Delhi High Court
Tek Chand vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 7 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002 (64) DRJ 338
Author: A D Singh
Bench: A D Singh, M B Lokur
JUDGMENT
Anil Dev Singh, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against
the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 7th
January, 2002 by which the learned Single Judge
rejected the challenge of the appellant to the
acquisition proceedings. It is not disputed that the
land was notified under Section 4 read with Section
17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as far back as
18th April, 1995. A declaration under Section 6 was
issued on 26th April, 1996 and Award was made and
published on 24th April, 1998. The appellant
challenged the acquisition proceedings only in the year
2000. The only explanation of the appellant for
challenging the qcquisition proceedings after an
inordinate delay of five years is that the appellant
had preferred a representation to the third respondent
against the acquisition of land which was pursued
by him bonafide. Assuming that this to be so, it
appears that the appellant remained on his own oars and
did not challenge the acquisition proceedings for a
long time. It appears to us that on the ground of
preferring a non-statutory representation before an
administrative authority the delay in filing the writ
petition cannot be excused.
2. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the
learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the writ
petition on the ground of laches on the part of the
appellant. Even otherwise we do not find any
illegality in the acquisition proceedings calling for
our interference. Learned counsel for the appellant
submits that some of the land which was notified under
the aforesaid notification issued under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act has been denotified. He
claims similar treatment in respect of the land of the
appellant.
3. We have considered the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellant. In this regard it may be
pointed out that possession of the land was taken over
by means of execution of a panchnama on 13th January,
1997. The Supreme Court in Balmokand Khatri
Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State
of Punjab and Ors. dealt with the
question of validity of the mode of taking possession
by drafting the Panchnama in the presence of Panchas
and taking possession and giving delivery of the land.
The Supreme Court in this regard held as follows:
"...It is seen that the entire gamut of
the acquisition proceedings stood
completed by April 17, 1976 by which date
possession of the land had been taken. No
doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the
appellant still retained their possession.
It is now well-settled legal position that
it is difficult to take physical
possession of the land under compulsory
acquisition. The normal mode of taking
possession is drafting the Panchnama in
the presence of Panchas and taking
possession and giving delivery to the
beneficiaries is the accepted mode of
taking possession of the land. subsequent
thereto, the retention of possession
would tantamount only to illegal or
unlawful possession..."
4. The aforesaid view was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam
(Dead) by Lrs. wherein it was held as
follows:
"It is settled law by series of
judgments of this Court that one of the
accepted modes of taking possession of the
acquired land is recording of a memorandum
or Panchanama by the LAO in the presence of
witnesses winged by him/them and that
would constitute taking possession of the
land as it would be impossible to take
physical possession of the acquired land.
It is common knowledge that in some cases
the owner/interested person may not
cooperate in taking possession of the
land."
5. Keeping in mind the aforesaid decisions of the
Supreme Court, we have no manner of doubt that the
possession of the land was validly taken over by the
respondent.
6. This being so, after the possession of land was
taken over it cannot be denotified under Section 48 of
the Land Acquisition Act.
7. It also appears to us that even if it be assumed
that some land was illegally released from acquisition,
such release cannot serve as a ground for a denotifying
the instant land. We cannot direct the respondent to
denotify the land just because some land was wrongly
released from acquisition. Two wrongs cannot make a
right.
8. No other contention was urged by the learned
counsel for teh appellant. We find no merit in the
appeal. Accordingly, teh same is dismissed.
