Delhi High Court
Manphool Singh Sharma vs Director Of Education And Ors. on 23 April, 2002
Author: S Sinha
Bench: S Sinha, A Sikri
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. The writ petitioner was the applicant before the Central Administrative Tribunal. He filed the said application, inter alia, for implementing the award of higher pay as per orders w.e.f. 5st September 1971 to 31st August 1978 and w.e.f. 1st January 1986 to 31st July 1990, inter alia, on the ground that he was entitled to get the benefit of step up of pay in terms of Rule 27 of Fundamental and Supplementary Rules.
2. The petitioner herein retired on 31st July 1990. The Original Application was filed on 3rd June 1997. The learned Tribunal dismissed the application on the ground that the same was barred by limitation.
3. Mr. Bhardwaj, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of 'stepping up of pay' as his pay was erroneously fixed showing the petitioner junior to some persons. The learned counsel would contend that the petitioner had all along been filing representations and even on 9th January 1997, the Vice Principal of the institution stated that his representation was under consideration and the relevant documents were being collected.
4. The learned counsel would contend that cause of action for the lis being a continuous one, the learned Tribunal erred in passing the impugned judgment.
The prayers of the petitioner before the Tribunal were:
"(i) Step up arrears w.e.f. 5.9.71 to 31.8.78 amounting to Rs. 8,000/- App.;
(ii) Step up pay w.e.f. 1.1.86 to 31.7.90 amounting to Rs. 14,050/- plus Rs. 3, 000/- D.A. App.;
(iii) D.C.R.G. on revised pension Rs. 7,600/-;
(iv) Difference of commutation of pension amounting to Rs. 5, 297/-;
(v) Difference of leave encashment Rs. 1,583/-;
(vi) Difference of pension from 1.8.90 to 31.5.97 and D.A. thereupon amounting to Rs. 16,000/- App.; &
(vii) 18% interest on the above dues be also ordered to be paid to the applicant."
5. The said application was filed purported to be on the basis of a decision of the Tribunal in OA-2024/94 (Puran Singh v. UOI) decided on 25.4.95 and OA-108/95 (Kartar Singh v. UOI) decided on 25.1.97.
6. The appropriate authority, indisputably who could consider the matter relating to the afore-mentioned prayer of the petitioner, was the Director of Education.
7. The representation was not pending before the Director of Education. A representation might have been filed before the institution - Bagh Kare Khan Govt. Boys Secondary School. It appears from the records that a letter demanding justice had also been issued on 4th December 1996 by the petitioner through the Advocate.
8. The earliest representation that the petitioner has filed, appears to be on 1st August 1991. The order representations were filed in 1993 whereas another representation was filed on 22nd August 1996. Filing of such representation, in our opinion, does not serve the purose of limitation
9. Furthermore, in relation to the claim during the period of three years prior to the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Tribunal could not have exercised its jurisdiction as by that time, the claim had become barred by limitation.
10. Even if it be taken that for the period 1.1.86 to 31.7.90 the petitioner's claim could have been considered, evidently, the petitioner never filed a representation when he was in service. He filed his first representation only after his retirement.
11. In terms of the decision of the apex court in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, , an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act should be filed after waiting for a period of six months to get the representation disposed of. The petitioner even did not file an application under Section 19 of the Act within the period specified in terms of the decision of the Apex Court.
12. It is now well settled that he who sleeps over his right, may not be granted equitable relief. Furthermore, if, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the learned Tribunal has refused to exercise its discretion, in condoning delay in filing the said Application, we do not find any cogent reason to interfere therewith as no illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety in the decision making process has been committed by the Tribunal.
13. For the reasons afore-mentioned, we find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
