtain the sanction of the building plan.

29. In reply to the above paragraphs, P.P.Resorts simply denies that there was no illegality whatsoever. It states:

7. That the contents of para 7 of the additional affidavit are wrong and denied. The contents relating to forwarding of letter dated 27.12.2005 of MCD are denied for want of knowledge. It is stated that the petitioner is not aware, how the NOC was issued by the SDM to the MCD as the request directly came from the MCD. The petitioner is only aware that the NOC was issued on 9.1.2006 and on the same day the Section 6 declaration was also made, so any dereliction of duty on the part of the officials of the respondent cannot be mean to say that the same was issued at the behest of petitioner or the petitioner illegally procured the same from the officials of respondent. The petitioner has not indulged in any such thing and NOC was issued as per the normal procedure followed in the SDM's office.

30. To say the least, the stand of P.P.Resorts does not inspire confidence that it is speaking the complete truth. The entire sequence of events, if carefully examined, would show that these events could not have transpired unless there was connivance at more than one level. And the false NOC was issued Page 0076 not once, but twice in a span of two months. It is difficult to understand how on two different occasions, the ADM (LA), who was the only competent authority to issue NOC was totally by-passed and a false NOC was issued by the SDM stating that the lands in question were not subject matter of the land acquisition proceedings. Despite its denials, which as we have found are not convincing, it appears to us prima facie that the role of P.P.Resorts in the grant of the false NOCs cannot be ruled out. We do not wish to say anything more because the entire matter is being investigated pursuant to the FIR lodged. We would not want any observation here to prejudice those investigations. It is hoped that the investigation will bring out the entire truth.

31. For the purposes of the present case, however, in view of these developments it is not possible to believe that P.P.Resorts was not aware at all of the land acquisition proceedings prior to January 31, 2006. As already noted, the record of the present case reveals that the three modes of publication were adopted - first, in the Official Gazette followed by the publication in the locality and then in the newspapers. In the circumstances, the stand of both the petitioners that they were unaware of the land acquisition proceedings does not appear to be credible.

32. Since the entire basis of the case put forth by the petitioners rests on this assertion that they were totally ignorant of the land acquisition notification, our finding to the contrary should suffice to dismiss these petitions. Nevertheless, since the matter has been argued at great length by the petitioners, we propose to deal with the merits of the other contentions.

33. In the first place, it may be noticed that the definition of 'public purpose in Section 3(f) LAA is an inclusive one. The categories mentioned therein are not exhaustive of what constitutes 'public purpose.' In other words, it is not as if the public purpose for which the land is acquired has to necessarily fall within the categories enumerated in Section 3(f) LAA. There may be other categories of 'public purpose' which the legislature has wisely chosen not to anticipate as these can keep expanding over the years. What constitutes public purpose should ordinarily be left to be determined by the government itself. Unless shown to be patently perverse and therefore unsustainable in law, the Courts would not lightly interfere with such determination. Support for this proposition can be had from the decision in Pratibha Nema v. State of M.P. .

34. In the instant case, the acquisition of the land is for the construction of a memorial to honour Guru Teg Bahadur. The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims the state to be secular. The construction of a memorial to honour a great Sikh Guru, highly revered not only by the Sikhs themselves, but universally, is not only in conformity with the nature of the State as proclaimed by the Preamble but respects the sentiments of the people of this country in general and the Sikh community, which is prominent in every sphere of public life, in particular. It is the considered view of this Court that there can be no doubt at all that the purpose for which the lands have been acquired in the instant case is indeed a public purpose.

Page 0077

35. If precedents are required to support this conclusion, a reference can be usefully made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanaiyalal Maneklal Chinai v. State of Gujarat . There the acquisition of land was for "setting up of a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi". The contention of those challenging the acquisition that this "was not acquisition for a public purpose," was negatived by the Gujarat High Court and this was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under (SCC p. 462):

We are clearly of the view that the notification under 4 of the Land Acquisition Act does not refer to any purpose of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, nor is the acquisition for a purpose for which the Commissioner is required by the provisions of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, to acquire the land. The land is needed for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi at a place associated with him, and we regard, because of the universal veneration in which the memory of Mahatma Gandhi is held in our country, that the purpose was a public purpose. Counsel for the appellants has not attempted to argue that acquisition of land for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi is not a purpose for which the Commissioner is required by the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, to acquire the land, nor is it a purpose of the Municipality under the Municipal Corporations Act. The purpose of acquisition being one which falls within the normal connotation of the expression "public purpose" within the meaning of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is unnecessary to rely upon the extended meaning of the expression "public purpose" as provided by Section 78(1) of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court also rejected the arguments that the funds for "setting up of a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi" were being used contrary to the provisions of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. The Court observed as under (SCC pp.462-63):

10. It was urged that the Municipal funds were, contrary to the provisions of the Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, intended to be utilized for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi. But we are not concerned to the present case to determine if the funds are utilized, they will be lawfully utilized; that is a matter which is not within the periphery of the inquiry in this appeal. The land is being acquired for a purpose which is a public purpose, and once that condition is fulfillled no further inquiry need be made, whether if the municipal funds are to be utilized for setting up a memorial to Mahatma Gandhi, after the land is vested in the State after acquisition, the Municipality will be acting within the limits of its authority. We may observe that a notification issued under Section 6 is by Sub-section (3) conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose.

The above judgment, in our view, is a complete answer to the submissions of the petitioners on the question of public purpose.

Page 0078

36. Turning to next point about the non-mentioning with sufficient clarity of the particulars of the Khasra numbers, we may bear in mind that the idea of giving the full particulars in the notification is to enable those whose lands are being acquired to file objections or claims for compensation, as they choose to. It is one thing to say that the land owners did take note of the Section 4 notification but they did not file objections under Section 5A LAA since their khasra numbers were not mentioned in the notification. It is quite another thing to say that the landholders did not notice the Section 4 notification at all and therefore, could not file their objections. In the latter case, it would matter little if the notification did not give the full particulars of the Khasra numbers of the landholders. These are therefore not alternative submissions but mutually contradictory ones. In the instant case, the case of the petitioners is that they did not at all know of the notification and therefore did not file their objections. Therefore the argument that they could not file the objections under Section 5A on account of full particulars not being given in the Section 4 notification cannot be countenanced. In any event, on closely examining the Section 4 notification in the instant case, we find that the Khasra numbers are indicated with clarity, sufficient for the land holders, to file objections or to claim compensation.

37. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory turned on its own facts since the concerned statute, the National Highways Act 1956, did not contain a provision similar to Section 5A LAA. In para 8 the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that while under Section 5A LAA "failure to exercise that right (of objecting) could be said to be acquiescence", it could not be so held in the case of Section 3C of the National Highways Act 1956. This decision is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case, where the petitioners have in any event not filed objections under Section 5A LAA. Further, as already noticed, P.P. Resorts filed their claims for compensation before the LAC in response to the notices under Sections 9 and 10 LAA. It is unbelievable that the petitioner would have filed its claims without knowing which particular Khasra numbers were involved. Therefore, this entire argument without basis and is rejected as such.

38. The submission that Section 4 mandates a particular sequence of publication of the notification is also untenable. A plain reading of Section 4(1) it indicates that such a sequence, as suggested by counsel for the petitioners, is not envisaged. The words "....shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality, the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification" themselves indicate that any of these modes of publication i.e., the Gazette publication, newspaper publication and the publication in the locality, can be the last. The argument that the time for filing objections was too short is also without merit since the case of the petitioners is that they were not at all aware of the notification all and therefore could not file Page 0079 objections. As pointed out earlier, these are not alternative arguments, but contradictory and mutually conflicting ones and cannot, therefore, be made credibly in the same breath. The petitioners' bonafides on arguments like this can be tested by examining if, soon after noticing the publication in the newspapers, they had submitted a short reply to the Collector stating that they required a longer time since they were still gathering particulars for filing objections. However, that is not the case here. In the circumstances, it is difficult to see how the petitioners can urge a denial of the opportunity of filing objections under Section 5A. Therefore, the decisions in Hindustan Petroleum v. Darius Shapur and Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram, Jaiswal cannot come to the aid of the petitioners. By the same logic, the argument that the plans for the memorial kept changing on three occasions and therefore, the last approved plan could not possibly be kept for inspection by the landholders seeking to object the land acquisition, must also fail. These petitioners, who in any event claimed that they never knew of the notifications, cannot be heard to make this complaint.

39. Having gone through the record, we are satisfied that the need for revision of the plans was not on account of any collateral considerations not germane to the decision to revise the plans for the memorial. Nothing in this entire exercise can be even remotely suggested as being mala fide or actuated by ulterior motives. The arguments of the petitioner in this regard deserve outright rejection.

40. As regards the contention that the acquisition was not in accordance with the Master Plan for Delhi, the respondents are right in contending that this cannot affect the validity of land acquisition proceedings. A reference has been made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh . There the argument was that the Master Plan for Agra City did not permit the use of the acquired land for a market yard and that therefore, the acquisition was bad in law. Rejecting this contention, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to the earlier precedents, as under:

22. As pointed out in the above judgments, there is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor will the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality. Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Page 0080 Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act seeking permission to change of land use even before the land is acquired or before possession is given to the beneficiary. On the principle stated in Aflatoon case it is clear that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from the competent authority under the Development Act concerned for change of land use are different from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter.

41. The decision in Praveen Jain v. Union of India appears to have turned on its own facts. Two principal questions in that case were whether the acquiring authority had applied its mind for invoking Section 17 LAA and whether the Section 5A procedure could have been validly dispensed with. Neither of these questions arises for determination here. Therefore, the observation in that case that the acquisition had to place only at the instance of DDA cannot be straightaway applied here to invalidate the present acquisition. In any event, it has been stated on affidavit by the respondents that the approval of the DDA has also been obtained. We also notice that it has been held in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Roshanara Begum v. Union of India that there was no question of promissory estoppel arising out of a government circular in the context of testing the validity of land acquisition proceedings. This decision has been approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Murari v. Union of India (supra). We accordingly find no merit in this submission either.

42. We, accordingly, find no merits in either of these writ petitions. We have to account for the fact that on account of the interim order of this Court, the further progress in the construction of the memorial has been halted for about nine months. The petitioners should, in our view be made to pay costs. Accordingly we dismiss both these petitions with costs of Rs. 10,000/- each which will be paid by the petitioners to the GNCTD within a period of four weeks from today. The interim orders stand vacated and the applications are dismissed as well.