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Chander & Ors. vs Delhi Administration & Anr.
2001 Latest Caselaw 464 Del

Citation : 2001 Latest Caselaw 464 Del
Judgement Date : 30 March, 2001

Delhi High Court
Chander & Ors. vs Delhi Administration & Anr. on 30 March, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001 IVAD Delhi 665, 91 (2001) DLT 21, 2001 (59) DRJ 68
Bench: A Kumar, A Sikri

ORDER

A.K Sikri, J,

1. This writ petition was initially filed by 40 petitioners. The averments made in the writ petition were their lands situated in the villages of Badli, Sahibabad, Daulatpur, Rajapur, Semapur and Surehra Najafgarh were acquired by the respondent NO. 1 on different dates and placed the disposal of respondent no.2 for planned development of Delhi under the Scheme of "Large Scale Acquisition, Development and disposal of land in Delhi-1961". Under this scheme, it was envisaged that the affected persons whose lands were acquired would be allotted alternate plots. Pursuant to the acquisition, awards were made on different dates and compensation was paid to the owners/interested persons. Few years later respondent No.1 sanctioned alternate plots to the petitioners. These sanctions were addressed to respondent No.2 directing it to allot developed plots of different sizes to the petitioners as per the sanction issued by respondent no.1 from time to time. It is not necessary to state the grievance of all the petitioners inasmuch as by order dated 1st July, 1999 in this writ petition, the petition was disposed of by recording that it was fully covered by the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in a batch of writ petitions, leading case being CWP No.1958/96 entitled Khazan Singh & Ors. Vs. UOI & Ors. decided on 28th October, 1998 and directions in terms of the said decision were issued in this case also. However, the petitioner No.37 Shri Tej Ram filed CM No.8087/99 for recalling of order dated 1st July, 1999 qua him on the ground that the claim made by the petitioner No.37 was different and was not covered by the decision rendered in Khazan Singh's case. On this application order dated 21st January, 2000 was passed issuing a clarification that the order dated 1st July, 1999 will not apply to the petitioner No.37 and the petitioner would be treated to have been kept pending qua him. therefore, this writ petition now concerns the case of the petitioner No.37 only.

2. The issue raised by the petitioner No.37 encompasses a controversy which is quite narrow. In his case the Delhi Administration issued sanction letter dated 25th November, 1985 addressed to Deputy Director (Res) i.e. respondent No.2 withe request to allot the said petitioner a plot measuring 400 sq.yards in lieu of his land having been acquired. The respondent No.2 after a gap of more than seven years issued allotment letter to the petitioner No.37 allotting Plot No.37, Sector 34, Pocket No.15A measuring 330 sq.yards in Rohini Residential Scheme. A provisional rate of Rs.1,650.65 per sq.mtrs, being the pre-determined rate notified by the Government of India, for the petitioner No.37 is challenging is this writ petition on the ground that when respondent No.1 issued sanction letter dated 25th November, 1985 the petitioner should be charged the rates for the plot notified for the year 1985-86. Simply because the DDA took more than seven years in ultimately making the allotment vide letter dated 18th January, 1993 is no ground to charge the rate prevalent in the year 1992-93 as respondent No.2 could not take advantage of its own wrong/slackness by acting belatedly and then demanding the rate to the prejudice of the petitioner. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner No.37 has relied upon the judgment dated 15th March, 1994 in the case of Kure Vs. Delhi Administration & Anr. (CW No. 4361/92). Relying upon the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rama Nand Vs. UOI & Ors. AIR 1994 Delhi 29, learned counsel further submitted that relevant dat with reference to which premium at pre-determined rates would be chargeable from a person such allotment of the residential plot should be the date when the recommendation was made by the Delhi Administration to DDA for allotment.

3. On the other hand, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondent No.2/DDA that merely from the letter dated 25th November, 1985 by Delhi Administration to DDA, no right accrued to the petitioner No.37 as is clear form the endorsement on the said letter while sending copy of the letter to the petitioner No.37 wherein it was clearly stated that the allotment of alternate plot was subject to availability of plot with DDA and the letter did not carry any legal commitment for allotment. Learned counsel further submitted that on the basis of availability of developed plots draw was held on 21st December, 1992 and as petitioner No.37 was successful in the draw of lots, DDA issued allotment letter dated 18th January, 1993 to him. Therefore, DDA was entitled to the premium at the rate of Rs.1,650.50 per sq.mtrs. which was pre-determined rat notified by the Government of India of the year 1992-93. It was also submitted that the case of Sh.Kure was distinguishable inasmuch as in that case no counter affidavit could be filed which led to the directions that are passed in that case. The perusal of the order would show that there is no formulation of law and it does not lay down any legal principle. This was so clarified by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khazan Singh's case (supra). It was further submitted that the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Ramanand(supra) goes in favor of the respondent and certain paragraphs from this judgment were highlighted to stress this point.

4. After giving our anxious consideration to the respective contentions, were are inclined to agree with the submissions of the respondent No.2/DDA. Learned counsel for the DDA rightly argued that the case of Kure would be of no help to the petitioner No.37. This point was specifically dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in Khazan Singh's case(supra). The Court made the following observations:

"The decision in Kure Vs. Delhi Administration & Anr., was rendered in the peculiar facts of that case along. On the facts of that case, it was held that case is not covered by the Full Bench decision. The instant case as well as the cases of Subhsah Chaudhry, Kasturi Devi and Vijay Kumar will not be covered by the ratio of decision in Kure (supra) in as much as in Kure's case(supra), reply affidavit had not been filed and SLP of DDA was dismissed: no legal point of general application was formulated therein and on the facts of that case, it was held that the case is not covered by the decision in Ramanand's case(supra)."

5. In so far as charging of premium at a particular date is concerned, the matter is no more res integra. Ramanand's case(supra) decides this issue. This case settles the two propositions of law which are as under:

1. A person whose land is acquired does not get any vested right to the allotment of alternative plot of land for residential purpose. This ratio is clearly discernible from the reading of paras 20, 25, 26 and 28 of the judgment. The position is summed up in para 28 in the following words:

"As a result of the above discussion, we find that an individual whose land has been acquired for planned development of Delhi, has no absolute right to allotment, but, he is eligible to the considered for allotment of an alternative plot for residential purposes; and that the DDA may allot Nazul land to such an individual, inconformity with the plans and subject to other provisions of the Nazul Rules."

2. The relevant date for charging premium for allotment of land would be the date when allotment is made by the DDA and not the date when the land is acquired or when application is made by the concerned person to the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi for allotment for allotment or when the Administrator makes the recommendation for allotment. The discussion on this aspect is found in para 33 of the judgment which reads

"In the any event, development can be undertaken only after land is acquired ascertained without undertaking development in the a particular area or zone? Obviously, predetermined rates, having regard to development charges, cannot be worked out at the time when the land is acquired. For this simple reason alone, the plea that the premium for allotment of a plot to an individual whose land has been acquired, should be chargeable at the predetermined rates prevailing at the time when his land was acquired, cannot be accepted. The position would be the same at the next two stages, also when the application is made to the Administrator for allotment of a plot, and when the Administrator may recommended the case for allotment. Logically, predetermined rates would come into play for calculation of the amount of premium chargeable from the concerned person only at the time when the offer is made to him for allotment of a plot in a particular area or zone."

6. The argument of learned counsel for petitioner No.37 alleging delay on the part of DDA in making the allotment is also without any merit. Even this aspect was considered in the case of Ramanand (sura) in para 39 which reads as under:

"In the present case, there are no allegations of male fides nor any motive has been attributed to the DDA or to any of its officers for causing delay in development of the land or in allotment are made in vague in general terms. In the absence of any specific pleading or other material on record, no fault can be found with the DDA on this score. The DDA has called upon the petitioner to pay premium for the plot at the same rate that is being uniformly charged from all other similarly place persons. I this nor as if the DDA has made any allotment earlier to the others or that in dealing with the claim of the petitioner there is delay. IN these circumstances, the question of inaction or delay on the part of the respondents does no arise, and the principle that no party can take advantage of its own wrong is not applicable."

7. After laying down the aforesaid principles of law, the petition was summed up in penultimate para 40 in the following words:

"For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the decision in the case of Rajinder Kumar (supra). We hold that an individual, whose land is acquired, does not have an absolute right to the allotment of alternative plot of land for residential purposes, and that such a person is only eligible to be considered for allotment of a plot, subject to certain conditions. Further, we hold that premium shall be chargeable from such a person at the pre-determined rates prevailing on the date when the offer is made to him by the DDA for the allotment of a specific plot of land in a particular area or zone, under the Nazul Rules."

8. The aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench was followed by the Division Bench in the case of Bhagwana Vs. UOI holding that whenever Central Government fixes pre-determined rates, the same will have to be done with respect to the date when allotment is made.

9. In view of the aforesaid settled position in law, we do not find any merit in the contention of the petitioner No.37 to the effect that rate prevalent in the year 1985-86 should have been charged from him. In fact the writ petition qua all the petitioners including the petitioner No.37 was rightly disposed of by order dated 1st July, 1999 on the basis of decision rendered in Khazan Singh's case (supra). However, as noted above, on an application made by the petitioner No.37 that his case is not covered by the judgment but by the decision dated 15th March, 1994 in Kure's case and taking note of the fact that when writ petition was disposed of by order dated 1st July, 1999 nobody was present on behalf of the petitioner No.37, it was clarified that the said order dated 1st July, 1999 would not be applicable in his petition. After hearing arguments of petitioner No.37. our conclusion is that Kure's case(supra). In view of the stand taken by the petitioner No.37, it would have been appropriate to dismiss the writ petition without any relief to the petitioner No.37. However, in the interest of justice, we hold that directions contained in order dated 1st July, 1999 which was based on the judgment in Khazan Singh's case (supra) would be applicable to the petitioner No.37 as well. The time frame stated therein would start from the date of this judgment. However, petitioner No.37 is burdened with cost quantified at Rs.5,000/- The amount to be paid by the petitioner No.37 to "Prime Minister's Relief Fund' for Gujarat earthquake victims within two weeks and thereof be filed in the Court.

10. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

 
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