Mr. Sudhir Chona vs Mrs. Shahnaz Husain
2002 Latest Caselaw 367 Del

JUDGMENT

Khan, J.

1. A shop at 31-A Khan Market is at the root of controversy. Petitioner-landlord executed an agreement dated 13.3.1993 for letting out a portion of it to respondent. Later differences cropped up between them and respondent filed suit No. 1768/1993 for specific performance and for award of compensation of Rs. 9.5 lacs. Petitioner defended the suit and also set up a counter claim of Rs. 7.42 lacs against respondent. The suit is pending in this court and both parties have been ordered to maintain status quo in respect of suit property.

2. Apart from the suit, parties have also taken recourse to other methods to show each other down by lodging rival complaints and other proceedings. Petitioner on his part has filed an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. against the respondent charing him of filing the suit on fabricated and false documents. Though all this is not relevant for our purpose but one of the acts attributed to respondent in this connection forms the basis of this contempt petition.

3. Petitioner's case is that respondent had exerted her influence in the Income-Tax Department with a view to constrain him to withdraw his counter claim and his application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. As a sequel thereto, proceedings were taken against him by Income-tax Authorities and while contesting these, he was threatened with extreme penalty and told by one of the I.T.Os, Mr. R.C. Bakshi that all this was being done against him at the instance of respondent. He was also threatened by respondent to withdraw his counter claim and petition under Section 340 Cr.P.C. and that respondent had also passed a copy of his counter claim to the Income-Tax Authority. All this, he claims, was designed to pressurise and deter him from pursuing his judicial remedies thus constituting a criminal contempt. He, however, admits in the same breath that he had lodged a complaint against ITO Bakshi in which FIR was registered and action taken against him.

4. L/C for petitioner Ms. Chopra submitted that respondent was an influential lady and adopting various methods and tactics to threaten and pressurise petitioner to dissuade and deter him from taking recourse to judicial remedies. She has also referred to excerpts from some tape recorded conversation between petitioner and ITO Bakshi to show that Income-Tax Authorities had proceeded against him at respondent's instance thus causing interference with the judicial process and administration of justice.

5. Respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit denying all allegations. She says that the boot was on the other leg and it was the other way round that petitioner was adopting different pressure tactics to compel her to withdraw the suit. She denies that she had approached the Income-Tax Authorities for taking any action against petitioner who was using this as a ploy to derive undue advantage in a malafide exercise.

6. Mr. Neeraj Malhotra, representing respondent submitted that this petition was barred by limitation and even on merits petitioner had not disclosed or established any act which either scandalises the court or lowers its authority or interfered with any judicial proceedings or process or tended to do so.

7. A contempt of court may be constituted by any act or conduct which lowers and undermines the authority of the court or tends to do so or which brings the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute. Contempt of Court's Act, 1971 defines it as a civil and criminal contempt. While civil contempt is an offence of private nature depriving a party of the benefit of the court order, criminal contempt is contumacious or obstructive conduct or behavior directed against the court and involves an element of criminality in it. It is despising, undermining and eroding the authority of the court and is punishable to protect and safeguard the public faith in the administration of justice.

8. Section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 defines criminal contempt as publication of any matter or doing of any other act whatsoever which (i) scandalises or tends to scandalises, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of court; or (ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner."

9. An analysis of this definition would show that the publication of any matter or doing of any other act whatsoever must fall in any one of these categories to constitute a criminal contempt. In other words, the act complained of must tend to scandalise the court or scandalise it, prejudice the due course of judicial proceedings or tend to interfere with it or interfere with the administration of justice and cause obstruction in it in any manner.

10. The Supreme Court dealing with this in Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court v. State of Gujarat observed thus:-

"The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The court has the duty of protecting public interest in due administration of justice and so it is entrusted with power to commit for contempt of court not to protect its dignity against insult or injury but to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."

11. Contempt power is conferred on the Courts in the interest of general public and to ensure that faith and confidence in administration of justice was not eroded. It is exercisable to protect and safeguard the majesty of law and the dignity of the court and integrity of its orders and the court process. It was a special type of jurisdiction, as observed by Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union 1998 (4) SCC 409 combining "the jury, the judge and the hangman" so as to make it not exercisable for adjudicating the rights and claims of the parties. Nor was it available to enable parties to settle their private and personal scores or to satisfy their vested interests or egos or their feelings of grudge and vendetta. A contempt of court was a matter between the court and the alleged contemner and what was contumacious was for the court to decide. The status of a litigating party was only that of an informer or an assistant to render necessary aid and assistance to the court to help it reach a right decision.

12. It could as well be that interference with parties may tend to interfere with due course of judicial proceeding or may prejudice or may even lead to obstruction of administration of justice in some manner. But it all depended upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Cases were conceivable where a party was abused or assaulted or beaten in the face of the court or on way to court or was threatened or pressurised to desist from prosecuting the proceeding or to induce or to forego the available judicial remedy. Any such act along with overall conduct of a person would attract contempt action by the Court.

13. But this was not true of all types of allegations which one litigating party may throw on the other. In re:- Balwan Singh , contemner-Sarpanch was found to use his influence to browbeat the writ petitioners to desist them from prosecuting the writ petition which was held to be an interference in due course of judicial proceeding and a criminal contempt. Similarly, in Govind Sahai v. State of U.P. , an action amounting to a threat held out a party to induce him to forego the assistance of civil court was held to constitute a criminal contempt.

14. All this was not, however, applicable in the present case. Because petitioner's allegation, even if assumed to be correct, could not result in such a fall out on his counter claim or his application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. which he had filed in Respondent's suit. On his own admission, he had taken available remedies against action initiated by Income-Tax Authorities who had, of course, acted in exercise of their statutory power. Therefore, even if it was assumed that their action was prompted by respondent's complaint, it would not neither have any tendency to interfere in any pending judicial proceedings, nor to deter petitioner from pursuing his remedies. Because even if petitioner was induced or coerced to withdraw his counter claim or application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. it would not terminate the tax proceedings in the bargain any way. These proceedings had, therefore, no consequence for the pending judicial proceedings between the parties and could not be said to have any tendency to interfere in due course of any judicial proceedings in which petitioner was stoutly defending his position. To top it all, petitioner had fought back these taxation proceedings by taking available statutory remedies and had even lodged an FIR against one of its officers with the CBI. Therefore, it was too much to say or claim that these tax proceedings even if assumed initiated on respondent's prompting had bred any tendency to cause interference in due course of any judicial proceedings or any obstruction in the administration of justice.

15. Petitioner's other pleas were also similarly misconceived. His allegation against the respondent that she had threatened him to withdraw his counter claim and application is bald and generalised for which no basis or foundation was laid. If such types of allegations were entertained for exercising criminal contempt jurisdiction in the prevailing adversorial system of litigation, the focus would be shifted more on the contempt actions launched on frivolous and flimsy grounds rather than adjudication and resolution of inter-party disputes.

16. Petitioner's other plea that respondents had passed a copy of counter claim to tax authorities was as much misdirected. Even if she was found to have done so, it would not attract any of the aspects of a criminal contempt.

17. All this leads us to conclude that petitioner was using the contempt jurisdiction of this court more as a stratagem to settle personal scores with respondent in an otherwise bitter fight with her. His effort was not directed to protect the dignity of the court or safeguard its process but to carry on with his agenda/

18. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. Rule against respondent is discharged and proceedings dropped.