Smt. Krishna Rani Kapoor vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 1083 Del

JUDGMENT

Khan, J.

1. Petitioner wants to have the cake and eat it too. She claims to have purchased property measuring 500 sq. yards situated at B-2/14, Safdarjang Enclave New Delhi through power of attorney from Smt. Sheila Cowasji to whom it was transferred by the original leaseholder Smt. Jamuna Bai. Later R-2 promulgated a policy for conversion of leasehold to free hold on terms and conditions laid down in the brochure in April, 1992 and fixed different conversion rates.

2. Petitioner also sought the benefit of this policy and applied for conversion on 30.6.1994. R-2 enforced the rate applicable to her category of property which she is contesting on the ground that it was unreasonable. Meanwhile her request for conversion stands granted and she has also paid the requisite charges at prescribed rate but her counsel still wants a decision on merits.

3. Petitioner complains of hostile discrimination. Her short case is that R-2 had fixed lower rate of Rs. 22,000/- for 125 sq. yards in the neighborhood property (B-2/108, Safdarjang Enclave) as against Rs. 2,38,567/- for her 500 sq. yards property. This according to her was unreasonable because a higher rate was being applied to her property though it was located in the same area. She accordingly wants the rate to be revised and slashed down and the impugned portion of the policy to be reformulated. Her counsel Mr. Kapoor pressed in service Supreme Court Judgment in (Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.) and to highlight that rate fixation was irrational and unreasonable. He also relied upon a judgment of this court in Federation of Ashok Vihar Residents Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors. to show that scheme was defective.

4. R-2 in its counter has explained the terms and contours of the scheme and has submitted that conversion charges were fixed taking in regard the locality of the property in different zones, the market rate of the land and the size of plot et. It is also asserted that the object of the policy was to give maximum benefit to the poor and the middle class families who were having small sizes of plots. So much so the conversion of leasehold residential properties up to 50 sq. metres was to be granted free of cost.

5. Since the petitioner had taken the benefit of scheme and had also paid conversion charges, there was hardly any need for us to examine the merit of her contentions and the issues raised by her. But we still deem it proper to do so to bring out the fallacy of her case. We have examined the terms of the scheme in question and we found that R-2 had fixed the conversion rates on consideration of various factors particularly the size of the plot. Petitioner's plot is admittedly 500 sq. yards as against 125 sq. yds of the neighborhood property. She could not therefore claim that she constituted the same class nor could it be said that classification of the property on the basis of size, location etc was irrational or unreasonable or that it had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The object of the policy indeed was to give benefit to holders of small size plots and therefore the higher rate fixed for large plots like that of petitioner could not be said to be arbitrary or having no nexus with the object of the policy. We have also gone through the judgment cited by petitioner's counsel and we find these wholly distinguishable. These judgments only reiterate and affirm a settled position on the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution, infringement whereof would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

6. We accordingly hold that impugned prescribed conversion rates cannot be held to be unreasonable or lacking in any basis or nexus with the object sought to be achieved. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed.

7. Mr. Kapoor pointed out at this stage that he had filed some applications asking for refund of some amount from R-2. It is not for us to pass any order on this. Instead petitioner may file a fresh representation in this regard before competent authority who shall consider and pass appropriate orders thereon under law within four months from such representation.