P.C. Mishra vs Union Of India (Uoi)
2002 Latest Caselaw 405 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. The petitioner, who at all material times was and still is holding the post of Joint Director, Directorate of Training, Union Territory Civil Services, filed Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'), which was marked as O.A. No. 1601/2001. The said petition having been dismissed, the present writ petition has been filed thereagainst.

2. The factual matrix leading to the institution of the present writ petition in a nutshell is as follows:-

3. While working as Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short 'CBI') arrested the petitioner on 01.03.1996 in view of a complaint filed by Shri Gulshan Sikri, Prop. M/s Filtrex India on 29.02.96. On 02.03.1996, the petitioner was released on bail by Special Judge, Delhi observing that till date no statement of the complainant or panch witnesses has been recorded by the prosecution though the accused was arrested on 01.03.1996 at about 2.00 p.m. The Special Judge further observed thus:-

"... there was no evidence of any direction having been given by accused P.C. Mishra to the complainant to give money to accused Ravi Bhat before him."

4. On 16.06.1996, the petitioner was transferred from the post of Assistant Commissioner, Salex Tax to the post of Deputy Director/Co-coordinator, Drug de-addition in the Department of Social Welfare vide direction of the respondent, i.e., Ministry of Home Affairs. The Respondent sanctioned prosecution against the petitioner on 01.01.1998 under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred to the post of Joint Director (Training), Directorate of Union Territories Civil Service, Viswas Nagar Shahadra purported to be non-sensitive post. He joined in the said post on 01.04.1998. CBI filed charge-sheet against the petitioner on 20.05.1998 in the Court of Special Judge, Delhi under Sections 7 and 13 the Act.

5. The petitioner was suspended by the respondent vide order dated 18.08.1998, which was received by the petitioner on 21.08.1998, on account of administrative expediency. There-against the petitioner filed a representation. The respondent on 10.12.1998 increased subsistence allowance to 75% of the salary w.e.f. 18.11.98.

6. The petitioner fled Original Application before the Tribunal, which was marked as O.A. No. 20 of 1999. The respondent rejected the petitioner's representation on 08.01.1998 and decided to continue suspension till the petitioner who is fully acquitted. The Tribunal on 04.06.1999 also dismissed the said original application filed by the petitioner. The petitioner again represented his case before the respondent vide his representations dated 07.09.1999 and 14.08.2000, which were rejected by the respondent on 07.03.2000 and 30.10.2000. In the meantime, on 31.10.2000 the High Court also dismissed the C.W.P. No. 3979/99 filed by the petitioner.

7. The said order dated 30.10.2000 was challenged by the petitioner before the Tribunal which was marked as O.A. No. 2489 of 2000. The learned Tribunal by an Order dated 29.11.2000 directed for a special review on fresh representation of the petitioner whereupon the respondent were asked to pass speaking and reasoned order. Thereafter, the respondent passed an order dated 01.05.2001 in compliance of the directions issued by the learned Tribunal in O.A. No. 2489 of 2000.

8. However, the learned Tribunal on 31.10.2001 dismissed the aforesaid Original Application on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola . The said Order dated 31.10.2001 is impugned herein.

9. The petitioner, who has appeared in person before us, inter alia submitted that the learned Tribunal committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the orders of suspension of other persons similarly situated had been withdrawn.

10. The petitioner would contend that having regard to the fact that the continued suspension being violative of his fundamental right as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India (in short, 'the Constitution'), the same should not be allowed to be continued for a long time.

11. In any event, as the appropriate authority has passed the impugned order without any evidence or material available with them that the petitioner is actually involved in commission of the alleged offence, the learned Tribunal ought to have quashed the order impugned before it.

12. The petitioner was placed under suspension on a charge-sheet having been filed in a criminal case on 20.05.1998, although the incident leading to his prosecution took place on 01.03.1996.

13. The learned Tribunal further rejected the plea of the petitioner to the effect that the impugned order of suspension is violative of the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution.

14. Mr. Mishra, who has appeared before us unperson and has argued his case with ability, inter alia submitted that the incident involved merely a sum of Rs. 4,000/- only, whereas the petitioner has been kept under suspension for a period of about 4 years and if the incident was true, the petitioner could be placed under suspension immediately after the occurrence took place in the year 1996. According to the petitioner, when the Ministry of Home Affairs did not suspend him even though the sanction for prosecution was accorded in January, 1998, there was no reason to place him under suspension on filing of the charge-sheet.

15. In earlier application filed before the learned Tribunal bearing O.A. No. 2489 of 2000, the learned Tribunal passed order dated 29.11.2000 directing:-

"Having regard to the claim made, we find that interest of justice will be met by disposing of the present O.A. granting liberty to the applicant to make fresh representation for review of the aforesaid impugned order of suspension. On such a representation being made, the respondents will, after affording reasonable opportunity to the applicant of being heard, pass a speaking and reasoned order expeditiously and in any event within a period of 3 months from the date of the receipt of the representation from the applicant."

16. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said directions, the petitioner filed a detailed representation before the President of India on 06.12.2000.

17. The petitioner also appeared before the Additional secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs on 28.02.2001 for being heard in person and by an order dated 01.05.2001 the President of India rejected the said representation and directed that the order of suspension be continued till termination of the order in criminal case. In the said order, it has inter alia bene held that although the CBI filed a charge-sheet in the Court of Sub Judge in Tis Hazari on 20.05.1998 and charges have been framed on 28.05.2000, the petitioner himself has filed Criminal Revision Petition in this Court bearing Cr. No. 47 of 2001 and thus the delay in progress of he trial is attributable to him. Various reasons have been assigned in the said order.

Rule 10 of CCS Rules reads as under:-

"10. Suspension:-

(1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered n that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension-

(a) where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending; or

(aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or

(b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial:

Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in regard to a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant-General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made. ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ..."

18. An order of suspension can be passed against Government servant, when disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or are pending against him; or in the opinion of the authority, the person has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial.

19. It is not a case where order of suspension has been passed mechanically. Admittedly, an order of suspension had not been passed when the criminal case was instituted. The said order was passed only when a charge-sheet was filed. Thus, even no mala file can be attributed against the respondent.

20. The question as regards the jurisdiction of the competent authority to place the petitioner under suspension is not in dispute.

21. The jurisdiction of this Court in such matter is limited.

22. Having regard to the order dated 01.05.2001 passed by the President of India, it cannot be said that the said order suffers from illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety.

23. A bare perusal of the said order would clearly show that the President of India while passing the said order has taken into consideration all the submissions made by the petitioner herein and arrived at a satisfaction that in the facts and circumstances of the case, continued suspension of the petitioner is necessary.

24. Under what circumstances, order of suspension as against other persons have been revoked are not known to this Court. In a case of this nature, only on the basis of allegations made by the petitioner that the order of suspension passed against persons similarly situated have been revoked, Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked.

25. In Allahabad Bank case's (supra) , it was observed as under:-

"9. This Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (SCC at p.21) dealt with the question as to what is the meaning of the expression "moral turpitude" and it was observed as follows:-

" Moral turpitude' is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity."

This expression has been more elaborately explained in Baleshwar Singh v. Distt. Magistrate and Collector where it was observed as follows:

"The expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But is means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty, which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does no knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man."

"11. We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there has been no application of mind or the objective consideration of the facts by the appellant before it passed the orders of suspension. As already observed, the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the CBI which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet, alleging various offences having been committed by the respondent, was sufficient for the appellant to conclude that pending prosecution the respondent should be suspended. It would be indeed inconceivable that a bank should allow an employee to continue to remain on duty when he is facing serious charges of corruption and misappropriation of money. Allowing such an employee to remain the seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in the acts for which he was being prosecuted. Under the circumstances, it was the bounden duty of the appellant to have taken recourse to the provisions of Clause 19.3 of the First Bipartite Settlement, 1966. There mere fact that nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed, can also be no ground for allowing the respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the Bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge."

26. It was further observed as under:-

"Allowing such as employee to remain in the seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in the acts for which he was being prosecuted."

"The mere fact nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed, an also be no ground for allowing the respondent to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the Bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge."

27. An order of suspension validly passed in no circumstances can be said to be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The said contention of the petitioner in our considered opinion is without any substance.

28. Let us now consider some of the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner.

29. In Union of India and Ors. v. Raj Kishore Parija reported in 1995 Supp (4) SCC 235, there had been an undue delay in completion of the departmental proceedings.

30. The Tribunal in that case quashed few charges as also the disciplinary proceedings and that part of the order was set aside by the Supreme Court. It is not known as regards the nature of the charges involved therein nor any ratio has been laid down therein that continued suspension per se would be illegal although delay in completion of the trial is attributable to the delinquent employee.

31. The decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Udai Narain runs entirely counter to the submission of the petitioner. Therein an order of suspension having regard to the fact that the trial was yet to begin was revoked by the Tribunal on the ground that the order of suspension no longer survived. The Apex Court observed thus:-

"4. A bare look at Rule 10 of CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 would show that the interpretation placed by the Tribunal does not appear to be correct. An unduly narrow technical view has been taken by the Tribunal to quash the order of suspension. The view of the Tribunal that the expression. "investigation, inquiry or trial" would not include the stage of filing of the charge-sheet in the Court and since investigation was over and the trial had not yet commenced, the respondent could not be placed under suspension, we are unable to accept. The delinquent cannot be considered to be any better off after the charge-sheet had been filed against him in the Court after completion of t he investigation, than his position during the investigation of the case itself. It has been brought to our notice that sanction for prosecution has already been obtained and case has been fixed for framing of charges by the trial court. In this view of the mater we find that the view taken by the Tribunal in the impugned order is not sustainable and the order of suspension was not liable to be quashed on the ground that the case was neither at the stage of investigation or enquiry or trial.

5. In view of our finding above, a necessary corollary would be to set aside the impugned order but certain other factors have intervened of which we must take notice."

32. However, having regard to the fact that the respondent therein was reinstated two years prior to the decision of the Apex Court, the said order was not interfered with.

33. We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference in the impugned judgment. However, we may observe that it is a fit case in which this Court should dispose of the Criminal Revision Petition No. 47 of 2001. expeditiously. We would therefore, request the concerned Bench to consider the desirability and to hear out and dispose of the said matter as expeditiously as possible. In the event, the said Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed, the Special Judge, CBI may also consider the desirability of the said case on priority basis. In the event, the trial is delayed for no fault on the part of the petitioner, it would be open to him to make a further representation before the competent authority.

34. This petition is dismissed with the aforementioned directions without any order as to costs.