Sh. Dharamvir Singh vs Sh. Brahmjeet And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 1028 Del

JUDGMENT

R.C. Chopra, J.

1. The appellant had filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on account of injuries allegedly suffered by him on 14.11.1989 in a road accident. His claim petition was dismissed by the learned MACT for want of proper prosecution vide orders dated 27.7.1998 in as much as the appellant had failed to produce evidence in support of his claim inspite of repeated opportunities given to him. The application for review of the orders was also dismissed vide orders dated 16.12.1999. The appellant challenges the orders dated 27.7.1998 by which his evidence was closed and the petition was dismissed as well as orders dated 16.12.1999 by which his review application was rejected.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents. I have gone through the Trial Court Records.

3. A perusal of the Trial Court record shows that the appellant-petitioner had filed his claim petition on 14.5.1990. Issues were framed on 17.8.1993 and thereafter the case was fixed for petitioner's evidence. Till 27.7.1998, when the petitioner evidence was closed and his petition was dismissed, the appellant-petitioner had examined only two formal witnesses. The learned MACT observed that the appellant-petitioner had failed to produce evidence in support of his claim inspite of ten opportunities given to him. A perusal of the order sheets however reveals that actually only 5 opportunities were available to the appellant/petitioner for leading his evidence and not ten as observed by the leaned Tribunal in as much as between 27.10.1995 to 8.1.1997 no Presiding Officer was available and the matter was being adjourned from time to time by the Reader of the Court. The dates fixed by the Reader for production of evidence or the adjournments given by the Reader on the dates on which the Presiding Officer was not available could not be treated as effective dates for production of evidence.

4. This Court is not in any manner inclined to suggest that five opportunities given to the petitioner for completion of his evidence were not sufficient but wishes to emphasise that before ordering closure of evidence. Which is an extreme step taken by the Trial Court, a partly should ordinarily by burned with costs so as to convey the disapproval of the Court in the matter of non production of evidence and a signal that in case the evidence is not produced expeditiously the Court may resort to the extreme step of closing evidence. Ordinarily in civil matters the parties do not attend every hearing and only Counsel put in appearance on their behalf and as such the day to day progress of the matters and the orders passed by the Courts do not come to the notice of the parties. Sometimes the adjournments are on the request of the parties Counsel or on account of non-availability of the witness or some other reasons but the litigants keep on blaming the Courts for delay without appreciating the causes for delay and the concern of the Presiding Officer to expedite the hearings. In case costs are imposed while granting an adjournment on the request of a party the message straight away reaches the party burdned with costs that the blame for the adjournment lies at his door and not on the system. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that after giving one or two opportunities for production of evidence further adjournments should be invariably given subject to costs with a view to expedite the trial. The extreme step of closing the evidence of a party should be resorted to if, inspite of imposotion of costs and adjournments granted in pursuance thereof, the party fails to produce or complete its evidence.

5. In the present case the records show that from 1995 to 1997, the Court had no Presiding Officer and the adjournments were being given by the Court staff only. Before closing the petitioners evidence no adjournment was granted to him subject to payment of costs and as such the possibility remains that the appellant- petitioner did not know much about the progress of his claim petition. It, therefore, is a fit case for giving one or two more opportunities to the appellant-petitioner for completion of his evidence so that the lawful claim, if any, of the appellant-petitioner does not get defeated only on account of defaults and latches.

6. In the result the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.8.1997 closing the evidence of the appellant petitioner is set aside subject to payment of costs of Rs. 2000/- each to all the three respondents. The case is remanded back to the Trial court with the directions to give only two more opportunities to the appellant-petitioner for completion of evidence and thereafter dispose of the petition in accordance with law.