Shri V.K. Agarwal vs Delhi Development Authority
2001 Latest Caselaw 1828 Del

JUDGMENT

Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. In the present case a Charge-Sheet dated 2.3.1994 was issued to the Petitioner. Shri P.K. Jain, Junior Engineer was also charged along with the Petitioner in connection with the same incident. Shri Jain filed CWP No. 3344/1996. It is alleged by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the issues that have arisen in both the writ petitions are similar. This submission has not been controverter. In Paragraph 16 the Reply of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) "it is submitted that in the case of Shri P.K. Jain with whom parity is sought to be drawn, he had challenged the charge sheet at the initial stages and not after the proceedings were over. No parity can therefore be drawn in the two cases."

2. Mr. P.K. Jain's Petition was allowed by Hon'ble Ms. Justice Usha Mehra. The Order was affirmed by the Division Bench. In the Order of the Single Judge, it was observed as follows:-

"After hearing for the petitioner Mr. Vinod Kumar and Mr. Apurab Lal for the DDA and after perusing the record it can be said that the facts are not it dispute i.e. the work was carried out under the supervision of the petitioner. The defects came to the notice of DDA when it got the site inspected for the first time on 11.3.83. The report regarding this inspection was received by the DDA on 30.3.83. Thereafter the Technical Examiner examined this site and submitted his report on 19.9.84. It is apparent that the irregulaties and technical defects came to the notice of the DDA by September, 1984. However, no action was initiated against the petitioner till October, 1988. It was in October 1988 DDA asked the explanation of the petitioner alleging that he did not supervise the work properly. After the petitioner submitted his explanation in 1988 no further action was taken by the DDA.

However, suddenly on 22.3.94 DDA issued charge-sheet against the petitioner on the ground of dereliction of duties. It is on account of this delayed action of the respondent with out furnishing any justification for the delay that the petitioner has challenged the action of the respondent.

It is a well settled principle of law that delay in initiating the departmental enquiry without affording any plausible explanation would vitiate the whole enquiry. Mr. Apurab Lal appearing for the DDA contends that the matter was pending with the CVC till 1992 hence charge-sheet could not be served. To my mind, this is not a good ground. Simply because CVC had not given any opinion, therefore, action could not be taken. To my mind, this explanation cannot be called sufficient nor plausible. For initiation of departmental proceedings, the respondent could have taken action immediately on the receipt of the reply from the petitioner in 1988. If the respondent allowed the CVC to sleep over the matter, the petitioner cannot be held responsible for the same, nor can be made to suffer for the latches of the department or for that matter of CVC which is a department of the respondent. Even otherwise CVC's opinion, as per respondent's own showing was received in 1992. Thereafer, the DDA slept over the matter till March 1994. For this delay there is no explanation. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh, held that in the absence of plausible explanation of delay in inititating the enquiry, it would results in vitiating the departmental proceedings. From the arguments raised at the bar and the contention raised in the counter affidavit, I find DDA has not rendered any explanation which could be called plausible or reasonable to explain the delay. The delay occurred due to CVC department of DDA cannot be a ground to justifying this dealy. In the absence of any plausible explanation rendered by the DDA for this inordinate delay of nearly 10 years in inititating the departmental proceedings, I have no hesitation in concluding that the order passed on 22.3.94 without justifying the delay cannot be sustained. The same is accordingly quashed."

3. The contention of Mr. Sabharwal, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/DDA is in essence a reiteration of the submission made in Paragraph 16 of the Counter Affidavit. It is vehemently argued that since the Inquiry has already been completed and the final order has not been pronounced only because of the interim orders passed by this Court, no prejudice has been caused to the Petitioner by the alleged delay. Hence, the decisions wherein it has been emphasised that in cases of delay the Petitioner is bound to show prejudice, would apply in full force. Mr. Sabharwal had sought to rely on these precedents but I find that this would be a needless exercise in the present case.

The fact of the matter is that the Petitioner had been charged along with Shri P.K. Jain. In the writ petition filed by Shri Jain the delay in the proceedings have been found sufficient reason for quashing the charge-sheet and all consequent proceedings. I see no reason as to why these orders, affirmed by the Division Bench, should not also apply to to the present petition. Mr. Sabharwal's contention is that the Petitioner's role and his obligation and duties in the present case, are different to that of Shri P.K. Jain. This argument appears attractive at first blush. However, it must be borne in mind that in P.K. Jain's case the proceedings were quashed because of inordinate delay. The event on which the charge-sheet was predicated pertain to the same period. The result in both the writ petitions should be the same.

4. In these circumstances, I hold that the departmental proceedings are vitiated because of inordinate delay. The Writ petition is allowed and Charge-Sheet bearing No. F.4(7)/85/VIG/2623 dated 2.3.1994 is quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.