Delhi High Court
Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. vs Sohan Singh Negi And Anr. on 11 July, 2002
Author: S Sinha
Bench: S Sinha, A Sikri
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. What the expression 'one year' connotes, is the question involved in this writ petition which arises out of a judgment and order dated 26th October 1998 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal in OA No. 408/98 whereby and whereunder the application filed by the respondent herein claiming for the following reliefs was allowed:
(i) to declare the verbal dis-engagement of the applicant as illegal.
(ii) to direct the respondent to consider the case of the applicant for the grant of temporary status in terms of Annexure A-2;
(iii) to direct the respondents to reengage the applicant in preference to juniors and outsides so long as the work is available;
(iv) to pass such other and further order which this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper;"
2. The resident herein admittedly worked 221 days from 25.5.1992 to 31.12.1992. He thereafter worked for 120 days from 1.1.1993 to 30.4.1993 and again worked for 151 days from 3.5.1993 to 30.9.1993. Yet again, he worked for 153 days with the Executive Engineer for the period 1.5.1994 to 30.9.1994.
3. According to the respondent, he had also worked in the year 1995-96 but details thereof have not been furnished. Again, he worked for 153 days from 1.5.1997 to 30.9.1997.
4. The contention of the respondent for denying temporary status to him was that he did not complete 240 days in any calendar year.
The learned Tribunal, upon noticing the rival contention, held:
"Shri Gupta, learned counsel for applicant cites the decision in O.A. 1696/95 dated 13.11.95 ( Kiran Kishore v. Union of India) to say that the period of 240 days need not be confined to only a calender year. It can be in a financial year or in a period of 12 months. If this relaxed criterion is taken, then the applicant has definitely worked for a period of 221 days in a five days week from 22.5.92 to 31.12.92 and more than 240 days in a period from 26.10.92 to 31.7.93. There is substance in the contention of the applicant that he was more or less regularly employed as a waterman with intermittent breaks from 1991 to 1997. This is a fit case whereby the respondents are directed to consider the applicant's case for temporary status and pass an appropriate order in that behalf in terms of the DOPT circular referred to above."
5. Mr. Maninder Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that 'a year' must be construed to mean either a calender year or a financial year. Drawing our attention to the findings of the learned Tribunal, it was contended that even according to the learned Tribunal, the respondent would be entitled to the benefit of grant of temporary status only in the event the conditions therefore are relaxed but the criteria fixed thereof are not relaxed.
6. Mr. Singh would contend that it is a well-settled principle of law that the eligibility criteria cannot be to be relaxed by the Tribunal.
Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that having regard to the purport and object of grant of temporary status, completion of 240 days during the course of a year must be held to mean completion of the period during preceding 12 months.
8. Rule 4 of the CPWD Manual, Volume II provides for temporary status in the following words:
"4. Temporary status: -- (i) Temporary status would be conferred on all casual labourers who are in employment on the date of issue of this OM and who have rendered a continuous service of at least one year, which means that they must have been engaged for a period of at least 240 days (206 days in the case of offices observing 5 days week).
(ii) such conferment of temporary status would be without reference to the creation/availability of regular Group 'D' posts.
(iii) conferment of temporary status on a causal labourer would not involve any change in his duties and responsibilities. The engagement will be on daily rates of pay on need basis. He may be deployed anywhere within the recruitment unit/territorial circle on the basis of availability of work.
(iv) such casual labourers who acquire temporary status will not, however, be brought on to the permanent establishment unless they are selected through regular selection process for Group 'D' posts."
When a temporary status is to be conferred upon an employee, in our opinion, the plain meaning to the expression "one year" should be attributed. A beneficial legislation, as is well-known, must be construed liberally. In terms of Section 3(66) of the General Clauses Act, 'a year' means:
"(66) "year" shall mean a year reckoned according to the British calendar."
9. In terms of the afore-mentioned provisions, therefore, a year is not to be computed either as a calendar year or financial year. If the intention of the frames of the legislation had been that such a construction should be given, there would have been no difficulty whatsoever in using the said expression in Rule 4 afore-mentioned. Furthermore, keeping in view the fact that the requirement to acquire a temporary status is working for a period of 240 days within one year which, in the considered opinion of this court does not and cannot mean that the same must be done within one financial year or within one calender year. For achieving a purpose of this sort, different period cannot be fixed. A person may be engaged at any point of time within one year. If such a meaning as has been proposed by Mr. Singh is assigned to the expression 'a year', the same will not only be contrary to the golden rule of literal interpretation, it would cause undue hardship. It is now a well-settled principle of law that where the statute is ambiguous, doctrine of just construction should be applied. Even otherwise, in case of industrial workers, working for a period of 240 days during preceding 12 months is required to be taken into consideration.
10. For the reason afore-mentioned, we are of the opinion that although the learned Tribunal purported to have applied the relaxed condition, in our opinion, no error has been committed by it in arriving at its conclusion.
11. This writ petition, therefore, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.
