Ishaq And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2006 Latest Caselaw 758 Del

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The petitioners claim to be owners/bhumidars as khudkasht of khasra No. 453(m) area 4.16, 454 area 4.16, 459 area 5.18, 460 area 4.16, 461 area 4.16 and 462 area 3.14 total 25.2 bigha and their share is 1/3rd situated in the revenue estate of village Shyoorpur. On 25.11.1980, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued for acquisition of the land in nearly 13 villages of South Delhi including the land of the petitioners in the village Shyoorpur. Declaration under Section 6 was issued on 18.6.85. An award was published being award No. 10/87-88 on 19.5.87 wherein the Collector provided for compensation payable to the claimants which according to the petitioners they did not accept. The petitioners claim that they are in possession of the land and on 14.7.87 it was incorrectly recorded in the name of the Government as owner in possession. The petitioners while relying upon the judgments of this Court in the cases of Balak Ram Gupta v. UOI and Ors. and Balbir Singh and Ors. v. UOI and Ors. , judgment of this Court in review application of Balak Ram Gupta's case and the judgment of the Supreme Court in UOI and Ors. v. Balbir Singh and Ors. (SLP 1867/91) decided on 20.9.91, now have filed the present writ petition on 27.2.2006 stating that the respondents are claiming ownership of the land of the petitioners and the revenue records showing the Government to be owner in possession is a wrong entry in the revenue records and thus in the present writ petition, have prayed that the notification dated 25.11.80 be set aside and it be declared that the petitioners are owners of the land in question. Further, the petitioners claim the relief that the respondents be directed to restore the possession, if taken illegally during the pendency of the petition.

2. It may be noticed that the present petitioners before filing the present writ petition had filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court being WP(C) No. 118/2006 titled as 'Ishaq and Ors. v. UOI and Ors.' which was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide its order dated 3.4.2006 which reads as under:

We see no reason to interfere. The Writ Petition is dismissed.

3. The averments made in the writ petition before the Supreme Court, were similar to the present writ petition and the same relief was claimed. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the petitioners have a legal right to file the present petition despite the order of dismissal passed by the Supreme Court vide its order dated 3.4.2006. According to him, there is neither any legal nor proprietary impediment in the way of the petitioners in filing such petitions.

4. We are of the considered view that the present writ petition, to say the least, is an abuse of the process of the court. Not only the various writ petitions have been dismissed by the Supreme Court and the law in relation to legality and correctness of the notification in question is fully and finally settled but even a Division Bench of this Court in a very recent detailed judgment in the case titled as Smt. Chatro Devi v. Union of India and Ors. , had rejected all the contentions challenging the acquisition of the land particularly in relation to village Shyoorpur as the inquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the Act for the land in that village was held to be proper and in fact the acquisition proceedings stood concluded as possession of the land had been taken by the authorities and the acquired land vested in the Government, free from any restrictions or encumbrances as contemplated under Section 16 of the Act. The petitioners are trying to reopen all these issues which is not permissible in any case. The present writ petition is an intended act of irresponsible and cantankerous litigants. Firstly they claim to have taken no action right from the year 1980 till 2006 despite the fact that the petitioners claim to have knowledge about various writ petitions relating to the 13 villages for which the notification was issued on 25.11.80 and suddenly in 2006 directly approached the Supreme Court, which writ petition was dismissed. After such dismissal, they filed the present petition before this Court stating that the order of the Supreme Court dated 3.4.2006 is a non-speaking order passed in liming, as such the present writ petition should be entertained by this court. It is certainly a glaring example of abuse of process of law by a litigant. A litigant who approaches the court for invoking its discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is expected to litigate within the accepted judicial norms. To approach the High Court after dismissal of the petition by the Supreme Court is nothing but attempt of a frustrated litigant who takes his chance by filing repeated litigations on the same cause of action. The present petition besides being barred is an abuse of the judicial process.

5. A petitioner is dominus lites of his proceedings. Every person can move the process of law into motion on the facts and circumstances as the person may deem proper. But this freedom and discretion of a party is subject to limitations of law. If a party commences a vexatious proceeding, he should be prepared to face the consequences. Nobody can be permitted to abuse the process of law. No person has the right to waste the time of the court with a motivated and frivolous litigation. A litigant who infringes the very soul of equity and encroaches upon the time and judicial process of the court, would even be called upon to face the legal consequences of such act. Abuse of process of court generally applies to proceeding wanting in bonafides and which are frivolous. Making use of the process of court as a device to bring jurisdiction of the court on baseless pleas which are patently not tenable in law, is an abuse of the process of the court, was the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Narappa Reddy v. Chandrammal .

6. The High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction which at the face of it would not be palpably erroneous and would not be an affront to the order of the Supreme Court. The court would also ensure that judicial proprietary is not sacrificed. In a case where SLP had been dismissed by the Supreme Court and a review application was entertained by the High Court which resulted in upsetting the original order of the High Court, the Supreme Court not only set aside the order of the High Court but in unambiguous terms termed the action of the party even as abuse of process of court. (refer 'Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran and Ors. ).

7. Reference can also be made to a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Mr. Kuldeep Kapoor v. Mr. Susanta Sengupta, IA 114/2006 in CS(OS) 821/2005 decided on 19.1.2006, where the court held as under:

10. Section 35A was added and subsequently amended primarily with the intent of preventing false or vexatious litigation. The effect of a false or vexatious litigation is not only prejudicial to the interest of the opposite party but also interferes with the proper and expeditious administration of civil justice. Large number of cases are pending and if time of the court is consumed by such ruthless litigants based on fabricated/tampered with and false documents, it deprives the genuine litigants of expeditious hearing of their cases. The time of the Court is consumed which could have been utilised for better purpose and to settle the dispute of other litigants. Secondly, it interferes with the administration of civil justice, unnecessarily consumes the time of the court, causes avoidable sufferance and undue delay in cases of genuine consumers of justice and, thus, tantamounts to abuse of the process of law. The Court would be obliged to check such litigants and carry out the legislative intent behind enacting the provisions of Sections 35A and 35B of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court in the case of T. Aravindam v. T.V. Satyapal clearly stated the principle that if the Court is satisfied that litigant was inspired by vexatious and altogether groundless motives, it should take deterrent action under Section 35A. The Court in that judgment held as under:

5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints....

6. The trial Court in this case will remind itself of S. 35-A, C.P.C. and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and altogether groundless. In any view, that suit has no survival value and should be disposed of forthwith after giving an immediate hearing to the parties concerned.

7. We regret the infliction of the ordeal upon the learned Judge of the High Court by a callous party. We more than regret the circumstance that the party concerned has been able to prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the court a case which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an advocate is an officer of justice he owes it to society not to colloborate in shady transactions. The Bar Counsel of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-operation of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the Bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of.

11. The effect of delay or vexatious litigation and imposition of exemplary /compensatory costs has been accepted in various fields of law including in the cases where a public body fails to discharge its duty as a result of which a person suffers. In the case of State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh , the Court held as under:

The said Secretary who is responsible for the violation of the statutory provisions and weakening the concept of rule of law, is, therefore, personally liable to pay the costs from his own pockets. While dismissing this appeal we direct the said Secretary to personally pay the costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the respondent No. 1 within a period of two months.

12. Various High Courts have taken the view that if the claim of a plaintiff is false, based on forged documents or ex facie is vexatious, the Court should impose exemplary and punitive costs against the plaintiff. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments in the case of Venkataswami v. Laxminarayana A 1957 AP 399 and Ahmed Abdul Aziz Bengali v. Mohammed Hanif M. Mulla 2001 AIHC 3500 (3508) Bom. Reference can also be made to the judgment in the case of Chittam Subbayya v. Muthyala Ramachandrappa and Ors. AIR (32) 1945 Madras 84 where the Court stated that if a false or vexatious suit is brought by the plaintiff at the instigation of defendant A against other defendants, the suit is liable to be dismissed and compensatory costs can be awarded against both the plaintiff and defendant No. A

8. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that even otherwise the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed by this Court in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Delhi Administration v. Gurdeep Singh Uban and Ors. , State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. D.R. Laxmi and Ors. and judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Chatro Devi v. UOI and Ors. (supra). This writ petition is an abuse of process of law and in fact tantamounts to an improper act of a litigant to file cases repeatedly on the same cause of action, which needs to be condemned and deprecated at this very initial stage itself.

9. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-. The costs shall be payable to the Delhi High Court Legal Aid.