M/S. Bhagwan Dass Yash Pal vs Wasu Ram & Ors.
2000 Latest Caselaw 143 Del

ORDER

Madan B. Lokur. J.

1. The Appellant has impugned the order dated 22nd May, 1982 passed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in RCA No. 783 of 1980. By the impugned order, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that in spite of having had the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),the Appellant had committed default in payment of rent for three consecutive months and was liable to be evicted. An appeal has been preferred under Section 39 of the Act, as it then stood on the statute book.

2. The case of the Appellant in brief is that he had initially committed a default in payment of rent and by an order dated 20th October, 1970 the learned Additional Rent Controller gave him the protection and benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act and as such no eviction order was passed on the ground of non-payment of rent.

3. Thereafter, the Appellant again committed a default in payment of rent and when eviction proceedings were initiated against him, a compromise was reached between the parties. While recording the compromise, the operative portion of the order dated 2nd November, 1972 passed by the learned Rent Controller was as follows:

"In view of the statements of the parties recorded above, I am satisfied that the respondent is a tenant under the petitioner, that in an earlier eviction petition under clause (a) of Section 14(1) the respondent had availed of the benefit of Section 14(2) and that second default has again been committed for more than three consecutive months inspite of notice of demand and termination of tenancy. I, therefore, allow the petition under clause (a) of Section 14(1) read with Section 14(2). However, in view of the statements of the parties it is ordered that in case the respondent pays Rs.1000/- to the petitioner by 31/12/1972 and Rs.900/- by 25th February, 1973 then in that case the petitioner shall not be entitled to execute the order of eviction and the respondent shall remain as statutory tenant. No order is made as to costs. File be consigned to Record Room."

4. Thereafter, the Appellant once again committed a default in payment of rent and a lawyer's notice of demand dated 1st September, 1977 was sent to him. In response to this notice, the Appellant sent a reply dated Nil to the effect that after the death of one of the landlords, namely, Bhagwan Dass there was a conflict between the legal representatives of Bhagwan Dass (on the one hand) and the other landlord, namely, Wasu Ram (Respondent No.1). Both of them were claiming rent from the Appellant and he did not know to whom he should pay the rent.

5. However, since the Appellant did not comply with the notice of demand, Respondent No.1 filed an eviction petition against the Appellant under the provisions of proviso (a) to Section 14(1) of the Act on the ground of nonpayment of rent. In this petition, the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass did not join as Petitioners and they were, therefore, made parties as Respondents.

6. Learned counsel for the parties addressed arguments on 21st January, 2000, 1st and 2nd February, 2000 when judgement was reserved.

7. Learned counsel for the Appellant made two submissions. He firstly submitted that because of the compromise entered into between the parties on 2nd November, 1972 before the learned Rent Controller, the defaults committed by the Appellant stood washed away. Since the Slate was clean, Respondent No.1 could not seek to take the benefit of the first default in payment of rent.

8. I am afraid I am not in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant. The order dated 2nd November,1972 records the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller that a second default had been committed by the Appellant. In view of this , the learned Rent Controller actually allowed the eviction petition. However, in view of the statement made by the parties the decree was not to be executed if the Appellant complied with the requirement of payments to be made to his landlord. In other words, an eviction order was passed but it was not to be executed subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Quite clearly, those conditions were fulfillled but this does not mean that the first default committed by the Appellant had been wiped out. At best, it only meant that the second default was, in essence, condoned or overlooked by the landlord.

9. The present default, which is effectively the third default in payment of rent, takes the place of a second default and the Appellant would be liable for eviction if the case was proved against him, which has been. In view of this, I reject the first submission of learned counsel for the Appellant.

10. The second and final submission of learned counsel for the Appellant was that there was a dispute between the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass (one of the landlords) and Respondent No.1, the other landlord. Learned counsel submitted that he had been told by the widow of Bhagwan Dass not to pay the rent to Respondent No.1. It is for this reason that she did not join in the eviction petition. She also testified before the learned Additional Rent Controller that she had requested the Appellant not to pay rent to Respondent No.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the notice of demand dated 1st September, 1977 was invalid because quite clearly the advocate issuing that notice did not have any instructions from the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass. In this context, learned counsel submitted that the eviction petition was filed only on behalf of Respondent No.1 and not on behalf of the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass.

11. Unfortunately, I am unable to agree even with this submission made by learned counsel for the Appellant. The question whether there was or there was not any dispute between the landlords of the suit premises is of no consequence to the Appellant. It was his duty to pay the rent and if he did not know to whom to pay the rent, he could very well have deposited the same in Court, as provided in Section 27 of he Act. The Appellant failed to do this. He cannot be allowed to hide behind the lame excuse of not knowing to whom to pay the rent.

12. There is nothing on record to suggest that the notice of demand dated 1st September, 1977 was issued by the advocate without the instructions of the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass. This argument is merely stated to be rejected. Similarly, whether the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass decided to join the eviction petition or not is a matter entirely between them and Respondent No.1. The Appellant has no role to play in this, more so since the legal representatives of deceased Bhagwan Dass were made parties in the eviction petition and did participate in the proceedings before the then learned Additional Rent Controller.

13. There is nothing on record to show that even after the notice of demand was received by the Appellant, he took steps to pay or tender the rent to the legal representatives of Bhagwan Dass or to Respondent No. 1. The second submission of learned counsel for the Appellant has also to be rejected.

14. In view of the fact that I have rejected both the contentions of learned counsel for the Appellant (no other contention having been urged) the appeal is dismissed.

There will, however, be no order as to costs.

15. The lower Court records be sent back.