Delhi High Court
Baldev Raj vs C. Natesan And Ors. on 8 August, 2006
Author: S K Kaul
Bench: S K Kaul
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
1. Admit.
2. At request of learned Counsel for the parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal.
3. The petitioner filed an eviction petition against the respondents / tenants under Section 14(1)(f) and (g) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the said Act'). The eviction petition was allowed by the Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'ARC') restricted to the ground of Section 14(1)(f) of the said Act by the order dated 20.05.2005. The respondents aggrieved by the same filed an appeal before the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred to as, 'the Tribunal'), which appeal was allowed by the order dated 05.10.2005. The petitioner has, thus, filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
4. It may be noticed at the inception that under Section 38 of the said Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is restricted to a question of law. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the question of law stated in the appeal is as to whether the eviction is against the weight of evidence. The Tribunal seems to have proceeded to re-appraise the evidence and seeks to derive different conclusions from the evidence on record. A generalisation to the effect that there is no evidence on record cannot be accepted because there are testimonies on record in respect of the rival claims including the claim of the petitioner.
5. A reading of the order of the ARC shows that it was the case of the respondents (tenants) themselves through a legal notice served on the petitioner that the premises were in a dilapidated condition and were not habitable and the petitioner was being called upon to repair the premises. It is in view thereof that the eviction petition was filed.
6. In order to appreciate the scope of the provisions, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions:
14. Protection of tenant against eviction. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:
...
(f) that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and are required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated;
...
20. Recovery of possession for repairs and re-building and re-entry (1) In making any order on the grounds specified in Clause (f) or Clause (g) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, the Controller shall ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the premises or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and if the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building, as the case may be.
(2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord shall on the completion of the work of repairs or building or re-building, place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof.
(3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the order, the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or re-building within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work, fails to place the tenant in occupation of the premises in accordance with Sub-section (2), the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the tenant within such time as may be prescribed, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof or to pay to the tenant such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.
7. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that in case a premises has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and is required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs, which repairs cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated, an eviction order is liable to follow. There are, thus, three ingredients and in the judgment reported in Lachhman Dass and Anr. v. Suraj Parkash Mahajan 1982 (1) RLR 533, Justice B.N. Kirpal (as he then was) held that all the three ingredients, namely, (a) the premises had become unsafe or unfit for human habitation; (b) they were required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs; and (c) the repairs could not be carried out when the premises being vacated are mandatory.
8. A perusal of the order dated 20.05.2005 of the ARC shows that there is a detailed discussion in respect of all the three ingredients. The legal notice Exhibit PW - 1/3 dated 06.06.2003 was, in fact, served by the respondents on the petitioner asserting that the tenanted premises had become inhabitable due to wear and tear of time. The floor of the ground had become worn out and the cement plaster on the side walls had fallen and the roof of their respective tenanted premises was likely to fall at any time. The roof of one of the tenants had, in fact, fallen down in December, 2001 and the condition of the tenanted premises was dangerous likely to cause damage to life and goods of the respondents. This notice was admitted in the cross-examination of RW-1. It was also admitted by the respondents in cross-examination that the suit property is situated below the road level and rain water seeps into it. On the weight of evidence, the ARC came to the conclusion that the premises were not fit for habitation and were required to be repaired.
9. A perusal of para 14 of the said order of the ARC shows that the respondents were refusing to vacate the premises unless an alternative accommodation was provided by the landlord. A perusal of the provisions referred to above shows that there is no such obligation on the landlord. The only obligation is that on repairs, the landlord would put back the tenants in possession of the premises, which the landlord offered to do.
10. Learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn attention of this Court to the cross-examination of the petitioner wherein it has been stated that the petitioner intends to re-build the entire property and it would take about a year to do so. The petitioner has further stated. I will accommodate all the tenants in the newly built property of similar nature. There could not have been a more categorical assertion on behalf of the petitioner to comply with the obligations as envisaged under Section 20 of the said Act.
11. In the teeth of the aforesaid material on record and the findings based on appreciation of the material, the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that there is no evidence on record. The reasoning of the Tribunal that since the premises have not been repaired earlier, the petitioner cannot ask the respondents to vacate to carry out repairs is not acceptable.
12. I am of the considered view that interference by the Tribunal was not called for and the Tribunal has erroneously exercised the jurisdiction. There is, in fact, a patent error in the impugned order.
13. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 05.10.2005 is set aside and the order of the ARC dated 20.05.2005 is restored. The petitioner is allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
