Delhi High Court
Shri Jagdish And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 27 April, 2006
Author: S Kumar
Bench: S Kumar, S Bhayana
JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners pray for issuance of an appropriate writ order or direction for quashing of the notification dated 18.12.1987 issued by the respondents under Sections 4 and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and declaration under Section 6 dated 14.1.1988 and also that the respondents should not acquire their land.
2. The petitioners are stated to be owners/bhumidars of various portions of land falling in khasra No. 394 in the Revenue Estate of village Bindapur, Q Block Extension, the details of which are as under:-
Petitioner No. Plot No. Area
1 136,137 300 sq. yds.
2 129,130 466 sq. yds.
3 135 200 sq. yds.
4 138,139 350 sq. yds.
5 199 74 sq. yds.
3. In furtherance to the above notifications, the land of the petitioners was sought to be acquired. A notification, firstly, was issued on 27.1.84 under Section 4 of the Act and even an award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 17.10.86 bearing award No. 163/86-87 and the land of the petitioners was left out from the said award and subsequently another notification was issued as afore-stated. Thereafter on 14.1.1988, notification under Section 6 was issued and award No. 24/89-90 dated 12.1.90 was made by the Land Acquisition Collector even in relation to the land of the petitioners. It is even stated by the petitioners that DESU had invited tenders for installation of sub-station in the colony of the petitioners and the land in question was acquired for a public purpose namely 'Planned Development of Delhi under the Papankalan scheme'. The petitioners challenged these notifications on the grounds that there was no circumstances justifying the invocation of the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act, in any case, there was no order passed by the competent authority under Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the compliance to the provisions of Section 5A of the Act, there was no public purpose and even possession of the land had not been taken and the payments had not been made.
4. All these submissions made on behalf of the petitioners have squarely been answered by us in a detailed judgment in the case of Nandu v. Union of India and Ors. WP(C) 933/1988 of the same date.
5. For the reasons stated in that judgment, we do not find any merit in the contentions raised except that there was no application of mind and in fact no order was passed by the authorities under Section 17(4) of the Act. That judgment relates to the same notification issued under Section 4 and the revenue estate of Village Bindapur.
6. As far as the records have been produced before us, we have perused them. As far as passing of the award in relation to the acquired land is concerned, it was made and passed by the authorities on 12.1.90 being award No. 24/89-90 . The 'kabza Karwahi' report dated 18.3.88 has also been produced, photocopy of which has been placed on record wherein the respondents had taken possession of khasra No. 394 measuring about 7 bighas. However possession of 19 biswas was not taken as it was probably a built up area at the relevant time. The counsel appearing for the respondents while relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. and Sneh Prabha (Smt) and Ors. contended that the petitioners being the subsequent purchasers to the Section 4 notification cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and are entitled to receive the benefits of compensation alone. To some extent, the judgments relied upon by the respondents may have bearing on the issue but partly the said contention is not even applicable inasmuch as one of the petitioners is purchaser of the land prior to issuance of the notification under Section 4. As such, these judgments would not be of any help to the respondents in raising an objection to the claim of the said petitioner No. 1. As far as the other petitioners are concerned, they have filed the writ petition as subsequent purchasers and have also placed on record the general powers of attorneys in their favor empowering them to look after the interest of the original owners in relation to the acquired property.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that merely because some of the petitioners are subsequent purchasers per se would not extinguish their right for challenging the validity of the notification. According to him on the correct interpretation of the judgments relied upon by the respondents at best, they may not be in a position to file objections under Section 5A which are limited to the person selling the property but the objections which are general and question the very legality of the notification could be raised by them. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Ors. v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Ors. where the court held as under:-
17. It was urged by Mr. Hazarnavis on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, that the three appellants were purchasers of the lands claimed by them after the notification under Section 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. If, however, the notification under Section 4 was vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land had title thereto may challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sums of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after the issue of the notification under Section 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands.
8. Once we have held that the acquisition proceedings partially are not in accordance with law inasmuch as there is no order passed by the competent authority under the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act, dispensation of objections under Section 5A would be illegal and the petitioners would be entitled to file objections. This is an illegality which would partially vitiate a severable part of notification issued under Section 4 to that extent. This would be a right which would be available to all the owners and is not an individual right available to one and not available to the other.
9. Keeping in view our judgment in the case of Nandu v. Union of India and Ors. WP(C) 933/1988 of the same date, we do not see any reason as to why these petitioners should be deprived of a valuable legal right available to them in law if the respondents wish to continue with the acquisition proceedings and complete them in accordance with law.
10. For the reasons afore-stated, this petition is partially allowed in terms of our judgment in the case of Nandu v. Union of India and Ors. WP(C) 933/1988 of the same date. The petitioners would be entitled to the same relief with the directions contained in the said judgment while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
