Ganesh Chand, S/O Shri Mangat Ram, ... vs Union Of India (Uoi), Through ...
2005 Latest Caselaw 872 Del

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The petitioner Ganesh Chand along with Karam Chand and Smt. Vidya Wanti submitted a petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to the Land Acquisition Collector, Tis Hazari, Delhi, on 10th June, 2002, praying that their case be referred to the Court of the Learned Additional District Judge, Delhi for enhancement of the compensation awarded to them by the Collector. In this application it was further stated that they had filed a representation on 24th August, 2001 as they were illiterate persons and ignorant of law. Thus, justice should be done to them by granting the benefit prayed for.

2. However, the following paragraphs of the said representations are relevant for the purposes of determining the controversy:-

"At the time of announcement of Award, we also attended your good office and were asked to sign the Award and We as a human gesture, being the persons not fully conversant with the provisions of the Act, signed the Award. Although the signing of Award is not a crime, but proved as a crime for us. Since We are ignorant of the provisions of the Act that any kind of representation was to be filed within a period of 42 days which we filed on 24-8-2001 which under the Act is being treated as time barred.

But in this case, it is humbly prayed that we are totally illiterate persons and ignorant of laws and the justice also provide relief to such cases as benefit of doubts. So your honour it is humbly prayed with folded hands to refer our case of enhancement of compensation to the court of A.D.J. from where, we may get some relief by way of enhancing the amount of compensation. Since we are illiterate persons and for that reason, we seek justice from your hands under the proviso of benefit of doubts of educative value."

3. This request of the petitioners was declined by the order passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, North Delhi vide his order dated 29th April, 2003 which again reads as under:-

" NO. F-13(LAC) NO. 01-02-2241-42

Dated: 29.4.03

Sub.: Petition U/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for Reference to the Court of ADJ

Reference his application received through his Advocate Shri M.P.S. Kasana on 28.8.01 on the subject noted above regarding sending his case to the Court of ADJ Tis Hazari Court for adjudication and enhancing compensation.

In the above context it is to inform you that your case was considered at length and the same has been rejected on the grounds of limitation as prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

LAND ACQUISITION COLLECtor (NORTH)

DELHI.

1. Sh. Ganesh Chand SO Sh. Mangat Ram, R/o 8616 Bhar Garh Roshanagar Road Delhi.

2. Sh. Sunil Sharma Genl. Secretary for information with ref.

9561 Azad Market to the representation Tokri Walan, Delhi. Dated 31.1.03."

4. The petitioners question the legality and correctness of the above order in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The short questions that require determination by the Court in the present appeal are whether the petitioners had no knowledge about the contents of the award and the law so as to grant them the relief of reference under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation, and whether such a claim would be treated as barred by time?

5. The facts are that petitioners learnt about the construction of the Metro Rail Project on 4th July, 2000. The appropriate government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act on 8th August, 2000 intending to acquire the land, including the land belonging to the petitioners, in furtherance to which declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 17th October, 2000. The Government invoked urgency provisions of Section 17 by issuing a notification on 12th October, 2000 and also dispensed with the compliance of the provisions of Section 5A and issued notices under Section 9 and 10 of the Act. The possession of the land was taken by the Metro Rail Project on 12th January, 2001, though, the award was pronounced on 8th June, 2001. The petitioners were present at the time when the award was pronounced and they claim to have made a representation on 9th July, 2001, as they had not received any compensation of their acquired lands. It is the claim of the petitioners that they submitted another representation on 26th July, 2001, and another reminder on 24th August, 2001. The petitioners did not receive any information in response to their representations and they even claim to have visited the Office of respondent No. 2. It is also the claim of the petitioners that during their visits, they were directed to file fresh claim applications, to which another reminder was sent by the petitioners on 10th June, 2002 to their earlier representations. As already noticed, this claim was rejected by the respondents vide order dated 29th April, 2003.

6. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that petitioners were present at the time of pronouncement of the award and in fact had even signed the award on 6th June, 2001.

7. The petition under Section 18 was submitted by the petitioners on 24th August, 2001 which was received in the Office of the Respondent vide diary No. 616/ADM/N on 24th August, 2001. It is specifically denied that any application was filed by the Petitioner under Section 18 of the Act on 24th July, 2001. According to the respondents, the order of rejecting the application, being barred by time, is in accordance with law.

8. It is not in dispute before us that at the time of making of the award on 8th June, 2001, the petitioners were present and had signed the award. The contention on behalf of the Petitioners is that it is not the pronouncement of the award which would be a relevant factor. On the contrary, it is the date of communication of award to the Petitioner and the date on which the petitioner and other persons affected by the award comes to know of the award, actually and constructively. The petitioners state that they received the compensation on 3rd August, 2001 and as such their representation dated 24th August, 2001 is within the prescribed period of limitation and the order passed by the respondents is contrary to law.

9. The claim of the petitioners that they filed any representation on 26th July, 2001 is without any substance. The receipt of this petition is specifically denied by the respondents. The petitioners have not placed on record any documents, postal receipts or acknowledgment from the Office of the Land Acquisition Collector to show that this representation was received in the Office of the Respondents. Furthermore, in the petition under Section 18 of the Act, which is filed by the petitioners on 24th August, 2001, the receipt of which is admitted by the respondents, there is no reference to the representation dated 26th July, 2001. It is not a normal human conduct that a person whose valuable right is likely to be effected would not make a reference to an earlier petition which he had filed, as alleged, within the period of limitation. This averments made by the Petitioners does not aspire confidence. Admittedly, the Petitioners were present at the time of making of the award. In terms of the provisions of Section 18(2) of the Act, the Petitioners were obliged to file such a representation/petition under Section 18 of the Act within six weeks from the date of Collector's award. As per the averments made by the Petitioners themselves in the writ petition, in the annexures attached to the writ petition as well as the rejoinder filed to the counter affidavits of the respondents, it is clearly stated that the Petitioners were present when the award was made. In fact, in the representation dated 24th August, 2001, the Petitioners have made all relevant averments in regard to acquisition of land, quantum of compensation and the errors which are alleged to have been committed by the Land Acquisition Collector. In the representations dated 10th June, 2002 the relevant portion of which has been extracted above, it has been clearly stated that at the time of announcement of the award, the petitioners were present in the office of the Collector and signed the award. In face of these undisputed facts, there is no occasion for this Court to hold that the Petitioners were not aware about the contents of the award on 8th June, 2001. It cannot be said on any reasonable premise that the Petitioners had no actual or constructive knowledge in regard to essentials of the award on that date.

10. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners while relying upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gangavaranu Venkata Narasa Reddy v. The Land Acquisition Officer Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) AIR 1994 Andhra Pradesh 2 submitted that where a petition under Section 18 of the Act is filed immediately after the payment is received, the same shall be treated to be within time and the Respondents are obliged to refer the same to the court of competent jurisdiction. In our opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner is based upon misreading of the said judgment. In that case the Court held that Civil Court could go into the questions of fact while determining whether a reference can be declined or not. On facts of that case the Court found that the petitioner came to know of the award when he received the award notice and the cheque under protest, and had filed a petition under Section 18 immediately thereafter. No principle of law as such has been enunciated in this case. On facts, the case has no application to the case in hand.

11. At this stage, we may refer to a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sh. Bale Ram v. Land Acquisition Collector in W.P.(C) No. 1179/2005 decided on 12th May, 2005, wherein the Court after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court held as under:-

This principle was reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Quiser Jehan Begum (supra) with further expansion to the word `knowledge and/or information of the award' and clearly interpreting the expression `six months from the date of Collector's award", the Court held as under :-

(5) As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this Court in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra). It was there observed that a liberal and mechanical construction of the words "six months from the date of the Collector's award: occurring in the second part of cl.(b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and "the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression.... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this. When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we should take a different view.

It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676 :(AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively.

If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award."

In the case of Bharat Chand Dilwali v. UOI 1988, Rajdhani Law Reporter 224 as well as a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court in the case of Rsulkhanji Sardar Mahomad Khanji v. H.P. Rathod 3rd Spl Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmd and Anr. 1975 (16) Gujrat Law Reporter 911 took the view that mere knowledge of the award or taking part in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act would not be helpful for holding that limitation had commenced from such a date. For this purpose, the date would be when either the award was communicated to the party actually or he had knowledge of essential contents of the award actually or constructively.

Now we would apply to the above well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case. In this regard, at the very outset, we may also notice that complete and correct facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners in these petitions. The award was announced on 19th June, 1992 and possession of the property in question was taken on 25th January, 2000. The claimants were obviously fully aware about the acquisition proceedings and they filed the application for receiving of compensation on 23rd June, 2001. In this application reference was made to the essential features including the number of the award. In regard to amount of compensation payable to the petitioners they had specified definite figures in the indemnity bonds and other documents annexed with the applications or filed subsequent thereto. The indemnity bond and surety bonds and other documents were filed by Bale Ram on 3rd December 2001 while the application was filed on 23rd March, 2001. These documents clearly how that the petitioners had complete and full knowledge and information about the passing of the award and essential contents thereof for the purposes of upholding their remedy under section 18 of the Act in accordance with law. The limitation for filing an application by the petitioner under section 18 thus would commence at best from 23rd March, 2001 and even if any liberal attitude, which is not called for, is given to the petitioners, then the limitation would commence from 3rd December, 2001 and could expire on 23rd September, 2001 and 3rd June, 2001 while admittedly the application under section 18 of the Act was filed on 30th May, 2002 and 3rd June, 2002.

The Supreme Court in the case of Msmt. Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra) had granted relief to the petitioner because their Lordships of the Supreme Court as a finding of fact held that the claimants had no knowledge of the contents of the award and did not know the amount of compensation which have been awarded. This judgment, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners as they themselves had submitted all necessary documents for payment of compensation including all essential contents required for that purpose."

12. In view of the above discussion, the inevitable conclusion keeping in mind the statutory provisions of Section 18(2)(a) of the Act is that the petition filed by the Petitioners on 24th August, 2001 was beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The order passed by the Respondents on 29th April, 2003 does not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction and the authorities have exercised their jurisdiction in accordance with the settled principles of law.

13. In any case, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal and Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 414, the Collector and even this Court has no jurisdiction to enlarge and/or contain the limitation prescribed in law. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we dismiss this writ petition, while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.