Pt. Madan Lal And Sons vs Union Of India And Others
2000 Latest Caselaw 886 Del

ORDER

Anil Dev Singh, J.

1. The petitioner, a partnership firm, assails the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal (for short "Tribunal") dated September 24, 1991. By that order the Tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction to deal with the dispute between the petitioner and Railway Administration, respondents No.1 and 2. The petitioner in this writ petition also seeks a declaration that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to proceed with transfer of case No. TA-I- 584/90 which was originally pending in this Court before coming into force of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (for short "the Tribunal Act"). Besides the petitioner seeks transfer of the case from the Tribunal to this Court.

2. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner claims to be a partnership firm registered with the Registrar of Firms, Delhi under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. On October 26, 1986 petitioner instituted a suit, being Suit No. 841/86, for recovery of Rs. 1,28,520/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum and costs against the Union of India through General Manager Northern Railway, New Delhi, the General Manager Eastern Railway, Calcutta and one Shri Bimal Roy, respondents No. 1,2 and 3 respectively in this Court. The suit was based on the ground that the petitioner had booked certain goods with respondents No. 1 & 2 through its agent, but due to fraud, collusion and conspiracy of respondents No. 1 to 3, the same were not delivered at the requisite destination. Respondents No. 1 to 3 were set ex-parte as they absented themselves in the proceedings in the suit. The suit of the petitioner was decreed ex-parte against respondents No. 1 to 3 and in favour of the petitioner by the learned Single Judge of this Court on September 18, 1987.

3. On may 7, 1988 the petitioner filed an execution application against the judgment-debtors/respondents No. 1 to 3 herein. Some times in July 1988 respondents No. 1 and 2 moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, being I. A. No.3643/88, for setting aside of the ex-parte decree. The said respondents also moved applications for condensation of delay (I. A. 7031/88) in filing the I. A. 3643/88 and for stay of execution of decree (I. A. 4247/88). On July 29, 1988 the learned Single Judge stayed the execution of the decree. In the meanwhile the Tribunal Act came into force and by virtue of Section 24 thereof, the matter was transferred to the Railway Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal on November 29, 1990 set aside the ex-parte decree at the instance of respondents No. 1 and 2. On January 14, 1991 the petitioner herein, filed an application under Order 44 of the Rules framed under the Tribunal Act before the Tribunal for the following reliefs:-

   "(a) that it may be held that this Hon'ble Tribunal has no juris-   diction/power/authority to proceed in the instant case in view of    circumstances stated hereinabove. 
 

   (b) all the orders passed by this Hon'ble Tribunal after the    transfer of the instant case from the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi    till date may kindly be recalled/modified/varied and be treated    as null and void since this Tribunal had no jurisdiction to    proceed against a private party under the aforesaid circum-   stances. 
 

   (c) that the instant case may kindly be transferred/referred back    to the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for trial from the stage at    which it was received by this Hon'ble Tribunal from Hon'ble High    Court of Delhi. 
 

   (d) any other order as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and    proper may also be passed in favour of the applicant to achieve    the ends of justice." 
  

4. This application was contested by respondents No. 1 and 2. On Septem- ber 24, 1991 the Tribunal rejected the application and observed that under Section 15 of the Act on and from the appointed date, no Court or other authority shall have or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction or power or authority in relation to the matters referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. It was also noticed that the High Court gave a specific direction on November 5, 1990 for transfer of the case to the Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal alludes to the statement made by Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner herein, that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain the case and the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree, which was originally filed before the High Court. The Tribunal was also of the opinion that in so far as the dispute between the petitioner and the Railway Administration was concerned, the same fell under Clause 13(1)(a) of the Tribunal Act and this being so, no Court or authority was entitled to exercise any jurisdiction in the matter with effect from the appointed day, namely, November 8, 1989. It is this order of the Tribunal which has been challenged before us.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following pleas:-

1. That after the passing of the decree, the application of the respondents No. 1 and 2 pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court could not have been transferred to the Railway Claims Tribunal as it is a suit or a claim which could be trans- ferred under Section 24 of the Act. Since the suit/claim of the petitioner had culminated in a decree, provisions of Section 24 read with Section 15 of the Act were not applicable.

   2. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the    claim of the petitioner as one of the defendant/respondent, Shri    Bimal Roy is a private party. 
 

   3. Section 24 of the Act is unconstitutional. 
 

   4. The ex-parte order passed by the High Court decreeing the suit    could never be set aside by the Tribunal.  
 

6.  We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the peti- tioner. In so far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it will be necessary to refer to Sections 13, 15 and 24 of the Tribunal Act. These Sections to the extent they are relevant, are set out below:-     

   "13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal_ (1)    The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed,    day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority, as were exercisable immediately before that day by any Civil court or a    Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Rail-   ways Act, ___-
 

   (a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administration    as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of    claims for
 

   (i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or    non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway adminis-   tration for carriage by railway; 
 

   (ii) compensation payable under section 82A of the Railways Act    or the rules made there-under; and
 

   xx xx xx
 

   15. Bar of jurisdiction_ On and from the appointed day, no court    or other authority shall have or be entitled to exercise any    jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters    referred to in sub-sections (1) and 1A of Section 13. 
 

   24. Transfer of pending cases_____(1) Every suit, claim or other    legal proceeding (other than an appeal) pending before any court,    Claims Commissioner or other authority immediately before the    appointed day or, as the case may be, the date of commencement of    the provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 13, being a suit,    claim or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is    such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the appoint-   ed day, or, as the case may be, the date of commencement of the    provisions of sub-section (1A) of section 13, within the juris-   diction of the Claims Tribunal shall stand transferred on that    day or, as the case may be, date to the Claims Tribunal. 
 

   2) Where any suit, claim or other legal proceeding stands trans-   ferred from any court, Claims Commissioner or other authority to    the Claims Tribunal under sub-section (1)__ 
 

   (a) the Court, Claims Commissioner or other authority shall, as    soon as may be after such transfer, forward the records of such    suit, claim or other legal proceeding to the Claims Tribunal; 
 

   (b) the Claims Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed    to deal with such suit, claim, or other legal proceedings, so far    as may be, in the same manner as an application from the stage    which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage    or de novo as the Claims Tribunal may deem fit." 
  

7. A perusal of these provisions inter-alia show that the Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction on and from the appointed day to deal with matter relating to compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deteriora- tion or non delivery of goods entrusted to the Railway Administration for carriage by Railway. For this purpose, the Tribunal is entitled to exercise powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before the appointed day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provi- sions of the Act. While the Tribunal Act confers jurisdiction, power and authority on the Tribunal with regard to the matters specified in Section 13 of the Act, at the same time it bars the jurisdiction of Court or other authority in such matters under Section 15 of the Act. Every suit, claim and legal proceeding other than an appeal pending before any Court, Claims Commissioner or any other authority relating to matters falling in Section 13 of the Act automatically stands transferred to the Tribunal under Sec- tion 24(1) thereof. After such transfer the Court, Claim Commissioner or any other authority, as the case may be, are mandatorily required under Section 24(2)(a) to forward the records of such suit, claim or other legal proceedings to the Tribunal. Since the lis between the parties in the instant case relates to non-delivery of goods entrusted to the Railway Administration for carriage by Railway. The jurisdiction of the High Court was extinguished from the appointed day and it was only the Tribunal which was entitled to exercise jurisdiction in the matter. Not only suits or claims relating to matters covered by Section 13 of the Act fall within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, but the same is true for all other legal proceedings pending before any Court, Claim Commissioner or any other authority relating to such disputes. Even though the suit of the petitioner stood decreed by the High Court, other proceedings arising therefrom as already noted above, were pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court immediately before the appointed day.

8. In Allahabad Bank Vs. Canara Bank and another, , the Supreme Court while construing the word "proceedings" occur- ing in section 31 of Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institu- tions Act, 1993, held as follows:- "In our view, the word "proceedings" in section 31 includes "execution proceedings" pending before a civil court before the commencement of the Act."

9. To the same effect is another judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Vs. Chajju Ram, . On the parity of reason- ing, the word "proceedings" occuring in section 24 of the Tribunal Act would include the proceedings for setting aside of the ex parte decree which was passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court before the commencement of the Tribunal Act. According to Section 24 of the Tribunal Act, these proceedings stood transferred to the Tribunal by sheer force of this section which provision is self operative in as much as the transfer is automatic and only file of the case was to be forwarded to the Tribunal. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any force in the plea of the petitioner that the proceedings pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court after the passing of the decree could not be trans- ferred to the Tribunal. It needs to be noted that even the counsel for the petitioner agreed before the Tribunal at one stage that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. We are not holding this conces- sion made by the learned counsel against the petitioner but according to the provisions of the Act, it is the Tribunal alone which has the jurisdic- tion in the matter.

10. The second plea of the petitioner also does not hold good on the aforesaid reasoning based on the provisions of the Act. A conjoint reading of Sections 13(1)(a)(i), 15 & 24 of the Act leave no manner of doubt that compensation for loss on account of non-delivery of goods entrusted to Railway Administration for carriage by Railway, is required to be dealt with by the Tribunal from the appointed day viz. November 8, 1989 and the jurisdiction of other forums, is barred. It may be noted that the Tribunal is only proceeding against the Railway Administration in the case. The Tribunal is not adjudicating the disputes between the petitioner and Shri Bimal Roy, respondent No. 3. In this regard it will be apposite to refer to the observation of the Tribunal:- "This Tribunal is therefore duty bound to proceed to determine the disputes between applicant and respondent No. 1 in view of aforesaid provisions in the Act as also in view of the directions of Hon'ble Delhi High Court. The petitioner to proceed against respondent No. 1 before this Tribunal. Be listed for framing issues on 8.10.91. If after decision of disputes between appli- cant and respondent No. 1, some further disputes are felt by applicant to be got decided against respondent No.2 the same be referred to the civil court (who may have pecuniary jurisdiction at that time)."

11. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations of the Tribunal and having regard to the provisions of Sections 13, 15 and 24 of the Act, we do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petition- er. The second plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is therefore, rejected.

12. As regards the third plea urged by the learned counsel for the peti- tioner is concerned, we do not see how Section 24 of the Act can be said to be ultra-vires of the Constitution. The writ petition is absolutely silent as to why the petitioner claims the said Section to be unconstitutional. Mr. Gambhir, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that Section 24 of the Act does not give any guidance in the matter relating to the transfer of cases pending on the appointed day before Court, Claim Commissioner or other authority. According to him, it would be in the discretion of the Court, Claim Commissioner or other authority where the matter may be pending to transfer or not to transfer the lis falling under Section 13 of the Act to the Tribunal. The argument is fallacious. It proceeds on mis-reading of Section 24 of the Act. Section 24 of the Act does not leave any discretion much less an unguided one to any Court, Claim Commissioner or authority as on the appointed day the suit claim or other legal proceedings by operation of the said provision would stand trans- ferred to the Tribunal because of the words "shall stand transferred" occurring therein. The word 'shall' signifies the mandatory nature of the provision. Therefore, we can not accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

13. Now coming to the last plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be seen that the petitioner has not challenged the order of the Tribunal dated November 29, 1990 whereby the application of the Railway Administration for setting aside of the ex-parte decree was accepted. The plea appears to be an after thought. In any case, a combined reading of Sections 13, 15 and 24 of the Act show that Parliament has transplanted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court regarding matters speci- fied in Section 13 including claims for compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods entrusted to Railway Admin- istration for carriage by Railway in the Claims Tribunal from the appointed day. Thus for all practical purposes the Tribunal would step into the shoes of the Civil Court and exercise all such jurisdiction, power and authority as were exercisable immediately before the appointed day by the Civil Court in respect of claims for compensation etc. Therefore, since the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside its own order, the Tribunal on transfer of the case under Section 24 of the Act will also have the same power. The Tribunal in the instant case has sup- planted the High Court and what the High Court could do, the Tribunal would also be entitled to do.

14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the submis- sions of the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs.