P.S. Bedi vs Assistant Commissioner Of ...
2005 Latest Caselaw 992 Del

JUDGMENT

1. This appeal arises out of an order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Benches SMC-IV, New Delhi, whereby the appeal filed by the Department against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), dated March 20, 2003, has been allowed.

2. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that the Tribunal had fallen in a palpable error in holding that the period for completion of the assessment proceedings, on the basis of the first notice issued to the assessed on March 26,1999, had expired on the date the second notice, dated March 29, 2001, was issued to it. It was contended by learned Counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that the period for completion of the assessment proceedings was one year from the end of the financial year in which the notice was issued. He urged that the period for completing the assessment proceedings was two years, which would have in the instant case expired on March 31, 2001, and not on March 31, 2000. That being so, the issue of a second notice on March 29, 2001, was not called for and could not provide a basis for the Department to complete the assessment proceedings.

3. Mr. Jolly, learned Counsel for the respondent, submitted that the argument now addressed, on behalf of the assessed, had not been advanced before the Tribunal with the result that the Tribunal had proceeded on the assumption that the period for completion of the assessment proceedings expired on March 31, 2000. He urged that instead of the issue being examined by this Court for the first time, the matter could be remitted back to the Tribunal to give it an opportunity to deal with the submission now urged on behalf of the appellant and to record a proper finding. We see no reason to decline that submission. The Tribunal does appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the period for completion of the assessment proceedings was one year from the end of the financial year in which the notice was issued. The fact of the matter, however, appears to be that the period prescribed for completion of the assessment proceedings was two years and would have expired on March 31, 2001. It would, therefore, be more appropriate to let the Tribunal to examine that issue afresh and to pass a fresh order. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order and remit the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh hearing in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above.