Shri Raj Kumar Avasthi vs Smt. Urmila Devi
2002 Latest Caselaw 1064 Del

JUDGMENT

R.C. Chopra, J.

1. The petitioner-tenant has come to this Court under Section 25-B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act only) aggrieved by an order dated 1.10.2001 passed by learned ARC, Delhi in Eviction Case No. E-196/2000 dismissing the petitioners application for leave to defend and ordering his eviction from the premises in question under Section 14D Read with Section 25-B of the Act.

2. The facts leading to the filing of this petition, briefly stated, are that the respondent landlady, a widow, had filed a petition under Section 14-D Read with Section 25-B of the Act against the petitioner praying for eviction on the ground that she was in bonafide need of the premises in question shown in Red in the plan attached with the petition. She claimed that the said premises were required by her for her own residence and the residence of her family members in as much as the present accommodation with her at the first floor was not sufficient to accommodate her, her family members and visitors. She was having four married sons, out of whom one was living with her but the second son also wanted to live with her as he was living in a rented accommodation. She claimed that she had no other alternative residential accommodation in Delhi.

3. The petitioner filed an application for leave to defend which was supported by an affidavit. He pleaded that the respondent-landlady was not entitled to an eviction order as the premises were let out by her when she was already a widow; that the accommodation available to her on the first floor was sufficient for accommodating her and her one married son Surender Kumar; that the other sons were living separately and were not interested in living with her; that she had other residential properties at Harsh Vihar and Bank Colony; that she merely wanted to let out the premises in question on a higher rent after evicting the petitioner there from and as such her need was not bonafide. The respondent landlady filed a reply Along with an affidavit controverting the pleas raised by the petitioner. The learned ARC vide impugned orders dated 1.10.2001 came to the conclusion that the petitioner-tenant had failed to raise any friable issue and as such refused to grant leave to defend to him. The application for leave to defend was dismissed and the eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlady was allowed.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. I have gone through the Trial Court records.

5. Before adverting to the facts of the case and the pleas raised by learned counsel for the parties, this Court must make it clear that the powers of the High Court under Section 25-B(8) of the Act are not as wide as those of an appellate Court and in case it is found that the impugned order is according to law and does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, the High Court must refrain from interfering with the same. The High Court should not substitute its own opinion in place of the opinion of the Trial Judge, if the view taken by the learned Trial Judge is possible and is not totally perverse or so unreasonable which no prudent man could have taken. His lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.C. Lahoti, Judge, Supreme Court of India in Shiv Sawroop Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta while speaking for the Bench has laid down the parameters of the powers of the High Court under Section 25-B(8) of the Act.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his arguments to only one contention that the respondent landlady does not need the premises in question bonafide in as much as out of her four sons only one is living with her and other three sons are living separately and they are not at all inclined to stay with her. It is submitted that the plea that one son of the respondent landlady is willing to join her and stay with her in the premises in question is a sham and bogus plea raised with a view to evict the petitioner from the premises in question.

7. Learned ARC has not accepted the plea of the petitioner and has held that respondent's desire to bring her son to her own house is not unreasonable and as such, additional accommodation is required by her for accommodating her second son in the property in question. This Court does not find any perversity in the view taken by the learned ARC. In joint families the circumstances and equations keep on changing. A son may not be willing to stay with his parents or other family members at a given time but at some subsequent stage he may be willing to join them and stay with them. He may be so inclined not only with the object of living with the family but also with a view to save his money on the rent that he is paying while living in a rented accommodation. The Courts must not stand in the way of reunion of families. Therefore, the plea of the respondent-landlady that one of her sons is willing to come to her and stay with her cannot be stated to be a malafide plea or a plea which is so unreasonable and frivolous that it cannot be accepted. It is further noticed that the respondent-landlady is in possession of only two rooms on the first floor of the property in question and even if it is assumed that her second son will not joint her, the accommodation with her is short for herself and her one married son who is living with her. Therefore the plea of the respondent-landlady that she needs the premises in possession of the petitioner for her resident and the residence of her family members is bonafide and there is nothing on record to show that the respondent is raising this plea malafide.

8. There is nothing on record to show that the premises were let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes. Even if the premises had been let out for commercial purposes, Section 14-D of the Act does not countenance such a defense. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent landlady is having some other residential properties also in Delhi and as such she has some alternative accommodation. The fact that at the time of letting out of the premises in question to the petitioner the respondent was already a widow does not dis-entitle her from evicting the petitioner under Section 14-D of the Act.

9. This court, therefore, is of the considered view that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity, calling for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 25-D(8) of the Act. The view taken by learned ARC is reasonable and based upon proper material on record. This petition has no merit.

10. The petition, therefore, stands dismissed.