Smt. Krishna Malik vs Sh. Ashok Kumar Malik And Anr.
2004 Latest Caselaw 364 Del

JUDGMENT

Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

1.The petitioner has filed the civil contempt petition alleging that the petitioner is a victim of the planned fraudulent acts of the respondents whereby she has been deprived of the possession of part of the property No. 2/102-C Geeta Colony, Delhi where she was occupying the first floor and the barsati floor. It may be noticed that there is no specific order of the court of which contempt has been alleged in the present petition.

2.The petitioner and respondent No.1 are husband and wife and have matrimonial disputes between them. The petitioner claimed to be in occupation of the aforesaid portion of the property in question and it is stated that the petitioner had even filed a suit for injunction restraining respondent No.1 from dispossessing the petitioner. In the said suit, respondent No.1 had filed an application praying for restraining the petitioner herein from entering the house of respondent No.1 mentioned aforesaid. This application of respondent No.1 was dismissed by the order dated 14.3.1995 by the Civil Judge.

3.In another proceedings, CM(M) 315/1997 in terms of the order dated 30.5.1997, a Local Commissioner had been appointed to visit the premises and make an inventory of the goods but not to remove the goods.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the grievance of the petitioner arises on account of a suit for specific performance filed by respondent No.2 against respondent No.1 in the District Courts. The suit was in respect of the first floor of the aforesaid property in question and was compromised in pursuance to an application filed under Order 23 Rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC. In the compromise application, the portion agreed to be handed over was stated to be the first floor along with the terrace while the terrace or the second floor room did not form a part of the claim in the suit. In pursuance to the execution of the decree passed as per the compromise application, the petitioner was dispossessed not only from the first floor but also from the second floor/ barsati floor.

5.The aforesaid are the contempts alleged by the petitioner against the respondents.

6.A reading of the aforesaid facts and the pleadings on record show that in so far as the suit for specific performance is concerned, the petitioner has already filed application in the execution proceedings seeking restoration of the portion in her possession and has also filed objections. These objections are stated to be still pending though considerable time has lapsed.

7.In my considered view, no case of contempt has been made out as it is not pointed out in what manner any order has been violated. If the decree has been obtained incorrectly, the remedy is by seeking setting aside of the decree or by objections to the execution proceedings which the petitioner has availed of.

8.Learned counsel for the petitioner has also not been able to point out as to how the order of the High Court in CM(M) 315/1997 dated 30.5.1997 gives rise to contempt proceedings. The only direction was for the appointment of the Local Commissioner which was not to remove the goods. The petitioner seeks to draw strength from the order passed on 14.3.1995 by the Civil Judge dismissing the application of respondent No.1 for interim orders against the petitioner in the suit filed by the petitioner. There has to be a positive injunction in favor of the petitioner in case such a case had to be made out which is not the case here.

9.Learned counsel for respondents has in fact pointed out that in the execution proceedings, the petitioner had moved an application and obtained ex parte orders on 20.6.1997 and vide order dated 23.6.1997, the orders were vacated. It was observed that it is the petitioner herein who had obtained the orders by misleading the court. Orders were even subsequently passed to break open the locks on the terrace of the first floor on 4.7.1997.

10.Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") defines the civil contempt as under:

"2(b) "civil contempt" means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of undertaking given to a court."

11.A query has been thus put to the learned counsel for the petitioner as to under which parameter does the petitioner allege that a civil contempt has been committed. In answer to the said query, only the aforesaid incidences have been mentioned which, in my considered view, do not show any willful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the court. In fact there is no disobedience much less the willful disobedience.

12.Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly sought to contend that in contempt jurisdiction the powers of the court are wide enough to take action if a fraud has been played on the court. In this behalf, a reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Re: Bineet Kumar Singh, . The case was one of forgery and fabrication of an order of the court and in that context, it was observed in para 6 as under:

"6. The law of Contempt of Court is essentially meant for keeping the administration of justice pure and undefiled. It is difficult to rigidly define contempt. While on the one hand, the dignity of the Court has to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne in mind that the contempt jurisdiction is of a special nature and should be sparingly used. The Supreme Court is the highest Court of records and it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of protecting the dignity of the Court. To discharge its obligation as the custodian of the administration of justice in the country and as the highest Court imbued with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower Courts and Tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the power to see the stream of justice in the country remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice is delivered without fear or favor. To discharge this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognizance of the deviation from the path of justice. The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish for contempt is always for the course of administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the Courts of justice, than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when the order of the Court is forged and produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal Contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean interference with the administration of justice in any manner. A false or misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and willfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favorable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is found to have utilised an order of a Court which he or she knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication."

13.The aforesaid are the salutary principles elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. These are binding on all courts. However, it has to be appreciated that the parameters of civil and criminal contempt are different. Criminal contempt is defined under Section 2(c) of the said Act as under:

"(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which--

(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;"

1. The present proceedings are not one of criminal contempt but the allegation is of civil contempt. Both the issues cannot be mixed up. Further, nothing has been shown whereby any reference has been made on account of there being any criminal contempt of the court.

2.In view of the aforesaid, the contempt petition is dismissed and contempt notices are discharged.