Smt. Vimla Sharma @ Bimla Sharma vs Smt. Veeran Devi
2001 Latest Caselaw 1184 Del

ORDER

Vikramajit Sen, J.

C.M. 1833/2001.

1. This is an application seeking a Review of the Orders passed on 24.7.2001. The grounds raised are that the Petitioner/Tenant had appointed Ms. Sudha Srivastava, Advocate but she was not present when the Revision Petition first came up for hearing on 6.6.2001. before S.K. Mahajan, J. the Learned Vacation Judge. It has been alleged that on 24.7.2001 when Ms. Sudha Srivastava appeared, she gave " contradictory statements so that Respondent could succeed and the Petitioner could lose her case". In the Reply filed by the Landlord to the main petition it has been disclosed that similar complaints were levelled by the Revisionist against her counsel Shri Kulbhushan Mehta and Shri Jai Parkash.

2. In the Order dated 24.7.2001 which is sought to be reviewed, I had taken into consideration the fact that S.K. Mahahan, J., the Learned Vacation Judge, had given a hearing tot he counsel who appeared for the Petitioner on 6.6.2001. It was after this hearing that notice was issued limited tot he grant of time to the Petitioner to vacate the premises. It was evident that the Petitioner had sought to resile from the statement made on her behalf, with the change in the Presiding Office of the Court. Ironically Ms. Sudha Srivastava had, on 24.7.2001, stated that her associate, who quite obviously had appeared on her instructions, had no authority to concede the petition and ask for time to vacate the premises. She has become the victim of the Tenant's strategy. This charade must be put to an end with a firm hand. By giving yet another hearing on the Revision Petition an end to this controversy can be reached. Hence the application is allowed. Although the application should attract the imposition of heavy costs, I refrain from awarding any.

C.R. 711/2001.

3. The case of the Petitioner/Tenant is that she has been residing in the premises for approximately thirty years having been inducted therein by Shri Narain Dass, who died on 2.2.1997 leaving behind his widow, namely, Smt. Veeran Devi, the Respondent herein, two sons and one daughter. All the children are married and have their respective families. The Eviction Petition was filed under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the DRC Act') premised on the foundation of the Respondent being a widow.

4. The contention of the Petitioner/Tenant is that one of the sons of the Respondent is living with his in-laws and the daughter is residing separately in her matrimonial home. The widow/Respondent is stated to be staying with her other son. IT is alleged that there is sufficient accommodation available with the Respondent/Landlady. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Petitioner emphasised the fact that a Relinquishment Deed had been executed in favor of the Respondent/Landlady by her children but this document was a fraud and forgery and hence should not be acted upon.

5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the provisions of Section 14D are calculated to alleviate the plight of a widow. A liberal approach, as compared to the attitude while dealing with similar cases under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, has been advocated by the Apex Court. Little significance can be attached to the fact that a Relinquishment Deed has been executed by the parties in 2000. Indubitably, the Respondent is a widow and even de hors the Relinquishment Deed is at the very least, a joint owner of the demised premises, by operation of the laws of Succession. The requirement of Section 14D of the DRC Act are, therefore, met even without the Relinquishment Deed being considered.

6. The next question is whether a bona fide case has been established. The Petitioner/Tenant has herself pleaded that the Respondent/Landlady is 70 years old. When this fact is kept in mind it will become immediately obvious that it would be reasonable for her to claim the eviction of the Petitioner herein on the grounds that she wished and intended to reside in the premises along with her family members. A reading of Section 14-D of the DRC Act does not indicate that the need should be exclusively of the widow or that the widow should be the exclusive owner of the property. As in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the residential need of members dependent upon her or as in the present case where the landlady is dependent on members of her family should also be legitimately taken into view. There is, therefore, no appreciable significance in the argument that Section 14D of the DRC Act does not permit or envisage an eviction on the grounds of the residential needs of members other than the widow herself. If the Respondent herein, for reasons of old age, requires her children to shift with her in her home, the need still remains legitimate and bona fide.

7. The Additional Rent Controller has taken all the relevant facts in perspective while deciding the case and granting eviction tot eh Respondent/Landlady. No jurisdictional error arises or has been disclosed.

9. The Revision Petition is without merit.

10. Dismissed.

C.M. 1491/2001.

11. Dismissed as infructuous.

C.M, 1490/2001, 1832/2001.

12. As the Revision Petition has been dismissed the question of granting a stay against execution of the impugned Eviction Order does not arise.

13. Dismissed.