Smt. Satya Devi vs Rati Ram And Ors.
2000 Latest Caselaw 263 Del

JUDGMENT

Devinder Gupta, A.C.J.

1. The judgment and decree passed on 10.12.1997 by Ms. Manju Goel, Additional District Judge, Delhi is under challenge in this appeal. The Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/appellant on recording finding on issue No. 1 only.

2. Facts in brief are that on 16.12.1963 suit was filed by the plaintiff/appellant against the defendant/respondent claiming a decree for possession of property No. 257, Block-A, defense Enclave, Madhu Vihar, Village Palam, New Delhi measuring 200 sq. yards from out of Khasra No. 108/18, as shown in the site plan. The plaintiff also claimed decree for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 2,000/-- per month with effect from 1.3.1992 till delivery of possession. In brief the plaintiff alleged that the property was purchased by her from defendants 1 and 2 by means of a registered sale deed duly registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Delhi on 11.17.1984 . Relevant documents regarding transfer/assignment of the plot were later executed in favour of Daya Kishan Jain, who later on transferred and assigned his legal rights, title and interest in favour of Nirmala Devi. Plaintiff had also executed power of attorney in favour of Daya Kishan Jain. Pursuant to the said power of attorney Daya Kishan Jain executed a power of attorney in favour of Nirmala Devi. On 31.1.1991 defendants 1 and 2 with their aids tried to demolish the room constructed on the property. Because of this thret, suit had to be filed for permanent injunction, which was decreed on 4.9.1991. Defendants land 2 were restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly from the plot in question. On 4.3.1992 execution petition was filed against defendants 1 to 4 seeking enforcement of the decree. Plaintiff also filed an application for initiating contempt proceedings. Plaintiff's attorney Smt. Nirmala Devi had gone to Calcutta and in her absence on 1.3.1992 the defendant broke open the locks of the property and took possession of the same thereby necessitating filing of suit for possession and mesne profits. The plaint was signed and verified by Smt. Nirmala Devi as attorney of the plaintiff.

3. The suit was resisted by the defendants/respondents, who filed separate written statements.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed on 17.9.1997:

"1. Is the plaint signed and verified and filed by a competent person?

2. Does the Court has jurisdiction to decide the suit?

3. Has the plaintiff any cause of action?

4. Is the suit bad for misjoinder of defendants 1, 2 and 4?

5. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for possession and mesne profits, as prayed for?

6. Relief."

5. After issues were framed, suit was adjourned for hearing arguments by the following order:

"Present Counsel for the defendants 3, 5 and 6, for the defendants 1 and 2 and for defendant No- 4 and proxy for the plaintiff's Counsel.

Issues framed. Arguments on issue No. 1 on 24.10.1997."

6. Arguments were heard on 10.12.1997 on which date the suit was dismissed holding that Smt. Nirmala Devi is not authorised to sign, verify and file plaint on behalf of Smt. Satya Devi. As the plaint was held not to have been signed and verified by a competent person, the suit was dismissed with costs.

7. The Trial Court doubted admissibility of the power of attorneys executed by Smt. Satya Devi in favour of Daya Kishan and by Daya Kishan in favour of Nirmala Devi. Assuming that the original documents were torn on account of the reasons assigned by the plaintiff in the previously instituted suit, it was held that Satya Devi's power of attorney did not authorise Daya Kishan to execute power of attorney in favour of Nirmala Devi. Power of attorney executed in favour of Nirmala Devi also did not show that Daya Kishan had conferred power on her to sign and verify plaint on behalf of Satya Devi. It was also held that Daya Kishan had no power to authorise Nirmala Devi to sign the plaint on behalf of Satya Devi.

8. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and been taken through the record.

9. At the outset, we may express our concern with the manner in which the suit has been disposed of by the Trial Court Parries had completed their pleadings on which issues were framed on merits. Rule 2 of Order 14 of Code of Criminal Procedure obliged the Trial Court to pronounce judgment on all issues and not to decide the suit merely by recording findings only on one issue. Rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads :

"2(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provision of Sub-rule (s), pronounce judgment on all issues.

(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to -

(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue."

10. Rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code was substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976. The amended provision says that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. After issues have been framed it is the mandate of law that judgment must be pronounced on all issues. The only exception to this rule is in Sub-rule (2), which provides that an issue of law may be tried as a preliminary issue but the same must relate to jurisdiction of the Court or to a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. Only in these two eventualities issues of law may be tried as preliminary issues and not in any other eventuality. The Trial Court thus acted with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in proceeding to dispose of the suit merely on recording findings on only one issue. The issue so decided was not an issue of law but a mixed issue of law and fact. Such practice on the part of the Court to dispose of suits at the very threshold without further trial on other issues must be deprecated.

11. Rule 14 of Order 6 of CPC requires that every pleading shall be signed by the party and his Pleader. Where a party by reason of absence or for other good cause is unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. The object of requiring pleadings to be signed by a party is to prevent, as far as possible objection as to whether a suit was instituted with the plaintiff's knowledge and authority. A bare reading of Rule 14 would suggest that pleadings can be signed by any person duly authorised to, (a) sign the same or (b) to sue or (c) defend on behalf of the party pleading. In other words, when general power is given to a person, who is authorised to sue or defend the party in whose favour the power is given would be entitled to sign the pleadings. The impugned judgment suggests that the Trial Court proceeded to construe the provision of Rule 14 of Order 6 of the Code in a limited manner by confining its scope only to a person who has been authorised specifically to sign the pleadings and not to these who have been authorised to sue or defend. The scope and ambit of Rule 14 of Order 6 of the Code cannot be limited. The true scope of Rule 14 of Order 6 of the Code is that the pleadings can be signed not only by the person who has been duly authorised to sign the same but also by the person, who is authorised to sue or defend on behalf of the party concerned.

12. General Power of Attorney dated 13.2.1989 executed by Smt. Satya Devi authorised Daya Kishan Jain with respect of plot No. 257, namely, the disputed property. Authority conferred on Daya Kishan Jain is to manage and transfer the said property under his signatures on behalf of the executant; to appoint further attorney; to give any statement or affidavit or application with respect to the said property in any Court and generally to do all the acts whatever necessary, for the management and transfer of the said property. It also authorised Daya Kishan Jain to sell the property in favour of any one by executing sale deed and getting the same registered and to receive the amount of consideration and also to utilise the said property in any manner. Similar power is conferred in the power of attorney executed by Daya Kishan Jain in favour of Smt. Nirmala Devi to pursue all proceedings in the Court or other offices; to give any statement or affidavit or application for the property in any Court and generally to do all acts whatever may be necessary for management and transfer of the said property.

13. Supreme Court in Timblo Iraus Ltd. v. Jorge Anibal Matos Sequeira and Anr., approved the well known principles of interpretation of documents including power of attorney that the powers which are absolutely necessary and incidental to the execution of the' ascertained objects of the general powers given must be necessarily implied. It was further held that most important factor in interpreting a power of attorney is the purpose for which it is executed. The purpose must appeal primarily from the terms of the power of attorney itself.

14. In the instant case Satya Devi has not come forward to challenge that the plaint has not been signed by Nirmala Devi for and on her behalf. Identity of Nirmala Devi is also not in dispute. So is the case as regards Daya Kishan Jain's identity, which is not under challenge. There is general authorisation in favour of Daya Kishan Jain and by virtue of the power conferred on Daya Kishan Jain the same powers have been conferred in favour of Nirmala Devi. Conjoint reading of the two power of attorneys makes it clear that Nirmala Devi is fully competent to sign all documents, make statements, file applications, which may be found necessary for proper management and preservation of the property in question and also to appoint further attorneys if necessary. Power conferred by virtue of the authorisation given in favour Daya Kishan Jain by Satya Devi and by Daya Kishan Jain in favour of Nirmala Devi is to sue on behalf of Satya Devi or even defend a suit on behalf of Satya Devi with respect to the property in question. On the basis of such authorisation, it cannot be said that the plaint has not been signed by a person competent to do so. There is no invalidity in the signing of the plaint by Nirmala Devi for and on behalf of Satya Devi.

15. Consequently, the appeal is allowed with costs. Impugned judgment and decree is set aside. As evidence have not been recorded by the Trial Court on other issues, the suit is remanded for trial in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 18.4.2000.