Sreenath Travel Agency And Anr. vs Lt. Governor Of Delhi And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 651 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. The petitioner's tourist bus bearing registration No. RJ-30-P0058 was impounded by Respondents 2 and 3 under Section 207 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") on 9.6.1998 at 9.45 a.m. at Vasant Road, Delhi. In the challan annexed as Annexure P-2 (colly) the following offence was alleged to have been committed:-

"Carrying passengers from Chittaur to Delhi, checked found W/O R/C, W/O fitness W/O permit, W/O I/C, W/O DC Badge, W/O Uniform, fails to produce any valid proof regarding aforementioned documents at the spot in originals."

2. The question that arises for consideration in this petition is whether the respondents could have impounded the petitioner's vehicle under Section 207(1) of the said Act when no Rules have been framed prescribing the manner of impounding? At the outset, it would be pertinent to set out the provisions of Section 207(1) ( so much as is relevant):-

"207. Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration permit, etc.- (1) Any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, if he has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of section 3 or section 4 or section 39 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of section 66 or in contravention of any condition of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, seize and detain the vehicle, in the prescribed manner and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle:

Provided that where any such officer or person has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of section 3 or section 4 or without the permit required by sub-section (1) of section 66 he may, instead of seizing the vehicle, seize the certificate of registration of the vehicle and shall issue an acknowledgment in respect thereof."

3. It is the contention of Mr R. K. Kapoor, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that a vehicle may be seized and detained in exercise of the powers under Section 207(1) of the said Act only "in the prescribed manner". He contends that insofar as Delhi is concerned, there is no prescribed manner inasmuch as no rules have been framed in this regard. According to him, inasmuch as there is no prescribed manner for seizing and detaining vehicles, the petitioner's said tourist bus could not at all have been impounded in purported exercise of the powers under Section 207(1) of the said Act. This, in short, is the petitioner's contention.

4. Mr Kapoor also drew my attention to the provisions of the definition Section i.e., Section 2 of the said Act and in particular to Sub-Section (32) thereof which entails that in the said Act, unless the context otherwise required, "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under the Act. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, "prescribed manner" would have reference to the manner prescribed by the rules made under the Act. Since, no rules have been made for Delhi prescribing the manner of seizing and detaining vehicles under Section 207 of the said Act, there exists, in point of fact, no prescribed manner. As such, no vehicle could be impounded under Section 207 of the said Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Verghese & Ors v. Bar Council of Kerala & Ors: in support of his contention that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way then it must be done in that way or not at all. This decision, coupled with the fact that the Act and in particular Section 207(1) thereof clearly stipulates that the vehicles may be seized and detained "in the prescribed manner", would imply that the vehicle must be seized in that manner or not at all. As no manner has been prescribed, it is obvious that the vehicle cannot be seized at all.

5. Mr Kapoor, the learned counsel for the petitioner, further relied on a decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered in CWP No. 9928/1999 - Jimmy Travels v. State of Haryana & Ors to show that, in identical circumstances, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had restrained the competent authorities from detaining, seizing or impounding vehicles under Section 207(1) of the Act till Rules were published and enforced.

6. Ms Avnish Ahlawat, the learned counsel for the respondents, while admitting that no Rules as such have been framed in respect of Delhi specifically prescribing the manner of seizure and detention of vehicles under Section 207 of the said Act, however, submitted that Section 207 itself prescribed the procedure. She submitted that Section 207 of the said Act was equivalent to Section 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act). She further submitted that Section 129-A of the old Act was the subject matter of challenge and was upheld by the Supreme Court in its decision in Transport Commissioner Hyderabad v. S. Sardar Ali: . Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel for the Respondents, submits that the words "in the prescribed manner" were missing in the said Section 129-A of the Old Act. Further, the Supreme Court defined the procedure which was to be followed for seizing and detaining a vehicle as indicated in paragraph 4 of the said judgment. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India: and she particularly referred to paragraphs 3, 11 and 12 of this judgment to support her contention that the Supreme Court had found nothing wrong with Section 207 of the new Act and had in fact specifically stated that Section 207 conferred power on a police officer or other authorised person to seize and detain a vehicle if he had reasons to believe that the same was being used in contravention of the specified provisions. She next referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra & Ors v. Nanded-Parbhani Z. L. B. M. V. Operator Sangh : . In particular, she referred to paragraphs 4, 8 and 11 to support her contention that the Supreme Court had recognised the power of seizure and detention of vehicles under Section 207 of the said Act.

7. Lastly, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the Division Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner was, in fact, a consent order and was not a judgment on merits. This is clearly indicated in the last two paragraphs of the order which is as under:-

"Today, Shri Jaswant Singh placed before us a printed copy of the draft rules and stated that the same will be finalised by the end of December, 1999. He further stated that till the rules are finally notified, the vehicles of the petitioners shall not be seized on ground of violation of Section 207 of the Act. Shri Rupinder Khosla also stated that the draft amendment in the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 shall be finalised up to the end of December, 1999. He also placed before us a Statement showing that as many as 102 unauthorised vehicles are being plied on various routes of the State of Punjab. Shri J.S. Sidhu, Advocate appearing for Union Territory, Chandigarh stated that after the publication of amended rules by the State of Punjab, the Union Territory, Chandigarh shall also publish the amended rules within two months thereafter.

In view of the statements made by the learned counsel for the States, we dispose of the writ petitions with the direction that the Governments of Punjab and Haryana shall finalise the rules under Section 207(1) read with Section 2(32) of the Act as early as possible and publish the same and then enforce the provisions of Section 207(1) for checking unauthorised plying of the vehicles. This shall include prosecution of the persons who may be found plying the vehicles without permits and in violation of the provisions of the Act. Till the publication of the rules, the respondents are restrained from detaining, seizing or impounding the vehicles of the petitioners. However, it is made clear that this direction shall not preclude the concerned authorities from taking appropriate action against the defaulters as may be permissible under law."

In view of the above, it is her contention that further seizure and detention of vehicles was restrained by the Court therein in view of the statements made by the learned counsel for the states of Punjab and Haryana who had submitted that the draft rules had been prepared and were being finalised. One of the directions given in the said decision was that the same be finalised, published and enforced as early as possible. The directions of restraining the respondents from seizure and/or detaining the vehicles was only till the publication of such rules. She submitted that these directions were relateable only to Punjab and Harayana and that too in the special circumstances of the case and therefore, could not be extended to Delhi.

8. Considering the rival contentions of the parties I find that there is a clear difference between Section 129-A of the old Act and Section 207 of the said Act. The distinction being the specific introduction of the words "in the prescribed manner" in Section 207 which were absent in Section 129-A of the Old Act. It cannot be presumed that Parliament has mindlessly introduced the words "in the prescribed manner" in Section 207 of the said Act. Because these words were absent in the earlier provision of section 129-A of the old act, their presence in section 207 of the said Act would clearly imply that their introduction was intentional and with a purpose. The words cannot be construed as being redundant or meaningless. Moreover, the word "prescribed" has also been defined under Section 2(32) of the said Act to mean prescribed by rules made under the Act. It is thus clear that prescribed manner would mean the manner prescribed by the rules made under the Act. If no rules are made under the Act there is no prescribed manner. In the case of Babu Verghese (supra) which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petiitoner, it is categorically stated that it is a basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, it must be done in that manner or not at all. It would be pertinent to set out paragraph 31 and 32 of the said decision of the Supreme Court:-

"31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45 LJ Ch 373) which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. Kind Emperor 2 who stated as under:

'[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.'

32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan . These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case (1936) 63 IA 372: 1936 PC 253) was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law."

While on this topic, it would be instructive to refer to three more decisions of the supreme court. In Narbada Prasad v. Chhagan Lal & Ors: and Parmar Himatsingh Jugatsingh v. Patel Harmanbhai Narsibhai: the supreme court, while considering the question of compliance with the provisions of Section 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act, held that:-

"There was no compliance with the provisions of Section 33(5) of the Representation of the People Act and there was no power in the Court to dispense with this requirement. It is a well-understood rule of law that if a thing is to be done in a particular manner it must be done in that manner or not at all. Other modes of compliance are excluded."

The third decision is the one rendered in the case of Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union Of India & Ors: wherein the supreme court held as under:-

"18. It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice."

9. Clearly, if a power is to be exercised in a certain way then it must be exercised in that way or not at all. All other modes of performance are forbidden. But, what happens when, though the statute says that the power must be exercised in a prescribed manner, there is no manner prescribed? As a corollary to the aforesaid well settled principle, since the power must be exercised only in the prescribed manner and there being no manner prescribed, the power cannot be exercised at all. In the facts of the present case, I find that since rules have admittedly not been framed for dealing with the seizure and detention of vehicles under Section 207 of the said Act, there is no manner prescribed. Thus, following the "basic principle of law long settled", the petitioner's vehicle could have been impounded under Section 207(1) only "in the prescribed manner". There being no prescribed manner, the vehicle could not have been impounded.

10. Insofar as the rival contentions with regard to the decision of the Pubjab and Haryana High Court are concerned, I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the same is in the nature of a consent order and has been rendered upon a concession made by the learned counsel for the the States when they stated that "till the rules are finally notified, the vehicles of the petitioners shall not be seized on the ground of violation of Section 207 of the Act." Thus, this decision cannot be construed as a decision on merits as regards the question of seizure and detention of a vehicle under Section 207 of the said Act. In my respectful opinion, it may, at best, be construed as a mere indication that the States were mindful of the fact that rules needed to be framed for prescribing the manner of seizure and detention under Section 207 of the said Act and that as long as such rules were not made and enforced, it would not be justifiable to seize and detain the vehicles under Section 207 of the said Act.

11. However, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that since Section 129-A of the Old Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Transport Commissioner's case (supra), therefore, the procedure for seizure and detention indicated in the said judgment itself would also apply to Section 207 of the said Act. The two sections, section 129-A of the old Act and section 207 of the said Act, are different. The words "in the prescribed manner" were specifically introduced in Section 207(1) of the said Act. Parliament by enacting this provision and introducing this phrase i.e. "in the prescribed manner", was mindful of the distinction being introduced. As indicated above, the phrase "in the prescribed manner" has a specific connotation particularly when it is read with Section 2(32) of the said Act. The intention of the Legislature was to specifically introduce this phrase being well aware of the earlier provision of Section 129-A of the old Act which did not contain the same. It is well settled that Courts are required to give full meaning to words of a statute and not to lightly brush aside the same as being meaningless or redundant. Accordingly, since the words "in the prescribed manner" were missing in Section 129-A of the old Act, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Transport Commissioner (supra) would not have any application in respect of the provisions of Section 207 of the said Act.

12. Coming next to the decision of the Supeme Court in M. C. Mehta's case (supra), we find that in that case the question before the Court, in a PIL, was with regard to proper management and control of traffic in the National Capital Region (NCR) and the National Capital Territory (NCT) Delhi and to ensure the maximum possible safeguards which were necessary for public safety. While considering what measures should be taken in this regard, the Supreme Court indicated in paragraph 2 of the said decision that after taking into account the various suggestions which had been given at the hearing it found that there were adequate provisions in the existing law which, if properly enforced, would take care of the immediate problem and to a great extent eliminate the reasons which were the causes of road accidents in NCR and NCT, Delhi. The Supreme Court further indicated that the officers had expressed some doubt about the extent of powers of the authorities concerned to take adequate and suitable measures for speedy enforcement of these provisions and the remedial steps needed to curb the growing menace of unregulated and disorderly traffic on the roads. The Supreme Court considered it expedient to clarify that position in this order with reference to the relevant provisions of the existing law. It is in this context that the Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of the said decision in M. C. Mehta's case (supra) held that in its opinion the provisions of the said Act in addition to the provisions of the existing laws, such as the Police Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, conferred ample powers on the authorities to take the necessary steps to control and regulate road traffic and to suspend/cancel the registration or permit of a motor vehicle if it posed a threat or hazard to public safety. And, it is in this connection that the Supreme Court referred to the various provisions of the said Act. In paragraph 11 of the said decision in M.C. Mehta's case (supra) the Supreme Court indicated that Section 207 took care of that situation by conferring power on any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf to seize and detain the vehicle if he has reason to believe that the same has been or is being used in contravention of the specified provisions so as to pose a serious threat to the public. The Supreme Court held that the existing provisions under the said Act alone were sufficient to clothe the members of the police force and the transport authorities with ample powers to control and regulate the traffic in an appropriate manner so that no vehicle being used in a public place posed any danger to the public in any form.

13. Upon carefully going through the said decision of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta's case (supra), I find that there is no discussion as regards the phrase "in the prescribed manner". Nor is there any reference to Section 2(32) of the said Act. There is no denying that the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that there is power to seize and detain the vehicle as provided under Section 207 of the said Act. There can be no dispute with this as that is the clear meaning of the section itself. However, the same provision also provides that such power be exercised "in the prescribed manner". The manner, as already been indicated above, has not been prescribed as no rules have been framed. This aspect of the matter was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in my view, the said decision would not cover the question raised in the present writ petition.

14. Lastly, I consider the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. In that decision, as indicated in paragraph 4 thereof, sub-section (1) of Section 207 of the Act came up for interpretation, though on a different aspect. On behalf of the State of Maharashtra, it was contended that violation of any condition of permit would entitle the police officer or other authorised person to seize and detain the vehicle. Thus, if the permit provided that a vehicle should carry a certain number of passengers and if the vehicle was found to carry more than that number then, under Section 207 the said Act, the vehicle would be liable to be seized and detained. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court and it held that it was not each and every contravention of a condition of permit that would entitle the authorities to seize and detain the vehicle; such seizure and detention could only be legal and valid where the contravention of any condition of permit related to the route on which the vehicle was to be used. The Supreme Court categorically held that carrying of passengers more than the number specified in the permit would not be a violation of the purpose for which the permit was granted. It further held that if the Legislature intended to confer the power of seizure and detention on the police officer for violation of any condition of the permit then there was no necessity for adding the expression "relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used". The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the aforesaid expression cannot be ignored.

15. Upon a careful reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Maharashtra's case (supra), it is clear that this decision, rather than supporting the case of the Respondents, in fact, supports the case of the petitioner, at least insofar as the question of interpretation and intention of the legislature was concerned. In this context it would be relevant to set out the following portion of the said decision:-

"8. The aforesaid power of seizure has been conferred upon the appropriate authority, which power is in fact a sovereign power of the State and has been delegated to the police officer in discharge of their duties of law enforcement and in the enforcement of an orderly society. The power, therefore, is required to be exercised with care and caution and the power has to be exercised only when the precondition for exercise of power is fully satisfied. It is a cardinal principle of the rule of construction of a statute that when the language of a statute is fairly and reasonably clear, then inconvenience or hardships are no considerations for refusing to give effect to that meaning. It is not the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the State nor can it be said that on giving a plain meaning to the words used in Section 207(1) of the Act, there will be any absurdity or it would make the statute offend any provisions of the Constitution. Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case {1 (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 143: 8 ER 1034 (HL)}(Cl&F at p. 143) applying the rule has stated -

'If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.'

9. In Emperor v. Banoari Lal Sarna Viscount Simonds held:

'[T]his Board has insisted that in construing enacted words, we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used.'

10. In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan (AIR at p. 910) Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, held:

'If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.'

11. The intention of the legislature is required to be gathered from the language used and, therefore, a construction, which requires for its support an additional substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided."

16. Clearly, section 207 of the said Act must be construed in such a manner which does not result in the rejection of words as meaningless. If the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents were to be accepted, then it would render the words "in the prescribed manner" meaningless and redundant. This, as cautioned by the Supreme Court, has to be avoided. It is further relevant to note that in the said decision although, it has been noticed that the power to seize and detain has been conferred under Section 207 of the said Act, the question of exercise of such power "in the prescribed manner" did not come up for consideration at all. In the case at hand, I am not, as such, concerned with the power to seize and detain but with the question of exercise of this power "in the prescribed manner". No rules have been framed and, accordingly, no manner of seizure and detention has been prescribed. That being the case, as indicated above, the power to seize and detain itself cannot be exercised. Thus, till rules prescribing the manner of seizure and detention of vehicles under section 207(1) of the said Act are made and enforced, no vehicle can be impounded in exercise of the power conferred under this section.

17. Before concluding, I would like to point out that at the commencement of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he was giving up prayer (d) of the writ petition which related to declaration of Section 207 as being ultra vires the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus, no arguments were advanced in respect of this prayer.

18. In view of the discussion above, the action on the part of the respondents in impounding the petitioner's vehicle was illegal. The respondents are directed to forthwith release the petitioner's vehicle bearing Registration No. RJ-30 P-0058, if the same is still under their detention. Further, the respondents are restrained from seizing or detaining the petitioner's said vehicle under the provisions of section 207(1) of the said Act till the manner of seizure and detention of vehicles under this section is prescribed by framing and enforcement of appropriate rules under the said Act. However, it is made clear that this direction shall not, in any manner, prevent the respondents from taking appropriate action against the petitioner in respect of defaults committed or that may be committed by it under other provisions of the said Act. To this extent the writ petition is allowed.

19. There shall be no order as to costs.