Ram Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 1694 Del

JUDGMENT

Devinder Gupta, J.

1. The petitioner has challenged the proceedings taken by respondents to acquire their property No. 2527-2539 situated in Tiraha Behraham Khan, Darya Ganj, New Delhi under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. Facts in brief are that Notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 3.1.1979 was issued expressing intention of the Government to acquire petitioner's property for public purpose i.e. running a Government Industrial Middle School. Declaration under Section 6 was made on 17.9.1982 and notices under Sections 9 and 10 were issued on 20.12.1982. The petition was instituted on 7.1.1983 challenging the action of the respondents in acquiring the property, inter alia on the grounds that the Government Industrial Public School had already been running in the premises under acquisition for the last more than sixty years. In view of this long and continued running of the school no fresh public purpose had arisen in favor of the Government so as to acquire the property in question. It was alleged that the said Industrial School had since been shifted to another newly built property, situated in the same locality where the school was then running its classes since about 1978-79 more effectively and efficiently. In view of this fact that the school had already been shifted to a new building, the purpose for which the land in question was sought to be acquired had become redundant and frustrated. In addition the petitioner also challenged the action of the respondents to acquire the property as mala-fide and full of malice. The petitioner made reference to earlier Notification No. 3198 dated 11.6.1924, issued under Section 4 of the Act, notice under Section 9 of the Act dated 30.7.1924 and the objections which the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner had filed on 19.8.1924 and finally to the Resolution dated 3.2,1925 and 16.12.1924 of Delhi Municipality alleging that this very property was previously sought to be acquired for the same public purpose. Objections were raised by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner. On acceptance of those objections the acquisition proceedings were dropped. In the resolution passed on 3.2.1925 it was made very clear and specific that the Head Master and Tehsildar be required to find another suitable house in the neighborhood to run the school. The petitioner has also alleged that it was due to malice that the proceedings have been initiated afresh. The petitioner had taken out eviction proceedings against the school. Only after the permission was granted to the petitioner by the Competent Authority to file ejectment petition that the notification under challenge was not issued.

3. The petition was resisted by the respondents on the affidavit of Shri S.N. Sharma, Dy. Director, Education, Delhi Administration stating that the acquisition is for public purpose, namely, construction of Government Industrial School for imparting general-cum-technical training. Density of population in the walled city area has increased manifold and in order to meet educational requirement, in conformity with the planned population, there should be more schools. Only three school buildings exist at present in the area. Therefore, there is scarcity of school building for which purpose property is sought to b acquired. It is, however, stated that the DDA had been requested to give no objection to the acquisition of the land in question for public purpose, namely for construction of Industrial School building as the Government is interested to impart technical and industrial know-how to the people of the locality. Respondents have not denied the fact that the rent was not paid and proceedings were taken out by the petitioners for their eviction. The respondents assigned their own reason for not paying the rent stating that no repairs were carried out by the petitioner and bills were not submitted for being paid.

4. We have considered the submissions made at the Bar. There is no dispute amongst parties that the school has been in existence in the building in question for the last more than sixty years. It is also not in dispute that efforts were made to have the property acquired for the same public purpose when in 1924 Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued. Petitioner's predecessors raised objections, which were sustained and the proposal to acquire the property was abandoned by directing the Head Master and the Tehsildar to find out another building for the purpose of school. In other words it was decided not to acquire the petitioner's property for the said purpose. Lease deeds were thereafter renewed from time to time. The petitioner has placed on record rent deed dated 23.9.1942. There is also no denial of the fact that the petitioner had to take out proceedings for eviction of the school for which purpose on 18.10.1972 a petition under Section 19 of the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act was filed by the petitioner seeking leave to institute eviction proceedings against the respondent through Secretary, Ministry of Education, New Delhi and Head Master, Government Industrial School. On 21.1,1976 the said application was allowed by the Competent Authority and permission, was granted under Section 10 of the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act. It is the petitioner's case that since permission was granted, as a retaliatory measure steps were taken by the respondents to have the property acquired and consequently Notification under Section 4 of the Act was got issued to acquire the property to which objections were filed by the petitioner. The petitioner had to take out proceedings for eviction against the respondents for their eviction, which proceedings are stated to be still pending and it is also not in dispute that in 1978-79 respondent had shifted to another premises, which according to the petitioner are more spacious and puce construction. It is a fact that the earlier proceedings for acquisition were dropped and the Government decided to shift to some other building in 1925. No steps thereafter were taken to acquire the property in question and when the petitioner sought respondent's eviction on valid grounds for which permission was granted, the respondents woke up and initiated proceedings to acquire the property. During the pendency of eviction proceedings the respondents have shifted to a new building from where the classes admittedly are being run. Earlier proceedings for acquisition were for the same purpose. These were dropped and it was decided to shift the school to some other site nearby. It is not shown that things have changed thereafter. In these circumstances it must be inferred that the proceedings to acquire the property again for the same purpose, which otherwise stands fulfillled, the same are nothing but mala-fide exercise of power. Because of which the proceedings are liable to be quashed by allowing the petition.

5. Consequently the petition is allowed. The impugned Notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are set aside.

6. Rule discharged.